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Chapter 1. Introduction: What Is the Grass? 
 
 A child said, What is the grass?  
Fetching it to me with full hands; 
How could I answer the child?  
… I do not know what it is more than he 
Walt Whitman, 1855 
 
1.1 Scientific Explanations and Scientific Understanding 
 
What is the grass? When posing this question in his ‘Song of Myself’, Whitman is not 
expecting an answer to be possible. He insists that none of his own experiences as a 
human being make him able to answer his innocent questioner. In his typically solipsistic 
fashion, Whitman interprets his existential quest, as well as the experiences involved in it, 
to hold for all mankind. Knowledge is elusive, he means to argue, no matter which 
actions we undertake, which culture we belong to and which methods we use to increase 
our understanding of nature.  
 
There is a sense in which Whitman’s pessimism is easily dismissed. It suffices to survey 
the range and variety of cultural traditions and systems of knowledge that hitherto tried to 
make sense of the entities and processes characterising the mysterious environment in 
which humans evolve. This thesis considers one such system of knowledge, the one I am 
most familiar with and in which I have been educated: the understanding of nature 
provided by Western science. Scientists, particularly those among them specialising in 
plant biology, have been posing Whitman’s same question for centuries. In the course of 
time, the question has taken many forms and attempts to answer each of those developed 
into separate disciplines. ‘How does grass develop?’, asks the developmental biologist. 
‘Why is grass green?’, wonders the physiologist. ‘How does grass grow and multiply?’, 
ponders the geneticist. ‘What does grass contribute to the environment?’, asks the 
ecologist. What is important to these ways of rephrasing the question is not just their 
increasing specialisation and the fact that they have been posed again and again by 
different groups of researchers. Thanks to the joint efforts of research groups armed with 
intellectual curiosity, sophisticated instruments and corroborated methodologies, 
biologists have actually found answers to those questions. For instance, the taxonomist 
lists several species of weed that might be defined as ‘grass’. The ecologist explains the 
function of grass in a given ecosystem, while the physiologist points to the structure of 
stem, roots and leaves and to the complex interaction of hormones that make processes 
such as germination possible. The molecular biologist zooms in on the microscopic 
mechanisms that allow plants to reproduce and develop. The evolutionary biologist tells a 
story about the ancestors of grass and how different species have been selected to keep 
replenishing our fields with green.  
 
The accumulation of scientific explanations such as the ones I sketched, which together 
constitute a vast (and fast growing) body of knowledge about nature, is surely a great 
human achievement and one that has been examined and discussed within much 
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philosophical literature. Yet, I intend to defend the idea that what makes scientific 
knowledge remarkable is not its role in explaining scientific phenomena. In this thesis, I 
focus on the extent to which scientific research allows us human beings to comprehend 
the phenomena that it aims to explain. Under which conditions do human beings learn to 
use scientific explanations in order to obtain understanding of natural phenomena? What 
does scientific understanding involve and how is it achieved? The main claim of this 
thesis is that scientific understanding is a necessary precondition for scientific 
knowledge: in other words, it is not acceptable for a person to state that she ‘knows’ a 
specific phenomenon (in a scientific manner), if this person is not able to use a scientific 
explanation to understand the phenomenon in question. 
 
1.2 Scientific Experiences and The Ability to Understand 
 
Why should one think of understanding as a precondition for scientific knowledge? After 
all, information abounds about all aspects of the natural world. Apart from books and 
encyclopaedias, internet search engines allow us to obtain scientific knowledge about 
virtually any subject in a matter of seconds. We can access and own scientific knowledge 
merely by entering a library or logging into a computer. Google the word ‘grass’ and you 
will obtain 107.000.000 entries
1
, each of which constitutes a potential answer to 
Whitman’s question. One would be tempted to classify Whitman’s declaration of 
ignorance as the existentialist whining of a (possibly Luddite) poet.  
 
In fact, I believe that Whitman’s pessimism is relevant precisely in the context of such an 
ocean of information. When acknowledging his ignorance, Whitman is not declaring that 
knowledge about grass does not exist. He is stating that he is personally unable to make 
sense of that knowledge in the light of his own experience. Understanding a claim or 
explanation is a largely subjective matter. The subject trying to understand needs to 
employ skills, experiences and beliefs that are appropriate to achieving such a goal. 
Biologists represent, arguably, a case in point: their training, professional life and 
experimental work (if any) constitute experiences that are highly efficient in enabling 
them to understand a series of phenomena in certain specific ways. Whitman did not have 
such experience and the related skills: in this sense, he is certainly right in pointing to his 
inability to make sense of (especially scientific) knowledge concerning grass.  
 
Following this line of thought, I shall base my analysis of scientific understanding on a 
study of contemporary research practices in the life sciences: that is, on my observations 
on how practicing scientists carry out research and share their results and methods with 
each other, thus acquiring the expertise that enables them to use scientific knowledge to 
understand natural phenomena. The study of contemporary biological research illustrates 
how skills and commitments acquired through specific practices inform the way in which 
biologists understand the world. I shall focus on scientific understanding as a cognitive 
achievement derived through the adequate performance of specific activities, which can 
lead to different interpretations of the same phenomenon depending on the specific skills 
and commitments of the individual involved. In my view, understanding is not an attribute 
                                                
1
 Google access 27/01/2006. 
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of knowledge itself, which can be measured quantitatively (as in ‘how much do you 
understand?’). Rather, it is an ability that is acquired by individuals in a variety of 
different ways and that can therefore take different forms depending on the instruments 
that are used to exercise it. In the case of biological understanding, the quality of the 
ability to understand displayed by any individual researcher will depend on his or her 
acquisition of appropriate background knowledge as well as expertise in handling the 
instruments, models and theories that make it possible to produce and apply any scientific 
explanation. It also requires the social skills enabling effective interactions with other 
scientists, for instance in order to communicate one’s findings and assess their 
significance in the light of both personal experience and the standards adopted by the 
relevant scientific community. Indeed, access to knowledge does not automatically 
involve an awareness of how to interpret and apply such knowledge: this awareness 
needs to be built through years of training into specific modes of thinking and acting. 
 
1.3 The Arabidopsis Research Community 
 
An important corollary of my view is that there are many types of understanding, some of 
which can be classified as ‘scientific’ because they are developed within and adopted by 
one or more scientific communities. There is no intrinsic property that sets scientific 
understanding apart from other forms of understanding. This demarcation rather emerges 
from the specific practices, goals and theoretical background characterising the 
community in which scientific understanding is developed and performed. Scientific 
understanding is, thus, a subset of the many types of understanding of the natural world 
acquired by human beings, whose special characteristics are determined by the manner 
through which such understanding is achieved as well as the standards and tools through 
which it is diffused and evaluated.  
 
This position implies that an investigation of scientific understanding should be at once 
analytic and empirical, since it has to define the features of scientific understanding as a 
separate and crucial notion to the study of science as well as to examine how such 
understanding grows out of the research practices of specific communities. I therefore 
aim, on the one hand, to offer an epistemological argument outlining which experiences 
and skills are most significant towards helping and informing a scientist’s understanding 
of the world. On the other hand, my analysis springs from a close investigation of the 
history, ethos and research practices characterising a specific community of plant 
biologists. This community, which I shall refer to as the ‘Arabidopsis community’, 
includes all scientists using the small flowering weed Arabidopsis thaliana as the 
material focus for their research and, in fact, as a representative of many other species of 
plants, including all other types of grass.
2
  
 
With over 6000 laboratories spread across all five continents devoted to its study, 
Arabidopsis is the most widely used model organism in contemporary plant biology. In 
line with the rest of the life sciences, plant biology is a messy affair involving a plethora 
                                                
2
 I shall henceforth refer to Arabidopsis thaliana as Arabidopsis, thus, for the sake of convenience, doing 
away with the italics used to characterise its complete name as the name of a species.  
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of different research groups with varying interests and expertise, each of which 
investigates different aspects of plant structure, evolution and development. The 
Arabidopsis community is no exception: it includes widely diverse fields of inquiry and 
expertise, each of which specialises in a different aspect of Arabidopsis biology. This is a 
landscape of multiple worlds, each of which characterised by its own tools, concepts, 
goals, theories and ethos, not to mention the different nationalities and cultural contexts 
of the thousands of researchers involved. It is therefore very difficult to view the 
landscape in just one glance: one has to switch disciplinary glasses to be able to 
acknowledge the richness and diversity of the research being done.  
 
One substantial challenge, given this fragmentation, is finding ways to systematise and 
integrate such knowledge. This is where the choice of the Arabidopsis community, rather 
than any other groups of biologists, becomes especially interesting to the study of 
scientific understanding in the life sciences. Despite its fragmentation into independent 
and diverse units, the community has a highly centralised structure. The coordination 
among component groups and the choice of research directions are still largely influenced 
by the handful of powerful, charismatic scientists who started Arabidopsis research in the 
early 1980s. Since that time, these individuals have been encouraging their pupils and 
associates to adopt a cooperative ethos in their research practices – a choice supported by 
the belief that only a joint effort would enable them to revive and re-invent plant science 
as a whole (mostly, as we shall see, by giving it a strong foundation at the molecular 
level). A notable consequence of this situation is that the research carried out in the 
Arabidopsis community is strongly centred on two goals:  
 (1) the goal of integration, that is of organising all the results gained about the different 
aspects of Arabidopsis into a unique body of knowledge, thus encouraging the 
understanding of the plant as a whole;  
(2) the goal of representativeness, i.e. of treating Arabidopsis as a model for any plant, 
rather than as a model of a specific type of weed.  
 
This last goal implies treating knowledge about Arabidopsis as potentially extending to 
all plants, including all types of weed and grass. This characterisation has obvious 
advantages, as it allows scientists to gain an immense amount of widely applicable 
knowledge by focusing all research resources on one organism. Further, using a single 
organism enormously facilitates the achievement of the first goal, the goal of integration, 
as it allows to study the relation among different aspects of plant biology without 
worrying about inter-species variation (a method widely supported in the emerging field 
of ‘system biology’). In other words, the concentration of research efforts on a single type 
of weed might be more effective than a comparative study of several different species in 
order to obtain an integrated, comprehensive answer to broad questions about plants 
(such as Whitman’s question about grass). These advantages notwithstanding, many 
biologists see these research strategies and goals as highly suspicious and potentially 
damaging to biology as a whole, since it is not clear to which extent Arabidopsis can be 
taken to represent other plants – and anyhow, assessing the representativeness of 
Arabidopsis would imply studying other plant species just as thoroughly. These critiques 
make the second goal of the Arabidopsis community look untenable in the light of the 
huge diversity of life forms populating our planet.  
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It is presently impossible to determine the role that Arabidopsis research will assume 
within future biology: it might be that its goals and results will prove to be much less 
foundational than is currently thought. Even in the light of this uncertainty, which 
anyhow characterises all scientific projects at least to some extent, I see Arabidopsis 
research as a valuable locus for examining how biologists understand phenomena and 
exchange such understanding among each other. In particular, I shall centre my attention 
on two highly powerful sub-groups within the community, whose efforts are directed 
towards constructing conceptual and material tools that might facilitate the development 
of an integrated approach to the study of Arabidopsis biology. These are The 
Arabidopsis Information Resource [TAIR] hosted by the Carnegie Institute for Plant 
Biology in Stanford, CA and the Nottingham Arabidopsis Stock Centre [NASC] based at 
the University of Nottingham, UK. In the context of an ever-fragmented and pluralistic 
field such as biology, the task pursued by these sub-groups proves as difficult as it is 
ambitious. It requires them to critically consider questions such as ‘what is biological 
knowledge’ and ‘how do we understand it’, so as to construct tools that would help other 
biologists towards understanding not only some bits of knowledge about Arabidopsis, but 
also the relations among these bits. Biologists working in these groups are not only 
unhindered, but indeed encouraged to ask biological questions in a very broad, inclusive 
manner. Because of this width of scope, as well as the emphasis on producing tools for 
displaying and understanding knowledge, this type of research represents an excellent 
ground for investigating which factors facilitate the scientific understanding of 
Arabidopsis biology (both by Arabidopsis scientists and by other biologists).  
 
1.4 Preview of Thesis Content 
 
Ultimately, this thesis is about scientific investigations and learning as experienced by 
individual researchers and shared within scientific communities. Understanding is 
defined as a cognitive achievement whose emergence and characteristics depend on the 
ensemble of skills and commitments acquired by each individual scientist through three 
main types of experience: intellectual, including reasoning through and developing 
available concepts, theories and explanation for natural phenomena; material, involving 
the setting and manner of intervention by researchers in the phenomena under scrutiny; 
and social, as implied by the dependence on and contribution of individual scientists to 
one of more scientific communities sharing the same research interests. The social 
contexts within which such understanding is developed is particularly important to its 
definition as ‘scientific’, since the personal experience of understanding is transformed in 
communicable, socially shared experience by virtue of the individual’s participation in 
one or more scientific communities. I hope to be able to clarify the motivations and 
implications of this view of scientific understanding through a close historical and 
sociological study of some of the practices characterising Arabidopsis research. This 
proves to be a complex endeavour, requiring me to weave together an extensive web of 
philosophical, historical and sociological analysis. Before delving into the material, I will 
therefore briefly outline the structure of this dissertation, which is organised in steps of 
increasing complexity: each new chapter builds upon the previous ones, thus 
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progressively disclosing various aspects of my argument and allowing me to discuss their 
philosophical significance and implications in connection to the concrete features and 
processes characterising Arabidopsis research. 
 
A major goal for any philosophical project consists of clarifying the background, content 
and methodology used to pursue a given question. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are thus devoted to 
introduce and justify the philosophical, historical and methodological bases for my 
argument. Chapter 2 sets the philosophical stage for my analysis. I start by reviewing the 
contemporary philosophical debate on the difference between explanation and 
understanding. I then zoom in on the biological sciences and discuss the characteristics of 
biology that I deem to be of relevance to the study of understanding, such as the 
pluralism characterising both theories and models and what I call the ‘dual nature’ of 
biological knowledge. In this context, I provide a first definition of scientific 
understanding, which I exemplify and elaborate throughout chapters 5,6 and 7 and to 
which I return to in a systematic fashion in Chapter 8. I conclude the chapter by exposing 
and discussing the elements of social epistemology that are relevant to my investigation 
of how individual understanding is formed through participation in one or more scientific 
communities. In Chapter 3, I outline the historical and social context of my research. 
After a short discussion of ‘model organism communities’ in biology, I trace the origins 
and development of the community working on Arabidopsis. I then discuss the current 
structure and goals of the community and I examine in detail the social and scientific 
roles played by the TAIR and NASC research groups. Chapter 4 aims to present and 
defend my research methodology, which I classify under the heading ‘history, philosophy 
and social studies of science and technology’, in the light of the philosophical and 
historical elements provided in the previous chapters. Starting from a discussion of the 
significance of using case studies to investigate broad philosophical issues, I reflect on 
the motives and concerns underlying my research and connect those with the research 
methods that I adopted. As I explain in this chapter, it is my hope that this piece of 
research will be of interest to both philosophers and historians of science, as well as to 
philosophically inclined biologists (such as the many scientists that have helped me by 
granting access to their laboratories, personnel and thoughts on Arabidopsis research). 
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 constitute the main argumentative body of the thesis. Each of them 
focuses on a different aspect of biological understanding, as exemplified in the context of 
Arabidopsis research. Together, Chapters 5 and 6 constitute an extended reflection on the 
role played by two types of epistemic skills, which I call theoretical and performative, 
towards enabling biologists to understand phenomena. Chapter 5 focuses on research 
practices in TAIR, which consist of producing databases able to visualise as many of the 
available data hitherto gathered on Arabidopsis as possible. I show that the construction, 
as well as the use, of such databases involves reference to a theoretical framework, which 
in this case consists in the network of concepts (‘gene ontology’) used by TAIR 
researcher to order and classify Arabidopsis data. This leads me to examine the skills 
needed by Arabidopsis researchers in order to use these data to understand Arabidopsis 
biology. After tracing the distinction between theoretical and performative skills, I 
highlight how biologists exercising different sets of skills in their research might acquire 
different understandings of the same phenomena. This claim is developed in Chapter 6, 
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where I discuss the activities carried out by NASC researchers in order to produce 
Arabidopsis specimens for distribution and use by laboratories around the world. I argue 
that both TAIR and NASC successfully produce models of Arabidopsis: in the former 
case, the models consist of images of the biology of the plant; in the latter case, the 
models consist of actual organisms, whose features have been selected and modified to fit 
the demands of experimenters. A comparison between the production and use of these 
two types of models brings out significant differences in the skills required to manipulate 
them. Through an analysis of the way in which these models are abstracted from, 
respectively, Arabidopsis data sets and actual Arabidopsis wildtypes, I elaborate on the 
manner in which theoretical and performative skills can be combined in order to use these 
models to enhance one’s understanding of Arabidopsis biology. Chapter 7 adds a crucial 
layer of complexity to the analysis developed in the previous chapters, by reviewing the 
social dynamics surrounding Arabidopsis research. I characterise the Arabidopsis 
community as a case of centralised big science and I analyse the effect of this 
institutional arrangement on the acquisition and distribution of scientific understanding 
within the community. In particular, I list several social skills that I deem to be necessary 
for scientists to be able to understand Arabidopsis biology, insofar as they grant access to 
the theoretical and performative skills required to conduct as well as share research with 
other biologists. 
 
Finally, Chapter 8 presents the epistemological conclusions drawn from my analysis of 
how skilful recourse to theories, models and socially shared resources enables 
Arabidopsis researchers to enhance their understanding of plant biology. I point to the 
strong ties between researchers’ skills and the commitments they make to the actions and 
beliefs through which such skills can be exercised. Different kinds of biological 
understanding of a phenomenon can be obtained depending on which combination of 
skills and commitments is used by researchers to coordinate their theoretical and 
embodied knowledge of that phenomenon. I sketch some implications of this pluralistic 
vision of understanding in biology, while also briefly pointing to the research paths 
opened by the approach herein proposed.  
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Chapter 2. Investigating Understanding in Biology 
  
Whatever we mean by understanding (at least as a scientific 
goal), it is a safe presumption that only humans can do it.   
Evelyn Fox Keller 2002, 322 
 
2.1   Understanding and Explanation in the Philosophy of Science 
 
2.1.1 The Long Way From the Received View 
 
Rarely mentioned and scarcely reflected upon, scientific understanding seems to have 
been largely dismissed as a topic worth of inquiry by 20
th
 century analytic philosophers, 
at least until very recently. This century-long dislike is epitomised by the work of Carl 
Hempel, whose thoughts on the issue were most forcefully expressed in the volume 
Aspects of Scientific Explanation, published in 1965. Hempel’s views were so influential 
as to deserve the label of ‘received view’ on explanation in science (proposed, somewhat 
polemically, by Putnam [1962]). In Hempel’s eyes, understanding is undeniably an 
important pragmatic feature of scientific research. However, it is only relevant to 
scientific epistemology insofar as it is linked to a deductive-nomological type of 
explanation. 'The explanation enables us to understand why the phenomenon occurred'  
(Hempel 1965, 337). Understanding is an inseparable by-product of any good scientific 
explanation. According to Hempel, it is therefore on explanation, rather than 
understanding, that philosophical inquiry should focus.  
 
This thesis questions the idea that scientific explanations hold the key to unravelling the 
epistemic role and significance of understanding in science. Decades of philosophical 
work on the notion of explanation did not provide us any tools to think about 
understanding, that is, about what it means to understand why or how a given 
phenomenon occurs, regardless of – or, only partially depending upon - the actual answer 
given to that ‘why’ or ‘how’ (that is, regardless of the contents of the explanation itself). 
Hempel argued that this issue is of no interest to philosophy of science. This is because it 
involves studying the characteristics of the subject acquiring understanding (the scientist) 
just as carefully as the characteristics of the object that is understood (the natural 
phenomenon). In other words, it requires the philosopher to investigate the actual 
conditions under which scientific understanding is acquired. The pragmatic character of 
this approach inevitably leads to context-dependent results, since the conditions under 
which understanding is obtained may vary depending on what is understood, who 
understands and how. This variability makes it impossible, at least on purely rational 
grounds, to formalise universally valid conditions for understanding. Furthermore, 
Hempel notes that there is nothing to set the notion of scientific understanding apart from 
other types of human understanding (1965, 413). To him, understanding a sketch by 
Monty Python functions in exactly the same way as understanding Newtonian mechanics: 
it is the nature of what is understood that makes the difference between understanding a 
joke and a scientific law. The problem of defining the nature and epistemic role of 
understanding is therefore irrelevant to an epistemology of science and should be 
confronted by general philosophers or, even better, by cognitive scientists. 
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The Hempelian stance on understanding underscores a normative stance that was 
enforced by most Anglo-American philosophy of science developed between the 1950s 
and the early 1970s. This is the idea that the main goal of philosophical inquiries about 
science should be the formalisation of universally valid principles for the production and 
evaluation of objective knowledge about natural phenomena. This formalisation would be 
largely a rationalist enterprise – that is, it would be based on logical, a priori reasoning 
about the best ways in which valid and truthful knowledge can be gained. Granted this 
goal, Hempel’s arguments are extremely forceful: to this day, his work represents a most 
valuable defence of traditionally objectivist methodology. The focus and commitments of 
the philosophical community have, however, shifted considerably in the last three 
decades. Several scholars have come to agree that the formulation and appraisal of norms 
applying to scientific research, which is arguably an inevitable part of any philosophical 
discussion of science, should be informed by descriptive knowledge of what scientists 
actually do. The caricature of the scientist as a knowledge-gathering robot, mindlessly 
following universal rules, is hardly an adequate description of scientific practices. An 
alternative is to consider the scientist as an active and fallible agent, endowed with 
limited skills and faltering motivation, who is responsible for making choices and 
forming judgements according to specific circumstances and inputs. The philosophical 
research agenda is increasingly shifting towards a throughout exploration of the 
implications of this insight for the nature of scientific knowledge and the objectivity and 
authority typically bestowed upon it.  
 
Three main intellectual sources have been instrumental to supporting this approach. 
Taking inspiration from the work of Thomas Kuhn, historians of science have gathered 
an immense body of detailed knowledge about actual processes of discovery and theory-
change and about the relation among material, social and theoretical components of 
scientific endeavours. This work encouraged reflection on the relevance of the individual 
scientist’s personality, social and political context and economic interests to the way in 
which she gathers data, sets up experiments and interprets results. Titles of influential 
books such as Jan Golinski‘s Making Natural Knowledge (1998) are highly suggestive of 
the increasing historical interest in the heterogeneous processes by which science is 
constructed and disseminated.
3
 Sociologists also contributed heavily to this empirical turn 
in philosophy by examining the structure and organisation of scientific communities and 
their relation to political and social institutions, media culture and the wider public. 
Research in this area spans from ethnographic investigations of scientific practices within 
small groups (for instance, in one laboratory, as in Latour and Woolgar 1979) to 
theoretical frameworks interpreting the interaction of both human and non-human actors 
in broad networks, of which scientists constitute but a subset (e.g. Bruno Latour’s actor-
network theory, as in his 1987). Despite accusations of being too steeped in the 
constructivist tradition (see Chapter 4 on this), the material gathered by social studies of 
science and technology marked a watershed in contemporary reasoning about how 
science works.  
 
                                                
3
 Influential work in this respect has been carried out by, among others, Fox (1971), Shapin and Schaffer 
(1989), Jardine (2000), Daston (2000), Mendelssohn (1984, 1976), Greene (1976), Griesemer (1990, 2006), 
Rheinberger (1997), Chang (2004) and de Regt (1999, 2001).  
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The third field that proved most helpful to a re-examination of scientific research is the 
one of gender studies, particularly the epistemological reflections elaborated by feminist 
scholars in order to critique traditional objectivist (and, in their eyes, characteristically 
‘male’) cosmology. This research yielded basic resources in order to explore the role of 
subjects in the production and validation of knowledge, three of which are especially 
relevant to the study of science. The first is Donna Haraway’s work on technoculture, 
resulting in a view of knowledge as necessarily situated and context-dependent (Haraway 
1988).
4
 This approach, criticised for its outright rejection of the belief in science as an 
objective, authoritative source of knowledge, is nicely complemented by Sandra 
Harding’s reflection on the difference between the notion of objectivity denoting context-
independence and what she calls strong objectivity (Harding, 1986).
5
 Both the notion of 
situated knowledge and that of strong objectivity require a throughout re-examination of 
the role of values in science, following the spirit of Kuhn’s preliminary list of epistemic 
values that are relevant to theory-choice (Kuhn 1977, 331). A lasting contribution in this 
sense is Helen Longino’s analysis of values that are constitutive of scientific knowledge, 
that is, that are ‘the source of the rules determining what constitutes acceptable scientific 
practice or scientific method’ (1990, 4). Longino distinguishes these constitutive values 
from contextual values that are also epistemologically relevant, but which pertain to ‘the 
social and cultural environment in which science is done’, rather than constituting 
reference points in scientific research (ibid.). 
 
These advances in the historical and social analyses of science provided a new awareness 
of the extent to which personal judgement, skills, experiences and alliances foster, rather 
than hamper, scientific understanding. Science is undeniably a human endeavour. Its 
representation as an objective body of knowledge is both misleading and delusional. Far 
from securing access to a reliable and cumulative body of knowledge, traditional reliance 
on the de-personified objectivity of scientific theories masks the unavoidable situatedness 
and context-dependence of the observations on which those theories are based. In order to 
understand scientific understanding, extended reflection is needed on the role played by 
‘subjective’, individual experience in enabling and shaping the concerns, perspectives 
and expertise of which scientific theories are but one incomplete expression. 
 
Philosophers of science have risen to this challenge by paying closer attention to 
scientific practices as a complex and composite set of activities conducted by specific 
individuals in a particular institutional and social setting. Much has been published on the 
differences among practices in the special sciences, for instance in the procedures 
favoured in each science and the resulting variation in the types of theories, models, 
instruments and data that are produced and used. Most interestingly for my purposes 
here, variations among types of explanation have been subject to much debate.
6
 The 
                                                
4
 A similar emphasis on the locality of knowledge can be found in Rouse (1987, chapter 4). 
5
 According to Harding (1986), situated scientific knowledge needs to point explicitly to the context 
(including personal interests) in which it was gathered. Harding highlights that there need not be a priori 
demarcations determining which contexts and interests are scientifically adequate: rather, awareness of the 
motivations behind a scientific view makes it easier to fruitfully apply and assess it, thus increasing its 
scientific value as a ‘strongly objective’ position. 
6
 The main types of explanations subject to philosophical debate are causal explanations (Salmon 1990, 
1998); mechanistic explanations (Craver 2001, Machamer et al 2000, Woodward 2003); functional 
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resulting consensus seems to be that there are many types of explanations (such as the 
causal, functional, unificationist or mechanistic), each of which provides meaningful 
knowledge and none of which is reducible to another type of explanation without 
significant loss of information. Science necessarily involves explanatory pluralism, a 
result that stands in opposition to Hempel’s account of scientific explanation as unified 
and universal
7
 and that emerges from a close examination of how and why explanations 
are actually produced (more on this in section 2.2.1).  
 
 
2.1.2 Contemporary Attitudes to the Problem of Understanding 
 
Given these developments, it may come as a surprise that most contributions to the 
philosophy of explanation still abide to the received view when it comes to discussing the 
notion of understanding. The tide might now be changing, with some systematic analyses 
dedicated to this subject appearing in print in the last three to four years
8
 and as 
demonstrated by this very dissertation. Apart from these scattered pronouncements, 
however, the majority of philosophers of science is showing a disappointing reluctance in 
exploring the issue. I distinguish four main types of reaction to the idea of a philosophical 
examination of scientific understanding, each of which is grounded on a different 
perception of the relation between understanding and explanation. 
 
a. Indifference. Many philosophers have taken quite literally Hempel’s stance on the 
irrelevance of understanding to philosophy of science. They mention this term 
without wasting time on attempts to define its meaning independently from 
explanation. This holds irrespectively of the many critiques that those same 
philosophers successfully level against other aspects of Hempel’s work. In his 
influential review ‘Four Decades of Scientific Explanation’, for instance, Wesley 
Salmon carefully exposes reactions and critiques of Hempel’s deductive-
nomological model of explanation, while not paying any attention to the notion of 
understanding if not as a self-evident outcome of explanation (Salmon, 1990). 
 
b. Reduction to Explanation. Philosophers in this category also consider 
understanding to be a by-product of explanation, even if not agreeing on 
Hempel’s arguments for this claim. An example is Michael Friedman’s view on 
explanatory unification (1974). Friedman recognises the difference between the 
notions of understanding and explanation, insofar as he defines understanding as 
an epistemic goal secured by unifying explanations. His conclusion in the light of 
this definition is, however, that it is explanation, and not understanding, that 
deserves philosophical interest.
9
 Philip Kitcher (1981) and Stephen Toulmin 
                                                                                                                                            
explanations (a review of the main relevant literature is given by Wouters, 2005); and unificationist or 
subsumptive (Friedman 1974, Kitcher 1981; critique by Barnes, 1992). 
7
 See Rose (1997), Beatty (1997), Keller (2000) and Dupré (1993) on explanatory pluralism. 
8
 De Regt (2001), (2004); de Regt and Dieks (2005); Yi (2002). 
9
 In fact, Friedman (1974) proposes a definition of understanding in science that depends entirely on the 
number of assumptions used in the explanations derived from that understanding. I should note here, 
however, that Friedman (2001, pers. comm.) has rejected this approach and currently proposes a very 
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(1961), despite their radically different interests and approaches, reach similar 
conclusions.
10
 
 
c. Hostility. This group of philosophers shares the Hempelian intuition that a 
philosophical analysis of scientific understanding is not only futile, but also 
confusing and possibly harmful to the development of philosophy of science. 
Trout (2002, 2005), for instance, advocates a position similar to the Hempelian 
one by putatively demonstrating that the subjective features of understanding are 
of no concern to philosophy but are a matter of study for cognitive scientists. The 
differences between explanation and understanding, if any, should then be 
accounted for at the subjective level of individual psychology. More belligerently, 
Trout also maintains that all attempts to investigate them philosophically will 
result in a distorted view of scientific method (for a critique, see de Regt 2004). 
 
d. Non-committed Interest. Authors such as Cushing (1994) and Keller (1999, 2002) 
do express a strong interest in scientific understanding as a promising research 
topic. Nevertheless, they stay clear of general pronouncements on this notion, 
again because of its vague and pragmatic nature. James Cushing maintains that 
understanding should be wedded to the ontological narrative underlying each 
particular theory. He does not, however, elaborate on how this conception differs 
from the role of explanation and indeed he does not provide any clear definition. 
Even more striking is Keller’s study of explanatory strategies employed in 19
th
 
and 20
th
 century experimental biology. There, she concludes that abstinence from 
analytic pronouncements concerning the nature of understanding and its relation 
to explanation is inevitable: ‘understanding is a notoriously unstable word, and a 
central aim of this book has been to demonstrate this instability’ (Keller 2002, 
296); thus she will not try to define such notion ‘for obvious reasons’ (1999, 322).  
 
This dissertation is intended as a critique of all four of these views. Rather than tackling 
the claims of each group in turn, however, I will respond to their arguments by proposing 
what I consider to be an epistemologically rich, alternative way of thinking about 
scientific understanding. Presently, I would like to take issue only with the last type of 
reactions, and particularly with Keller’s argument for the inevitable instability – and thus, 
unintelligibility - of the notion of understanding.  
 
There are two main reasons for viewing Keller’s disinterest in a systematic analysis of 
understanding in science (what it is, how it is obtained and with which implications) as 
unjustified. First, her account is built on a number of assumptions concerning the 
                                                                                                                                            
different view on the role and achievement of understanding within a scientific community. His earlier 
position still constitutes an important reference to many unificationists (e.g. to Kitcher), but not to himself. 
10
 Toulmin’s position might seem far from reducing understanding to explanation, as it focuses explicitly 
on intelligibility and on the importance of understanding in science. Yet, he adopts a tendentiously static 
view of the role played by standards of intelligibility in different phases of the history of science, thus 
paving the way for a Kuhnian understanding of scientific theory-change. His 'ideals of natural order’ 
account for the achievement of scientific understanding provided that, in a somewhat circular fashion, we 
define understanding itself as the ensemble of theoretical presuppositions (indeed, ‘ideals’) by which we 
justify the results obtained at every step of our investigations (1961, 34). 
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meaning and applications of the notion of scientific understanding. Keller’s refusal to 
make such assumptions explicit implies conferring an unqualified ubiquity of meaning to 
the word ‘understanding’, which in turn means a loss of analytic strength for her 
otherwise convincing account. For instance, her position on the relation between the two 
key notions of explanation and understanding (both of which are used in the titles of her 
book and of its final chapter) remains unclear. On one hand, she often treats 
understanding and explanation as distinct notions.
11
 On other occasions, understanding is 
treated as synonymous not only with explanation, but indeed with any other term 
referring to the gathering and development of knowledge (including ‘learning’ and 
‘theorising’; Keller 2002, 2, 117 and 296). As a result of this conceptual vagueness, her 
position on what counts as explanation itself keeps shifting, making it very difficult to 
establish the import of her conclusions to general philosophy of science. Second, I share 
Keller’s conviction that scientific understanding is likely to come in a variety of forms 
depending on the specific context and goals of the science involved. But is this not the 
case with scientific explanation, too? After all, the notion of explanation has been agreed 
to encompass a plurality of types, a taxonomy of which can be traced by looking at how 
explanations are produced and used in practice - as beautifully demonstrated by Keller’s 
own work. Why, then, should diversity and context-dependence make us refrain from 
dissecting the analytic differences among types of understanding? The acknowledgment 
of the pluralism and instability of scientific practices is a constructive starting point for an 
investigation of understanding, in the same way as the recognition of explanatory 
pluralism increases, rather than diminishes, the value of studying different types of 
explanation.  
 
Keller fails to engage in two philosophical tasks that I maintain to be necessary to a 
credible analysis of scientific understanding. The first of such tasks is the provision of an 
analytic framework in which this notion can be studied. This framework does not have to 
imply a strict definition of understanding, but rather provide philosophers and scientists 
with tools with which to assess the different ways in which understanding can be 
achieved and the forms that it can take. Such a framework is indispensable to 
highlighting the epistemological and scientific relevance of different ways of pursuing 
understanding in science, as well as different conditions under which understanding can 
be achieved. Its development would also allow to pursue the second task, that is, to 
provide a clear account of the way in which the notion of understanding differs from the 
one of explanation. This thesis aims to engage with these two tasks, thereby contributing 
to the birth of a philosophical debate on the notion of understanding that is based on the 
study of actual scientific practices. In Chapter 4, I shall discuss the methodological 
challenges posed by studying scientific understanding through a philosophy of scientific 
practice. The rest of the present chapter focuses on the epistemological framework within 
which I construct the claims on biological understanding presented in the conclusion of 
this thesis.  
 
 
                                                
11
 For example when claiming that 'the need for understanding, as for explanation, is a human need, and 
one that can be satisfied only within the constraints that human inquirers bring with them' (Keller 2002, 
297).   
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2.2   Focusing on Biology 
 
I purposefully limit my study of scientific understanding to biology - in particular, as I 
illustrate in detail in Chapter 3, to the segment of plant sciences using Arabidopsis 
thaliana as model organism. Partly, this choice stems from my own fascination and 
familiarity with the ‘sciences of life’. It also underscores my interest in exploring how the 
types of knowledge and practices that characterise biological research contribute to 
biologists’ understanding of the phenomena that they study.
12
  
 
My approach to the study of scientific understanding is restricted to the analysis of a 
well-defined set of practices. In this sense I follow the idea put forward by Henk de Regt 
(2001, 2005): an analysis of scientific understanding should ‘encompass the historical 
variation of specific intelligibility standards employed in scientific practice’ (de Regt and 
Dieks 2005, 138). De Regt goes on to propose a generally applicable definition of 
understanding as an epistemic aim of science, (ibid.,139). By contrast, I wish to propose 
an analysis grounded in a detailed investigation of specific features of research carried 
out in contemporary biology. I shall therefore not focus on the notion of understanding as 
a general (what de Regt and Dieks call ‘macro-level’: 2005, 140) aim of science, but 
rather I shall emphasise a reading of scientific understanding as a cognitive achievement 
shaped by scientists’ experience and training within specific research communities. My 
interest lies with the processes and conditions through which such understanding-as-aim 
is achieved: in other words, in the activities underlying scientific understanding ‘in 
action’. The results of this approach are compatible with de Regt’s ideas and I shall 
specify precisely how the two accounts complement each other in the final chapter of this 
thesis (section 8.1.2). 
 
In this section, I lay out the epistemological framework for my approach by depicting my 
view on biological knowledge and the relation among theories, models and phenomena 
that such a view implies. In particular, I emphasise the role of human agency in creating, 
applying and interpreting biological knowledge. My philosophical journey departs, again, 
from the Hempelian account of scientific understanding. In the previous section, I pointed 
to the rationalistic and universalising character of that view as two problematic factors, in 
the light of recent scholarship reflecting on science as it is actually practiced in local 
settings. I then sketched how the philosophical study of scientific understanding is 
affected by the clash between practice-inspired and rationalistic accounts of science. I 
now intend to discuss in more depth the account of the nature of scientific knowledge that 
is implied by the Hempelian view.  
 
Hempel’s work is strongly characterised by two interrelated assumptions about the nature 
of scientific knowledge. One is the idea that all scientific explanations, no matter their 
scope or generality, contain, at least implicitly, reference to law-based generalisations 
                                                
12
 As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 4, I do not intend my reflections to be necessarily restricted to the 
biological sciences. It might be argued that other sciences, both natural and social, display characteristics 
similar to the ones that I attribute to biology, and thus that my account of how understanding is achieved is 
applicable to them, too. The scope of applicability of my analysis, as well as its validity, can only be 
determined by further scrutiny and research. 
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about natural phenomena that aim at the unification of scientific knowledge about the 
world. I come back to this assumption below. The second assumption is that 
explanations, observations and theories (that is, the main components of what he views as 
scientific knowledge) should all be expressed propositionally, that is, through a series of 
statements. Hempel recognises that scientific knowledge encompasses statements of 
different types. He thus distinguishes between observational and law-like statements. 
Observational statements are statements describing a specific phenomenon at the lowest 
level of generality. Hempel defines them as ‘a sentence – no matter whether true or false 
– which asserts or denies that a specified object, or group of objects, of macroscopic size 
has a particular observable characteristic, i.e. a characteristic whose presence or absence 
can, under favourable circumstances, be ascertained by direct observation’ (1965, 102). 
For instance, the sentence ‘this group of storks is red-legged’ counts as an observation 
sentence. Law-like statements spell out concepts (and relations among those concepts) 
that are applicable to more than one observation statement (ibid., 345): an example is the 
sentence ‘all storks are red-legged’ (ibid., 105). These law-like statements are also 
referred to as ‘covering laws’, precisely to highlight their role in unifying various 
observation statements under a unique, general explanation.
13
  
 
When making the distinction between observational and law-like statements, Hempel is 
careful to underline that both types of sentences constitute crucial components of 
scientific knowledge. He is therefore far from advocating that all observational 
statements should be, at least in principle, reducible to law-like statements. At the same 
time, however, Hempel suggests that scientists should strive to find law-like statements 
that can be used to explain the observational statements gathered during empirical 
(experimental or field) research. This is because of the special role that law-like sentences 
play in providing what he calls ‘objective insight’ in phenomena:  
 
What scientific explanation, especially theoretical explanation, aims at is not [an] 
intuitive and highly subjective kind of understanding, but an objective kind of 
insight that is achieved by a systematic unification, by exhibiting the phenomena 
as manifestations of common underlying structures and processes that conform to 
specific, testable basic principles (Hempel 1966, 83). 
 
As argued by Philip Kitcher (1981, 508), paragraphs such as the above reveal two basic 
intuitions underlying Hempel’s view: (1) the belief that law-like statements constitute the 
most significant theoretical result of scientific research, insofar as they provide a 
foundation for the explanations through which we understand the natural world; and (2) 
the idea that the best way to magnify the explanatory power of these explanations is to 
                                                
13
 The following quote from Suppe is useful in trying to reconstruct Hempel’s view on scientific theories: 
‘Of the various concepts occurring in the pre-axiomatic version of the theory, a small number of these 
concepts are selected as basic; axioms are introduced which specify the most fundamental relations holding 
between these basic concepts; and definitions are given specifying the remaining concepts of the theory in 
terms of these basic ones. The relations specified by the axioms and definitions do not explicitly state the 
entire content of the theory, but if the axiomatisation is fruitful and adequate, it will be possible to deduce 
the remaining content of the theory from the axioms and definitions by a process of logical manipulation’ 
(1977, 64). What Suppe here calls ‘axioms and definitions’ are the nomic assumptions – the ‘covering 
laws’ – on which Hempel constructs his generalisations. 
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subsume all available observational statements under the smallest possible number of 
law-like statements. These are the assumptions that allow Hempel to define the 
acquisition of scientific understanding as a by-product of the acquisition of scientific 
knowledge: a phenomenon is understood once law-like statements are formulated that 
might be employed to explain it.
14
  
 
I intend to criticise Hempel’s simplistic connection between ‘possessing knowledge’ and 
‘understanding phenomena’. In this section, I use recent studies of contemporary 
biological research to illustrate how neither of Hempel’s assumptions on the nature of 
scientific knowledge fits actual scientific practice, its results and aims.
15
 I first examine 
the theoretical results that biologists actually produce in their research activities. Both 
within and across different biological disciplines, several different types of theories are 
produced, some of which do not even contain law-like generalisations (let alone attempt 
to unify observations under a unique theoretical framework).
16
 Far from seeing it as a 
problem to their research, biologists actually appreciate this pluralism in types of 
biological theories, which is tightly intertwined and sustained by a wide diversity among 
the modeling practices that are used to pursue and apply each type of theoretical result. 
Those modeling practices, in turn, include several ways of representing theoretical 
knowledge that are not propositional. Statements are but one manner to express 
biological knowledge, and not necessarily the most popular. Pictorial, three-dimensional, 
symbolic, digital models are equally if not more widely used in order to represent 
theoretical results – and, what is worst for Hempel, contain information that simply 
cannot be expressed propositionally (as in the case of diagrammatic representations of 
mechanisms). 
 
As an alternative to Hempel’s views on the nature of scientific knowledge, I propose to 
shift our philosophical attention to the epistemic activities through which models are 
handled and theories are created and interpreted. I emphasise the dual nature of biological 
knowledge as encompassing both theoretical knowledge (‘knowing that’) and embodied 
knowledge (‘knowing how’). In the final section, I outline a working definition of the 
notion of scientific understanding that will be used throughout this thesis and hopefully 
starts to clarify the difference between theories and explanations (and other types of 
theoretical knowledge) and understanding. This is the idea of understanding as an ability 
possessed by individual scientists: that is, the ability to coordinate their theoretical 
knowledge with their embodied knowledge.  
                                                
14
 For a succinct overview of Hempel’s views on the matter, see the paragraph starting with the following 
sentence in ‘Aspects of Scientific Explanation’: ‘in general, an explanation based on theoretical principles 
will both broaden and deepen our understanding of the empirical phenomena concerned’ (1965, 345). 
15
 One of my referees rightly encourages me to clarify that a practice-based approach does not represent the 
only alternative to the Hempelian framework, which has been critiqued from several angles (including for 
instance Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism [1980] and Peter Achinstein ordinary language 
philosophy [1983]). My focus on practice-based critiques stems from my present interest in the actual 
conditions under which biologists explain and understand phenomena. 
16
 Hans Radder suggested to me that any science containing reproducible observations or experiments can 
be claimed to contain an empirical law in Hempel’s sense. I do not agree with this objection, since many 
experiments in biology are reproducible not on the basis of their results (i.e. the correlations between 
phenomena for which they provide evidence) but on the basis of the activities involved in carrying them out 
(which cannot arguably be expressed in the form of law-like statements). 
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2.2.1 Theory-Pluralism 
 
Can all biological knowledge, at least in principle, be subsumed under one set of law-like 
generalisations, as Hempel would have it? The reply to this question can only be 
negative, given the extreme pluralism characterising the perspectives, results, methods 
and aims to be found in contemporary biological research. Biology is growing 
increasingly disunified. Biological research is fragmented into countless epistemic 
cultures
17
 (Knorr-Cetina 1999, 1), each with its own terminologies, research interests, 
practices, experimental instruments, measurement tools, styles of reasoning, journals and 
venues.
18
 These cultures are typically constructed around a specific set of issues, the 
investigation of which requires training in a series of techniques, software applications 
and instruments that are regarded as appropriate to this aim.
19
 Researchers enrolled in one 
of these cultures develop in-depth expertise about a specific set of topics and approaches, 
without necessarily complementing it with a broader awareness of which research is 
carried out by other epistemic cultures. It occasionally happens that a biologist shifts 
among cultures, thus acquiring overlapping expertises: still, this is a difficult and risky 
choice with regard to his or her future career, and allegiance to more than three or four 
cultures proves practically unattainable.
20
 Because of divergence in epistemic cultures, 
each research community tends to develop increasing expertise on a very narrow topic. 
Dialogue among communities is difficult and sometimes nonexistent, as individual 
researchers have little interest, motivation or time to invest in communication with 
individuals with differing expertise. Further, as we shall see in more detail in the course 
of my analysis of integration efforts in the Arabidopsis community, extreme 
specialisation makes it hard to find common vocabularies, references and tools through 
which to understand each other. This means that many biological research groups happen 
to have overlapping research programmes, without however being aware of it and thus 
without gaining from each other’s discoveries. Biology is indeed so fragmented a science, 
and so disinclined towards the construction of general theoretical narratives, that its 
disciplinary unity can better be traced via the objects that it studies (that is, living 
organisms) than via specific approaches or results (Cooper 1996, Keller 2002).  
 
In this context, it is not surprising to find that different biological fields provide not only 
different theories about the same sets of phenomena, but actually different types of 
theoretical results, ranging from the mostly descriptive knowledge gathered by 
experimental or field biologists to the largely speculative research pursued by theoretical 
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 Epistemic cultures are defined as ‘those amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms – bonded through 
affiliation, necessity, and historical coincidence – which, in a given field, make up how we know what we 
know’ (Knorr-Cetina 1999,1). I will come back to this definition and its significance in practice in section 
2.3.2. 
18
 Careful analyses of each of these elements, aimed at emphasising methodological divergence and 
epistemic diversity among and within scientific disciplines, are proposed by Rosenberg (1994), Dupré 
(1993), Winther (2003), Bechtel (1993) and Mitchell (2003), among others. Hacking (1992), although not 
specifically focused on the life sciences, provides an enlightening view of styles of reasoning in science.  
19
 For the mechanisms through which specific tools come to be regarded as indispensable within any one 
epistemic culture, see Knorr-Cetina (1999) and Galison (1999). 
20
 More on the sociology of epistemic cultures can be found in section 2.3. 
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biologists through mathematical reasoning.
21
 There is little chance that results obtained 
by different fields could be subsumed under a common framework, such as the one 
provided by Hempelian covering laws: this is not only due to the varying degrees of 
generalisability of results in each field, but also to the differences in the quality of results 
and in the explanations obtained (ranging from functional to mechanistic or causal). The 
field of population biology, for instance, strives to produce results in the form of 
mathematical definitions of the principles and laws guiding the evolution of life forms. 
Prima facie, these law-like mathematical statements seem to conform to Hempel’s 
expectations of how a covering law in biology should work: they possess high 
generalisability and, potentially, great unifying power over the biological phenomena to 
which they refer. However, practicing biologists do not consider these results as covering 
laws, because their relation to the evolutionary patterns measured in actual biological 
populations is very unclear: data-sets and observation statements in more applied 
branches of evolutionary biology are formulated via reference to parameters that are 
incommensurable with the parameters used to mathematically describe general patterns in 
evolutionary dynamics. Similarly, there is little knowledge in physiology that matches the 
scope and potential applicability of an equation describing the behaviour of groups of 
organisms in population biology: what is achieved is an accurate narration of the 
mechanisms or processes giving rise to specific behaviours, structures or events. In the 
overwhelming majority of experimental life sciences, established explanations for 
biological phenomena contain much detailed information that is derived from data 
acquired through experiment and/or in the field. The law-like statements involved in such 
explanations tend to have low generality; in any case, they do not aim at unifying 
different phenomena, but rather at making sense of specific biological processes in 
relation to their local environment. Such detailed knowledge of the local processes is 
considered as an extremely important result in its own right, whether or not it is 
applicable to other cases and/or helpful to the construction of law-like generalisations. 
Given this context, the law-like statements produced in population biology cannot act as 
covering laws for the observation statements gathered by experimental biologists: there is 
currently no set of law-like statements under which the disunified approaches and results 
obtained in the life sciences can be subsumed and, thus, unified. In fact, as I shall 
illustrate in the next section, a whole apparatus of models, procedures and new results 
needs to be put in place in order to bridge the epistemological gap.  
 
It might then be concluded, as Keller (2002) does in her own fashion, that the low 
epistemic value attributed to the unifying power of theories across biological disciplines 
is a defining characteristic of the biological sciences: extended fragmentation into 
different approaches and perspectives over the same phenomena does not allow to draw 
general analytic characterisations of what a theory is or should be in biology. The 
theoretical knowledge produced by the several epistemic cultures engaging in biological 
research takes a variety of forms, ranging from mechanistic explanations, to 
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 While wishing to emphasise the great diversity among the theoretical outcomes of different projects 
within each biological subfield, it is not my purpose here to engage in a survey of the notions of biological 
theory that have been formulated by philosophers of biology. An excellent critical survey is offered by 
Mitchell (2003). In Chapter 5, I discuss my own view on one type of theoretical framework used to develop 
integrative (plant) biology. 
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mathematical equations, to descriptions, representations and categorisations of 
phenomena. Researchers are not divided as to which type of theoretical formulation or 
approach is most informative or correct. More often than not, it is acknowledged that 
different types of theoretical knowledge can all have a relative significance towards the 
understanding of a given phenomenon (Beatty 1997, S433). As highlighted by Longino 
(2001) and Mitchell (2003), this pluralism in theoretical approaches and epistemic 
cultures is more conducive to the development of biological knowledge than a more 
uniform landscape, strongly centred on a few unifying covering laws, would be. Even the 
increasing concern with finding ways to integrate biological perspectives (which 
characterises research conducted in the Arabidopsis community, as documented in 
chapter 3) is both motivated by and appreciative of pluralism. Integrative approaches do 
not propose a unifying framework of law-like statements under which all types of 
theories can be subsumed (and which could, therefore, replace them). Rather, they are 
constructed as meta-frameworks to be used in addition to each culture’s specific 
concerns, theoretical approaches and terminology, for the purpose of facilitating 
communication across different communities. 
 
The de facto pluralism characterising both aims and results of biological research makes 
the Hempelian perspective on the nature of scientific knowledge look rather inadequate. 
Most biological fields, including molecular biology, genetics, ecology, developmental 
biology and physiology (to mention but a few), do not search for generalisations under 
which to subsume all data gathered through experimental or field activities (they cannot, 
in Suppe’s words, be ‘fruitfully axiomatised’; 1977, 66). What those fields do produce 
are mechanistic, structural, functional, causal, phylogenetic and/or historical information 
about many aspects of organic life. Such largely descriptive, yet conceptually structured 
information can hardly be dismissed as a reputable source of knowledge. This situation 
prompts the rejection of Hempel’s views on the unifying role of theory in biology and its 
replacement with a more liberal approach highlighting the epistemological advantages of 
theory pluralism.  
 
This refutation is clearly based on the observation of contemporary science rather than on 
a rational analysis of what science should be like. This is all very well for my purposes 
here, since I am interested in ‘de facto’ scientific knowledge (knowledge as it is actually 
produced and used), rather than in elaborating a vision about the ‘essential’ nature of 
knowledge or what scientific knowledge should be like (according to some rational 
and/or ideal principles). A devout Hempelian might justifiably raise a forceful objection 
against this attitude: Hempel’s is a normative view and does not imply that theoretical 
knowledge as used in actual research always abide to the proposed ideal. Indeed, Hempel 
lists several ways in which his ideal is distorted in scientific practice (which is by 
definition incomplete, as it is in the process of extending and improving currently 
available knowledge), yet notes that the production of law-like statements remains the 
goal towards which scientists should and do strive (1965, 340). Several studies of 
biological practice found, however, that most biologists do not even strive to create 
unifying explanation of phenomena (and certainly not by reference to law-based 
generalisations): rather, they aim at understanding biological processes in their specific 
context, if possible by reference to various theoretical perspectives so as to understand 
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several aspects of phenomena at the same time.
22
 The pluralism characterising biological 
results and views on biological phenomena is happily tolerated, as long as each 
researcher is free to pursue her or his favourite approach and obtain results of interest to 
her or his peers and sponsors. As some have remarked, some parts of biology might even 
be regarded as ‘science without laws’.
23
  
 
 
2.2.2 Modeling Activities 
 
As a step towards proposing an alternative view on biological knowledge, I now turn to 
the relation between theory and practice in contemporary biology. Rather than insisting 
on a specific definition of what a biological theory is or should be, I examine the ways in 
which theoretical knowledge is expressed, constructed, modified and interpreted by 
researchers. As it turns out, theoretical results are often expressed and handled by 
researchers in forms other than propositional statements: apart from symbolic 
representations (such as in mathematical equations), we find pictures, diagrams, 
photographs and various kinds of three-dimensional objects playing important roles not 
only in the context of discovery, but also towards the expression and justification of 
biological knowledge. Biologists refer to these representational tools as models.  
 
Both biologists and philosophers acknowledge models to be crucial epistemological 
components of scientific reasoning and experimentation. Much has been written on the 
way in which models are produced and used to acquire theoretical knowledge about 
biological phenomena. Model-based reasoning, broadly defined as the use of 
representational tools towards gaining epistemic access to natural processes, is now 
widely recognised as playing a crucial role in the production of scientific knowledge. 
Further, it is acknowledged that models come in an endless variety of forms, a 
combination of which is always required by their use in scientific practice.
24
 To 
investigate the epistemological role of any one model, we need to recognise and explore 
how and why biologists choose and handle specific combinations of them in order to 
pursue a given research goal.
25
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 For instance, see Winther’s analysis of the difference in style and method between what he calls 
‘compositional’ biology and ‘formal’ biology (2003, 2006). Rose (1997) illustrates how such theory 
pluralism works by means of a suggestive example. He lists the various ways in which a frog’s jump into a 
lake can be explained: each of the five relevant explanations that he considers is compatible with the others, 
but cannot be replaced by them without significant loss in the understanding of the phenomenon in 
question.  
23
 The recent volume edited by Creager et al (2006) under the title ‘Science Without Laws’ provides some 
excellent studies supporting this claim. See also Rosenberg (1994) on what he calls law-less biology. 
24
 The collections of essays edited by Morgan and Morrison (1999), de Chardaverian and Hopwood (2004), 
Laubichler and Müller (2006) and Suarez (2006) provide excellent examples of the different types of 
models used by scientists and the combinations of different types required to acquire knowledge about 
natural phenomena.  
25
 Much recent philosophical work addresses directly the piecemeal nature of modeling practices. For 
instance, Cartwright’s framework is unique in its attempt to deal with different types of models across the 
natural and the social sciences (1999), while Suarez carefully considers the pluralism among notions of 
theory idealised within models (in Morgan and Morrison, 1999). Bailer-Jones published both on the 
different ideas that practicing scientists hold on what models are (2002) and on the use of ‘sub-models’ in 
 24
 
This position is well represented by the view recently proposed by Morgan, Morrison and 
their associates in their 1999 edited volume ‘Models as Mediators’. Their analysis 
focuses closely on the practice of modeling and it does take interest in the overwhelming 
evidence for the diverse types of models used in scientific research. Making sense of the 
multiplicity of models and their uses is a major goal of the mediators view, which is one 
of the reasons for the broad definition given of models themselves: anything used by 
practising scientists to mediate between theory and phenomena can be called a model. 
The notion of mediation is used to suggest that a model serves ‘both as a means to and as 
a source of knowledge’ (1999, 35). I take this to mean that a model functions as 
representative of one or more phenomena as well as representative for a given theory 
taken to apply to such phenomena.
26
 Models constitute the meeting point between 
knowledge and reality, thus providing ‘the kind of information that allows us to intervene 
in the world’ (1999, 23). By representation, Morgan and Morrison do not necessarily 
denote some kind of mirroring relation or structural (isomorphic) similarity between what 
is represented and the representation itself.
27
 Rather, they imply ‘a kind of rendering – a 
partial representation that either abstracts from, or translates into another form, the real 
nature of the system or theory, or one that is capable of embodying only a portion of a 
system’ (1999, 27). 
 
This account is very permissive, encompassing a potentially enormous diversity of types 
of representations. I see this breadth of scope as one of its main strengths.
28
 Research in 
                                                                                                                                            
order to obtain an overall model of a phenomenon (2000). A further example is represented by Levins’ 
foundational work on biological models, which I shall consider closely later in the chapter. 
26
 My use of ‘representative of’ and ‘representative for’ differs from the use proposed by Morgan (2003, 
230). In Morgan’s account, ‘representative of’ stands for the actual phenomenon that a model is taken to 
represent and ‘representative for’ refers to the range of phenomena to which the model can be further 
applied. In other words, Morgan’s categorisation focuses on the range of typicality granted to the model. As 
I shall show in the case of Arabidopsis modeling, what matters in my account is not the extent to which a 
model is taken to be typical (as I shall illustrate, that depends strongly on the social and scientific context in 
which the model is used); rather, I focus on the degree to which the model of a phenomenon incorporates 
elements from a theory and thus makes it possible to apply that theory to the phenomenon in question. 
27
 The characterisation of the relation between model and phenomena as isomorphic found a strong 
proponent in Suppes (1969, 2002), among others. For forceful criticisms of what Giere refers to as the 
‘instantial view’ on models, see Giere (1999) and Suarez (1999).  
28
 Notably, this very feature also makes this notion of representation rather slippery, for how are we to draw 
clear distinctions between a representation and ‘the real nature of the system or theory’ that it represents? 
Jeff Shank’s analysis of modeling within behavioural biology (Shank and Koehler, 2006) constitutes a 
forceful illustration of this problem. In his view, most elements used by practicing biologists as tools for 
investigation – including theories, data and material samples - should be thought of as models, that is, as 
representations conveying some (partial and tentative) information about the phenomena that they 
represent. This argument comes from the recognition that, within any research context, the stipulation of 
what the phenomenon and theory in question are depends on the tools used to investigate them just as much 
as the choice and handling of those tools is based on what scientists endorse as theoretical hypotheses and 
descriptions of reality. How should we then draw boundaries between the notion of ‘mediators’ and the 
notions of theory and/or phenomena that they are supposed to mediate? The risk of a slippery slope, leading 
to the denial of the very possibility to distinguish between the model and what it models, represents a very 
serious problem for Morgan and Morrison. It runs counter their basic intuitions, which I share and value, 
that (1) an analysis of the representational value of models necessarily includes making explicit what it is 
that models represent at any given moment of the research process; and (2) models can represent theories as 
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biology involves the manipulation of several types of models, each of which is 
irreducible to all others and arguably plays a unique role towards the achievement of 
scientific understanding. We find discussions of mathematical models, geometrical maps, 
two-, three- or four-dimensional computer simulations, robotic models and model 
organisms, both simulated and real. Each of these types of model is constructed – or even 
‘discovered’, as is arguably the case with model organisms
29
 – in different ways and for 
different purposes. Their representational value (that is, what they are taken to be 
representative of/for) depends on their material features as well as on the interests and 
beliefs characterising the research context in which they are used. Further, none of those 
types of models is ever used on its own: all relevant biological literature underscores the 
need for a combination of different types of models in order to answer specific theoretical 
questions.
30
 
 
This latter point is best explained by highlighting the constraints on the number of 
epistemic virtues that any one model can possess. Philosopher and biologist Richard 
Levins characterises those virtues as features that a biological model is expected to 
maximise in order to accomplish its mediating function in the most successful way. These 
features range from the requirement of generality (denoting the range of phenomena to 
which the model can be applied) to the idea of tractability (the ease with which it can be 
computationally or experimentally manipulated) and realism (the degree of empirical 
accuracy with which it represents relevant elements of the phenomenon under 
investigation). Levins’ important observation is that no single model can posses all 
virtues at once. Emphasis on one of them is only possible at the expense of some other: 
for instance, all concessions to the realism of a model unavoidably detract from its 
tractability or generality. Trade-offs among the epistemological merits of models are 
therefore unavoidable: scientists need to employ a ‘multi-modeling approach’ involving 
the integration of several different models, each of which maximises at least some of 
                                                                                                                                            
well as phenomena. Morgan and Morrison try to avoid the problem by a sophisticated discussion of what 
they mean by ‘theory’ and ‘phenomenon’, a detailed assessment of which eludes my present purposes (see 
Morgan and Morrison (1999) and Cartwright (1983, 1999)). In contrast, other scholars propose to embrace 
the problem by resorting to a ‘modified’ version of the semantic view on modeling, according to which 
scientific theories are in fact collections of models and their robust consequences, as coordinated by a 
theoretical perspective (Wimsatt 1987; Griesemer 2000). I do not agree with this latter solution. As I 
explain in the rest of this section, I view modeling as encompassing a set of activities which are not 
themselves theoretical, but which lead to the formulation of theories about phenomena (which, in turn, need 
to be interpreted in the light of the models used to create and apply them). Regrettably, providing a full 
argument for this crucial point would require writing another dissertation: I will therefore set it aside for 
now and hope to develop it in future work. I thank James Griesemer for discussions on this point. 
29
 See Chapters 3.2.3 and 6 on this. 
30
 Historians of science contributed extensive evidence for the importance of combining different models 
for the development of scientific research. For instance, some controversial cases of theory-choice 
characterising the history of physics and biology are being usefully reconstructed and understood as 
depending on changes in the range and interpretation of empirical evidence as much as on creative 
transformations in the number and sophistication of the modeling practices favoured within each of the 
rival theories (see for instance de Regt (2001), Keller (1999, 2000), Boumans (2001), Chang and Leonelli 
(2005a/b)). Equally indicative are the analyses of the evolution of research systems presented by Kohler 
(1991), Rheinberger (1997), Griesemer (2001), Galison (1997) among others. 
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those dimensions.
31
 This allows biologists to optimise their overall modeling strategy at 
any given moment by constantly shifting and calibrating priorities from one set of 
requirements to another, depending on the changing demands of their research context (in 
turn dictated, at least in part, by the pursuit of the above-mentioned research outcomes). 
As Levins concludes: ‘it is desirable, of course, to work with manageable models which 
maximise generality, realism and precision toward the overlapping but not identical goals 
of understanding, predicting and modifying nature. But this cannot be done’ (1984, 19).  
 
Given the necessity of a dramatic diversity among biological models, and the resulting 
‘promiscuity’ of the notion of model itself in biology (Griesemer 1999, 436), much 
philosophical attention has been showered on the actual models employed in biological 
practice, so as to clarify the epistemological status of each type of model as both a 
product of and a tool towards scientific theorising. Relatively less attention has been 
devoted to the variety of activities that need to be performed in order to handle models 
adequately. Scientists do not only refer to models in their theories and explanations: they 
use them, manipulate them and modify them all the time in order to achieve and justify 
those very theories and explanations. The adequacy of such use is determined both by the 
features of the phenomena under scrutiny and by the material, social and institutional 
setting and commitments of the researchers involved. In a recent comment on this 
situation, James Griesemer suggested that ‘knowing how models are made and deployed 
is as important to the philosophy of scientific representation as knowing that models are 
linguistically connected with phenomena by hypotheses in specified respects and 
degrees’ (2004, 434). In other words, focusing primarily on modeling practices, rather 
than on models thus produced, might prove a useful way to gain insight in some long-
standing debates in the philosophy of scientific modeling and representation. 
 
Here I am therefore not interested in providing a general definition of what a scientific 
model is and how it functions in research practice (as Morgan and Morrison’s position on 
these issues suffices for my present purposes).
32
 My analysis relies on an account of 
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 This does not mean that there is one optimal combination of models to study each phenomenon, as the 
results expected of research through modeling vary depending on the interests, expertise and values of the 
group that carries out the research. For details on this view see Levins (1984), Puccia and Levins (1985), as 
well as the elaborations of Levins’ argument presented by Wimsatt (1981, 1987), Griesemer (2000, 2006), 
Shank and Koehler (2006), van der Steen (1995, 26ff) and the relevant debate between Odenbaugh (2003) 
and Orzack (2005). 
32
 Especially between the 1960s and the 1990s, a great part of the flourishing philosophical debate on 
scientific models concentrated on establishing which features, if any, are common to all models. This 
choice is understandable, given the need for at least a minimal definition of model that would allow to 
distinguish it from other elements involved in scientific experimentation and reasoning (and thus clarify its 
distinctive epistemological role). And indeed, it generated a vast body of literature fruitfully analysing the 
modalities by which models abstract, represent, illustrate and/or explain the aspects of reality and/or the 
scientific theories that they embody. Despite the interest displayed in the glaring differences among models 
and among the types of theoretical knowledge produced through their use, the importance, to practicing 
scientists, of using several types of models in combination did not receive much attention. The attempt to 
analyse the diversity among models turned into an effort to explain it away - either by arguing that only 
certain kinds of models should be characterised as such or by elaborating a unifying description of the 
processes of abstraction, representation and explanation characterising modeling activities. For instance, 
see Patrick Suppes’ restriction of the definition of model to set-theoretical constructs (2002); Daniela 
Bailer-Jones’ view of models as mental representations (2003); Hesse’s early work on model-based 
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modeling that highlights the epistemic activities required to create, handle and interpret 
models.
33
 Such analysis draws explicit connections between the different features of 
models and their role in securing one or more of the several epistemic goals of potential 
interest to practicing scientists. As illustrated in the previous section, that many different 
types of theoretical perspectives are used to study the same systems is certainly true of 
current biological sciences. Each way of theorising implies a different perspective, a 
different way of carving nature at its joints. Each type of research outcome arguably 
requires handling a different set of modeling practices. Hence the necessity to diversify 
modeling practices in order to comply with (or, as Levins would put it, trade among) the 
varying research outcomes and theoretical views characterising any specific research 
project.  
 
Scientific modeling requires researchers to perform a series of actions in a skilful and 
effective way. By ‘skilful’, I mean that they have to resort to intellectual and material 
expertise in ways that are acceptable to their peers. For instance, epistemic activities 
required to construct and use models involve the selection and interpretation of the 
concepts and data to be represented in the models. Also, they include adequate handling 
of the instruments and/or software used to manipulate the model, together with the ability 
to create, interpret and/or follow guidelines and procedures set up to this aim. By 
‘effective’, I indicate that the performance of those actions contributes to achieving the 
research goals of the community within which it is staged. Theories and explanations 
represent one kind of result of such performance.  
 
It is not difficult to recognise a tension between my account and Hempel’s exclusive 
focus on propositionally expressed knowledge. Not only models turn out to constitute an 
integral part of biological knowledge (as well as an important means towards its 
expression and communication): the very ways by which they are created and handled 
constitute parts of scientific knowledge, whose importance is entirely unacknowledged in 
the Hempelian framework. Further, even when looking at models as the results of these 
processes (rather than at modeling activities themselves), it is evident that non-
propositional models cannot be reduced to or transformed into propositional ones without 
a substantial loss of information. Models such as graphs and three-dimensional objects 
contain different information from models such as descriptions and equations. In fact, the 
epistemological merits of models varies also depending on their material features: as I 
shall demonstrate in detail in chapter 6, a digital model of Arabidopsis biology yields 
different insights than a material model of it, meaning that these two types of models can 
be combined in order to obtain as comprehensive an understanding as possible of the 
same phenomenon. The re-evaluation of non-propositional knowledge that follows from 
                                                                                                                                            
analogical reasoning as heuristic to the development of theories (1966); and Cartwright’s (1983) account of 
how features of representationally powerful models are abstracted from phenomena and idealised from 
theories (which she modified precisely by focusing on the distinctions among models in her later work).   
33
 I take the term ‘epistemic activity’ from Hasok Chang, who uses it to frame his rich reflection on the 
notion of intelligibility in science (unpublished). His framework as a whole constitutes a fascinating 
analysis of the epistemic value of intelligibility, as well as of the relation between scientific ontology and 
practice. Note that, while much of my present reflections are inspired by Chang’s framework, I use the 
notion of epistemic activities in a different way, that is, to denote actual sets of action that are (mostly 
intentionally) carried out by researchers in order to reach a specific goal.  
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the study of modeling practices constitutes as strong a reason to abandon the Hempelian 
view on scientific knowledge as the dismissal of covering laws as essential components 
of theories proved to be in the previous section.  
 
 
2.2.3 The Dual Nature of Biological Knowledge 
 
I hitherto proposed a view of theories encompassing the diverse types of theoretical 
knowledge of phenomena obtained in different subfields in biology; and of modeling as 
the skilled performance, by a group of scientists, of a set of activities geared towards the 
achievement of a given set of research goals. I also sketched how this approach contrasts 
with the Hempelian view on scientific knowledge. Now I can finally outline the 
implications of this description of biological practice and its results for my original 
concern about the nature of biological knowledge. 
 
The intuition that theories and explanations constitute but a small part of scientific 
knowledge was already put forward in the 1950s by the prominent philosophers Gilbert 
Ryle and Michael Polanyi. Both men presented systematic reflections on what I shall 
refer to as embodied knowledge – ‘know-how’ in Ryle’s words (1949) and ‘personal 
knowledge’ in Polanyi’s (1958). Their research suggests that scientific knowledge never 
involves simply a theoretical content, that is, that which is known (as expressed, for 
instance, by theories and explanations). It also involves the ability to apply such 
theoretical content to reality, to interpret it in order to intervene effectively in the world 
as self-aware human agents. 
 
Polanyi sees such ability as an ‘unspecifiable art’, which can only be learnt through 
practice or by imitation
34
, but which is rarely self-conscious, as it needs to be integrated 
with the performer’s thoughts and actions without swaying his or her attention from his 
or her main goals (1958, 54-55). This is why Polanyi refers to this knowledge as ‘tacit’: it 
is an ensemble of abilities that inform scientists’ performances (actions as well as 
reasoning), without being directly acknowledged by the individuals who possess them. 
Polanyi furthers this interpretation by distinguishing between two ways in which 
scientists can be self-aware: ‘focal’ awareness, which is tied to the intentional pursuit of 
‘knowing that’; and ‘subsidiary’ awareness, which concerns the scientists’ perception of 
the movements, interactions with objects and other actions that are involved by their 
pursuit. In this view, focal and subsidiary awareness are mutually exclusive: one cannot 
have one without temporarily renouncing the other. Switching from ‘knowing that’ to 
‘knowing how’ and back is, to Polanyi, a matter of switching between these two ways of 
being self-aware. In fact, his characterisation of know-how as ‘subsidiary awareness’ 
relegates this type of knowledge to a secondary position with respect to ‘knowing that’ 
(1958, 55). The acquisition of theoretical content constitutes, according to Polanyi, the 
central focus of scientists’ attention. Tacit knowledge makes it possible for scientists to 
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 To Polanyi, the difference between learning by practice and learning by imitation corresponds to a 
difference in the tacit knowledge that is acquired: skills (in the former case) versus connoisseurship (in the 
latter case; Polanyi 1958, 57).  
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acquire such theoretical content, but it is not valuable in itself: it is a means to a 
(theoretical) end.  
 
While drawing inspiration from Polanyi’s emphasis on tacit expertise, I do not think that 
his hierarchical ordering of types of knowledge (‘knowing how’ being subsidiary to 
‘knowing that’) does justice to the intertwining of ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’ that 
characterises biological research.
35
 Polanyi bases his reflections on the study of 
theoretical physics – and indeed, it might be that at least some theoretical physicists value 
theoretical knowledge much more highly than the practices and skills used in order to 
construct it. Within most of biology, however, the development of skills, procedures and 
tools appropriate to researching specific issues is valued as highly as – or, sometimes, 
even more highly than – the achievement of theories or data that it enables. The evolution 
of tools and procedures is crucial to theoretical developments and biologists openly 
acknowledge this to be the case.
36
  
 
On this point, Ryle’s view proves more accommodating. His analysis of the distinction 
between knowing that and knowing how does not assume either type of knowledge to be 
predominant over the other. This is due to an underlying difference between his outlook 
and Polanyi’s: while the latter thinks of the distinction as descriptive, thus presenting the 
two types of knowledge as actually separate in practice, Ryle presents the distinction as a 
purely analytic tool. Indeed, he refers to the idea of an actual distinction between 
‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ as a false ‘intellectualist legend’: ‘when we describe a 
performance as intelligent, this does not entail the double operation of considering and 
executing’ (1949, 30). Also in contrast to Polanyi’s analysis, Ryle defines ‘knowing how’ 
as involving both intentional actions and unconsciously acquired habits. In fact, he 
prefers an intelligent agent to avoid as much as possible the enacting of habits: ‘it is of 
the essence of merely habitual practices that one performance is a replica of its 
predecessors. It is of the essence of intelligent practices that one performance is modified 
by its predecessors. The agent is still learning’ (1949, 42). And further, ‘to be intelligent 
is not merely to satisfy criteria, but to apply them; to regulate one’s actions and not 
merely to be well regulated. A person’s performance is described as careful or skilful, if 
in his operations he is ready to detect and correct lapses, to repeat and improve upon 
success, to profit from the examples of others and so forth. He applies criteria in 
performing critically, that is, in trying to get things right’ (1949, 29).  
 
Ryle does not specifically apply his account to the case of scientific knowledge. 
Nevertheless, his characterisation of agents ‘trying to get things right’ by iteratively 
improving their performance fits my characterisation of biologists’ practices and 
interests, as reported in the previous sections. Biologists do indeed learn to use a variety 
of tools in order to pursue their intellectual interests, tools which I referred to as models. 
                                                
35
 Note that, while Polanyi is widely credited for being the first philosopher of science to analyse the role of 
tacit knowledge in science, his classification of tacit knowledge as secondary in importance to theoretical 
knowledge has not received attention by his critics and followers alike.  
36
 A nice illustration for this is provided by Edna Suarez’s (2001) historical reconstruction of the role 
played by technologies (such as hybridization) towards the ‘stabilisation of phenomena’ in molecular 
biology. See also Rosenberg’s views on the instrumental character of biological research (1994).  
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Biologists need to keep improving their ability to handle these models, in order to reach 
their goals. In the words of Mary Morgan, ‘learning from models happens at two places: 
in building them and in using them. Learning from building involves finding out what 
will fit together and will work to represent certain aspects of the theory or the world or 
both. Modeling requires making certain choices, and it is in making these that the 
learning process lies' (1999, 386). As I shall discuss in detail in chapter 6, the function of 
models is not exhausted by their usefulness as thinking tools. These same models need to 
be handled adequately in order to incorporate and express theoretical knowledge about a 
phenomenon: in other words, they are tools for acting as well as for thinking. Thus, the 
knowledge acquired by a biologist successfully pursuing a research project encompasses 
both some results (like a theory, a set of data or a taxonomical system) and the 
procedures needed to develop, interpret and reproduce those results. A biologist is not 
born with the ability to perform the modeling activities required by his research. The 
skills and expertise enabling him to perform are important products of his work, in the 
same way as theoretical results are. In fact, as I shall contend at the end of this section, 
understanding those theoretical results becomes very difficult without reference to the 
know-how acquired via relevant research experience. Acknowledgements of the tight 
connection between learning and the material manipulation of objects have a long history 
and are increasingly accepted in current cognitive science.
37
  
 
On the basis of these considerations, I characterise biological research as involving two 
types of knowledge, which are closely intertwined and virtually inseparable in practice, 
but which it is very useful to distinguish analytically. The first type includes what is 
typically characterised as the content of knowledge, that is what we regard as facts, 
theories, explanations, concepts concerning phenomena that are available independently 
of specific procedures or ways of acting. Access to cell theory and relevant data about 
cellular organisation, for instance, can be obtained without any expertise in cell biology 
or experimental research. I shall refer to this type of knowledge as theoretical knowledge. 
The second type is what I call embodied knowledge. This is the awareness of how to act 
and reason as required in order to pursue scientific research (for instance, by performing 
modeling practices). This awareness, whose features I shall characterise in more detail in 
chapters 5 and 6, is essential for biologists to intervene in the world, improve their 
control over the phenomena they study and handle the representations made of those 
phenomena. Embodied knowledge is expressed, for instance, through the procedures and 
protocols allowing scientists to intervene on the entities and processes of interest; the 
ability to implement those procedures and modify them according to the specific context 
of research; the acquired skill of handling instruments and models; the perception, often 
based on the scientists’ experience in interacting within a specific space (such as a 
laboratory
38
), of how to move and position oneself with respect to the models and/or 
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 Indicative of this trend is the recent focus of fields such as artificial intelligence on the idea of ‘embodied 
cognition’ – see for instance Anderson (2003) and references therein. 
38
 See also Latour’s influential argument for any site of scientific research becoming a laboratory setting, in 
the sense of being standardised and perceived so as to eliminate all irrelevant elements to the research 
project(s) at hand (Latour 1988).  
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phenomena under study
39
; and the development of methods allowing to replicate 
experimental results.
40
  
 
I thus posit that biological knowledge has a dual nature, encompassing both a theoretical 
and an embodied component. Before turning to the implications of this view for my 
account of understanding, let me note that this position nicely accounts for another 
widespread feature of contemporary biological research, that is the ever-increasing 
blurring of boundaries between ‘applied’ and ‘pure’ or ‘theoretical’ fields. I shall clarify 
this point via the example of biotechnology, to which I will come back when discussing 
the interests underlying Arabidopsis research (chapter 7). Biotechnology has traditionally 
been referred to as ‘applied’ research, because of its explicit focus on producing 
instruments, enhancing technological expertise and devising methods to apply theoretical 
knowledge to real processes (and thus produce a number of goods for use by non-
scientists). A well-known instance of biotechnological research is the development of 
genetically modified organisms [GMOs], such as crops
41
, which requires scientists to 
‘apply’ knowledge coming from molecular biology and genetics in order to produce 
plants and animals with characteristics that are socially and/or economically 
advantageous. The classification of GMO research as applied does little justice, however, 
to the constant mix of theoretical and embodied knowledge required by biologists and 
bioengineers engaging in it, all of whom possess a high level of background knowledge 
as well as technical expertise. Technological expertise and specialised training are not 
only indispensable to the production of knowledge, but are part of biological knowledge 
itself. This is evident in the current distribution of research on the molecular mechanisms 
underlying bioengineering and the application of these mechanisms towards the 
production of useful mutants: most relevant laboratories engage in both of these areas at 
the same time. The large overlap between applied and blue-skies research explains why 
contract research has been steadily displacing governmental funding towards most 
biomedical and genomic research in the last three decades (Krimsky 2003). This is a 
blatant example of the impossibility to think of theories and explanations as disjoint from 
their intended scope and the way in which they are applied.  
 
 
2.2.4 The Ability to Understand 
 
I claimed that theoretical and embodied knowledge are two inseparable aspects of the 
knowledge used and produced by biological research practices. This view on the nature 
of biological knowledge is very different from the one offered by Hempel, who tried to 
formalise scientific knowledge by emphasising the axiomatic formalisation of its 
theoretical results (as Ryle and Polanyi would put it, its ‘knowing that’ dimension). I here 
finally turn to the implications of my critique to the Hempelian account of the nature of 
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 See Myers (forthcoming). 
40
 Hans Radder (2002) convincingly argues that the development of methods to replicate experimental 
results is a necessary step towards the development of theories. 
41
 Soybeans, maize, rapeseed and cotton are the only GMOs hitherto developed and marketed (mostly in the 
United States and India: Europe only admits maize up to now), due to current tight restrictions on the kinds 
of organisms that can be produced and sold in a genetically modified form (Freese and Schubert 2004; see 
the report published by Friends of the Earth [2006] for further bibliography on this issue). 
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scientific knowledge for Hempel’s view on scientific understanding. As I remarked in my 
introduction to this section, Hempel classified understanding as a by-product of scientific 
explanations, thus implying that possessing explanations automatically leads to the 
acquisition of scientific understanding of the phenomena to which those explanations 
apply. In other words, Hempel claimed that access to theoretical knowledge leads to the 
understanding of that knowledge and of its applicability to real processes.  
 
Now, it is certainly true that access to theoretical knowledge does not, per se, imply 
recourse to embodied knowledge. Scientific theories express the analytic concepts and 
categories employed in the study of phenomena through specific formulations, which can 
be propositional, symbolic (as in mathematical equations) or even pictorial (as in the 
depiction of a biological mechanism). These formulations can be independent of the use 
of models to develop and study them, as well as of knowledge about how to apply the 
theories. In this sense, theoretical knowledge can thus indeed be possessed without 
recourse to embodied knowledge. Using theoretical knowledge in order to understand 
natural phenomena is, however, an entirely different matter. Understanding phenomena 
by reference to scientific theories requires some level of know-how about how those 
theories apply to reality - such as the assumptions that are used, the models that have 
been employed to produce them, and so on. Hence, understanding natural phenomena by 
means of the theoretical knowledge accumulated by biologists does require some 
embodied knowledge (and vice versa, embodied knowledge needs to be coupled with 
theoretical interpretations in order to provide understanding): the individual in the 
process of acquiring understanding needs to intertwine his experience of the phenomenon 
(his observations and experimental interactions with it) with a theoretical interpretation of 
that same phenomenon. In view of this, I define understanding as the cognitive 
achievement realisable by individual scientists depending on their ability to coordinate 
theoretical and embodied knowledge that apply to a specific phenomenon.  
 
By the verb ‘coordinate’, I refer to the variety of strategies that a scientist can learn to use 
in order to (1) select beliefs, thought processes and experiences that are relevant to the 
phenomenon in question and (2) integrate these components with the goal of applying 
them to the phenomenon.
42
 I shall expand on some of these strategies in the course of this 
dissertation, with a special emphasis on modeling practices. This is not because I think 
that modeling is the only way to gather scientific understanding (in fact, as I shall specify 
in chapter 8, different types of understanding can be achieved, some of which derive from 
reflection, observation or taxonomic exercises, among other activities). Rather, it is 
because modeling is both a prominent activity in contemporary biology and a good 
exemplification of the means by which a coordination of knowledge that is relevant to a 
specific phenomenon can be achieved. In section 2.3.1, I illustrate this view on scientific 
understanding by means of two examples taken from contemporary biology.  
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 Galison uses the expression ‘coordination of action and belief’ to describe the interaction between 
experimentalist and theoretician culture in physics (1997, chapter 9). The practices to which he refers 
constitute, in my eyes, an excellent case for the analysis of understanding that I propose here: my definition 
of what is meant by coordination, as well as the notions of theoretical and embodied knowledge, are 
however largely unrelated to Galison’s account. 
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2.3   Towards a Social Epistemology for Biological Understanding 
 
Of course, the interactions between the body and the 
environment are not the only form of cognitive mediation with 
the world. It is obvious that social communication too (and of 
course manipulations of the conditions of possibility of this 
communication) provides rich information to many of our 
senses. 
Lorenzo Magnani 2001, 68 
 
Once we reconsider the role of the individuals conducting research, thus doing away with 
Hempel’s rejection of what Popper called ‘psychologism’, we are immediately drawn to 
asking questions about the characteristics of such individuals, the way in which they 
share experience and goals among each other and participate in collective projects. 
Especially in the context of ‘big science’ projects, such as Arabidopsis research today, 
the constant exchange of insights, data and resources among researchers is not an option, 
but a necessity. Even more importantly, the organisation of scientific research into 
distinct communities, and its significance to scientific epistemology, is as widespread a 
phenomenon as it is understudied. What are the epistemological implications of carrying 
out research in large, multicultural and multi-sited groups? What is the relation between 
individual scientists and the communities in which they work? Does it make sense to 
think of scientific epistemology as a social phenomenon? And what types of socialisation 
does research in communities actually involve? 
 
This section examines some of these questions, as relevant to my current investigation of 
scientific understanding. While the characterisation of understanding offered in the 
previous section emphasises the role of individual researchers in understanding biological 
phenomena, I certainly do not intend to underestimate the extent to which individual 
understanding is shaped by her or his membership in a scientific community. As I am 
about to clarify in this section, I take understanding to be ‘scientific’ precisely when it 
arises from an agreement, reached among the relevant actors, over what constitutes 
adequate theoretical and embodied knowledge. Such an agreement need not be explicit, 
as many instruments and protocols are adopted and recognised as valid without formal 
approval by the community. Also, the resources, tools and concepts in use in a scientific 
community do not need to cohere with each other in any way, since in the same 
community very diverse concepts, techniques and instruments might be used: each 
scientist is free to associate tools and resources as wished, depending on his or her 
preferences and beliefs. 
 
Given these caveats, I wish to argue that scientific understanding is a socially nurtured 
phenomenon. Moreover, the notion of ‘social’ applying to the case of scientific 
communities is not just the minimal characterisation involving the interaction of at least 
two individuals (thus, ‘social’ as ‘interpersonal’). In the vast majority of contemporary 
scientific communities, social norms, behaviour and forms of communications are 
dictated and enforced by institutions or other super-individual organs. This implies that 
for scientific understanding to be social, it needs to be sanctioned by institutionalised 
measures such as peer-reviewed publications, public presentations and receipt of research 
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grants: the understanding of a phenomenon shared by two or three individuals only 
becomes scientific when it is expressed to other members of their community through 
means independent of any one individual and instituted in order to control the quality of 
the research in the community as a whole.
43
  
 
Prima facie, the study of scientific understanding as an essentially social phenomenon 
seems almost to contradict the definition of understanding given in the previous section. 
When I characterise understanding as the ability to act and think in a specific way, I seem 
to make this ability depend entirely on the individual who is acting and thinking in such a 
way. Yet, this is not the case. This section illustrates that the individual’s ability to 
understand, as well as the quality of that understanding, is largely shaped by the 
participation and allegiance of that individual to the epistemic culture of one or more 
research communities. This argument is exemplified in detail in chapter 7, which is 
devoted to an analysis of how the structure and power relations characterising the 
Arabidopsis community influence the scientific understanding that its participants have of 
Arabidopsis biology.  
 
 
2.3.1 Individual and Communicative Understanding 
 
The account of cognitive agency as involving interdependence 
means that individuals know to the extent they interact critically 
with others in cognitive communities. The context-bound character 
of validation and the characterisation of cognitive agents as 
interdependent do not deny the importance of individual agents in 
the construction of knowledge. It does mean that attributing 
knowledge to them is attributing to them some relation to their 
cognitive communities, as well as to the objects and content of 
knowledge  
Longino 2002, 122 
 
Several philosophers of science emphasise individual work, responsibilities and 
discoveries when accounting for the history and structure of science. More or less 
explicitly, they maintain that scientific epistemology is not inherently social and that the 
study of science requires focusing on individual achievements rather than on the 
environment that frames these individuals’ actions, intuitions and decisions. This position 
informs many accounts of scientific discovery, where few individuals are held 
responsible for the birth and establishment of new ideas; it also permeates most analyses 
of scientific reasoning and methods, which are, after all, enacted by individuals. Here I 
would like to counter this approach by suggesting that there are epistemologically 
relevant differences between research conducted by an isolated individual, the research 
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 In this broad characterisation of what I mean by ‘social’, I take inspiration from Durkheim’s intuition 
about what makes a fact ‘social’ at all: that is, ‘ways of acting, thinking, and feeling, that are external to the 
individual and endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which they control him’ (Durkheim [1895] 
2003, 27).  
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conducted by an individual working in a small group and the research conducted by an 
individual working in a large group whose work is regulated by institutionalised norms.
44
 
Most contemporary research, certainly in biology, is indeed pursued in large 
communities. The organisation of a scientific community can be examined according to a 
multitude of variables, each of which commends a different partitioning of the 
community in question. These variables include disciplinary expertise, common sets of 
skills, degree of intellectual authority and/or credibility, level of education and power 
status within and without the community. How does this complex social organisation 
influence the individual’s ability to understand? And where can we start in order to tackle 
this issue? 
 
Let me start from a common-sense interpretation of the notion of understanding, which 
certainly underscores its individualistic nature. This is the idea of understanding as a 
sudden insight, an intuition exemplified by what Keller calls the ‘Aha! Feeling’ of 
cognitive grasp (2002, 12). In his ‘Philosophical Investigations’, Wittgenstein reflects on 
the notion of understanding implied by utterances like: ‘Now I understand!’. Passages 
150 and 151 report a distinction between such a notion of understanding, which is tightly 
connected to individual imagination and creativity, and a different notion of 
understanding, which is used in interpersonal communication to denote the ability to do 
something. Wittgenstein does not elaborate on this intuition, yet there is much to be 
drawn from it. What I intend to argue here is that understanding of the ‘Aha!’ type is not, 
per se, scientific. This is where Hempel and his followers had it right. This type of 
individual understanding consists in the acquisition of an intuition that is triggered by the 
individual’s personal experience and leads him or her to critically reconsider the 
knowledge that he or she already possesses: this intuition is a subjective interpretation of 
reality, which is typically derived by the individual’s interaction with phenomena or their 
representations. Examples for this type of understanding are typical cases of discovery 
both in everyday life (such as pushing a door and understanding that it is open, or trying 
an unknown road to work and understanding that it is actually a shortcut) and in scientific 
research (doing an experiment with animals and discovering that they behave in different 
ways from what was expected).
45
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 William Bechtel captures one of these differences when describing the transition of cell biology from a 
research field to an actual discipline (that is, an independent unit with its own locations, venues, journals 
and internal dynamics): ‘in order to make cell biology a viable discipline, and not just a research domain to 
which a variety of disciplines might contribute, it was necessary not only that appropriate research tools be 
developed and that new information be derived from use of the tools, but also that institutions emerge 
which could provide a stable work environment in cell biology’ (1993, 292). 
45
 I do not mean to treat scientific understanding as synonymous with scientific discovery, or at least not 
with the traditional definition of discovery as an event that brings new knowledge to a given community (in 
the form of a new object, concept, theory, result and so forth). What I do maintain is that an individual’s 
acquisition of understanding can be seen as a form of discovery in a different sense: that is, as an event that 
brings new knowledge to that individual, even when it does not add anything to the knowledge possessed 
by the community of which that that individual is a member. Whether that individual’s new understanding 
will be counted as a discovery by the whole community depends on whether the community accepts that 
understanding as (1) truthful and (2) innovative. 
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The ‘Aha!’ type of understanding can be sought for, but it is not achieved intentionally.
46
 
It is not possible to predict when that intuition will be experienced, under which 
circumstances and with which implications. The elements of unpredictability and 
randomness characterising individual understanding highlight the creative, non-
intentional nature of this cognitive process. They are also responsible for the fascinating 
mix of progressiveness and mystery (even, sometimes, serendipity) that characterises 
scientific pursuits. For these same reasons, individual understanding is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for the achievement of scientific understanding. The latter emerges 
solely from each individual’s attempts to share his or her intuitions with other researchers 
and explore the significance of that finding in the light of knowledge previously acquired 
by a group of individuals devoted to study similar topics.  
 
Why should this be the case? Consider the example of scientific discovery given above, 
in which an experimental biologist experiences the ‘Aha! feeling’ of understanding when 
witnessing an unexpected behaviour by laboratory animals. The renowned developmental 
biologist John Bonner reports exactly this sort of experience in his memoirs. He recounts 
how an unexpected behaviour by his favourite organisms, the slime molds, triggered his 
intuition about chemotaxis
47
 and effectively started his proficient career as a scientist: 
 
What surprised me [after the discovery] was how quickly I read the message sent 
to me through that one glance into the dissecting microscope. Instantly I saw that 
chemotaxis had been proved, and that I made the discovery that would get me a 
satisfactory thesis. I remember dancing about my lab room and punching the air in 
my excitement. The experience also taught me a great lesson. I had not carefully 
designed an experiment that would prove diffusion; I had managed it by accident. 
That and all the other observations I had made told me that the slime molds were 
in charge, not I. They would let me know their secrets on their terms, not mine. A 
gifted and delightfully eccentric mathematician who helped me with the 
publication of these results knew the same thing: he would write an equation, 
stare at it for a bit, and then as though I were not in the room, he would say to the 
equation, ''speak to me, speak to me''. Well, the slime molds had spoken to me 
(Bonner 2002, 77-78; my emphasis). 
 
Bonner’s ‘Aha!’ experience seems to be entirely individualistic and dependent on his 
own interaction with his objects of study, the slime molds – in exactly the same way as 
opening a door or discovering a convenient shortcut to work is, as in my previous 
examples.  How can Bonner’s experience of understanding be defined as social? In order 
to answer this question, let us consider what it is that Bonner actually understands here. 
What Bonner understands is not the pattern of behaviour of the slime molds per se, but 
rather its relevance in the context of existing biological research on chemotaxis. Before 
his enlightenment, Bonner already had theoretical knowledge about what the biological 
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 See Kleiner’s debate with Nickles over the degree of premeditation and intentionality involved in 
scientific ‘discovery’ (1999).  
47
 By chemotaxis, biologists indicate the process through which single-cell or multi-cellular organisms 
direct their movements in response to the presence of specific chemicals in their environment (allowing, for 
instance, bacteria to find food or flee poison). 
 37
community meant by chemotaxis. He was well trained in what more senior biologists 
thought of the phenomenon and of its implications - otherwise he would not have been 
able to ‘instantly’ recognise it in the behaviour of the slime molds. Through his weeks of 
laboratory experiences with slime molds, he had also become familiar with their habits, 
behaviours and reactions to various experimental set-ups, thus effectively accumulating 
some embodied knowledge about how chemotaxis might manifest itself. Thus, slime 
molds might have unexpectedly ‘spoken’ to Bonner: but what allowed him to ‘listen’ to 
them were his combined abilities to phrase their message in a specific terminology, match 
it to relevant laboratory experiences and interpret it according to the theoretical 
background that he had been taught by his supervisors. Bonner’s understanding of how 
chemotaxis occurs was enabled by his participation in a research community as much as 
by his own ability to use the tools acquired in that community.  
 
As I pointed out in the previous section, understanding results from the ability to 
coordinate theoretical knowledge with embodied knowledge. In the case of Bonner’s 
discovery, this means that his new observations on slime molds behaviour were assessed 
through the spectacle of the theoretical knowledge that he already possessed (such as 
previously accumulated speculation about chemotaxis) as well as his embodied 
knowledge about the usual behaviour of slime mold, as he experienced it day-in, day-out 
in the laboratory. Bonner’s experience of scientific understanding is made ‘scientific’ by 
its continuity and intertwinement with the work conducted by the whole community of 
biologists working on the same type of phenomenon. This is a first sense in which 
understanding needs to be social in order to be scientific: both the theoretical and the 
embodied knowledge used in order to make sense of the new observations are the fruit 
not of Bonner’s personal intuition and experience, but of the agreement reached among 
several individuals about which terms, models, issues and instruments to use in order to 
examine the phenomenon that is being understood. Notably, not any individual or 
community will do: the agreement among individuals needs to be sanctioned in at least 
one scientific community, in the sense of being incorporated in the series of methods, 
instruments, concepts used by members of that community to express their knowledge 
and pursue their research. This last point, to which I shall return in the second half of this 
section, is important since many types of everyday understanding can be claimed to 
depend on social constraints of some sort (think of the awareness of social codes and use 
of language characterising a specific community that is needed to understand a joke). 
What makes understanding scientific is the extent to which it is nurtured by knowledge 
accepted and cultivated in one or more scientific communities. An isolated individual 
might have the deepest and most meaningful understanding of a specific biological 
phenomenon. However, that understanding can hardly be categorised as scientific unless 
it is informed by current scientific knowledge of that phenomenon and unless the 
individual in question attempts to offer that result as a contribution to one or more 
established scientific fields.  
 
This last statement already contains a reference to another sense in which I think that 
scientific understanding is social. This second aspect concerns the necessity for a 
community, in order to build such consensus over what constitutes acceptable theoretical 
and embodied knowledge about the phenomena under scrutiny, to communicate and 
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assess individual results at the community level. Understanding becomes scientific when 
it can be communicated, either by speech or through the imitation of others’ actions. In 
order for an individual’s understanding to be relevant in a research community, she needs 
to refer to a linguistic formulation, a series of representations and/or specific 
experimental set-ups that will enable her to communicate her understanding to her 
peers.
48
 In contrast to everyday understanding, scientific understanding captures the 
process of finding ways to exchange knowledge about nature among human agents.  
 
In the case of Bonner’s discovery, this means that his understanding would not have a 
scientific status unless he disposed of the right tools, terminology and skills to allow 
other biologists to share and replicate his experiences. This second aspect of the social 
nature of scientific understanding is clearly illustrated by reference to a very recent case 
of biological controversy, whose details have peppered the pages of journals and 
newspapers all over the world. This is the debate on the credibility of the results 
published by Hwang Woo-suk, an internationally recognised expert in stem cell research 
and the head of a prestigious laboratory at Seoul National University, South Korea. At the 
beginning of 2004, Hwang Woo-suk and his American associates announced that they 
were about to publish a paper in ‘Science’ containing findings on human somatic cell 
cloning that had the potential to revolutionise stem cell research (Hwang, 2004). 
Immediately after the paper was published, several laboratories tried to replicate Hwang 
Woo-suk’s findings, without success. A huge controversy erupted on the techniques and 
procedures used by the South-Korean lab in order to achieve its results. The controversy 
started from questions, raised by one of Hwang Woo-suk’s colleagues in 2005, about the 
ethical legitimacy of the manner by which the necessary eggs had been acquired from 
female donors. Doubts then spread to the procedures with which the experiments had 
been carried out, as well as on the quality of the documentation provided. It was claimed 
that the procedures were impossible to reproduce; that data had been falsified; and that 
the photographs of the process provided by the South-Korean team had been digitally 
altered to fit their intended findings. In other words, the international community of stem 
cell researchers that had so enthusiastically bought into Hwang Woo-suk’s results started 
to question the validity of his procedures: the embodied knowledge displayed when 
producing those acclaimed results was found to be inadequate to the standards imposed 
by the community on its individual members. By the end of 2005, the clash between 
Hwang Woo-suk’s procedures and the ones recognised by the international community 
proved so powerful as to totally discredit Hwang Woo-suk’s results. He was forced to 
step down from his job and issue a public apology. Even more interestingly in the light of 
my arguments, the editors of ‘Science’ apologised for having published his results 
(Chong, 2006), an action that was widely taken to exemplify the unreliability of peer-
review processes conducted by major scientific journals (Bosman, 2006). The efforts and 
personal humiliation suffered by these editors in order to salvage the peer-review system 
is understandable, as this system constitutes one of the foremost institutional measures 
for a community to gauge the quality and adequacy of an individual’s or a group’s 
research in the light of accepted standards in the field.  
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 The modalities under which scientific understanding, as I define it, can be communicated will be 
explained in detail in chapter 7, section 7.2.1. 
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In its quality of ‘ability to do something’, understanding is a prerogative of individual 
experience. However, as illustrated by the above examples, the knowledge required to 
exercise this ability, as well as the standards placed on what constitutes relevant and 
adequate knowledge with respect to the phenomenon that is being understood, is a social 
achievement by whole research communities. The individual experience of understanding 
thus qualifies as ‘scientific’, only if it deploys (and eventually adds to) the theoretical and 
embodied knowledge that is already shared by the research community within which the 
individual’s work is conducted and evaluated. This explains why scientific discoveries, 
when breaking loose from traditions already established, are so difficult to communicate 
to other scientists: the communication of new findings implies some break from the 
theoretical and/or embodied knowledge hitherto accepted in the relevant communities.
49
  
 
When viewed from this perspective, scientific understanding could be defined as the 
cognitive substratum to what Thomas Nickles calls ‘reconstruction’, i.e. something that 
scientists ‘must do [..] in order to apply old results and techniques to new problems at the 
frontier and to model one problem solution on another’ (Nickles 1988, 34).
50
 This 
account resonates with Thomas Kuhn’s notion of paradigm, especially in the reading that 
Imre Lakatos gave of it through the notion of ‘research programmes’. According to 
Lakatos, such programmes are constantly modified through ongoing research, with the 
exception of their ‘core’, which is composed of key concepts, beliefs and ways of acting 
that unify the work of any research community and make it possible for it to be 
progressive (Lakatos, 1970). James Griesemer rephrased this intuition by emphasising the 
importance of the knowledge that biologists take for granted while conducting their 
research. Griesemer refers to the core beliefs of a research community in biology as its 
‘theoretical perspective’: that is, the set of concepts, interests and values that are (largely 
uncritically) used by biologists in their research and that, therefore, demarcate their 
epistemic culture. A theoretical perspective does not apply directly to a specific set of 
phenomena. Rather, it contributes the analytic and practical tools needed by a scientific 
community to pursue and obtain knowledge about a specific phenomenon (Griesemer 
2000, S348; more on this in chapter 5, section 3).  
 
It is precisely the constant inter-personal (and inter-group) communication of results and 
methods, as well as the institutionalised practices used in order to allow for such 
exchanges, that qualifies understanding as ‘scientific’. In this sense, my approach to 
scientific understanding embraces the suggestion, made recently by Michael Friedman, 
that scientific research is tied to a communicative rationality, that is, to ‘our capacity to 
engage in argumentative deliberation or reasoning with one another aimed at bringing 
about an agreement or consensus of opinion’ (Friedman 2001, 54). The social roots of 
deliberation, which several scholars of science view as the foundation for scientific and 
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 Note that my account, despite admittedly Kuhnian in its emphasis on expertise, in no way implies the 
incommensurability of results, methods and practices used within different epistemic cultures. As I 
emphasise in the rest of my thesis, each individual scientist might participate in several epistemic 
communities at once; as a result of this, as well as of the constant evolution of research, the boundaries 
separating different communities are often permeable and fluid.  
50
  Gooding phrases the issue as a question of scepticism toward one’s own findings: ‘This is non-Cartesian 
scepticism – a state of uncertainty that allows for reconstruction and the reinterpretation of one’s own 
experience so as to make it compatible with aspects of experience as reported by another’ (1990, 21). 
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technological knowledge, are what Helen Longino refers to as ‘the rationality of social 
cognition’.  
 
 
2.3.2 Collaboration in Scientific Communities: Focusing on ‘Big Science’ 
 
‘Collaboration’ as a term is helpful insofar as it indicates different 
individuals or groups aiming at certain shared goals, but we can and 
have gone further toward a specification of how the coordination takes 
place. Indeed, far from melting into a homogeneous entity, the different 
groups often maintain their distinctness, whether they are electrical 
engineers and mechanical engineers, or theorists and engineers, or 
theorists and experimentalists. The point is that these distinct groups, 
with their different approaches to instruments and their characteristic 
forms of argumentation, can nonetheless coordinate their approaches 
around specific practices  
Peter Galison 1997, 806 
 
After having clarified the reasons why scientific understanding can be regarded as a 
fundamentally social phenomenon, let us have a closer look at the organisation of 
research communities and the implications of different modes of scientific collaboration 
for the study of scientific understanding.  
 
Knorr-Cetina’s work on epistemic cultures, to which I referred in section 2.2.1, departs 
from the observation that individual researchers depend on others in order to carry out 
their research. This might have not been the case (not to this extent, anyhow) in the 18
th
 
and early 19th centuries, when the study of science was still the leisurely occupation of 
rich gentlemen, rather than a profession in its own right. The professionalisation, and 
consequent institutionalisation, of scientific research meant that contemporary scientists 
could not afford isolation, whether physical or intellectual. Most of their work takes place 
in facilities whose use is shared with other researchers; their training is carried out within 
universities and requires extensive collaboration with both teachers and other students; 
their research is based on and connected to several other endeavours by senior scientists 
or colleagues; and, most importantly, the quality of their work is assessed with relevance 
to its role in and relation to related research carried out by others. The goals, methods and 
results of each scientist’s research depend heavily on the goals, methods and results of his 
or her peers; this is what is meant by epistemic dependence in science (Hardwig 1985).   
 
Epistemic dependence among individuals belonging to research communities of various 
sizes may vary both in quality and in quantity. By quantitative variation of epistemic 
dependence, I mean variation in the extent to which an individual or research group 
depends on the work of colleagues. Similarity of interests and geographical proximity, for 
instance, might determine closer collaboration (even if this latter factor is losing 
importance in the context of globalised transport and communications, as I note below). 
Also, the degree of dependence of individuals on material and institutional constraints – 
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such as for instance shared access to a particularly expensive experimental apparatus, use 
of a common pool of funding or need to cooperate to obtain a grant – determines the 
quantity of epistemic dependence among individuals that are subject to them.  
 
The quality of collaborations among scientists within a community can be classified 
according to the background and role of those individuals. Thagard proposes to 
distinguish among four types of collaborations on the basis of the individuals’ 
institutional role and expertise, as follows: 
(1) employer/employee 
(2) teacher/apprentice 
(3) peer-similar (that is, collaboration among scientists with similar expertise) 
(4) peer-different (that is, collaboration among scientists with differing expertises). 
This classification exposes the different characteristics of each type of collaboration 
(Thagard 1997, 245-6). For instance, both (1) and (2) usually involve strong asymmetries 
in knowledge, status and power characterising the agents involved. At the same time, (1) 
constitutes a weaker form of collaboration than (2), as an employer trains employees to 
execute his or her own orders (as in the case of laboratory technicians), while a teacher 
trains apprentices to think and act for themselves (as in the case of a postgraduate 
student). The asymmetry characterising collaboration (4), also referred to as 
‘interdisciplinary’, is of a very different type from the one expressed in (1) and (2). It 
indicates that the specialised skills, training and knowledge of the individuals involved do 
not overlap (or at least, not to a great extent). At the same time, this lack of reciprocal 
understanding puts them on an equal stand: they both have to learn from the other in 
order to construct a framework in which they can share their expertise. This effort is not 
nearly as marked in the case of collaboration (3). This last type of collaboration might be 
the one involving the most epistemic dependence, as sharing of information and materials 
among scientists working on the same issues in the same way is often vital to the success 
of the relevant field. At the same time, this type of collaboration is the most vulnerable to 
competition for the limited number of powerful positions available within the field. 
Often, the advantages of competition trump the advantages of collaboration, thus leading 
to a secretive environment where results are rarely shared and collaboration occurs only 
when enforced by institutions.  
   
Of course, Thagard’s system is not the only way in which collaboration among scientists 
can be analysed. Other methods include noting distinctions between individuals working 
in ‘central’ institutions and individuals working in ‘peripheral’ institutions (Evans, 2004); 
between theorists and experimentalists, or field biologists and laboratory biologists 
(Galison 1987); and between scientists allied with specific (and sometimes opposing) 
scientific, social, economic or political interests (Fuller 2002). Also, Thagard’s 
classification concerns mostly overt collaboration, while much scientific collaboration 
involves indirect contact with others. For instance, the peer-review system, as well as the 
referencing system adopted in scientific journals, does not presuppose (and sometimes 
precludes, as in the case of referees) that contributors know each other personally. An 
individual or team may collaborate in a large project by perfecting a protocol, model or 
tool, thus spreading expertise without directly interacting with who benefits from it. 
Indirect collaboration can be just as effective as overt collaboration among scientists, 
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even if skills and tacit abilities (what I characterised as embodied knowledge) are most 
effectively acquired by close contact with individuals who are already experienced in the 
type of research in question.  
 
The importance of indirect collaboration and collaboration at a distance is especially felt 
in relation to so-called ‘big science’ projects, to which I will devote the bulk of my 
analysis. Scientific research, especially in biology, is increasingly financed and structured 
around large projects involving overt collaboration and sharing of resources among 
various institutions. They are typically interdisciplinary, thus including various ‘peer-
different’ collaborations. Given the specificity of the topics at hand, they include 
researchers based at different locations, often widely distant from each other (as in the 
case of American-Japanese collaborations, for instance). Steve Fuller gives a negative 
assessment of the effectiveness and organisation of big science projects. He remarks that, 
while a critical mass of contributors and resources is certainly necessary to conducting 
scientific research in any given field, contemporary large-scale science has little to do 
with constructing this critical mass and a lot to do with maximising the power, prestige 
and social influence of the individuals and institutions involved (2000, 33). According to 
Fuller, the complexity and hierarchy inherent to big science, not to mention the several 
social, political and economic interests bound to such expensive undertaking, represent a 
threat to the integrity and credibility of the science that is produced: ‘many of the 
essential virtues in science, especially those associated with criticism and openness, seem 
to get lost once scientific institutions reach a certain size, complexity, hierarchy and level 
of material investment’ (2002, 28).  
 
Fuller’s assessment touches a core concern in large-scale research regulation, which is 
often in the position of offering what Jasanoff (1990) has called ‘serviceable truths’ for 
policymaking (whether it is privately or publicly financed). Yet, I think that the type of 
collaboration fostered by big science has not only negative but also positive connotations. 
The reason why large projects are an increasingly popular way of organising all kinds of 
scientific research are not purely financial and political, even if opportunities for 
economic advantages and social prestige (especially in media resonance) abound in this 
mode of research. Another reason for the success of big science is its corrective influence 
over the lack of collaboration plaguing competitive fields like genetics and molecular 
biology, where both peer-similar and peer-different collaboration is avoided by individual 
scientists in order to enhance each individual’s chances of publishing and climbing the 
career ladder (with negative consequences for dialogue and overall productivity of the 
field). In this context, big science projects prove effective in order to encourage groups at 
different locations to collaborate, coordinate their research strategies and share data and 
instrumentation.  
 
The positive dimensions of big science are recognised by funding bodies, particularly at 
the governmental level. Different types of sponsorship give rise to mainly two modes of 
large-scale collaboration, which I shall call centralised and decentralised big science, 
respectively. Centralised big science is launched and coordinated by few (often only one) 
leading institutions, which acquire funding and distribute it among interested groups from 
other institutions on condition of complying with a given research agenda. As I shall 
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illustrate in chapter 7, the Arabidopsis community constitutes a good instance of this 
mode of collaboration. The research conducted in the community is highly centralised, 
despite its geographical dispersion. The leading institution proposes a research program 
for all participants to follow according to specific conditions and rules, including the 
methods, tools and materials to be used. In turn, all participants report their findings to 
the leading institution, which thus acts as the scientific, financial and administrative 
‘centre’ of the community. As is evident even from this short description, centralisation 
often entails a high amount of standardisation, which guarantees that all participant 
groups indeed follow the rules and conditions dictated by their sponsors and/or the 
leading institution.  
 
In the case of a collaborative project among equally powerful institutions, research does 
not have to be centralised. Rather, it is often the case that all participant laboratories 
agree on the set of issues to be investigated, and then each laboratory carries out its own 
research without consulting with others unless it needs to share information or resources 
(the European Union often sponsors collaborations of this kind among laboratories based 
in different European countries). Results are then reported in international venues such as 
conferences and workshops, where participant researchers correct each other’s inferences 
and try to integrate them into an overall understanding of the set of issues on which the 
overall project is focused. In order to start this type of collaboration, standardisation of 
practices and theoretical frameworks is not necessary, as each group pursues the common 
topic in its own way. In the absence of a priori constraints on the instruments and 
methods to be used, the chances for some of the groups to yield interesting and 
innovative results are higher. On the other hand, the lack of standardisation makes it more 
difficult for groups to collaborate and it generates problems when the time comes to 
integrate results by different groups. I shall refer to this type of community as an instance 
of decentralised big science.  
 
By highlighting some positive features characterising centralised and decentralised big 
science, I do not mean to undermine Fuller’s argument about the negative aspects of 
research carried out under such conditions. Indeed, I agree with him that in centralised 
big science it is more difficult to maintain a pluralism of perspectives: the high degree of 
standardisation, inter-group communication and the need to publish results jointly are 
only some of the characteristics of big science that threaten to homogenise and flatten the 
controversies that might emerge between different groups involved in a given project. As 
I signalled in section 2.2, there are reasons why so many biologists and philosophers 
deem theoretical and model pluralism to be an advantage, rather than a detriment, to 
scientific research: as forcefully argued by Peter Galison, among others, ‘it is precisely 
the disunification of science that brings strength and stability’ (Galison 1997, 781). As I 
shall discuss with reference to big science collaboration on Arabidopsis research, there 
are strong doubts among biologists as to whether it is at all possible to ‘reconcile’ 
protocols, results and techniques used by groups with differing perspectives, beliefs and 
interests to different aspects of the same phenomena. Further, the provisional agreement 
achieved in large constellations of powerful groups tends to have repercussions on the 
work of smaller communities, which are not part of the big science circuit but have to 
publish in the same journals, consult the same reviewers and appeal to the same sponsors. 
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In the long term, this input might be damaging to the creative pluralism that is inherent to 
biological research in precisely the way envisaged by Fuller. The construction of 
consensus especially within centralised big science can be extremely undemocratic, as 
more powerful institutions tend to simply impose their beliefs and methods to financially 
and/or socially weaker groups.  
 
Even in the face of all these misgivings, however, I think that power struggles in big 
science project can be confronted and regulated in different ways, not all of which are 
bound to have negative effects for the development of science. Under some (especially 
centralised) arrangements, most useful controversies and debates will indeed be 
eliminated; under other arrangements, only the irrelevant and fruitless discussions will be 
cut out of scientific attention. Big science does not necessarily lead to the elimination of 
useful controversies on the results obtained by different groups involved in such research. 
Extensive collaboration among different epistemic communities also yields more 
opportunities than otherwise to exchange and debate perspectives and opinions: if dissent 
and pluralism among scientists are at all valued in a big science project, research carried 
out in such a context might actually foster, rather than undermine, the critiques and 
confrontations that proved crucial to scientific development throughout the history of 
science. Both centralised and decentralised big science foster collaboration over dissent 
among participants. Agreement must be reached on which topics to investigate and, 
especially in the former case, on which methods and instruments to use: as remarked by 
Star and Griesemer, ‘each protocol is a record of a process of reconciliation’ (1989, 407). 
Such reconciliation is helpful especially when the goal of biologists involved in big 
science research is, as in the case of Arabidopsis biologists, to attempt to integrate the all-
too-many approaches and studies hitherto carried out on the same phenomenon (plant 
biology) into a unique framework. Many biologists view integrative biology as a step 
towards a better understanding of the sea of data hitherto gathered on all aspects of 
biological phenomena: we can really understand how an organism or an ecosystem 
functions, it is argued, only when we find ways to analyse many of its characteristics at 
the same time and under a common framework.  
 
Integrative biology is now far from being achieved and attempts towards obtaining large 
frameworks of this kind can only be carried out in the context of big and interdisciplinary 
research projects. In this sense, the collaboration enforced in big science projects might 
be viewed as enabling biologists to exchange and debate their views in more efficient 
ways than a more local context where collaboration is totally lacking. Arguably, 
theoretical pluralism is today so extensively disseminated as to threaten the very 
possibility for biologists to examine the foundations and general framework for their 
research. Occasional reflection on what scientists agree on, rather than disagree upon, is 
relevant to acquiring a balanced vision on the state of the field. In the face of the 
unstable, dynamic, complex organisation of scientific research into networks competing 
for the same, limited resources, large-scale science thus provides a platform for 
collaboration and for building bridges between the results, beliefs and methods upheld by 
different groups. It provides a space for different communities to meet and build 
consensus over what makes for acceptable (theoretical and/or material) knowledge: it is 
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thus, arguably, an important platform through which to enhance biologists’ understanding 
specifically of complex biological phenomena.   
 
My account of the tension between epistemological advantages and disadvantages 
brought about by ‘big science’ collaborations highlights the extent to which the research 
context (and specifically the degree and quality of epistemic dependence among 
individual biologists) influences both the theoretical and embodied knowledge used by 
researchers to understand biological phenomena. The quality of their understanding, as 
provided by coordinating theoretical and embodied knowledge that is deemed to be 
relevant to specific phenomenon, is therefore dependent on their social context and on 
their participation in it. I shall illustrate precisely how this works in practice in chapter 7, 
where I discuss how the organisation of Arabidopsis research as centralised big science 
affects the ways in which Arabidopsis biologists think and talk about their results, as well 
as their experimental practices and their ability to access and manipulate models and 
instruments useful to further their understanding of plant biology. 
 
 
2.3.3 An Internalist Position? 
 
I would like to spend some final words on an objection that is likely to arise in relation to 
my – for now – minimalist sketch of what it is that enables scientific understanding. This 
is the idea that my approach is overly demanding: it sets high standards for the set of 
tools and conditions necessary for an individual to understand phenomena ‘scientifically’. 
As I shall clarify in the rest of this dissertation, there are different ways in which 
understanding can be achieved: biologists use several strategies to coordinate their 
theoretical and embodied knowledge, depending on the type and quality of the 
knowledge that they possess, the phenomena with which they are dealing and the social, 
institutional and material setting of their research. Still, my definition of scientific 
understanding might be criticised as strongly internalistic
51
 - in other words, as restricting 
the ability to understand scientifically to active participants in research communities, thus 
denying that people without scientific training and professional experience might be able 
to understand in such a manner.   
 
There is a sense in which this criticism is well taken. Indeed, I believe scientific 
understanding to be strongly tied to participation in scientific communities and related 
exposure to their epistemic culture(s). I have already emphasised how the ability to 
understand scientifically, as I describe it, is nurtured and regulated by participation in a 
research community, whose epistemic culture determines the adequacy of the theoretical 
and embodied knowledge used by the individual in order to understand the phenomenon 
in question. When saying this, I do not wish to argue that other, non-scientific kinds of 
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 This notion of internalism (which has no relation to the one employed as the opposite of externalism 
within general epistemology) has been forcefully used by Fuller (2000) to criticise the Kuhnian approach to 
the philosophy and history of science. Kuhn himself presented his work as an internal approach to history 
(1970, 209). Fuller and others have long questioned the links between such a view and the social authority 
granted to science and technology in the public sphere (for instances of such debates, see the 1979 issue of 
‘Kennis & Methode’ [in Dutch] edited by Nauta and de Vries and the 2003 issue of ‘Social Epistemology’ 
edited by Gattei). 
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expertise should be seen as irrelevant to scientific understanding. However, their 
usefulness towards acquiring understanding dubbed as ‘scientific’ depends on the 
willingness by scientific peers and circles, to accept this knowledge as relevant to their 
practices and interpretations of natural phenomena. The idea that understanding can only 
be dubbed as scientific when recognised as such by scientific experts does not mean to 
reduce scientific understanding to a matter of social consensus, nor does it imply that 
understanding that is not acknowledged as scientific has no epistemological value. As I 
discuss above, the definition of understanding as scientific depends both on the manner 
by which it is achieved and on the consensus of the community in which it is expressed. 
Thus, an individual understanding a phenomenon through coordination of relevant 
theoretical and embodied knowledge is producing valuable insight: its relevance to 
science is, however, dependent on whether and when a scientific community adopts such 
understanding as its own.  
 
This account does not imply by any means that non-scientists cannot or should not 
intervene in scientific controversies: this involvement is both possible and necessary 
within societies that are increasingly dependent on scientific and technological 
developments. What my account of scientific understanding does signal is a sizable gap 
in resources, perspectives and expertises between scientists and non-scientists. This gap 
is a core issue underlying the democratic use of science and technology (also referred to 
as ‘politics of displacement’; Beck 1991) and it is my opinion that it should be recognised 
as such. Let me underscore this view by appealing, again, to the case of GMOs. That the 
results of research on GMOs are difficult to understand in the absence of detailed 
knowledge about transgenic technology and genetic mutations, is evident in the civil 
unrest surrounding the introduction of GMOs in the European Union. Several 
representatives of European civil society have been expressing deep concern about their 
inability to assess the risks eventually associated with GMO consumption. The voicing of 
these concerns effectively hampered ongoing research on GMOs (especially on those 
destined to human consumption, such as maize, tomatoes and apples). Arguably, a 
prominent cause for consumers’ worries consists precisely in the knowledge gap 
separating them from biologists, which makes consumers unable to understand the 
biological processes involved in biotechnological interventions. As a consequence, it 
becomes more difficult for non-scientists to evaluate health risks that might be associated 
to the consumption of such organisms. Several other controversies surrounding the use of 
technologies (such as the environmental hazards caused by chlorofluorocarbons [CFCs], 
long-term effects of radiations emitted by mobile phones and other house appliances, and 
so on) signal the same type of unease: debates among scientists on the safety of these 
technologies are just as heated as debates on the same topic by non-scientists (and the 
divergences on what is considered to be ‘scientific’ might be large in both camps), but the 
topics discussed and especially the means by which discussions are carried out tend to 
differ considerably between the two spheres. While using a technology does not usually 
require theoretical knowledge of the processes underlying its functioning, such 
theoretical knowledge, together with embodied knowledge of how scientists apply 
theoretical knowledge in producing an artefact, is required in order to understand how 
that artefact works and with which long-term implications. This latter type of scientific 
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understanding is often crucial to assessing the impact of that artefact on human health and 
the environment.  
 
In this thesis, I do not intend to propose a solution to the complex and much-discussed 
problem of the role and justification for so-called ‘scientific expertise’. However, I find it 
instructive to signal the connection between my present discussion of the epistemology of 
scientific understanding and the more political discussion over internalism in science, in 
the hope that looking at ‘expertise’ from my perspective might elicit further, innovative 
research on this important set of issues. I shall return to this in my conclusions (section 
8.1.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 48
Chapter 3. History of Arabidopsis Research: Towards Integrative Plant 
Biology 
 
3.1 Model Organisms in Biology 
 
Reasoning via model organisms, in a sense, has become the 
lingua franca of biologists entering twentieth-first century 
Rachel Ankeny 2001, S251 
 
The selection of appropriate organisms on which to make experiments and from which to 
draw data has been a pressing problem throughout the history of biology. Biological 
research typically aims at extrapolating knowledge whose applicability extends beyond 
the organisms that are actually being studied. The study of an individual organism is 
taken to provide understanding about all other members of the same species; further, it is 
often expected that the study of a single species should provide biological insight into 
many other species. This idea is grounded in evolutionary theory, according to which all 
life forms are related through a common evolutionary history and thus share a smaller or 
greater amount of genetic make-up and developmental features. This assumption is used 
to justify the possibility that an organism acts as a ‘sample’ of a much larger class of 
animals and/or plants (those, that is, that are phylogenetically most closely related to that 
species and hence display significant morphological, structural or ecological similarities 
with its members).  
 
This possibility turns into a necessity when, for ethical and/or pragmatic reasons, research 
cannot be carried out directly on the organism of interest – blatant examples being many 
human diseases and relevant treatments, which cannot be investigated without serious 
hazards to the health of the organism that is employed. An important cluster of issues 
surrounding the use of model organisms in biological research concerns precisely its 
ethical and scientific soundness, especially with regard to pharmaceutical testing. Is it at 
all viable to propose that knowledge acquired on rats is safely transferable to humans, 
and if so, under which conditions? Is it possible to formulate criteria through which the 
representativeness of a model organism can be evaluated? There is no easy answer to 
these questions and, while they are not entirely irrelevant to my discussion, it is not my 
purpose to confront them in this dissertation.
52
 What interests me here is the ubiquity and 
epistemological significance of model organism research in biology, as there is simply no 
way, in practice, to avoid (1) basing research on the study of actual organisms and (2) 
treating them as representatives for other organisms. As Krogh concluded already in 
1929, ‘for a large number of problems there will be some animal of choice or a few such 
animals on which they can be most conveniently studied’ (1929, 244). This is true even 
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 For instructive discussions of the ethical dimensions of model organism research, see Lynch (1988), 
Logan (2001, 2002) and Malezka et al. (1988). Some relevant literature is restricted to animal 
experimentation, e.g. Rowan (1984) and Lafollette and Shanks (1997).  
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despite the popularity recently acquired by simulations and digital models in 
experimental biology (in fact, as I shall discuss in chapter 6, research via these types of 
models yields useful insights especially when complemented by research on actual 
organisms).  
 
The central role played by model organisms in biology is due to their crucial 
contributions towards scientists’ understanding of biological phenomena. I shall clarify 
precisely how this is the case in Chapters 6 and 8 of this dissertation. For now, I take this 
claim to imply that the use of model organisms has several epistemological advantages, 
some of which I shall introduce and discuss in this chapter. Model organisms are often 
chosen on the basis of their tractability
53
 under laboratory conditions, including ease of 
maintenance and transport, length of life cycles and fertility rates. They provide a stable 
environment in which a biologist can investigate specific issues (such as the animal’s 
metabolic system), while leaving worries about environmental variability across 
individuals or about variation among species aside for later consideration. They thus 
constitute low-cost, low-maintenance research materials that are easy to control and of 
which a substantial body of knowledge can rapidly be accumulated, since repeated use of 
and reference to the same model organism provides a great opportunity for sharing 
knowledge across the vast constellation of biological disciplines, groups and research 
schools. As I discuss in the chapters that follow, the choice of a model organism greatly 
influences the way in which biologists reason about the issues that they investigate, the 
way in which they act in the laboratory (for instance, by imposing protocols and skills 
favouring the survival and maintenance of the organism at hand) and the way in which 
they interpret such actions.  
 
The profound impact of model organism research has been amply recognised by 
biologists themselves, who have exploited model organisms in increasingly sophisticated 
manners and have recently magnified their usefulness as research tools by giving them 
central stage in the genomic revolution. By the end of the last century, the transparent 
nematode Caenorhabditis elegans, the bacterium E. coli and the plant Arabidopsis had 
become the first organisms to have their DNA fully sequenced, thus opening a whole new 
space for genomic research aimed at deciphering the now cracked, and yet largely 
uninterpreted, code. As a consequence of their new status in an ever-expanding 
microbiological research, the use of these model organisms has been made more efficient 
- for instance by creating and standardising protocols and codes of conduct in order to 
keep them alive and handle them adequately, as well as procedures and techniques to 
make them ‘cooperate’ with the other human and non-human actors in an experimental 
setting (Latour, 1987). Biologists have also found ways to enhance their production, so as 
to obtain and reproduce organisms in the shapes and/or genetic make-up that are most 
desirable for specific research programmes. Last but not least, the distribution of model 
organism has been standardised: various model organisms communities, including the 
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 Note that the term tractability, as I use it in this dissertation, indicates the ease with which specimens can 
survive and reproduce in a laboratory. It does not indicate the ease with which specimens can be modified 
to fit the techniques and procedures of specific types of research (as for instance in the case of mutations).  
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Arabidopsis community, have instituted stock centres and private inventories that make 
them available to laboratories that require them.  
 
An important condition for, as well as implication of, these processes is that large 
research communities have been forming around the use of specific model organisms, so 
as to profit from the know-how, expertise, instrumentation and data accumulated by 
participating scientists. Funding programmes have increasingly supported work on the 
most popular model organisms, thus creating the so-called ‘founders effect’ in biological 
research (that is, the narrowing of experimentation to a few well-studied organisms, 
rather than bestowing resources on comparative research among organisms) as well as a 
complex network of alliances and interests gravitating around and within the 
communities devoted to one or the other organism. Glaring examples of this tendency are 
the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster, whose claims to fame stem from its adoption as 
the model organism for genetics – a choice so successful as to promote the humble insect 
to ‘lord of the flies’ and centre of attraction for virtually all researchers in the field 
(Kohler 1994); the above-mentioned worm C. elegans, ‘conqueror’ of neurology 
(Ankeny 1997, 2000, 2006); the crucial contribution of the tobacco mosaic virus to the 
development of molecular biology and pathogeny (Creager 2002); and the house mouse, 
whose intricate adventures as the object of study of several biomedical branches have 
been brought together in a recent volume by Karen Rader (2004).
54
  
 
I shall not attempt here to summarise the various ways in which reference to a specific 
model organism impacts scientific reasoning: it is my intention to explore them in detail 
throughout this dissertation (particularly in chapter 6), with reference to the case of the 
model plant Arabidopsis thaliana. Arabidopsis research is propelling significant advances 
in several branches of the life sciences. The success story of this plant sets the stage for 
the epistemological analysis of the main features of model organism research that I will 
propose in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. My aim in this chapter is to unravel at least some of the 
factors that contribute to the success of a specific life form as a model organism. To this 
aim, I start from an historical reconstruction of the events that transformed Arabidopsis 
into the leading model organism in plant biology. With reference to this history, I shall 
single out and discuss several characteristics of Arabidopsis research that account for its 
scientific fruitfulness and institutional fortunes. This analysis constitutes an appropriate 
starting point for my philosophical study of how practices in model organism research 
enable a biological understanding of the phenomena under study.  
 
At the same time, the very nature of these characteristics, which include both social and 
scientific factors, colourfully illustrates the importance of collective work in biological 
research. In line with research modes characterising other large model organism 
communities, the Arabidopsis community is engaged in big science, in which sponsors, 
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 This list is by no means exhaustive. For other examples, consider the literature on rats (Logan 2001), 
yeast (Botstein and Fink, 1988), further studies of C. Elegans (Schaffner 2000, de Chardaverian 1998) and 
all examples cited by Geison and Creager (1999). 
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participants, projects, investments and (it is expected) results all come in high numbers. 
Its scientific agenda, activities and results are therefore shaped by a variety of factors, 
including power dynamics, social tensions within and without the community, political 
commitments, economic constraints and scientific alliances. As claimed by historian 
Angela Creager, ‘the uses of model objects in research reveal the otherwise 
inconspicuous connections between biological experimentation and activities usually 
relegated to the domains of technology, politics, medicine and agriculture’ (2002, 3). I 
hope to illustrate how such connections inform and maintain the epistemological status of 
Arabidopsis research. The collective nature of this enterprise, as well as the many non-
scientific factors that make it possible, greatly influence the way in which scientists 
conceive of a model organism and manipulate it in order to gain knowledge about 
biological phenomena. As a prelude to further discussion of this point, I shall conclude 
this chapter by introducing two subgroups in the Arabidopsis community, the details of 
whose work shall inform much of my analysis: The Arabidopsis Information Resource 
and the Nottingham Arabidopsis Stock Centre.   
 
 
3.2   Enter Arabidopsis thaliana 
 
One of the most powerful forces in plant biology during the past 
15 years was the accumulation of a critical mass of scientists 
around the use of the small plant Arabidopsis thaliana. Much of 
the recent progress in plant biology has been made possible by 
the technical advantages of having a large group of biologists 
working with a well-chosen model organism combined with the 
inherent power of molecular genetics 
Chris Somerville 2000, 21 
 
Arabidopsis thaliana, commonly referred to as mouse cress, is a plant of the mustard 
family that grows almost everywhere across the Northern hemisphere. An occasional 
visitor wandering through the European countryside is, however, highly unlikely to pay 
any attention to its characteristic white flowers – and with good reason. Arabidopsis is 
tiny, with an average length of about 10 to 15 cm excluding the roots. It has a short life-
span (about six to eight weeks), bears no fruits and its flowers come in no spectacular 
colours, size or variety. As most other types of weed, it is regarded as a parasite, yet its 
impact on the ecosystem is so limited as to be generally disregarded. It obviously has no 
agronomic significance. In short, Arabidopsis has long been regarded as an insignificant 
organism from the commercial, aesthetic as well as scientific points of view. 
 
Figure 3.1 - Arabidopsis thaliana.  
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This connotation accounts for the very scarce attention that experimentalists and 
naturalists alike, with a few exceptions in the Netherlands, Germany and the States, paid 
to Arabidopsis until the 1980s. Yet, over the last two decades, Arabidopsis came to play a 
prominent role in experimental plant biology: it is currently its most important and well-
researched model organism. Since the late 1970s, the community of biologists working 
with this plant has grown from around 25 researchers to 6000 laboratories distributed in 
five continents, for a total of more than 16000 researchers.
55
 Its genome has been the first 
plant genome to be sequenced and the facilities and tools assembled to gather data about 
it are arguably the best available for any organism, with the exclusion of Homo sapiens. 
Further, this extensive gathering of knowledge has brought about several important 
theoretical discoveries in a variety of fields in plant biology (table 3.1): among them, an 
improved understanding of molecular mechanisms for flowering and root development, 
light reception, metabolism and disease resistance (plant pathogen interactions). 
 
Table 3.1. Most cited subject areas, illustrating the scope of Arabidopsis research. 
Courtesy of James Evans 2006.  
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 This estimate is based on the number of contributing members registered by the The Arabidopsis 
Information Resource (TAIR website, accessed 15 November 2006), as well as from statistics gathered 
from published Arabidopsis research by the sociologist James Evans (2004, 2006).   
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This scenario prompts several questions, the most prominent of which for my current 
purposes is an historical one: how to account for this reawakening of interest in 
Arabidopsis and, most importantly, for the ensuing success story of the plant as a model 
organism? This is the question that I shall address in this section of the chapter. To this 
aim, I shall first review the history of Arabidopsis as a model organism, then focus more 
closely on the features of the plant that, in the context of a specific community and 
scientific setting, have determined its unlikely success.  
 
 
3.2.1 Early History of Arabidopsis Research 
 
The first significant bout of interest in Arabidopsis as a model organism arose in 
Germany and the United States in the 1940s, mainly through the work of Friedrich 
Laibach (based in Frankfurt) and George Redei (Columbia). Laibach was initially 
attracted to Arabidopsis because of the great phenotypic variation to be found in nature 
among its ecotypes: he was in fact the first scientist, in 1937, to start a systematic 
collection and classification of Arabidopsis wildtype mutants. This interest was fuelled 
by his belief that Arabidopsis could become a suitable model organism for (classical) 
plant genetics and developmental research, i.e. for the mechanisms responsible for this 
diversity of ecotypes (Laibach, 1943). Several material features of Arabidopsis made it a 
promising candidate for the experimental study of natural variation at both the ecological 
and the micro-structural levels. First, there is its ease of maintenance and small space 
requirements, allowing the cultivation of large populations of plants within relatively 
primitive facilities. Second, its low chromosome number – only five, which is little 
relative to other flowering plants. The last and most important element is its short 
generation time and large number of progeny: a self-fertilising diploid, each Arabidopsis 
specimen can produce thousands of seeds in its short life cycle (between six and eight 
weeks).  
 
Laibach’s collection of mutants reflected his interest in both the ecological and micro-
structural properties of Arabidopsis. Working in the Mendelian framework, he was 
interested in Arabidopsis ecotypes that presented variations at the phenotypic level, in 
order to study and compare their differences at the chromosomal level and thus establish 
correspondences between chromosomal and morphological traits. Laibach’s intuitions 
were developed in the 1950s and 1960s by research groups led by Michel Jacobs in 
Belgium, Wil Feenstra in the Netherlands and Gerhard Röbbelen in Germany. Upon 
Laibach’s retirement in 1965, Röbbelen assumed the role of curator of the ecotype 
collection (which he shared with Redei in the United States, so as to have a set of all lines 
per continent). At around the same time (1964), Röbbelen also started the publication of 
the Arabidopsis Information Service [AIS], a yearly newsletter bringing together research 
updates on experimental work on the plant and helping communication and exchanges 
among interested biologists. 
 
The small group of readers and contributors gathered by AIS was not yet, however, 
destined to grow. In fact, despite the convincing evidence available about the utility of 
Arabidopsis to the study of genetics, these early attempts to bring Arabidopsis to the 
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laboratory failed to create wider consensus. This was mainly due to the values and 
interests upheld in plant biology as a whole in the post-war period. While huge amounts 
of money were destined to basic genetic research on animal models, both in Europe and 
in the United States most governmental (not to mention corporate) support for plant 
biology was directed towards applied research. Projects concerning breeding techniques, 
particularly on agriculturally significant organisms such as tobacco, received almost all of 
the anyway limited funding allotted to this branch of biology. In the absence of 
institutional support, basic research on commercially uninteresting plants, such as 
‘insignificant’ Arabidopsis, remained highly unfashionable among plant biologists. 
Moreover, a second major drawback emerged from the study of the material properties of 
the plant. While its natural variability attracted biologists working in the framework of 
classical genetics, the new emphasis on biochemically induced mutations proved to be 
inapplicable to Arabidopsis specimens: they simply refused to be transformed. The few 
mutations obtained between 1950 and the early 1980s were produced at the high cost of 
months of experimental labour and with no foreseeable hope of speeding up the process. 
Arabidopsis’ resilience to genetic modifications was an extremely unhelpful feature at 
such a high point of the molecular bandwagon: upon realising this, the few European and 
American biologists hitherto interested in working on Arabidopsis had to turn the bulk of 
their energies to tomato, yeast or maize. Even Maarten Koornneef, a student of Feenstra 
in Wageningen and one of the early and most fervent champions of Arabidopsis as a 
model system for genetics, retreated to the study of tobacco and published on Arabidopsis 
in his (very scarce) spare time.
56
  
 
In the face of this debacle, how can we explain the revival of Arabidopsis as a model 
organism that blossomed already at the beginning of the 1980s? A first step towards 
understanding requires enlarging our historiographic gaze to include the contemporary 
situation in animal biology, and particularly the burgeoning field of animal genetics. 
Many researchers working on Drosophila felt that the time was ripe for moving genetic 
analysis decidedly in the direction of molecular biology. However, the large resources, 
long history and high reputation of research on fruit flies constituted obstacles, rather 
than advantages, for this purpose. Competition among the several researchers enrolling in 
the Drosophila community was stiff and unforgiving: as a result, newcomers to the field 
were encouraged to specialise on already established – and thus often theoretically 
uninteresting – issues. Exploring new directions of research in such a climate was almost 
impossible, given both time and peer pressures to submit enough publications as required 
to climbing the steep academic ladder. Plant biology, by comparison, was regarded by 
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 Other factors also contributed to the increasing disinterest in Arabidopsis as a model organism. For 
instance, there was the interest initially awakened by the publication of a paper trying to force Arabidopsis 
to assimilate thiamine by injecting E. coli DNA into the plant (Ledoux, L., Huart, R. and Jacobs, M. 1974). 
The experiment proved to be entirely spurious, thus further endangering Arabidopsis’ shaky reputation as a 
model organism. The rise of scepticism following this publication is documented in Somerville and 
Koornneef (2002) and has been further emphasised to me by Koornneef himself (pers. com.). Further, 
personal misfortunes also contributed to Arabidopsis decline. To mention one: a PhD student hired by 
Feenstra in the mid-1970s to pursue his interests in biochemical genetics for nitrites metabolism in 
Arabidopsis, was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis shortly after her appointment. Human tragedy thus also 
triggered a significant delay in (in this case, Dutch) genomic research on the plant (since the student, who 
indeed managed to conclude her thesis, submitted her results only well into the 1980s). 
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many geneticists as a relatively ‘empty field’ (Koornneef, pers. com.). Focused as it was 
on producing applied knowledge (such as breeding studies), the discipline did not have a 
history of tackling basic developmental mechanisms in plants. Here, therefore, was a 
possibility to start this line of research anew in a much less competitive environment – 
which meant, on one hand, freedom from the cumbersome legacy of the theoretical 
commitments favoured by older biologists; on the other hand, the possibility to organise 
research effort in a highly collaborative fashion, so that participant scientists would 
investigate different and potentially complementary topics on a common basis of insights 
and tools coming from molecular biology.  
 
Given the situation in animal molecular biology, the dormant state of Arabidopsis 
research characterising the end of the 1970s turned into a contributing factor for its 
revival. Precisely when animal researchers started to feel that ‘molecular biology was in 
such a state that it needed a model’ (Koornneef, pers. com.), they discovered a plant of 
excellent tractability and chromosomal structure, on which a host of genetic data was 
already available together with a rich and well-systematised collection of ecotypes, yet 
which was not already adopted by any large research project. Some prominent experts in 
animal biology, such as Elliott Meyerowitz (Caltech) and Gerd Jürgends (Tübingen), thus 
started to consider channelling their interest in organismic development towards plants. 
Even more enthusiastically, younger researchers of great promise understood the 
situation and decided to gamble their future careers on it: prominent among those figured 
Chris Somerville and Shauna Somerville, who teamed up (in research as well as in 
private life) to start one of the first and most successful programmes in Arabidopsis 
research first at Michigan State University and then in Stanford’s Carnegie Institution for 
Plant Biology.
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 In their own words, the relevant question for molecular biologists in the 
early 1980s became: ‘why not a plant?’ (pers. com.).   
 
Figure 3.2 – First meeting of (from left to right) Shauna Somerville, Chris Somerville, 
Elliot Meyerowitz, David Meinke, an unidentified researcher and Maarten Koornneef. 
Photograph: courtesy of Chris Somerville and Elliot Meyerowitz. 
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 The vision of the Somervilles played indeed a crucial role towards the establishment of the Arabidopsis 
community. During an interview conducted in August 2004, they recounted to me what they felt to be the 
circumstances in which they conceived their ideas about the future of Arabidopsis. Right after Shauna’s 
graduation from her PhD on Arabidopsis pathology, she and Chris (then working on E coli after graduating 
in Maths and shifting to experimental biology) left for a summer vacation in Paris. There, they apparently 
spent their time elaborating a life-career plan for themselves based on their specific vision about what could 
be achieved via Arabidopsis work. Shauna convinced Chris that work on that plant held great promise, both 
for its characteristics as a model organism and because of the humanitarian promise held by biotechnology. 
Notably, the Somervilles believed that work on plant biology could have positive, long-term impacts on 
people’s lives (via the improvement of control over plant development which, when applied, would lead to 
enhancements in agricultural productivity).  
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It was to discuss this question and its possible implications that the Somervilles, 
Koornneef, Meyerowitz and David Meinke (now at Oklahoma State) independently 
decided to attend a 1985 meeting on plant molecular biology in Colorado. That otherwise 
unremarkable conference had the important function of bringing together for the first 
time the founding fathers of the ‘revived’ Arabidopsis community. The group hit off 
immediately, as their communality of interests, values and vision quickly transformed 
their affiliation into a friendship (figure 3.2). This is an important element in the history 
of Arabidopsis as a model organism, since the strong personal and professional bond 
established among its advocates greatly helped to enhance the popularity of the plant 
among other researchers. This was in part due to the group’s complicity in elaborating 
common strategies towards attracting funding (and thus recruits and facilities) at both the 
national and the international level. Even more importantly, the group expressed a strong 
commitment to creating a common ethos for the prospective community of Arabidopsis 
researchers: it was an ethos of collaboration and coordination of research efforts, aimed at 
heightening the overall output of the community as well as countering the ‘publish or 
perish’ mentality increasingly pervading the scientific world.
58
 Sue Rhee, a former 
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 Remarkably, both Chris Somerville and Koornneef have emphasised to me how struck they were, since 
their youth, by the epistemic advantages of a community sharing data on the basis of need and interest, 
rather than as a career token. Koornneef, for instance, had an early experience of collaborative research 
when visiting Zürich as a postdoctoral fellow (then a recognised centre of excellence on plant biology 
research) – an experience that had a dramatic impact on his perspective on research methods and values. 
Chris and Shauna Somerville, as a married couple working on different aspects of the plant, also have 
extensive personal experience in collaboration. Their current graduate students at Carnegie do not even 
understand the competitive attitudes that they witness outside Arabidopsis research (indeed, even now the 
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student of Chris Somerville and current director of The Arabidopsis Information 
Resource, aptly characterised this attitude as the ‘share and survive model’ of research 
(Rhee 2004).  In 1987, an international steering committee called Multinational 
Arabidopsis Steering Committee [MASC] was created in order to coordinate Arabidopsis 
research projects around the world.
59
 To this day, MASC functions both as a powerful 
attractor for governmental funding and as a centralising and rationalising force in the 
community, subtly but strongly enforcing the ethos of collaboration and pre-publication 
sharing of results that would have otherwise been lost to the competitive dynamics of 
scientific hierarchies.  
 
In plant biology, the growing attention to molecular approaches and the increasingly 
successful campaign in favour of Arabidopsis research brought about a shift in the 
features to be valued in a model organism. It became acceptable to study a plant that was 
highly suited to laboratory life, but of no immediate agronomic interest, since the basic 
mechanisms of heredity were expected to be applicable to all other plants, including more 
useful crops. This was particularly true in the case of Arabidopsis, which is genetically 
closely related to other flowering plants and is thus characterised by a high (genetic) 
typicality with respect to them. These characteristics partially account for the choice of 
Arabidopsis as the plant on which to focus research effort. A major remaining obstacle to 
its adoption was, however its above-mentioned low transformative ability. This feature 
nurtured much of the lingering scepticism about focusing on plants, in general, and 
Arabidopsis, in particular, as models for molecular genetics. No wonder, then, that the 
unexpected announcement of a spectacular solution to this problem, published by 
Feldmann in 1986, felt like ‘hocus pocus’ (Chris Somerville, pers. com.), a little ‘miracle’ 
(Koornneef, pers. com), to early Arabidopsis proselytes. What Feldmann discovered was 
a simple and extremely effective technique for the production of Arabidopsis mutants: it 
was sufficient to spray the wildtype with a bacterium (Agrobacterium tumefaciens) 
containing a gene of interest in plasmid, then selecting for the transgene in the second 
generation (Feldmann and Marks, 1987). Thanks to this technique, it became suddenly 
possible to obtain an astonishing variety of Arabidopsis mutants in which phenotypic 
growth had been disrupted in some way or other. This development won a great number 
of biologists over to the study of Arabidopsis.  
 
Last but not least, there was the sudden decision by the National Science Foundation to 
appropriate the study of the plant and provide abundant funding to its American 
proponents. The interest and lobbying of James Watson, by then a celebrated figure with 
powerful influence on governmental support for scientific projects, certainly contributed 
to the benevolence of NSF.
60
 Another strong motivation for NSF involvement had again 
to do with the state of research on animal models, which was then entirely funded by the 
National Institute of Health [NIH] – a governmental agency traditionally competing with 
                                                                                                                                            
collaborative ethos characterising this community represents strong motivation for young researchers not to 
move to other organisms). More on this in Chapter 7, section 7.1.1. 
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 While its members are elected by open nomination and voting, and their mandate lasts no more than 3 
years, the MASC committee tends to include researchers who have studied with one of the ‘founding 
fathers’ or who anyway subscribe to their vision and long-term goals.  
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 Watson’s involvement was indicated to me by Chris Somerville (pers. com.).  
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NSF for prestige and power. NSF hoped – and indeed, successfully managed – to exploit 
the empty niche of plant biology in order to enhance its own profile among American 
funding bodies. Its institutional support was crucial not only to the rapidity with which 
Arabidopsis research developed in the States, but also to the manner of that development, 
since dependence from a unique funding source enormously enhanced the centralising 
and collaborative nature of the Arabidopsis community. Also, NSF patronage greatly 
spurred governmental support at the international level, since none of the other big 
players in scientific research could afford being left behind. In five years from the start of 
NSF funding, therefore, Britain, Germany, the European Union and Japan had all agreed 
to invest considerable amounts of money into Arabidopsis research. Further, they had to 
yield to the ethos of collaboration and sharing of resources imposed by their American 
partners: it quickly proved unthinkable to keep secrecy over results at the pre-publication 
stage within an American-dominated context supporting that ethos.
61
    
 
 
3.2.2 Creating a ‘Botanical Drosophila’ 
 
Standard flies were not just the means of experimental 
production but also the bearers of a distinctive moral economy 
and a distinctive way of experimental life   
Robert E. Kohler 1994, 168 
 
All the above-mentioned factors, ranging from the useful features of Arabidopsis plants 
to the institutional setting and resources devoted to their study, resulted in the birth, in 
1990, of the Arabidopsis Genome Initiative [AGI], a multinational research effort 
(involving six research groups based in the States, Japan and Europe) that yielded a 
complete mapping of the Arabidopsis genome by the year 2000. As the first plant 
undergoing genomic sequencing, the status of Arabidopsis in plant biology was finally 
sanctioned: in little more than a decade, it had become its best-known and most popular 
model organism. This latter statement refers to the institutional as much as the 
epistemological status of Arabidopsis in plant biology. The recognition of a model 
organism is taken here to involve both the frequency of its usage in the laboratory and the 
type of knowledge yielded through that usage. In other words, the dramatic growth in the 
number of researchers working on Arabidopsis contributed to transforming the plant into 
the most popular model system in plant biology and one of the most important organisms 
in biology as a whole.  
 
This argument implies that the extent to which a model organism is used does tell us a lot 
about how it is used and to which results. That is, the study of how a research tool is used 
by scientists is relevant towards uncovering its epistemic function and usefulness. The 
history of Arabidopsis as a research tool and (as I will characterise it in Chapter 6) a 
materially abstracted model constitutes a clear illustration of how closely social, 
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 Sean May, director of NASC, stressed the initial British resistance to this ethos in his interviews with me. 
The US ‘push’ is also visible in episodes such as the Crete meeting (early 1990s) organized by the EU to 
select which model organisms to privilege within plant biology. On that occasion, both the EU and Japan 
stressed how they had to follow the US trend and fund Arabidopsis research.  
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institutional and scientific factors intertwine in order to enhance and shape the 
epistemological contribution of Arabidopsis to plant biology. As reported above, many 
elements of the early Arabidopsis history signal the importance of institutional support, 
community ethos and strategies to obtain funding in shaping the goals of research on 
Arabidopsis. In fact, the centralised coordination of Arabidopsis research was guided by 
the enthusiastic acceptance, by participant researchers and funding agencies alike, of a 
common scientific goal concerning precisely the status of Arabidopsis plants as model 
organisms. This goal, as expressed by the first MASC programmatic statement in 1990, 
was ‘to understand the physiology, biochemistry, growth and development of a flowering 
plant at the molecular level, using Arabidopsis as an experimental model system’ (MASC 
1990, 12). Remarkably, this formulation implies that the Arabidopsis community as a 
whole takes up a commitment for which it holds itself accountable to its sponsors and 
peers: this is to treat Arabidopsis as a model of the molecular processes characterising 
growth and development in flowering plants.  
 
As indicated by the disciplinary background and research interests of most scientists 
involved in the community up to the early 1990s, what confirmed the importance of 
Arabidopsis as a model system was indeed its relevance to the study of plant genetics and 
molecular biology. Already in 1964, the first AIS editorial exemplifies the extent to 
which this goal set an agenda for Arabidopsis research. In it, Röbbelen characterised the 
plant as the ‘botanical Drosophila’, that is to say as an organism useful to the study of the 
biochemical basis for genetic mutation, in the same way as the celebrated fruit fly. This 
was not surprising in light of the paradigm shift to molecular genetics, or ‘molecular 
bandwagon’, characterising a large part of biology at the time.
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 Yet, it also indicated the 
gradual dismissal of Laibach’s original interest in the morphology, evolution and ecology 
of Arabidopsis as a necessary complement to its genetics. Despite Röbbelen’s feeble 
reminders to pursue and publish research concerning other aspects of plant biology
63
, the 
AIS became a promotional vehicle for shifting research focus from the phenotypic to the 
genotypic features of Arabidopsis. This communication tool exemplifies the extent to 
which the adherence of institutions and researchers alike to specific epistemic 
commitments facilitated the rise of Arabidopsis as a credible system for the study of 
mutagenesis. By the mid-1990s, most scientific reviews hailed the usefulness of 
Arabidopsis as ‘a model plant for genome analysis’ (Meinke et al, 1998): in other words, 
it was not the plant as a whole organism that counted as experimental tool, but rather its 
chromosomes.  
 
It seems evident that the institutional set-up and centralised ethos of the early Arabidopsis 
community were indispensable conditions for the establishment of a common scientific 
goal for the use of the plants. However, this is not the only way in which the research 
community made it possible to treat Arabidopsis as the ‘botanical Drosophila’. A key 
contribution to the achievement of this goal was the shift in the administration of the 
stock of Arabidopsis specimens originally collected and systematised by Laibach. 
Between 1950 and the 1970s, Laibach’s collection was maintained and moderately 
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 For historical accounts of this shift, see Kay (2000) and Keller (2000).  
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 ‘Genetics will indeed take the main part, but notes on ecology, morphology, development, physiology or 
biochemistry should as well be appreciated’ (Röbbelen 1964, 1).   
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enlarged by Redei in the States and by Röbbelen and Albert Kranz in Germany. The 
German collection, institutionalised in 1965 into the first official Arabidopsis stock 
centre, underwent moderate extensions by incorporating Kranz’s own samples, but 
otherwise remained the main point of reference for Arabidopsis researchers up until the 
late 1980s – that is, until Feldman started to produce mutant lines on a massive scale. The 
lack of interest in adding ecotypes to the collection is in fact an expression of the 
representational value attributed to the plants in that period. Researchers were not 
interested in the extent of morphological variability among Arabidopsis specimens in the 
same way as Laibach was at the beginning of the century: they wanted to investigate the 
common mechanisms underlying such diversity. The research spotlight was thus placed 
largely on only two ecotypes. The first was a wildtype originally classified by Laibach 
under the name of Landsberg [Lan] (figure 3.3).  
 
Figure 3.3. The Landsberg ecotype.  
 
 
 
 
By 1970, the Lan wildtype had undergone already a considerable amount of 
modifications for use in the laboratory. Redei had selected it out of Laibach’s collection 
and irradiated it with X-rays, in order to derive genotypically identifiable populations. 
One of those was adopted by Feenstra under the name of Landsberg erecta and became 
known as the background line for all the mutants produced by his group at Wageningen 
(including Koornneef). The second chosen ecotype was a particularly fertile and vigorous 
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strand which Redei had selected from the original Landsberg nonirradiated population. It 
was referred to as Columbia [Col] and acquired enormous popularity especially in the 
1990s, when it was chosen as the background line for the AGI sequencing project (figure 
3.4).  
 
Figure 3.4. The Col ecotype.  
 
 
 
 
In both cases, the adoption and progressive standardisation of the ecotype in a 
particularly visible group of research projects, whose results constituted a stepping stone 
for further experiments, had the effect of encouraging researchers to pursue research on 
that ecotype rather than others, so as to guarantee continuity and reproducibility of 
results. Col and Lan are very different morphologically – the former tall and slender, with 
slim, pointy leaves; the latter short and rich in well-rounded leaves – as well as 
genotypically (they vary by 50,000 polymorphisms, thus making it relatively easy to 
isolate mutant genes by positional cloning). In between the two, researchers agreed that 
there was enough genotypic differentiation as to allow for an in-depth study of genetic 
mechanisms. In other words, taken together, Col and Lan constituted a satisfactory model 
system for the study of plant genetics.  
 
Were the epistemic aims motivating the use of Arabidopsis as a ‘botanical Drosophila’ 
successfully fulfilled? In light of the successful completion of the AGI, as well as several 
important findings obtained by the mid-1990s about other molecular processes in 
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Arabidopsis (such as the biochemical mechanisms for light reception and flowering), the 
answer to this question has to be positive. Col and Lan proved to be an extremely 
valuable model of plant genomes for molecular biologists. And again, the internal 
organisation of the community, including its communication tools and the standardisation 
techniques for Arabidopsis ecotypes, was crucial to enabling researchers to work on 
shared models yielding knowledge about plants genetics.   
 
 
3.2.3 How to Choose a Weed 
 
For all of its superior properties, Arabidopsis is typical 
of flowering plants in its morphology, anatomy, growth, 
development, and environmental responses, a kind of 
"everyman" of the plant world. In short, Arabidopsis 
thaliana is a biologist's dream: a model plant  
National Science Foundation 2000 
 
The story of the recasting of Arabidopsis as a botanical Drosophila allows me to locate 
the major characteristics of successful model organism research, which I will now spell 
out and to whose analysis I will devote the bulk of this dissertation. Let me start by 
considering a schematic list of factors that have arguably contributed to Arabidopsis’ 
success: 
 
1. the manipulability of Arabidopsis specimens: the initial selection of Arabidopsis as a 
model can be explained pragmatically by the ease with which the plant can be grown 
and manipulated in laboratory settings, as well as by its conveniently short life cycle; 
 
2. the small size of Arabidopsis genome, which makes it amenable to detailed molecular 
analysis (as demonstrated by Koornneef’s genetic map, released in 1983, and 
Meyerowitz complementary research published in 1985); 
 
3. the mutation rate of Arabidopsis specimens, especially following the discovery of 
Agrobacterium-induced mutations; 
 
4. the typicality of Arabidopsis: in its quality of one of the most common and 
widespread types of plant (a species of weed), Arabidopsis is used as representative 
of a large group of plants (except, of course, fruit-bearing species); 
 
5. the usefulness of Arabidopsis research in the fields of physiology, biochemistry and 
development: this was an important argument from the scientific viewpoint, since no 
model organisms had yet been employed for research in such different, and yet highly 
interdependent, areas (as argued in influential reviews by Somerville 2002, Meinke 
1998 and Meyerowitz 2001); 
 
6. the organisational and scientific skills of the scientists who first adopted Arabidopsis 
as a laboratory model (in the 1970s and then most successfully in the late 1980s), 
including the commitment of researchers such as C. Somerville and Meyerowitz 
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towards communication, accountability and exchange of available data (entailing the 
development of bioinformatic tools and protocols to do so); 
 
7. the ethos of the community - the initial and sustained agreement on a broadly defined 
set of shared goals for future research in plant biology; 
 
8. the long-term dependence upon the same governmental funding agencies, such as the 
NSF, which also acts as an incentive to contribute actively to the community (it is 
often the case that such contributions constitute an important factor in assessing the 
quality of each individual’s research, since the community includes most of one’s 
academic peers). 
 
We can distinguish two broad categories of factors in this list. The first category brings 
together characteristics of the model organism that facilitate its use towards gathering 
biological knowledge, while the second category includes characteristics of the 
community studying the organism.  
 
Prominent in the first category figure the natural characteristics of Arabidopsis 
specimens. These are the features that are found in all wildtypes independently of human 
manipulation.  They make Arabidopsis into an especially tractable organism as well as 
helping its representativeness with respect to other plants (points 1, 2 and, to an extent, 
4). In contrast to these, I call induced characteristics those traits of Arabidopsis 
specimens that have been artificially created (through biotechnology, as in the case of the 
oncomouse) or induced via human intervention (as in the case of point 3). These 
characteristics are helpful towards making a model organism especially tuned to the 
specific goals and methods of the research carried out on it: for example, given current 
microbiologists’ high interest in genetic variability, it is no surprise that induced mutation 
has become an important factor for preferring Arabidopsis over other model organisms.  
 
A third type of relevant features of the first category includes the projected 
characteristics of Arabidopsis specimens. These are traits that are attributed to the plant 
by the scientists using it, without however being or becoming material features of the 
plant. For instance, the advantages of studying Arabidopsis in physiology and 
development (point 5) do not directly depend on the specific structure of the plants, but 
rather on the researchers’ intention to use Arabidopsis in this context. Arguably, the 
typicality of Arabidopsis (point 4) is also a factor that is largely not intrinsic to the plants 
themselves. This claim might appear counter-intuitive. After all, the extent (and 
plausibility) to which Arabidopsis can be used as a representative for other plant species 
seem crucial to its use as a model organism, in the sense specified in section 3.1. Does 
this not imply that the plants themselves should carry features that are especially – 
intrinsically – representative? There are two reasons to think that, even if this were the 
case, it constitutes only part of the justification for taking an organism as highly 
representative of others.
64
 One is that tractability, rather than representativeness, has been 
shown to be the main criterion for selecting model organisms. A second, more important 
observation is that the representativeness of an organism results just as much from its 
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 These points are discussed, though in a different context, in Ankeny (2006).  
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adoption by a research community as from properties intrinsic to the organism itself . 
Biologists’ expectations in choosing a model organism fuel the way in which it is 
described and compared to other organisms, as well as the representational value given to 
results gained from such research. This point is usefully emphasised also in Creager’s 
history of the tobacco mosaic virus, where she remarks on the use of model organisms as 
‘exemplars’ in the Kuhnian sense: they are instances of specific ways in which organisms 
can be handled and interpreted, which can be applied to many other instances depending 
on the interests and motives of the biologists involved (Creager 2002, 7).  
 
My second broad category of factors focuses directly on such interests and motives, by 
addressing the features of the scientific community that adopts a model organism, rather 
than the features of the organism itself. In the case of Arabidopsis, these factors range 
from social commitments (point 6) to institutional structures and organisation (point 7) 
and funding sources (point 8). I shall expand on each of these points in Chapter 7. Yet, I 
hope that my reconstruction of the history of Arabidopsis research already shows the 
relevance of these factors to the experimental value of a model organism. The 
Arabidopsis community provides a particularly interesting case for this, since, thanks to 
the above-mentioned circumstances of its birth, it is an unusually centralised and 
coherent community. While this makes of Arabidopsis an exception rather than the rule 
for model organism research
65
, I believe that studying this specific community allows an 
even stronger emphasis on the fruitfulness of investing resources towards a centralised 
organisation for this type of research, while at the same time providing a close-up view of 
the tensions and problems also associated with this choice (more on this in Chapter 7).  
 
My analysis of factors involved in the choice and successful use of a model organism is 
summarised in table 3.2 below. Of course, neither the above list nor my categorisation are 
supposed to include all factors involved in the choice of Arabidopsis or any other model 
organism. Yet, they provide a good picture of the main reasons behind Arabidopsis’ 
success as a model plant. They also allow me to exclude factors that, despite their 
potential importance, had no real influence on the huge popularity that the weed was to 
acquire. One of them is the great natural variability among Arabidopsis ecotypes. This 
feature played a relevant role in Leibach and Redei’s initial adoption of the organism, 
since their research focused both on the study of environmental adaptations as well as on 
the study of genotypic variability. However, it became irrelevant in the context of the 
subsequent revival of Arabidopsis research in the 1980s: Arabidopsis’ rise to notoriety is 
due largely to its role in plant genetics, rather than to its ecological variability. This latter 
feature has been revalued only recently, when research on Arabidopsis was anyhow an 
unavoidable passage point for most plant biologists.  
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 The Drosophila community, for instance, is extremely decentralised despite the greater communality 
characterising the issues that are investigated (Kohler 1994). This is both due to its long history (starting at 
the turn of the 19
th
 century and involving research carried out independently by groups in the UK, USA and 
Russia) and to the competitiveness characterising animal genetics (to which I already referred in 3.2.1). The 
same holds for the research communities gathered around the tobacco mosaic virus and the nematode C. 
Elegans. For a much expanded discussion of the centralisation characterising the Arabidopsis community, 
see chapter 7.  
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Table 3.2 - Factors contributing to the popularity of a model organism among scientists. 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Arabidopsis Research Today: Modeling to Integrate 
 
3.3.1 Towards Integrative Biology: The Arabidopsis Information Resource [TAIR] 
 
The extent to which the status of Arabidopsis as a model organism depends on the 
scientific goals upheld by the community working on it becomes even more evident when 
looking at what happened in the last decade of research. Starting with the mid-1990s, 
with its genome almost entirely sequenced, a host of open questions concerning its 
interpretation and a flourishing community ready to tackle those questions, Arabidopsis 
scientists suddenly found themselves in a strong position from both the institutional and 
the scientific viewpoint. Arabidopsis had proved its worth as an extremely valuable 
research tool in plant molecular biology. Further, the amount of data accumulated on the 
plant encouraged the above-mentioned ‘founder effect’: that is, the tendency by research 
communities to keep accumulating knowledge on the same organism in the hope to reach 
 
Categories 
  
Type of 
characteristics 
 
Corresponding Factors in Arabidopsis 
Research 
 
 
Natural  
 
 
Manipulability, small sized genome 
 
 
Induced 
 
Mutation rate 
 
 
 
CHARACTERISTICS 
OF THE ORGANISM 
 
Projected  
 
Usefulness in physiology and 
development, typicality 
 
 
Social Commitment 
 
Common goals, ethos of open 
communication 
 
 
Institutional 
Organisation 
 
 
Unity, centralisation [e.g. MASC] 
 
 
 
CHARACTERISTICS 
OF THE 
COMMUNITY 
 
Funding Source 
 
Largely governmental funding [e.g. NSF 
in the USA] 
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better and faster results than the ones obtained through the slow comparative study of 
different organisms.  
 
It was at this stage that the idea of expanding research on the plant beyond its molecular 
level started to gain new ground in the community. Given that the goal of AGI had been 
successfully fulfilled, why not drastically increasing the ambitions of Arabidopsis 
research and, as a consequence, its status as a model organism? Already since the 1980s, 
Meyerowitz, the Somervilles and Koornneef, among others, had entertained the prospect 
of using Arabidopsis as the material reference point for integrating knowledge coming 
from different biological disciplines. Even the staunchest advocate of molecular research 
felt uncomfortable in limiting investigations to the molecular level – and the need to 
combine research about the physiology, ecology and evolutionary history of Arabidopsis 
with the available genetic knowledge became even stronger in the context of geneticists’ 
growing interest in functional genomics. The realisation that genetics alone would not 
have yielded insight in the functioning of organisms as wholes brought the most 
prominent members of the Arabidopsis research community to value more and more the 
plant as an ‘intact’
66
 source for knowledge about organisms as complex wholes. In other 
words, Arabidopsis was not interesting only as a representation of plant genes and 
pathways. More ambitiously, it could be taken to represent any whole organism as an 
ecologically adapted product of evolution: Arabidopsis had the potential to become an 
epistemically powerful tool for improving scientific understanding of the connections 
among processes occurring at different levels of organisation of the organism (genetic, 
cellular, physiological and morphological).  
 
I should note here that the special representational value bestowed on Arabidopsis in the 
last few years does not in any way imply a belief, on the side of the scientists making that 
commitment, that one plant can indeed be taken as a representative of the whole floral 
kingdom. The current epistemic status of Arabidopsis specimens is, rather, dictated by 
the practical necessity of focusing research efforts on one organism. In fact, Arabidopsis 
researchers – not to mention biologists working on other model organisms – do not 
hesitate in indicating the many phenomena that Arabidopsis cannot be representative for.  
These include, for instance, RNA interference (injecting RNA into an embryo to see what 
happens), which can be done on Drosophila but not on Arabidopsis
67
; homologous 
recombination (which is better done on yeast); and several studies of plant pathogens, 
which would require an organism with a much longer life span than Arabidopsis. Further, 
there are of course many features that Arabidopsis cannot be representative for because it 
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 The following quote from Rubin, originally meant as a comment on the usefulness of Drosophila within 
animal research, well illustrates the reasons for favouring an intact organism: 'Many problems in eukaryotic 
cell biology can be most easily studied in unicellular organisms, such as yeast, or in cell cultures derived 
from multicellular organisms. Other problems, however, currently can be studied meaningfully only in 
intact animals. This may be because we do not know how to mimic crucial aspects of the organismal 
environment in vitro, because cell-cell interactions play an important role, or because the process under 
study involves a behaviour that is not currently understood in terms of the properties of individual cells. 
Examples include pattern formation in the embryo and the development and function of organ systems, 
such as the nervous system' (Rubin 1988, 1453). 
67
 The reasons for this are unknown to biologists, one of whom remarked to me that ‘it’s meaningless to ask 
why, actually, it’s like asking why it is so easy to transform Arabidopsis’.  
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does not possess them – like fruit development (for which tomato is a favourite 
candidate), nodulation (a symbiotic relationship with bacteria that allows legumes to fix 
nitrogen), adaptations to extreme climates (desert or seaside) and studies of chromosome 
shape (for which Arabidopsis chromosomes are too small). The awareness of these 
shortcomings does not, however, constitute a reason to challenge the current epistemic 
status of Arabidopsis – simply because, as most researchers argue, there is still so much 
to be understood and investigated about this plant and it is important to keep pursuing the 
centralised, well-coordinated research effort that holds it as its focus.   
 
Here is how a 2004 report issued by the MASC re-phrases the goals of using 
Arabidopsis: ‘the intent is that the knowledge gained on this experimental model 
organism will serve as the central reference and conceptual framework for all of plant 
biology’ (The Multinational Coordinated Arabidopsis thaliana Functional Genomics 
Project 2004, 7). The authors go on to specify that ‘the ambitious goal of understanding 
the function of all Arabidopsis genes as a first step toward an in-depth understanding of 
the biology of higher plants to the benefit of our society can be achieved, if sufficient and 
sustainable research funding is secured, biological materials and services are made 
available around the world, and human resources are further developed’. This new series 
of commitments is exemplified by the creation of two extensive projects officially 
initiated in 1999. The first is Project 2010, a ten-year-long umbrella project for the 
development of Arabidopsis functional genomics. In a nutshell, its goal is ‘knowing the 
function of all plant genes by the year 2010’ (Somerville and Dangl 2000, 2077). The 
second is The Arabidopsis Information Resource [TAIR], an internet portal aimed at 
gathering, storing and providing access to as much Arabidopsis data produced about 
Arabidopsis as possible (Garcia-Hernandez et al, 2002).  
 
It is to this second project, and to the subgroup of the Arabidopsis community that is in 
charge of carrying it on, that I shall turn my attention. Originally created as an expansion 
of the AGI project
68
 and a complement to existing Arabidopsis databases such as MIPS in 
Munich and NASC in Nottingham, the goals of TAIR actually far surpassed the already 
gargantuan tasks of storing and organising data at the genomic level.
69
 As I shall argue in 
Chapters 5 and 6, the construction of dabatases to be included in TAIR involves not only 
the collection of Arabidopsis data from multiple sources (publications and reports by 
laboratories from a variety of disciplines), but also the elaboration of modeling strategies 
through which this ocean of data can be organised, retrieved and visualised by TAIR 
users. TAIR thus becomes a virtual laboratory experimenting with different ways of 
representing biological phenomena, such as Arabidopsis metabolism and biochemical 
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 In view of the huge amount of data expected to stream out of Project 2010, TAIR was initially thought of 
as a necessary expansion of Arabidopsis the Database (AtDB). Based at Harvard, AtDB was in turn the 
child of an initial database called AAtDB and it had the function of storing data coming from AGI, which it 
would do in collaboration with two other major European databases, the MIPS in Munich and the NASC 
database in Nottingham.  
69
 Indeed, the epistemic goals proposed by TAIR are judged to be somewhat too pretentious and theory-
informed (i.e. losing attention to the actual empirical data) by researchers working at MIPS and NASC. On 
the other hand, these characteristics are precisely what make TAIR research so appealing to a philosopher’s 
eye. I shall say more about the difference between TAIR and NASC modeling strategies in chapter 5.  
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pathways. Most importantly, TAIR representations of these phenomena are taken to hold 
for the whole of plant biology. In the words of TAIR Director Sue Rhee,  
 
Ultimately, our goal is to provide the common vocabulary, visualisation tools, and 
information retrieval mechanisms that permit integration of all knowledge about 
Arabidopsis into a seamless whole that can be queried from any perspective. Of 
equal importance for plant biologists, the ideal TAIR will permit a user to use 
information about one organism to develop hypotheses about less well-studied 
organisms (Rhee website, accessed January 2005).  
 
For my current purposes, two features of this mission statement are particularly 
remarkable: the emphasis on Arabidopsis knowledge as a ‘seamless whole’ and the high 
representational value placed on Arabidopsis as a model for other, ‘less well-studied’ 
organisms. This rhetoric, which pervades much of the programmatic descriptions of 
TAIR as well as acting as heuristic guide in its actual development, indicates precisely 
the shift in epistemic value of Arabidopsis as a whole organism. Massimo Pigliucci, one 
of the initiators of the efforts to integrate the ecological study of Arabidopsis with the 
analysis of its genetics, talks about this view as fitting a specific interpretation of the 
controversial notion of ‘integrative biology’: that is, ‘a quest toward a comprehension of 
the connections among levels of biological hierarchy’, rather than toward the formulation 
of a unifying biological theory or framework (Pigliucci 2003, 304). A first step towards 
such quest could be, according to many Arabidopsis researchers, a common focus and 
coordinated investigation of a unique organism.  
 
The importance of TAIR with respect to the goals of Arabidopsis research as a whole, 
and especially to the pursuit of integrative biology, makes it an extremely interesting 
locus for analysing how Arabidopsis research might increase scientists’ understanding of 
plant biology. Given that a close analysis of the thousands Arabidopsis-related projects 
would be impossible, I thus selected TAIR as one of two subgroups in the Arabidopsis 
community whose practices I want to explore in detail (I shall introduce and discuss the 
second subgroup in the next section).  
 
It might be surprising to think of a bioinformatic project, a website, as a powerful stage 
for the ambitious pursuit of integrative Arabidopsis biology. A brief look at the state of 
contemporary bioinformatics will, however, quickly dispel the philosophers’ scepticism. 
TAIR is part of a huge research effort – valuable both as a contribution to bioinformatics 
and as a development in theoretical biology – to find pragmatic and conceptual tools in 
order to integrate data, theories and models coming from different disciplinary 
backgrounds.
70
 Bioinformatics is at the moment the most innovative and progressive field 
for data collection and integration in biology, generating a wide range of software, 
employment opportunities
71
 and knowledge. In its integrative mode, Arabidopsis research 
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 See the enthusiastic ‘update on bioinformatics’ published in ‘Plant Physiology’ (one of the prominent 
journals in plant biology) by Somerville et al. already in 1997.  
71
 The ‘bioinformatician’ is now a popular and sought-for interdisciplinary specialist, partially as a result of 
the needs of model organism communities (see for instance the recommendations for the enhancement of 
training in this field by the National Plant Genome Initiative, 2002). 
 69
plays a major role both as a propeller of IT innovation and as a beneficiary of new 
computational tools. Conversely, a close scrutiny of bioinformatics and of the tools that it 
can and cannot provide to this aim is crucial to understanding the modes of integration 
proposed to the Arabidopsis community. As is reported in ‘Nature’, ‘the key to 
bioinformatics is integration, integration, integration’ (Chicurel 2002, 751). Biologists 
and funding agencies (also in the EU, as testified by the large share of funding recently 
devolved to it) seem to agree that the key to data integration is indeed bioinformatics, 
insofar as facilitating data collection, exchange, elaboration and visualisation (in some 
cases, notably the newest ‘workflows’, by providing interactive tools that forge automatic 
connections between a variety of databases and elaborating results; in other cases, such as 
GenomeBench, by predicting genetic structures on the bases of previous data and even 
designing ways of testing such predictions). This attitude is mirrored in the NSF-funded 
Plant Genome Initiative that is currently backing Arabidopsis research.  
 
The central role played by TAIR in the Arabidopsis community is evidently part of this 
trend. Already in 2000, at the end of the AGI project, TAIR had become the most 
accessible and recognised platform for exchanging resources about the biology of 
Arabidopsis. The very existence of the TAIR, currently counting more than 12.000 
registered users (building up to more than 30.000 hits by unique IP addresses per month), 
underscores the existence of a community of researchers increasingly trying to construct 
a common terminology and a set of common goals for their multi-faceted research 
programmes. Sue Rhee’s position as curator of the TAIR is crucial, since her team is in 
the process of considering and selecting the bioinformatic tools that provide the most 
suitable platform for collaboration among disciplines using entirely different types of 
data (e.g. gene sequences and images of morphological development of flower organs). 
Her work embodies one of the major challenges in contemporary bioinformatics: the 
construction of additional layers of data annotation which might fill the gap currently felt 
to exist between gene sequencing (resulting from the AGI and the HGP, among others) 
and the biology of organisms.
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Figure 3.5 - History of Arabidopsis Databases, starting from AAtDB and ending with 
TAIR, with the red line indicating the swift growth of users following the shift to TAIR.  
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 In the long run, innovative ways of annotating and elaborating data should enable a better understanding 
of the mechanisms governing what is known as the ‘epigenetic space’. In turn, this is likely to result in a 
better overall understanding of the relation between genotype and phenotype - an advancement that 
according to most biologists would amount to understanding the organism as a whole, thus fulfilling one of 
the main research goals of the Arabidopsis community. Initiatives such as BioMOBY, an open source 
produced by the model organism community for biological web services, are also prominent in the attempt 
to make biological data increasingly accessible, usable and free from commercial obligations. According to 
its curator BioMOBY, the project ‘was established to address the problem of discovering and retrieving 
related pieces of biological data from multiple hosts and services by attempting to generate a standardised 
query and retrieval interface using consensus object models’. The system ‘facilitates the ‘wandering’ 
through large sets of data sets in a manner similar to the thought process biologists use when approaching 
their problems’ (Wilkinson and Links 2002).    
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Apart from the construction of the databases, the TAIR team is entirely committed to 
actively encourage interdisciplinary interaction among the various biological disciplines 
investigating Arabidopsis, to the investigation of new tools for integration (most notably 
in the form of bioinformatics and ‘systems approach’ experimental methodologies) and to 
creating educational tools targeted both to researchers and to interested laypersons. I shall 
delve in the details of TAIR integrative project in chapter 5. Let us now go back to the 
broader picture, that is, the decision by the Arabidopsis steering committee to re-focus 
Arabidopsis research towards integration. Admittedly, this represented a large step from 
the previous use of Arabidopsis as a model of plant genetics. First of all, the plant was 
assumed to be representative not only of flowering plants, but indeed of any plant. 
Second, it was not only the components of a plant specimen, such as its chromosomes 
and flowering system, that interested researchers: the plant as a whole was seen as 
valuable, thus coming to represent the intact organism whose complexity and cohesion 
keep mystifying all branches of the life sciences.   
 
This highly pretentious goal was then (and still is) met with wide resistance. This is 
understandable, especially in view of the clash in commitments, research goals and 
strategies characterising biologists working at the micro-structural level with respect to 
biologists investigating ecological and evolutionary processes.  The widespread resilience 
to attempts to integrate these types of research derives, among other things, precisely 
from the implied commitment to focusing research efforts on a limited number of 
organisms – an approach that strongly collides with the emphasis on diversity and 
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comparative studies characterising, for instance, ecological research. It then comes as no 
surprise that Pigliucci himself found his closest peers to be hostile to his willingness to 
capitalise on the extensive molecular knowledge accumulated on Arabidopsis. 
Interestingly, a common objection was that the weed ‘wasn’t a real plant’ (Pennisi, 2000), 
in the sense that it does not possess several characteristics deemed of crucial importance 
for the understanding of plants – such as, most blatantly, the capacity to bear fruits. This 
objection encapsulates both the above-mentioned perception of Arabidopsis as a model 
system for plant genetics, rather than a model of plants as whole organisms, and the 
belief that the actual plant specimen had little (if any) significance in the context of 
research at the molecular level.   
 
But was it really the case that specimens had no significance within Arabidopsis 
research? A strong argument against this view is provided by the central role played by 
the centres for the production and distribution of Arabidopsis plants, starting precisely 
from the early 1990s. I already mentioned the importance of standardisation procedures 
in collecting and distributing specimens with relevance to the establishment of 
Arabidopsis as a botanical Drosophila. As it turns out, the institutionalisation of 
techniques, resources and categories with which to grow laboratory specimens played an 
even more fundamental role in the most recent and ambitious phase of Arabidopsis 
research. Accordingly, I shall now introduce the Nottingham Arabidopsis Stock Centre, 
which constitutes the second locus of Arabidopsis research practice on which I focus my 
investigation.  
 
 
3.3.2 Growing models: the Nottingham Arabidopsis Stock Centre [NASC] 
 
The shift in the representational value of Arabidopsis plants implied the recruitment of 
researchers from a variety of fields to work on a model organism hitherto envisaged as a 
model system for plant genetics. The expansion of goals had one further important 
consequence: a strengthened need to make Arabidopsis specimens easily available to 
biologists interested in working with them. At the practical level, it seems easy enough to 
fulfil this requirement: all that is needed is the creation of structures whose responsibility 
is to provide biologists with the specimens that they require. Yet, given the great 
variability among Arabidopsis ecotypes and the proliferation of mutants made possible 
by the Feldmann technique, this seemingly simple task becomes exceedingly arduous. 
Let me now clarify some of the practical hurdles associated with such a massive 
standardisation project. For a start, criteria need to be in place for the description and 
categorisation of different Arabidopsis specimens, which would be understood and used 
by the whole community independently of the expertise of each participant subgroup. 
Also, stocking and distributing Arabidopsis specimens requires a high level of control of 
the quality and genetic make-up of the seed. The risk of contamination among different 
lines, for instance, is enormous. In a typical laboratory glasshouse, a slight current is 
enough to transport some of the thousand microscopic seeds produced by a single 
Arabidopsis plant across a room and into a different harvest, thus causing seeds of 
different type to mix. In sum, the production, storage and distribution of different types of 
Arabidopsis specimens is as difficult a task as it is indispensable to the Arabidopsis 
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community. It requires both technical and scientific expertise; constant interaction with 
the community as a whole concerning the latest experimental practices, techniques, 
instruments and results; and the capacity to interpret research results so as to make 
informed choices about which are the most promising fields in Arabidopsis research (so 
as to be able to produce and supply enough of the relevant specimens to fit requests).  
 
Most importantly for my purposes, all these activities have a great influence on scientific 
reasoning via model organisms as well as on the understanding derived from model 
organism research, since they affect the experimental procedures used on Arabidopsis 
specimens, the interpretation of such procedures as well as the very nature of the 
specimens themselves. This is because Arabidopsis scientists, no matter their specific 
expertise or location, need to be sure that their experimental work is based on relatively 
similar plants. All the efforts accompanying the decision to focus research on one specific 
organism, thus collecting data concerning different aspects of the same organism and 
holding that ‘integrated understanding’ as representative for other plants, would be in 
vain if it turned out that researchers had been investigating Arabidopsis ecotypes and 
mutants with very different characteristics – which could therefore hardly be defined as 
‘the same organism’. In order to ensure that theoretical integration among Arabidopsis 
findings can take place, variation among individual plants has to be eliminated via a 
highly controlled and centralised process of standardisation. Researchers need to be sure 
that they are gathering results on organisms possessing the same material features 
(natural and/or induced), in order to then compare those results and compile them into a 
unique dataset about that organism. The indiscriminate use and classification of 
Arabidopsis variants cannot be tolerated, if results are to be replicable, extended and/or 
used in several research sites (each of which cultivates its own plant collection). Finding 
a solution for this problem constituted as important a step towards pursuing the ideal of 
integration as the construction of digital data repositories such as TAIR. Of course, the 
standardisation of plants does not constitute integration as such: yet, it is a necessary 
material platform towards obtaining such integration at a theoretical level.  
 
The MASC itself is aware of how relevant the categorisation and production of 
specimens is to biological research practice and to the interpretation of its results. 
Already in the mid-1980s, the Steering Committee of MASC could foresee the extent of 
the difficulties and problems gravitating around specimen production. It therefore 
proposed to establish a single Arabidopsis stock centre, a central institution that would 
differentiate among lines and ecotypes, dictate standards and protocols for recognising 
and handling them, and generally assist researchers by supplying specimens with the 
required features. As a result of this proposal, the Nottingham Arabidopsis Stock Centre 
[NASC] was created in 1990. Up to that point, one of the main collections of Arabidopsis 
specimens had been maintained in Frankfurt by the successor of Röbbelen, Albert Kranz, 
who was planning to retire by the end of the 1980s. The MASC committee decided to 
take advantage of that change of guard to transfer the collection to a new facility in the 
Plant Science Institute in Nottingham, UK. In 1991, a twin facility was established at 
Ohio State University in order to facilitate distribution of seeds to American researchers, 
as well as to guarantee that there would be a duplicate of every strand stored by NASC 
(in the event of fire or other disaster affecting the storage rooms). The Arabidopsis 
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Biological Resource Centre [ABRC] and NASC were conceived as working in strict 
collaboration – and indeed, over the last two decades their two directors have been 
working closely together in order to create and implement common standards and 
procedures.
73
 I shall devote the final paragraphs of this section to introducing NASC 
activities and their relation to Arabidopsis history as a whole, so as to provide a basis for 
the in-depth analysis of NASC practices and their epistemological significance that I will 
offer in Chapter 6.  
 
NASC has much broader responsibilities than its German predecessor. For one thing, it 
has to store and categorise the thousands of knockout lines produced thanks to Feldman’s 
Agrobacterium-induced mutations. As mentioned above, the rapid creation of so many 
genetically modified strands of Arabidopsis specimens requires a much stricter policing 
of the lines, as well as new methods for handling the storage and maintenance of that 
many plants. Standardisation and the related control acquired over lines guarantees the 
uniformity and reproducibility of results, by allowing scientists working at opposite ends 
of the world to credibly claim to be working on the same plants, grown in similar 
conditions and from the same stock.
74
 For instance, Feldman’s knockout lines were all 
produced with Wassilewskija [Ws] as a background line, an ecotype that he regarded 
(wrongly, as it turned out) to be more easily transformed than its more popular relatives 
Col and Lan. The perceived necessity to replicate Feldman’s experiments and pursue his 
line of research on the same plants that he had used enormously enhanced requests for the 
original Ws ecotype and mutated lines. In 1995, Feldman thus donated this whole stock, 
in the form of plant seeds, to NASC. NASC handled the donation according to its 
standard procedure. It dehydrated and froze a sample of the donation, so that it would be 
safely stored in its seed archive (which NASC members half-jokingly refer to as ‘seed 
museum’). The rest of the seeds were then re-bulked under conditions of maximal 
separation from other lines (to avoid cross-contamination). The resulting stocks were then 
sorted, bar-coded, packaged and transferred to a low temperature, low humidity storage 
room, where they wait to be distributed according to demand from laboratories around 
the world. The resulting availability of the Feldman stock through NASC quickly 
transformed Ws into the third most popular ecotype in the whole community.  
 
The shift in epistemic goals within the community did revive the interest in collecting 
natural variants (Alonso-Blanco and Koornneef 2000), since ‘different ecotypes 
apparently do things in quite a different way’ (Pigliucci 1998, 301) – thus making the 
exchange of stocks akin to a ‘research currency’ in the community, where the stock 
centres function in much the same way as the stock exchange.
75
 Yet, while such 
wildtypes were used to target questions relating to ecological variation and adaptability, 
Col, Lan and Ws established themselves as the main tools for exploring epigenetic and 
cellular mechanisms for gene expressions as underlying development and growth patterns 
of plants. As a result of these and several further developments, NASC and ABRC had to 
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 A joint statement by NASC and ABRC directors, discussing their tasks and their visioen for future stock 
storage and distribution, can be found in Scholl et al (2000).  
74
 For in-depth analyses of the role of standards as coordinating devices, see the seminal work by Bowker 
and Star (1999) and Berg (2004).  
75
 I owe inspiration for this metaphor to Maarten Koornneef.  
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channel huge efforts into the standardisation of seed storage and distribution: new ways 
to distinguish wildtypes from their mutated offspring; tools and techniques to avoid 
cross-contamination among strands (given especially the fact that they had to be grown 
and harvested in the same limited space); and methods and space for storing multiple 
copies of both wild and mutant lines.  
 
Given the difficulties encountered by stock centres themselves in growing the plants, and 
thus their increasing expertise in handling them, it became their responsibility also to 
transmit these skills to their ‘users’ (that is, the researchers requiring and using the seeds 
for their own research purposes).
76
 This meant issuing strict guidelines concerning the 
conditions in which plants should be sown, germinated, grown and harvested 
(temperature, humidity, type of soil and pesticides, etc.).
77
 The ensemble of protocols, 
guidelines and actual modification of specimens elaborated by NASC and ABRC thus 
represents a notable amount of standardisation, given especially the ease of maintenance 
characterising Arabidopsis wildtypes (which after all, in their quality of weed, have the 
infamous tendency to grow pretty much everywhere). This demonstrates how, once 
adopted in the laboratory, Arabidopsis lines (‘ecotypes’ or ‘accessions’ according to 
different nomenclatures adopted by the stock centres
78
) became something different than 
their relatives living in the wild. They have to be kept in the best possible growth 
conditions; to be easily distinguished on the basis of standard morphological parameters, 
such as the width and smoothness of the leaves, the shape of the flowers and the length of 
the stem; and to bear the material features most compatible to the research purposes for 
which they were used. Such modifications of the ‘wild’ specimens are partly determined 
by the need to store, produce and distribute the plants on a massive scale.
79
 At the same 
time, most changes are effected to ‘serve the user’ (in NASC terminology), i.e. to fit the 
practical needs and epistemic goals of researchers using the plants. Either way, the plant 
features thus obtained can all be classified as induced characteristics, according to my 
categorisation in 3.2.3.  
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 Further, stock centres have to handle a good deal of PR, since they have to actively encourage 
researchers to donate samples of the plants that they used for each experiment. In line with the Arabidopsis 
ethos, these donations are expected to come free of charge and as a service to the community – yet, as 
testified to me by the current director of NASC, Sean May, eliciting donations is no easy task even within 
the collaborative environment of Arabidopsis research (as exemplified by the need for Material Transfer 
Agreements for some of the mutant lines provided by NASC). 
77
 ABRC guidelines are ‘designed to generate healthy plants that give maximum set of pure seeds and to 
preserve these in the safest and most convenient manner’ (ABRC website, accessed 6 May 2005). 
78
 Throughout this chapter, I have been employing the terms ‘ecotype’, ‘accession’, ‘strand’ and ‘line’ as 
synonymous. While acceptable for my purposes, this usage effectively eliminates a major source of 
disagreements within the Arabidopsis community. In particular, ecologists and molecular biologists are 
divided over the meaning of the term ‘ecotype’. Most molecular biologists take the term to refer to any  
accession (i.e. a group of plants with the same genotypic structure) derived from a wildtype (i.e. an 
organism not genetically modified). Ecologists, on the other hand, would only talk about ecotypes as 
indicating the phenotypic traits of an organism that result from genetic adaptation to its environment. 
Unfortunately, given the potential interest of an analysis of these discussions, I cannot focus on these issues 
within this dissertation and shall therefore keep using these terms as synonymous. 
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 This is well illustrated by the zwapak example that I provide in Chapter 6, section 6.2.1. 
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3.4 Understanding via Model Organisms: Three Areas of Research 
 
In this chapter, I have presented the history of biological research on the model organism 
Arabidopsis thaliana, with specific focus on two current projects within the Arabidopsis 
community whose main purpose is to produce tools enabling an integrative understanding 
of plant biology. In section 3.2, I sketched a categorisation of the features of Arabidopsis 
that, throughout the last three decades of research, most contributed to the growth of 
biological knowledge about the plants and, hence, to the success of Arabidopsis as a 
model organism. In this sense, these features can be defined as epistemologically 
advantageous to the acquisition of scientific knowledge. However, I have not yet 
explained how this is the case. Nor have I discussed how working on a model organism 
that possesses these characteristics helps biologists’ understanding of plants. The study of 
how Arabidopsis came to be known as prominent tool towards scientific understanding 
constitutes, in fact, a platform from which I can start tackling these crucial questions.  
 
Consider again the list the epistemologically advantageous characteristics of Arabidopsis 
that I provided in section 3.2. On the basis of that list, I shall now distinguish three main 
aspects of model organism research, each of which I take to signal a fundamental 
condition towards acquiring a scientific understanding of organisms. The first aspect 
concerns the embodied knowledge needed to deal with the material features of organisms: 
that is, the constraints imposed on researcher’s actions and thoughts by the physical 
nature of some features of Arabidopsis specimens and thus by the need to learn how to 
intervene effectively on them for research purposes. Of course, biologists manipulate the 
material features of an organism in order to acquire knowledge about its functioning and 
its structures. In other words, they use their embodied knowledge of model organisms to 
acquire theoretical knowledge of their functioning and structure. This aspect is especially 
evident when considering the projected characteristics of Arabidopsis (point 3). Without 
even starting to examine the content and quality of scientific results obtained through the 
study of a model organism, these features illustrate the extent to which Arabidopsis 
research is useful as a thinking tool and heuristic guide to researchers. The last three 
elements on my list of Arabidopsis features, which I call ‘characteristics of the 
community’, define the co-dependence characterising Arabidopsis specimens and the 
community within which such specimens are studied. On one hand, the currently thriving 
Arabidopsis community owns its interdisciplinary and multi-sited character to the 
decision of focusing efforts on this plant. Arabidopsis plants can be argued to constitute 
‘boundary objects’ in the sense outlined by Star and Griesemer: material representations 
of nature that bring together social worlds that are usually separate from each other.
80
 On 
the other hand, Arabidopsis plants would not have the status of model organism (and thus 
would not be produced, distributed and used as such) unless they had been adopted and 
promoted as such by a community of capable biologists. Thus, the social organisation of 
communities conducting model organism research constitutes a third crucial aspect.  
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 Perhaps surprisingly, there are many analogies between the case analysed by Star and Griesemer (that is, 
natural history collections in musea) and the case of model organisms. See for instance their description of 
the pre-conditions for the successful establishment and use of boundary objects within a community (1989, 
408).   
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These three aspects of model organism use in biological research constitute the focus of 
the rest of this dissertation. The relation between embodied and theoretical knowledge of 
the model organism Arabidopsis, as used by biologists in the whole Arabidopsis 
community, will be analysed in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 7 will focus on the crucial role 
of social epistemology in enabling the understanding of models and theories about 
biological phenomena that are gathered via the study of Arabidopsis. Via a detailed study 
of the practices and skills characterising the Arabidopsis community, I shall identify and 
study some of the conditions under which a biological understanding of plant biology is 
gathered in the community (Chapter 8). Before venturing into my analysis of model 
organism research, however, I wish to voice some reflections on the methodological 
issues emerging from research that, as I propose to do here, deals with philosophical, 
historical and social aspects of biology at the same time. Chapter 4 is thus devoted to 
presenting and defending the research method that I refer to as ‘complementary science’.  
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Chapter 4. Methodological Framework: Is Empirical Philosophy a 
Philosophy of the Particular?  
 
Understanding is not achieved by generality alone, but by a 
relation between the general and the particular  
Richard Levins 1984, 26 
 
The three scholarly traditions of philosophy, history and sociology of science have 
increasingly diverged over the last few decades. Despite the examples set by Bruno 
Latour, Peter Galison and James Griesemer, among others, attempts to integrate ‘science 
and technology studies’ [STS] with ‘history and philosophy of science’ [HPS] remain 
rare and are often the object of controversy.
81
 One of the charges levelled by some 
philosophers to the work of historians and sociologists concerns the limited scope and 
applicability of their results. History and sociology, it is claimed, study the local, the 
situated, the contextual; their narrative is unavoidably a narrative of the particular, given 
the richness and relevance of details that these empirical disciplines need to analyse. 
Philosophy of science, on the other hand, is a largely rationalistic enterprise whose aim is 
to reflect on the general, the abstract, the universally applicable. It uses historical 
examples as exemplifying some or other conceptualisation, yet it should not let itself be 
deranged by reference to a handful of cases: its aim is to produce ideas that are not tied to 
a single occurrence, but that can inspire and be used in several different contexts and 
situations. Empirical philosophy of science, according to this type of rationalism, is 
destined to generate ideas that are extremely limited in their applicability, since their 
scope is constrained to the analysis of a handful of practices. A philosophy of scientific 
practice, in other words, can be nothing else but a philosophy of the particular, with 
nothing to offer to philosophy of science as a whole, let alone to scientists or other 
science scholars.  
 
Chapter 2 already contained a philosophical critique of this strict form of rationalism, as 
represented in the work of Carl Hempel. This lead to a defence of an empirical 
philosophy focused on the specificities of scientific practice. In this chapter, I intend to 
focus on the how questions, that is on the methodological issues that arise when actually 
pursuing a philosophy of scientific practice. In particular, I consider the difficulties 
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 Both the philosophical and the STS community have contributed to widening the divide between the two 
disciplines. Influential philosophers such as Larry Laudan (1990) and Philip Kitcher (1993) have warned 
their colleagues against meddling with sociology. At the same time, some STS scholars have stirred 
younger generations of STS students away from philosophy and towards more ‘applied’ and ‘concrete’ 
types of analysis. The dismissal of philosophy as part of STS is visible from the list of ‘core literature’ 
adopted by the Dutch society for STS research (WTMC), which only includes four outdated philosophy 
references (Popper 1963, Kuhn 1970 and two old reviews by Hans Achterhuis) over 66 social scientific 
volumes (http://www.wtmc.net/wiki/index.php?title=WTMC_list_of_core_literature, accessed 24 July 
2006). In addition, disciplinary boundaries are enforced at the institutional level, for instance by the 
establishment of strongly field-centred journals that refuse to publish pieces ‘contaminated’ by other 
disciplines. Within philosophy, high-profile journals such as ‘Philosophy of Science’ and the ‘British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science’ are reluctant to publish research informed by empirical studies on 
specific contexts. In a similar way, history and sociology journals such as ‘Annals of Science’ and ‘Social 
Studies of Science’ have very high standards on the quality of the evidence submitted and generally do not 
accept largely theoretical analyses.  
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encountered when reconciling a detailed study of cases with the production of general 
claims. The present piece of research is a good exemplification of the seemingly 
paradoxical fusion of particular and general that haunts empirical philosophy. On the one 
hand, I tackle one of the most widely applicable, all-encompassing and significant topics 
in science and technology. My philosophical study of the conditions under which 
scientific understanding is achieved involves a reconstruction of what I take to be 
relevant components of scientific practice (and indeed, I propose such a reconstruction in 
Chapter 8). The resulting epistemological analysis could, in principle, be applied to all 
biological science, or even to science as a whole. It aims at generating discussion and 
accordingly, in the absence of further research, no constraints are imposed a priori on the 
applicability of my conclusions. On the other hand, the range of scientific practices on 
which these results are based is as limited as they are inclusive. I am considering a single 
case study, the Arabidopsis community, which, despite its size and internal diversity, is 
hardly representative of all research in the life sciences. Moreover, a detailed study of the 
practices characterising contemporary biology requires methodological input from the 
history and sociology of science. Reading practitioners’ own accounts of their activities is 
not enough, when it is also possible to witness them in person. The need to visit 
laboratories and gather scientists’ private opinions about what they are doing forced me 
to borrow methodological insights and procedures from both HPS and STS, so as to be 
able to extract arguments and claims from the large array of data gathered by 
participating in, rather than simply observing, Arabidopsis biology.  
 
This chapter reflects on the methodological problems associated to conducting the 
mixture of sociological, philosophical and historical research that is ungracefully 
subsumed under the heading of ‘history, philosophy and social studies of science and 
technology’ [HPSSST]. My discussion assumes that an interdisciplinary approach to the 
study of science, such as the one attempted in this thesis, is both useful and feasible
82
: it 
therefore explores the nature and epistemological significance of the practical dilemmas 
encountered with carrying out this type of research. These reflections are fuelled by the 
experiences that I accumulated while conducting the present inquiry. A secondary aim of 
this chapter is thus to illustrate and account for my choice of materials, the way in which 
I gathered them and the way in which I used them to feed my epistemological 
pronouncements.   
 
 
4.1 Studying Science and Technology: Insularity and Integration 
 
I begin by dwelling briefly on the current state of interdisciplinary approaches to the 
study of science. What causes the lack of interaction among scholars of science that 
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 As I specify below, I do not intend to argue that such an interdisciplinary approach is always necessary to 
the study of science (regardless of the issues under investigation); nor do I want to claim that integration 
among the different disciplines involved in the study of science should be conducted in one and only way. 
As Wim van der Steen has convincingly shown, an excessive and uncritical emphasis on the integration of 
disciplines constitutes ‘a modern variant of the old ideal of unity of science’ (1993, 259), especially when 
interdisciplinary methodology is seen as one method with standard characteristics and universal 
applicability. I do not think that this argument applies to cases where the manner and purpose of integrating 
different approaches is motivated by and adapted to the actual issues under investigation. 
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HPSSST attempts to challenge? Besides the structural and social constraints dictated by 
specialised training and disciplinary expertise, is there anyone to blame for the poor 
integration among philosophical, historical and sociological approaches? And are there 
exceptions to this trend? Discussing these questions will hopefully set the background 
against which to examine problems and methods associated to HPSSST research. In what 
follows, I illustrate the relevance of an integrated approach to the study of science by 
pointing to some shortcomings of what I call ‘insular’ philosophical, historical and 
sociological research.  
 
Before setting out, it is important to note that this is not a manifesto requiring every 
scholar of science to contribute to all three disciplines at once. As I argued elsewhere, 
interdisciplinarity is not the achievement of individual scholars. It is primarily the result 
of cooperation among researchers of varying expertises, gathering together in order to 
confront a common problem (this is the so-called issue-based mode of research; Leonelli, 
2004 and 2005).
83
 A general critique of disciplinary training as such is therefore far from 
my present purposes. Further, not all issues emerging from science and technology need 
to be investigated at all times by an interdisciplinary research group. For instance, the 
nature of laws and concepts in science is a largely philosophical concern, while the 
organisation of research communities and their relation to funding sources are matters of 
inquiry for a sociologist. I have no qualms with exploring such issues through firmly 
discipline-centred methods (which have in fact been revised and improved throughout 
decades of trials and errors for precisely this purpose). What I intend to condemn is the 
inability, currently displayed by a majority of scholars of science, to learn from other 
disciplines’ results and to form interdisciplinary teams when required by the nature of the 
topic at hand. Interdisciplinary discourse across philosophers, sociologists and historians 
is still very limited. It is difficult to organise research venues and launch publications 
focusing on intersections among expertises. Also, the abundance of literature in one’s 
chosen field discourages from venturing into other disciplines to check for relevant 
knowledge. This insularity represents a loss to all research communities involved. This is 
certainly the case with phenomena like biotechnological innovation or nuclear energy, 
whose examination requires interdisciplinary brainstorming. A lack of exchange also 
affects the development of areas that might not require interdisciplinary research, but 
might nevertheless benefit from insights from different areas. For instance, while it is true 
that the nature of concepts is an issue of primary interest to philosophers alone, the 
consequences of such analysis are relevant to both historical and sociological uses of 
concepts (as demonstrated by the recent come-back of the Koselleck-inspired field of 
‘conceptual history’ as an extremely fruitful historical approach). At the same time, the 
scientific application of concept-based approaches to actual cases could teach much to the 
philosopher willing to lend a hear. Similarly, as I show in this dissertation, the 
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 I am aware of the literature documenting the difference between interdisciplinarity and 
transdisciplinarity, where the former characterises collaboration across disciplines and the latter involves 
collaboration on a specific topic. For the purposes of this thesis, I shall not take this distinction into 
account. This is because, in the context of my analysis, it is not helpful to separate issue-based research 
from research requiring dialogue across epistemic cultures (in fact, it may prove entirely misguided, as 
interdisciplinary collaboration always requires ‘transdisciplinary’ attention to common topics or objects).  
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sociologist’s take on community structure and funding has serious implications for an 
epistemologist’s analysis of models and explanations produced by a research community.  
 
Let us consider this last point more closely. Very few philosophers trained in the Anglo-
American tradition are interested in bringing sociological and historical insights into their 
analysis. This is true also of scholars that rejected old-school rationalism and concern 
themselves with current scientific practices, in accordance to the recent empirical turn 
that I discussed in Chapter 2.
84
 Given their reluctance towards adopting interdisciplinary 
insights, these philosophers might be portrayed as prime culprits for insular discourse. 
Helen Longino has attributed the prolonged philosophical disinterest in social aspects of 
science to what she calls the ‘rational-social dichotomy’ (Longino 2001,1): namely, the 
pervasive notion that the nature of science can be defined as either rational or social – 
and that focusing on one of these two aspects automatically excludes consideration of the 
other. This influential idea brings many philosophers to disdain the work of sociologists, 
as in their eyes attention to the social aspects of science (which they see as synonymous 
with ‘contextual’) corresponds to a denial of its rationality, truth-value, empirical 
adequacy and so forth.  
 
I agree with Longino that the rational-social dichotomy is entirely misguided. 
Nevertheless, philosophers are not the only scholars of science to have fallen under its 
spell. Outright opposition to the interest in rationality and truth expressed by philosophers 
was a key motivation towards the construction of one the most influential schools in 
sociology of scientific knowledge, that is the ‘strong programme’ put forward by Barry 
Barnes and David Bloor at the University of Edinburgh (Barnes and Bloor, 1982). While 
the strong programme presented several insights that would have benefited both the 
philosophy and the sociology of science, such as the ideas of symmetry and reflexivity, 
its proponents’ insistence on the opposition between the aims of sociologists and 
philosophers of science contributed to deepening the burrow already dividing the two 
camps.
85
  
 
Sociologists busy with laboratory studies and ethnographic approaches were influenced 
by this anti-philosophical attitude, as made clear by Latour and Woolgar in the 
introduction to their topical ‘Laboratory Life’ (1979). Mistrust of the ‘rationalism’ and 
‘black-boxing’ attributed to philosophical analysis led many sociologists to turn their 
backs to philosophers. Towards the mid-eighties, the increasing attention to the social 
values and interests involved in scientific practice also commanded a shift in the 
sociologists’ choice of objects of study. Research on the content of scientific knowledge 
as a social achievement declined dramatically, to be substituted by studies of the role of 
science as a social institution and of scientists as successful entrepreneurs, whose main 
abilities lie in gaining and maintaining recognition and social authority. The emerging 
                                                
84
 This statement might sound paradoxical, as the empirical turn is supposed to imply precisely a renewed 
attention to historical and sociological research. However, many of the protagonists of this turn in 
philosophy (Giere 1999a, Kitcher 1993, van Fraassen 2002, Solomon 2001) have not actually engaged in 
empirical research on science practice: they have borrowed examples from studies of such practice and they 
have used them as an illustration of, rather than a potential challenge to, their own points.  
85
 Sociologist David Bloor and philosopher John Worrall conducted a famous debate epitomising this 
controversy, which is documented in Worrall (1990).  
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need to understand recent advances such as the digital revolution, the advent of 
information and communication technologies and of other types of artefacts (such as 
nano and biotechnology) also contributed to this shift of focus. Technology has taken 
over science in the eyes of most sociologists, as demonstrated by the popularity of Wiebe 
Bijker’s views on the social construction of technology (1995). Why spending time on 
the content of theories whose truth-value has been severely questioned by constructivist 
critiques, when processes such as the digital revolution are reshaping politics, social 
dynamics, trade and communication all around the world? This is an excellent and very 
reasonable question. Social studies of science have been extremely successful in 
highlighting the extent to which controversy and disagreements permeate scientific 
practice. Thanks to this work, we can no longer accept the idea that scientists 
unanimously agree on what constitutes scientific truths. This constitutes a great starting 
point for philosophical work on pluralism in theories as well as practices, which some 
philosophers have indeed welcomed and pursued. Many sociologists are not, however, 
aware of these latest developments. As a consequence, they keep portraying philosophy 
of science as an unquestioning defender of scientific rationalism and, at the same time, 
they pay much more attention to the social context in which research is carried out than to 
its scientific aims and results. Much more reflection is needed on the value and status of 
the objects (issues, concepts, situations, sites, concerns, policy measures, personal 
experiences or else) that STS investigates, as well as on the type of results that such 
investigations can and should yield.  
 
The sociologists’ disregard for the content and significance of scientific and 
technological knowledge constitutes the main difference between their work and the 
work of historians of science and technology. The latter group preserves a much stronger 
focus on the content, rather than just the context, of scientific knowledge. In order to 
comprehend how complex processes like theory-change and discovery take place, 
historians rightly insist on the necessity of descriptive and anti-Whiggish research (that 
is, on reconstructing the roots, significance and implications of such processes at the time 
of their occurrence
86
). Attention to actual scientific results notwithstanding, collaboration 
with philosophers proves difficult, given the characteristic resilience of historians 
towards systematic analysis and generalising conclusions. Historians are primarily 
interested in ‘getting the facts right’ – in other words, they see their main task as one of 
recovering knowledge that has been lost. This often implies deep reflection on what 
counts as a fact for the actors involved and its relation to the type of knowledge gathered 
and sanctioned by their community of peers. The fruits of such reflection are however 
tied to the specificities of the circumstances and events to which they are meant to apply. 
Rather than providing analytic tools for the study of episodes in the history of science, 
much historical research is directed at providing illustrations for specific themes and 
processes (such as, most recently, ‘objectivity’
87
) and thus refuses to venture into the 
realm of theoretical analysis. 
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 See Nickles on ‘reconstruction’ in HPS (1986, 1995). 
87
 On objectivity, see Daston (2000) and recent issue of ‘Social Epistemology’ by Boumans and Beaulieu 
(2004). 
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I take contemporary philosophy of biology to constitute a promising exception to the 
above-mentioned insular trends.
88
 This is largely due to the history of this field, which 
has been marked in the 1970s and 80s by the charismatic influence of interdisciplinary 
contributors such as the philosophers-historians Marjorie Green and Everett 
Mendelssohn. It is also due to its peculiar institutionalisation, as exemplified by the 
International Society for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Biology 
(informally known as ISH Kabibble). Founded in 1990, this society strongly encourages 
its members to share insights ranging through all three disciplines mentioned in its title. 
In its quality of the one and only well-recognised international meeting point for 
philosophers of biology, the society has played a major role in shaping and directing 
research in the field through the last two decades. As a result, interdisciplinary research 
on biology is relatively safe from the disciplinary diatribes characterising other fields and 
receives substantial institutional support.
89
 Accordingly, all prominent journals dedicated 
to the philosophy of biology favour a history-informed reconstruction and interpretation 
of biological practices over the more traditional focus on a priori reasoning that is still 
privileged in general philosophy of science. 
 
History, philosophy and social studies of biology [HPSSB] thus provides a welcoming 
environment for my own research interests, that is for using methods characteristics of 
the history and sociology of science in order to achieve a philosophical analysis of 
scientific understanding. I shall now turn to examine the methodological implications of 
seeking to incorporate the concerns of both sociologists and historians – from the interest 
in social dynamics and technology to the attention to local, situated practices – without 
renouncing the philosophical ambitions to systematise, elucidate and critique the ‘facts’ 
of which science is made.  
 
 
4.2 Reconsidering Research Goals: HPSSB as Complementary Science  
 
Note that the above account of scholarly attitudes towards interdisciplinary research on 
science and technology emphasises the intellectual interests displayed by the 
philosophers, historians and sociologists involved. This choice is deliberate. While 
institutional and financial aspects are equally relevant to explaining the current state of 
affairs in science studies, the focus on research goals and values underlying commitment 
and/or resistance to interdisciplinary scholarship is more directly relevant to my 
methodological discussion. This is because I believe a critical examination of the 
concerns fuelling research to be tightly intertwined with the evaluation of which courses 
of action might appropriately serve those interests. A normative discussion of HPSSB 
methodology, as exemplified in my own work, needs to start from a reflection on the 
goals that research is supposed to fulfil. In this section, I shall therefore examine the 
goals and values governing my methodological strategies. As it will turn out in the next 
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 See Callebaut (2005). 
89
 This claim is valid only at the international level and relatively to other fields in philosophy of science, 
since philosophers of biology have often trouble in making other faculty members of their local institutions, 
as well as local funding bodies, accept their integrating preferences. A brief analysis of this phenomenon in 
the case of the Netherlands can be found in Leonelli and Reydon (2005).  
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sections, a close analysis of how these goals might be achieved in practice does not lead 
to selecting one specific methodology as the absolute best HPSSB tool for inquiry. 
Rather, considering HPSSB ‘in action’ illustrates that this type of research is associated 
to a set of key concerns, rather than a set of methods. These concerns, including empirical 
adequacy, generality and reflexivity, are equally important to achieving HPSSB goals and 
should therefore be carefully calibrated in each specific piece of inquiry. The choice of 
methods that would support those concerns and facilitate results depends largely on the 
subjective preferences and context of each HPSSB researcher.  
 
In order to describe the goals and values that I take to motivate my contribution to 
HPSSB, I draw inspiration from a recent programmatic statement made by philosopher 
and historian of science Hasok Chang. Chang defines his brand of HPS research with the 
label of ‘complementary science’, which he describes as seeking ‘to generate scientific 
knowledge in places where science itself fails to do so’ (Chang 2004, 236). Chang’s 
starting point in building this position is the Kuhnian notion of ‘normal science’, which 
he takes not only to constitute the vast majority of scientific practice, but also to possess 
characteristics whose significance was crucially underestimated by Kuhn himself.
90
 One 
of these characteristics is the tendency to close itself to the critical challenges that are 
necessary to its very development.
91
 Imre Lakatos (1970) famously pointed to the 
necessity, in the context of increasingly specialised research programmes, of holding on 
to a ‘research core’ for guidance and constructive development. In an equally powerful 
pronouncement, Karl Popper condemned the dangers, to society and science alike, that 
lurk behind this partially dogmatic attitude (Popper 1970, 53). This debate generates 
crucial questions as to how to pursue the goals of normal science without suggesting 
drastic changes to its modes of operation (which, after all, have proved to be immensely 
efficient), but at the same time without being paralysed by the constraints on questions 
and commitments to which any research community, typically limited in its human and 
material resources, is inevitably subjected.  
 
Chang proposes complementary science as an answer to this dilemma. Like science itself, 
complementary science aims primarily at a better understanding of reality itself, rather 
than of science as a system of knowledge. It is interested in ‘normal’ scientific research 
as a subset of that reality, whose results and practices are therefore subject to probing and 
scrutiny in much the same way as scientific phenomena are to normal scientists. 
Complementary science thus pursues the goal of understanding reality by examining 
science just as closely as the rest of the natural world on which scientists focus their 
attention.
92
 Hence, its secondary goals, which mark its difference from normal scientific 
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 The argument that Kuhn’s description of normal science, though insightful, does not go far enough in 
overseeing its implications, is certainly not new. The work of Steve Fuller (2000), Joseph Rouse (1987) and 
Peter Galison (1997), to name just a few, starts from the same claim and develops into very different, 
fascinating accounts of the nature of scientific practices.  
91
 The importance of critical reflection within scientific community will be further emphasised when 
discussing Longino’s social epistemology in Chapter 7, section 7.3. 
92
 The assumption here is that scientists and their activities are certainly part of the animal (and thus the 
natural) world. It might be argued that the artefacts produced through those activities are not part of the 
same natural world, but it is not within the scope of this chapter to discuss this complex claim. I shall come 
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research, are the development of a critical perspective on the methods and aims of 
science, the search for alternative frameworks and methodologies and the proposal of 
new issues and agendas for the future.
93
  
 
What type of research might fall under the heading of complementary science? Free from 
the restrictions of tight research goals, specialised questions and deadlines imposed by 
funding bodies, philosophy of science (and especially the philosophy of scientific 
practice) can indeed take upon itself the critical role that specialised science is often 
forced to forego.
94
 The philosopher’s work is, in this sense, overlapping with the 
historian’s interest in uncovering and re-evaluating questions and ideas that have fallen 
out of the scientific agenda for all sorts of reasons. Further, and here I take issue with one 
of Chang’s claims
95
, contemporary history and sociology of science can also operate in 
such complementary manner. They can do this by addressing interests, circumstances and 
ideas that today’s practicing scientists do not reflect upon or do not consider to be 
relevant to their research (as it often turns out that social, political and economic interests 
do have a great impact on both the contents and the directions of scientific and 
technological research). In this sense, HPSSB can serve as a type of complementary 
science. In fact, I maintain that at least some areas of HPSSB research, such as my own 
                                                                                                                                            
back to it, in a somewhat different form, when discussing the difference between model organisms as 
artefacts and samples of nature in Chapter 6.  
93
 In this sense, complementary science differs greatly from the naturalistic approach to scientific 
epistemology advocated, for instance, by Ron Giere (1988): a complementary scientist aims to critique and 
further the claims of normal scientists, while a naturalist wants to use scientific knowledge to produce 
philosophical arguments. I agree with Chang’s Popperian stance that ‘constructive scepticism can enhance 
the quality of knowledge, if not its quantity’ (2004, 243): naturalist epistemology, however, leaves no space 
for such constructive scepticism.  
94
 I do not mean to depict philosophers and historians of science as entirely free from professional demands, 
deadlines and various kinds of financial obligations. Whether they are located in scientific or humanistic 
departments or institutes, HPS scholars are certainly not immune from the pressure to compete with their 
peers, satisfy their sponsors and fulfil requirements of teaching and publication. Still, HPS professional 
constraints are relatively minor when confronted with the constraints and specialisation often affecting 
scientific research. For instance, the way in which I chose to develop my PhD research was entirely 
independent from funding or institutional matters. This determined financial difficulties in funding my field 
trips, which meant that I could not afford very long stays in Arabidopsis laboratories: yet, this financial 
restriction was the only serious restriction determined by my academic affiliation. In this relative sense, I 
maintain HPS scholars to possess a relative freedom with respect to scientists.  
95
 Chang claims that social studies of science do not operate as complementary science. This is because the 
sociology of scientific knowledge ‘deflates the special authority of science as a whole by reducing the 
justification of scientific beliefs to social causes. In contrast, the aim of scepticism and anti-dogmatism in 
complementary science is the further enhancement of particular aspects of scientific knowledge’ (Chang 
2004, 248). As illustrated at the beginning of this chapter, I agree with Chang’s diagnosis about the 
disinterest (at best) and unwarranted scepticism (in the worst cases) in scientific questions characterising 
the majority of STS research, which is exemplified the Latourian stance that ‘we want to be at once more 
scientific than the sciences - since we try to escape from their struggles - and much less scientific - since we 
do not want to fight with their weapons' (Latour 1988b, 165; note the pseudo-evangelical ‘we’, meant to 
involve all scholars regarding themselves as contributors to STS, and the rhetorical use of war imagery). 
However, I do not take this tendency to be indicative of what social studies can and sometimes do 
contribute to science itself. As exemplified by Arturo Escobar’s work on anti-essentialism in ecology 
(1999), Stephen Helmreich’s anthropology of the Artificial Life community (1998) and Steve Fuller’s 
controversial (and, unfortunately, largely unchallenged) defence of intelligent design (2006), social and 
ethical considerations can have great bearing on the scientific understanding of nature. 
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fairly specialised study of scientific understanding, are especially interesting to scientists 
themselves and thus should explicitly aim at contributing to their work.  
 
I hope to provide an illustration of this latter claim in the conclusion of this dissertation, 
where I discuss the possible impact of my analysis on the ongoing scientific debate about 
how to use databases and simulations in model organism research. In attempting to 
confront this scientific issue, my work indeed conforms to the goals of complementary 
science by producing results that challenge – and thus, potentially improve upon – current 
scientific practice. The fashionable area of genomics constitutes another setting in which 
complementary science might operate alongside specialised, normal science. The main 
preoccupation of scientists working in this field is to acquire knowledge about the 
relation between gene structures and their functions in the cell. This is seen as an 
important first step towards uncovering the mechanisms governing organismal growth 
and development (and, eventually, controlling them). It is not a geneticist’s job, however, 
to conduct research on the way in which the history of genomics shaped current 
understandings of what a gene is, on the alternative conceptual frameworks that could be 
used to think about genes, or on ethical concerns about the use of genomic knowledge in 
society (such as issues of privacy, patenting, governmental regulations over 
biotechnology and so forth). This is problematic, since there is much that a geneticist 
could learn from these complementary types of research. Some biologists indeed profited 
from philosophical critiques of the foundations of genomics in building the field of evo-
devo, now one of the most exciting area of biology that counters many of the gene-centric 
tenets of classical genomic research. Further, it is often argued that scientists have at least 
some responsibility towards the social significance of their research. Much sociological 
research is relevant to their work in this sense, for instance by documenting how 
scientific authority is misused and its results distorted in the public arena. Better 
information about these mechanisms might encourage individual scientists (and scientific 
institutions) to take interest in the circulation of their results beyond the laboratory, 
participate in public debates and refrain from exploiting such misuse for their own private 
purposes (as is sometimes the case in corporate-sponsored biotechnological research, 
where principal investigators are free to protect personal financial profit over the validity 
and trustworthiness of their results).  
 
Does the idea of philosophy, history and sociology as forms of complementary science 
then imply that practicing scientists should take interest in it at all times? I would argue 
that this is not the case. This is not because contamination between science and 
philosophy is impossible or useless (as repeatedly claimed by some of the contributors to 
the infamous Science Wars
96
). After all, a clear distinction between the two types of 
practices cemented only towards the end of the 19
th
 century. Moreover, the scientific 
fruitfulness of mingling research with philosophical analysis is demonstrated by several 
crucial episodes in the recent history of science. Michael Friedman has cogently argued 
that intellectual exchanges between philosophers Helmholtz, Mach and Poincaré and 
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 Scientific hostility towards the co-operation of scientists and philosophers is tellingly exemplified by 
Steven Weinberg’s ‘Dreams of a Final Theory’ (1994), where a whole chapter (titled ‘Against Philosophy’) 
is devoted to declaring philosophy useless for scientific purposes. For a rich examination of Science Wars 
discourse, see Koertge (1998). 
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mathematicians Riemann and Klein provided an ideal terrain for Einstein to establish the 
foundations for special and general relativity (a process that Friedman calls 
‘communicative rationality’ in his 2001 ‘Dynamics of Reason’). Cooperation between 
philosophy and science features heavily in the history of biology, too. Apart from the 
well-known philosophical threads in Darwin’s ‘Origin of Species’, a telling example here 
is the Modern Synthesis achieved during the 1930s: most biologists now regarded as 
responsible for that fusion of Mendelian and Darwinian insights were also active 
contributors to philosophical debates about the implications of their scientific views (as in 
the well-known cases of Ernst Mayr and Theodosius Dobzhansky).
97
  
 
From these examples it might be tempting to conclude, as Friedman does in his own 
fashion, that it is preferable for scientists to take interest in complementary science 
alongside their ‘normal’ research. While this might certainly be the case at specific 
junctures in a scientist’ career, I am not convinced by this claim. A constant and/or 
conscious mingling of scientific and philosophical analysis is neither always necessary 
nor sufficient to the advancement of science. The general goals of normal and 
complementary science might be the same. Nevertheless, the ways in which philosophers 
conceive of scientific matters might differ so widely from the scientific perspective as to 
be incomprehensible to working scientists (and vice versa). It might be that such a gulf of 
interests is filled in the course of time and that philosophers find ways to make their 
thoughts relevant to scientific practice. It might also be that the line of thought pursued 
by philosophers turns out to be sterile or entirely misguided, just as in the case of a 
scientific research programme not fulfilling expectations and preliminary aims. In the 
latter case, complementary science will not have fulfilled its goals in the positive sense of 
contributing to the advancement of science.   
 
In fact, this positive fulfilment is not necessary, as long as complementary science has 
another, more negative but not less crucial, connotation: this is, in Chang’s words, its 
‘reluctance to place restrictions on the range of valid questions’ (2005, 239). Surely not 
all questions are of interest to the practicing scientist, nor should they be. What 
complementary science hopes to offer is an intellectual space where alternative questions 
can be asked without immediately worrying about their short-term utility or social 
repercussions. Such worries are intrinsic to specialised scientific practice. This is, at least 
in part, a good thing: given the limited availability of resources for scientific research, 
research programmes should indeed be carried out under time pressure, especially when 
their results may prove fruitful to society or, in case of failure, might steal precious 
resources from other programmes (as is often the case in the biomedical sciences). There 
are darker sides to the situation, especially since specialised science is becoming 
increasingly product-oriented and sponsored by agencies that value the applicability of 
results over their epistemic value. Complementary science is essential in order to 
supervise and critique the effects of these circumstances: it is perhaps unreasonable - and 
certainly unrealistic - to require specialised scientists themselves to conduct such 
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 See Mayr and Provine (1982).  
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complementary research while burdened by tight deadlines and heavy responsibilities 
towards funding bodies, peers and the public.
98
  
 
 
4.3 Complementary Science in Action: Interacting with the Biologists 
 
After outlining the goals and values characterising HPSSB as a form of complementary 
science, it is time to turn to the practical, methodological implications of this position. In 
this section, I take my own research as representative for this framework and I expose 
some of the issues that emerged while carrying it out. In particular, I address the 
ambiguity brought by this approach to the relationship between myself, as HPSSB 
researcher, and Arabidopsis scientists and their practices as the objects of my research. 
 
 
4.3.1 From Participant Observation to Collaboration 
 
My research centres around two specific subgroups of the Arabidopsis community: The 
Arabidopsis Information Resource [TAIR], that is the laboratory that collects, organises 
and makes available online all existing data on Arabidopsis biology; and the Nottingham 
Arabidopsis Stock Centre [NASC], where Arabidopsis specimens are grown, labelled and 
distributed to researchers for experimental use.
99
 I started my investigation of these sites 
by consulting two traditional sources of material for trained historians. The first was 
published literature, including scientific publications about the history of Arabidopsis 
research, the results achieved by the two research teams and their role in the broader 
Arabidopsis community, as well as online presentations of the main laboratories involved 
in Arabidopsis research, such as the NASC and TAIR home pages and the websites of 
leading figures in the field (e.g. the Meyerowitz Lab). My second source was the 
ensemble of community archives, conveniently stored within TAIR and NASC premises, 
documenting the processes through which these two research teams and their practices 
came to be. I quickly found out that published literature contains useful information about 
the ethos and directions publicly endorsed by researchers from the two sites, but largely 
obliterates the actual activities and tools characterising their research. The same is true of 
websites, whose function is more to advertise than to document the tasks carried out in a 
specific lab. For the purposes of making sense of how Arabidopsis scientists acquire 
understanding, this strategy alone would not do. Archival work presented me with an 
even more pressing problem: it would not yield meaningful information without the 
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 These remarks are not meant to depict normal scientists as entirely unreflexive, nor to sanction their lack 
of reflexivity when it occurs. There are notable exceptions to this trend (such as, for instance, John 
Maynard Smith, who has reflected at length on the relation between Darwinism and capitalism; 1979, 32) 
and it might even be that the ‘exceptions’ constitute the majority of scientists: unfortunately, we lack 
empirical data documenting the extent to which scientists’ concern with the implications of their work 
influences their research activities. My arguments here are not directed at the personal stands of individual 
scientists, but rather to contemporary scientific journals and institutions, the vast majority of which is 
certainly not encouraging reflexivity and social concerns in science. I thank Henk van den Belt for 
encouraging me to reflect on this point. 
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 For detailed information about the history and function of these two loci of Arabidopsis research, see 
section 3.3.  
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guidance of the biologists who gave me access to the records. This is largely due to the 
digital nature of the archives in question. Documents pertaining to communities built in 
the computer age risk to be far too many and far too unorganised for an historian to 
examine them all. Email exchanges among founders of TAIR alone run in the tens of 
thousands, all preserved in chronological order in the same database. Since in this case 
software does not allow for word-searches or quick scanning of text, there is practically 
no way to distinguish the majority of entirely trivial or purely technical messages from 
the small minority of text that might be relevant to my purposes. In order to select 
material without wasting years on a single archive, it became necessary to rely on 
scientists both for locating documents and correspondence and for complementing it with 
additional oral information.   
 
In the summer of 2004, I thus started to pursue what anthropologists would call 
‘fieldwork’ experiences – that is, periods spent in visiting the protagonists of my study on 
their home ground and participating, insofar as possible, in their daily activities. Those 
comprised a visit to the Carnegie Institute of Plant Biology in Stanford in August 2004 
(home to TAIR as well as to a large group of brilliant Arabidopsis researchers); 
participation to a number of biology conferences (concerning the set-up of gene 
ontologies, as documented in Chapter 5, and the use of models in biology); a visit to the 
NASC in May 2005 (where I learnt the rudiments of planting and harvesting Arabidopsis 
seed, which I discuss in Chapter 6); and several conversations with leading Arabidopsis 
researchers based in England and in the Netherlands. These experiences brought a wealth 
of material and insight without which this dissertation would hardly have been possible. 
Indeed, personal interaction with biologists turned out to be at least as relevant to my 
purposes as archival research and literature searches. Moreover, visiting the physical 
space in which Arabidopsis biologists work, watching them interact with each other and 
with their laboratory environment, experiencing the space and conditions under which 
they work as well as studying the materials that they used, have all proved extremely 
useful clues in deciphering the more or less tacit skills that they employ, their strategies 
to communicate and persuade each other and their concerns. ‘Being there’, as 
ethnographers would put it, is very important to an analysis of contemporary scientific 
practices. In my case, it was essential in order to make sense of the research practices of 
TAIR and NASC scientists, assess the extent to which these practices are influenced by 
the context in which they are carried out and, most importantly, verify how tight the 
connections are between the scientists’ ways of reasoning and their ways of acting.  
 
As it might be expected in the light of my discussion of complementary science, I found 
myself to be closely allied with the scientific goals pursued by the scientists I was 
studying. Like them, I am interested in determining the tools and strategies that are most 
appropriate to facilitate a cross-disciplinary, integrated understanding of plant biology. I 
agree with many of the scientists that I interviewed that disciplinary specialisation in the 
life sciences is both necessary and useful; I also share their unease in admitting that there 
are no resources nor venues available where such results can be brought together to bear 
on issues of common interest. I certainly wish my work to be useful to scientists trying to 
achieve such common conceptual platforms. What is most interesting about this sharing 
of commitments is the extent to which it facilitated my inquiry. It was helpful at the 
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practical level, as the common engagement with Arabidopsis research facilitated my 
access to both resources and willing interlocutors. Most importantly, it was helpful to 
experience for myself the extent to which adherence to scientists’ goals, exposure to their 
social context and acquisition of some of their material skills increased my own 
understanding both of their work and of the phenomena that they study. These three 
elements are the ones that I single out and discuss in my conclusions as crucial conditions 
enabling a scientific understanding of natural phenomena. In an interesting reflexive 
loop, I thus extracted my epistemological analysis not merely through a rational process 
of reconstruction, but by understanding my targeted phenomena (Arabidopsis practices) 
in much the same way as Arabidopsis scientists understand plant biology.  
 
Here is a first aspect of the ambiguity that HPSSB research, in its form of complementary 
science, brought to the relationship between me as a researcher and the communities on 
which I work: what constitutes an object of my study also constitutes my closest 
collaborator, as it helps me to acquire the experiences through which I can gain an 
understanding of it. Another way to read this phenomenon is to note that, apart from 
sharing interests and goals, the biologists and I have similar stakes in the research being 
carried out. Neither of us can claim to be impartial towards the results and significance of 
Arabidopsis research: I care about the trustworthiness and outreach of knowledge about 
plant development in much their same way. I invested a great deal of time and resources 
in studying the Arabidopsis community, which involves both a personal attachment to 
their endeavours and personal interest in their successes and failures, which might even 
impact my career and future employment (even if, admittedly, not to the same extent as 
in the biologists’ case). In addition, I see reciprocal, embodied understanding of 
phenomena as one of the most mysterious and successful aspects of science, as well as 
one fraught with social and political value that should, in my mind, be made explicit and 
subject to public debate. This care and personal investment constitutes a strong basis for 
efficient communication.
100
 It also motivates my shift from participant observation to 
outright collaboration with the scientists that I investigated.  
 
 
4.3.2 A Step Back to Situate Knowledge 
 
The emphasis on the value of collaboration is not, however, the only guiding principle of 
my research. As already mentioned in my introductory discussion of complementary 
science, there is a strong sense in which my approach to HPSSB requires a certain 
detachment from scientific goals, values and experiences. My practice is not the same as 
the practice of NASC and TAIR scientists, nor does it aim to be: it differs from normal 
science primarily to the extent in which I maintain a critical distance from their modus 
operandi, terminology, interpretations and commitments. 
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 I owe this recognition to the work on participative research carried out by Steven Helmreich in 
conditions comparable to mine. Helmreich’s research on the Artificial Life community, as reported in his 
(1998), remains a model of how daily interactions and critical engagement with researchers might yield 
enriching suggestions on both the value of Artificial Life research and its future development.  
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These latter statements might appear to flatly contradict my previous considerations on 
communality of goals and experiences. Yet, this seeming self-contradiction represents the 
main strength as well as the main difficulty of this type of research. HPSSB contributes to 
scientific understanding by challenging science itself. A detailed HPSSB study of 
scientific methodology thus inevitably involves the attempt to criticise such 
methodology, its theoretical roots and the interests it incorporates from as many 
perspectives as possible. Maintaining a critical distance enables me to recognise and 
assess alternative points of view with respect to the ones expressed by the scientists that I 
interview. It allows me to assess the credibility of each claim, as well as of my own 
related experiences, with reference to a number of other perspectives. In short, it is 
necessary in order to situate the knowledge gathered via a specific actor and/or 
experience in its proper context, thus understanding its value and place in the broader 
landscape of research practices, multiple interests and social networks that makes 
Arabidopsis biology what it is.  
 
How to reconcile this requirement with the advantages attached to collaborative 
participant observation? Further reflection shows how the two attitudes are not, after all, 
incompatible with each other. Taking a step back does not mean renouncing the 
commitments and beliefs that I share with the scientists that I study. I can better describe 
it as a willing ‘suspension of belief’
101
 that sustains the epistemological interpretation of 
the events experienced on fieldwork. There is a sense in which the HPSSB researcher is 
constantly of two minds: while extracting input from her objects of study by sharing their 
goals, context and experiences, she keeps looking for reasons to distrust that input and 
assess it relatively to all other relevant information in her possession, be it historical, 
social or scientific. This systematic debunking also applies to the researcher’s own 
framework, which needs to be critically challenged and re-adjusted depending on her 
exposure to ever more varied alternative perspectives and interpretations of the 
phenomenon under scrutiny. This exacting combination of sympathy and mistrust 
stretches even further the above-mentioned ambiguity of the position of an HPSSB 
researcher with respect to her objects of study.  
  
To clarify how this might work in practice, let me turn to my own attempts to situate 
experiences and information gathered during fieldwork. Consider in particular the 
process of selecting a restricted set of relevant actors on which to focus my inquiry. Such 
a selection is unavoidable. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Arabidopsis research is 
conducted in over 5000 laboratories spread across the globe. Depending on their location 
and training, Arabidopsis investigators differ in culture, expertise, skills, instruments and 
contexts – a variation that has direct consequences for the practices that they employ. The 
amount of different activities carried out in the Arabidopsis community is thus simply too 
large for an HPSSB researcher to study it comprehensively. I was therefore forced to 
select a set of actors and practices that would be especially suitable to my investigation of 
biological understanding.  
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 I paraphrase the expression ‘suspension of disbelief’, introduced by the poet S. T. Coleridge to describe 
the mechanism by which we come to trust fictional entities and images, in order to underline the contrast 
between the instinctive quality of that process and the rational nature of philosophical analysis.   
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One difficulty posed by this selection consisted in calibrating the amount of trust to be 
placed on my initial sources of information as well as my own interpretation of these 
sources. My shift of attitude towards the initiative named ‘The Arabidopsis Book’ [TAB] 
constitutes a good example of the need to maintain a critical perspective even towards my 
own intuitions. TAB is a collection of essays by influential Arabidopsis scientists that 
aims at summarising the knowledge hitherto obtained on the plant. It is published 
exclusively online, so as to be regularly updated with novel insights. Thanks to my 
philosophical training, which greatly emphasises (one might say, overestimates) the 
importance of written texts and explanations, I initially took this digital book to constitute 
a wonderful case of scientific collaboration towards the integration of data – and, 
therefore, a good case study for my research. I thus devoted much of my initial inquiries 
to TAB and planned to study interdisciplinary understanding in the community by 
interviewing the various authors of TAB pieces as well as the editor and some readers. 
This was only to discover, within scarcely four months of research, that few Arabidopsis 
scientists considered TAB to be of much interest and, even worse, that there was no 
actual collaboration underlying its publication. Experts in different fields would simply 
send in their review articles, while it was up to the reader to understand the connections 
among them (which cannot be done in most cases, as different articles contained entirely 
different techniques, perspectives and terminologies to illustrate the same phenomena). 
Recognising this required a great deal of detachment from my own initial perspective and 
from the information I had gathered from Arabidopsis researchers who were 
exceptionally enthusiastic (though, it turned out, not that well informed) about TAB.  
 
My research focus then shifted to digital databases, of which TAIR is certainly the most 
interesting by virtue of its commitment to conceptual integration in plant biology, and to 
the establishment responsible for the distribution of Arabidopsis specimens, i.e. the 
NASC. As discussed in Chapter 3, both of these laboratories tuned out to be immensely 
more influential to the production and exchange of knowledge in the community, thus 
fitting my intellectual interest in activities that explicitly targeted the need to bring 
together knowledge concerning different aspects of Arabidopsis biology. In addition to 
these intellectual motivations, the choice of TAIR and NASC as my research objects was 
attractive for strategic and practical reasons. These two centres are arguably among the 
most powerful and well-funded sites for Arabidopsis research worldwide. They benefit 
from excellent material as well as human resources: in fact, association to these 
laboratories involved gaining proximity to some of the leading figures in the community 
as a whole (such as, in the case of TAIR, Shauna and Chris Somerville). As recounted in 
Chapter 3, these scientists effectively started research on Arabidopsis and hold great 
power, to this day, on the directions and means pursued by the community. Also, they are 
directly responsible for the creation, organisation and preservation of the archive material 
that I needed to consult. Working with them thus implied accessing a wealth of 
information about aspects of Arabidopsis research that I could not have gathered 
anywhere else. For all these reasons, choosing the powerful seems extremely 
advantageous to an HPSSB researcher, especially if tackling large-scale science as in the 
case of the main model organism communities. It is no wonder that the vast majority of 
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the historical studies focusing on popular model organisms have selected powerful 
scientists as protagonists for their narratives.
102
  
 
Despite these advantages, however, there are good reasons to refrain from using powerful 
actors in HPSSB research on ‘big science’. Some unhelpful implications of this choice 
are already evident in my own analysis. Access to key players in the development of 
Arabidopsis research was gained at the expense of the so-called ‘periphery’: it did not 
leave me the time to investigate samples of the thousands of Arabidopsis laboratories 
that, rather than imposing research directions and resources on the rest of the community, 
keep developing experiments and increasing knowledge pertaining to their own 
specialised domain. This limited the scope of my investigations to laboratories that, like 
TAIR and NASC, focus on achieving an integrative biology of Arabidopsis – a goal that 
is philosophically stimulating, yet far less representative of model organism research than 
the specialised work done in the vast majority of Arabidopsis laboratories. This 
characteristic needs to be taken into account when evaluating the epistemological 
significance of TAIR practices with respect to Arabidopsis biology as a whole: and yet, 
without data to document how ‘periphery-bound’ biologists view and use TAIR results, a 
balanced evaluation becomes very difficult to achieve.
103
 The recognition of the tension 
between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ in Arabidopsis research required me to assess my 
sources of information with an eye to their privileged location.  
 
The challenge posed by this problem is enhanced by the very personality and talents often 
displayed by the scientists I worked with. Principal investigators working in the most 
prestigious scientific institutes worldwide are, unsurprisingly, strongly opinionated about 
which issues and events matters the most to an historical and philosophical reconstruction 
of Arabidopsis research practices. Charismatic figures such as Chris Somerville possess 
an uncanny and highly rehearsed ability to advertise their views and argue for their 
credibility – the same ability that helped them to rise to their current positions. While 
striving to diversify my sources (by interviewing several scientists at different locations, 
including Maarten Koornneef in the Netherlands and a number of British contributors) 
and to underline the role and interests of scientists that I mention, my emphasis on the 
thoughts and actions of powerful individuals certainly influenced my epistemological 
assessment. This influence is fuelled also by my awareness that disputing the 
perspectives of people whose knowledge and power so far exceeds my own carries its 
own risks and responsibilities (especially given that the same people are likely to act as 
peers to my work or to influence my professional credibility).
104
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 This is true of all accounts of model organism research practices, including Creager’s on the tobacco 
mosaic virus (2002), Kohler’s on Drosophila melanogaster (1994) and Ankeny’s on C. elegans (1997). A 
possible exception is represented by Karen Rader’s recent book on mice (2004), which, by virtue of its 
focus on standardisation rather than the animals themselves, embraces a larger diversity of perspectives. 
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 A detailed discussion of the epistemological significance of the tension between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ 
in Arabidopsis research can be found in section 7.1.  
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 This issue has been hotly debated especially within anthropology, since this field is growing interested 
in the study intellectual and political elites, rather than the poor, powerless and geographically remote 
peoples preferred by traditional anthropologists. This welcome change of interests (aptly dubbed ‘studying 
up’) is usefully discussed by Nader (1974) and Helmreich (1998, 25). Sociologist of science Michael 
Mulkay (1981) has also usefully critiqued the relation between sociologists of science and the scientists that 
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These elements point to the necessity of holding a pluralistic vision of Arabidopsis 
research, one that offers an overall view of the practices and beliefs employed within the 
community, but that, precisely for this purpose, differs from each of the partial 
perspectives offered by individual Arabidopsis contributors. Like the vision of my 
informants, my own vision is of course, situated, as it is grounded in a specific set of 
interests and principles. Yet, neither the recognition of situatedness nor my dependence 
on the information provided by my scientific collaborators constitute insurmountable 
obstacles to providing an enriching view of scientific practices – one that is broader, 
more systematic, more historically and sociologically informed and less tied to financial 
interests than the views produced by biologists themselves. It is in this sense that I 
propose to contribute to biology, while at the same time taking critical distance from its 
normal practices: collaboration and analysis can co-exist within the same approach, 
without necessarily undermining the epistemological value of my findings.  
 
 
4.3.3 Inevitable Asymmetries and Valuable Ambiguities 
 
HPSSB research offers descriptive and normative accounts of scientific practice that 
derive their usefulness from the asymmetry characterising the role of complementary 
scientists and the role of normal scientists. Complementary scientists are less 
knowledgeable than normal scientists about the actual content and techniques used in 
scientific practice – in most cases, they would not be able to perform them themselves, 
just like I would not be able to sequence an Arabidopsis gene or to expose a plant to 
chemicals so as to increase its mutation rate. At the same time, because of this specialised 
knowledge and interest, normal scientists are rarely receptive to the broader scientific, 
social and historical context of their research and to its significance towards the 
construction and interpretation of their results. The asymmetries in perspective, methods 
and background knowledge characterising the two types of science are as inevitable as 
they are helpful. In this context, it is a matter of course that a HPSSB researcher should 
maintain an ambiguous role with respect to the scientists that she is studying. This point 
is so well entrenched to HPSSB practice as to look trivial. Yet, it is important to 
recognise it explicitly, so as to discern its main methodological implication: that is, 
HPSSB should choose methods that feed upon, rather than repressing, this valuable 
ambiguity.  
 
As a conclusion for this section, I shall exemplify this point by discussing the strategy I 
adopted in order to conduct and analyse my conversations with scientists. This was, 
namely, the choice of avoiding to tape my conversations with my interviewees, thus 
                                                                                                                                            
they study as one of ‘intellectual vassalage’: analysts of science are over-dependent on their scientific 
informants for resources and material, thus making it difficult for them to provide critical evaluations of 
scientists’ actions and beliefs. I see this concern as very much alive within HPSSB. Yet, I think that a way 
out of intellectual vassalage is precisely the possibility, by analysts of science, to distance themselves from 
scientific practices and situate their own interventions. Reflexivity, coupled with relative financial 
aloofness and skills honed to reflect precisely about this issue, might go a long way towards freeing 
students of science from the constraints imposed by their dependence on their objects of study, i.e., in most 
cases, powerful scientists.  
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renouncing the opportunity to transcribe these exchanges and storing them as written 
documents that could be accessed by any other interested researcher. This decision has 
been widely criticised by several sociologists who have examined my work. As they 
pointed out, it compromised the accuracy and trustworthiness of my finding, by leaving 
me with no ‘objective’ trace of my verbal exchanges with the scientists. While 
acknowledging the damage that this choice could inflict on research of types other than 
my own, I wish to defend it in relation to my brand of HPSSB research. What I have been 
trying to achieve through dialogue with biologists is not a collection of statements and 
quotes that could usefully support my philosophical argument. This would not have made 
sense in my perspective, given the gulf separating the use of terms and arguments in 
biology and in philosophy. Quoting a biologist in a philosophical text is likely to have 
misleading results: the actual words in the quote might match the interpretation and 
terminology provided by the philosopher, but there is no guarantee that that interpretation 
actually corresponds to the biologist’s. Far from securing an objective sense of ‘what 
scientists really think’, quotes clipped away from the transcript of a conversation black-
box the processual nature of the communication between interviewer and interviewee, 
that is the way in which they keep learning from each other and adapting to each other’s 
mentality and terms. Acknowledging the asymmetry in training and methods that 
distinguishes complementary from normal scientists implies acknowledging that the two 
sides need to have extended conversations in order to recognise the communalities of 
their overall goals as well as the difference in their tools and patterns of reasoning.  This 
difference in paradigms, so to speak, need not be incommensurable: in order to overcome 
it, starting a dialogue challenging the references and overall vision of the subject is much 
more useful than the analysis of an interview transcript.  
 
Again, consider my actual experience. One of my most useful sources of knowledge and 
insight turned out to be the extended dialogues I had with the director of TAIR, Sue 
Rhee, during my four weeks of residence in her laboratory. Thanks to her interest in my 
project, I was given office space on the floor of the Carnegie Institute that is occupied by 
the TAIR team, thus managing to interview most participants to TAIR research in their 
own working environment. While single interviews with several collaborators clarified 
different aspects and perspectives underlying TAIR work, the frequent and in-depth 
conversations I had with Rhee shed light on some crucial differences between our 
approaches, uses of terms and points of reference when discussing what would appear, at 
first sight, to be similar themes. Our seven two-hour interview sessions, not to mention 
briefer exchanges in Carnegie corridors and coffee breaks, were instrumental to my 
understanding of the meaning that biologists, rather than philosophers or historians, 
attribute to statements that I had seen in various MASC reports and Arabidopsis 
publications. One instance is the notion of ‘integration’ itself. To me, that denoted the 
merging of knowledge gathered by different biological fields. To Rhee, integration 
indicates more specifically the fusion of data gathered at the genetic level with data 
gathered at the organism-level. Once uncovered, this difference made both my questions 
and her answers more intelligible (otherwise, I would have kept talking about what I 
thought as the merging of theoretical explanations, while she would have answered with 
reference to merging databases). It also boosted my insight in the relevance of database 
modeling to Arabidopsis research. Another example concerns the term ‘model system’. 
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Rhee uses it in a very different way from its philosophical equivalent
105
, namely, as 
referring to the model of a component of a model organism. Further, she makes a 
distinction between this term and the term ‘model organism’, which denotes an organism 
as a whole to her. Recognising and understanding this difference forced me to revise 
much of my epistemological assessment of model organism research, as will become 
clear in Chapter 6 where I discuss the status of Arabidopsis as a material model.  
 
Taping my conversations with Rhee and other scientists proved a practical obstacle to 
such meaningful communication. This was as much the result of the location and 
discontinuity characterising my exchanges
106
 as it was a consequence of scientists’ 
uneasiness with being recorded and eventually misquoted. In the case of group meetings 
among scientists, this concern easily gives way to involvement in the discussion. In the 
context of a one-to-one interview, by contrast, the interviewee is rarely comfortable with 
the thought of being recorded. I noted such a stark difference between interviews carried 
out with or without the recorder, that I stopped recording altogether and started to take 
notes instead. Hence, my adoption of a methodological strategy that sacrificed the 
accuracy of my records on the altar of meaningful communication. Rather than looking 
for specific quotes, I have been trying to exchange ideas and get the gist of the 
researchers’ outlook, of their own interpretation of what they are doing. This helped at 
the practical level, too: taking notes during interview gave people time to think and the 
impression of being taken seriously, while maintaining a useful tension throughout the 
exercise (taking out my notebook would be a signal that ‘things are getting serious’, thus 
favouring a smooth shift from amicable, preliminary chit-chat to a focused discussion). 
 
This process of communication wonderfully exemplifies the advantages of the 
characteristic ambiguity of HPSSB research. Meaningful communication can be achieved 
by agreeing on the meaning of terms and references used, by sharing experiences that 
allow for a reciprocal understanding of one another’s research and by meeting the 
interviewees on the common ground of a commitment towards increasing current 
scientific understanding of plant biology. At the same time, dialogue is fuelled by my 
ability, as a researcher gathering evidence on both scientific and social aspects of 
Arabidopsis research, to assess the situated nature of the views of my interlocutor.  
 
 
4.4 Beyond the Particular: A Matter of Concerns 
 
My combination of philosophy with history and sociology of science yielded a hybrid 
body of work. While certainly unable to tackle each relevant issue to the level of 
specificity required in each discipline, I hope that it goes some way towards breaking free 
of their insular limitations and thus address the broad issue of understanding with the 
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 Philosopher-historian Hans Rheinberger has introduced the very broad definition of experimental system 
as ‘the smallest functioning unit in science’ (1997, 306).  
106
 In several cases, the time and circumstances of interviews were heavily constrained by the extremely 
busy schedule of the scientists I was interviewing. Interviews had to be conducted whenever convenient to 
the subjects. This meant, when I was lucky, over meals or coffee; otherwise, I would be discussing the 
meaning of experiments, the epistemic status of models and the ethos of the Arabidopsis community while 
hitchhiking a ride home or helping to transport material around the campus.  
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flexibility and open-mindedness that such an enterprise requires. The methodological 
choices and experiences accounted for in the previous section have hopefully left readers 
with a sense of how I accumulated evidence for the present piece of research, as well as 
with some motivations for these choices. I tried to emphasise how the goals and values 
underlying my research have informed my methodological decisions. However, rather 
than promoting a specific set of procedures as most appropriate way to pursue my goals, I 
have outlined the ambiguities intrinsic to HPSSB research in its complementary mode. In 
my view, there is in fact no precise course of action that might secure credibility and 
fruitfulness to this type of research. That is not to say that an HPSSB researcher has no 
methodological standards whatsoever. These standards are best expressed as a set of key 
concerns, which the researcher has to respect as much as possible while carrying out her 
inquiry. The precise significance and practical methodological implications of abiding to 
these concerns need to be established with relevance to the specific context and goals of 
such inquiry.  
 
I shall now briefly discuss the three concerns that I think best constrain the space for 
action and interpretation within which an HPSSB project should be positioned. The first 
concern is empirical adequacy. In her interpretation of the cases that she studies, the 
HPSSB researcher strives to be as faithful as possible to her empirical findings, thus 
avoiding to distort and/or invent evidence in order to defend her claims. There should be 
no stance or interpretation of scientific practices and findings that an HPSSB researcher 
is not prepared to modify or even reject in the case of it not fitting the reality of what is 
observed. Efforts to provide empirically adequate descriptions of scientific practice 
should extend to both its (scientific, institutional, social, economic and political) context 
and its results (that is, the scientific knowledge that is gathered).
107
  
 
The second concern on my list, generalisability, is indeed required to act as an antidote 
against such confinement. A well-known interpretation of this notion is that of generality 
as an absolute attribute of philosophical views, which denotes their universal 
applicability. This qualification of generality is mostly associated to rationalistic 
philosophy - even some social sciences occasionally aspire to it. Here I want to focus on 
a different interpretation of generality, one that is relative to the context in which this 
notion is used. This is the idea of generalisability in the sense of multi-locality
108
. 
According to it, a scientific claim is the more general, the more local contexts it can be 
applied to. These local contexts need to be other than the ones with reference to which 
the claim was originally developed. In this sense, the notion of generalisability is almost 
synonymous with the one of applicability: yet, it differs from the latter term insofar as it 
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 This apparently trivial point needs to be mentioned, given the above-mentioned tendency within some 
branches of social studies to exclude the intellectual goals and fruits of scientific research from their 
analysis of science. This first concern is central to historical and sociological methods of inquiry and needs 
to be integrated within (empirical) philosophy without, as I noted in my introductory section, necessarily 
confining the scope of philosophical analysis. 
108
 Inspiration for this view is provided by Hans Radder’s ideas about the non-locality of the results of 
scientific experiments (1996); and by Rachel Ankeny’s arguments about the comparative nature of 
generalisations in the biomedical sciences, a body of knowledge which according to her is constructed on 
the detailed description of specific cases, which are then used as ‘index-cases’ for comparison with similar 
occurrences (2005).  
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includes both potential and actual applicability (in other words, one can reasonably 
suppose that a general claim might be applicable to a given context, unless such 
applicability has been empirically disproved).  
 
The third concern of interest to HPSSB research is the one of strategic reflexivity. 
Reflexivity broadly refers to the awareness that a researcher is supposed to cultivate 
about the impact of her own beliefs, actions and reasoning on the data that she gathers 
and on her ways of interpreting them. As I argued when reflecting on the similarity of 
goals and concerns between my work and the biologists’ work, active involvement in the 
issues to be researched might be the only way to produce historical, philosophical and 
sociological analyses. As participant observation gives way to collaboration, there is no 
denying the significant role played by the researcher in shaping the very reality that she 
studies. A complementary scientist actually aims at acquiring influence – thus offering, 
she hopes, a constructive contribution – on her objects of study. The reflexivity 
characterising an HPSSB researcher is therefore of a strategic type, since being aware of 
her impact on scientific practice is not just a means towards evaluating the credibility of 
her narrative, but also a means towards assessing her own success in pursuing the goals 
of complementary science. 
 
My emphasis on concerns, rather than actual courses of action, highlights the extent to 
which HPSSB research methods are tied to the contingencies of a specific situation and 
the preferences of individual researchers. In this purely procedural sense, HPSSB does 
indeed produce a philosophy of the particular. On the other hand, my account of the goals 
of HPSSB research about contemporary science highlights two of its crucial components: 
(1) participative experiences alongside scientists, which aim at understanding their 
practices, allegiances and modes of communication and which are guided by the above-
mentioned concerns; and (2) reflective moments of rationalisation in which those 
experiences are assessed and conceptualised relatively to background knowledge and 
beliefs. In the case of my own research, these two components produced a rational 
reconstruction of my participative experiences. This reconstruction was guided by my 
intellectual interests and methodological concerns, as well as by the abstract concepts and 
categories through which I chose to structure my analysis (such as the notions of theory, 
model, commitment and skill).  
 
The resulting narrative yields a series of claims about the characteristics of biological 
understanding in the case of Arabidopsis research. These claims are not assumed to be 
transferable to contexts other than the Arabidopsis community: HPSSB research in its 
complementary mode does not, a priori, pretend its results to be universally valid. 
Nevertheless, they certainly have the potential of being applicable to other contexts: they 
are general in the sense of having the potential of being multi-local. Thinking of 
generality in terms of multi-locality means making it subject to empirical research: we 
can test the generality of a claim by verifying how it applies, if at all, to contexts different 
from the one that it has been developed to describe (that is, by evaluating its empirical 
adequacy in different sites). This view does not imply that those claims should maintain a 
fixed interpretation independently of the context to which they are applied – which is in 
itself advisable, since the meaning of concepts, as well as the nature of the relations 
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among them, may well vary when travelling through different environments. This version 
of HPSSB research does imply, however, that uttering general claims is perfectly 
compatible with the study of specific cases. This is an important result, since the 
formulation of general claims provides a standpoint for further work and for the 
development of alternative (or even incompatible) interpretive frameworks to the one I 
proposed. In the context of HPSSB research, coining a claim means accounting for its 
local origins, motivations and development. As I hope to have shown, such information 
in turn facilitates, rather than hampers, the transferability of that claim to other contexts.  
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Chapter 5. Using TAIR to Understand Arabidopsis: Theoretical and 
Performative Skills  
 
Ultimately, our goal is to provide the common 
vocabulary, visualisation tools, and information 
retrieval mechanisms that permit integration of all 
knowledge about Arabidopsis into a seamless whole that 
can be queried from any perspective   
Sue Rhee Website, accessed November 2003 
 
As recounted in section 3.3, The Arabidopsis Information Resource [TAIR] was set up by 
the Arabidopsis Steering Committee at the end of the 1990s in order to gather together 
and organise the various types of data progressively accumulated on Arabidopsis biology. 
The main practical purpose of this exercise is to facilitate Arabidopsis research, by 
making data about several aspects of Arabidopsis biology freely available to any biologist 
who might require access to them.
109
 As I shall illustrate, the pursuit of this goal alone 
represents a major scientific feat, since it is very hard to classify and order the ever-
growing mountain of data gathered by all contributors to the Arabidopsis community. 
Yet, what makes TAIR unique among the existing biological databases devoted to 
Arabidopsis is not the focus on storing and retrieving data. Rather, it is the realisation that 
compiling diverse data into one resource requires reference to an integrating framework. 
This realisation determined a crucial expansion of TAIR goals: from the practical 
necessity of finding ways to archive Arabidopsis data to the ambitious wish to construct 
tools ‘that permit integration of all knowledge about Arabidopsis’, in the words of TAIR 
Principal Investigator Sue Rhee (above).  
 
In this chapter I intend to focus on the intertwinement of practical constraints and 
conceptual judgements underlying the making of TAIR (section 5.2) and on the nature of 
the integrating framework adopted by TAIR to arrange data and thus ‘integrate 
knowledge’ (section 5.3). Further attention will be bestowed on the embodied knowledge 
needed by scientists working at TAIR in order to build the resource (section 5.4). As it 
turns out, both the construction and the use of TAIR require a series of epistemic skills 
(section 5.5), without which it is impossible for biologists to use TAIR in order to further 
their understanding of Arabidopsis biology. This determines a tension between the goals 
of the TAIR project, since the emphasis on making the resource easily accessible does 
not square with the need to acquire additional skills in order to use it effectively. I start 
my analysis by illustrating what the TAIR project actually achieved up to now. In other 
words, it is high time to discuss what TAIR actually is and how it works.
110
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 See thee report compiled by the Multinational Arabidopsis Steering Committee in 1999.  
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 As specified in Chapter 4, the material that follows has been gathered through extensive interviews with 
members of TAIR, including Sue Rhee, Eva Huala, Leonore Reiser, Danny Yoo, Doug Becker, Katica Ilic 
and external advisers Chris and Shauna Somerville. The interviews were conducted during a month-long 
visit to TAIR in August 2004, during which I was granted a working space within the Carnegie Institute as 
well as access to TAIR archives.  
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5.1 What Is TAIR? 
 
To Arabidopsis biologists, TAIR is primarily a website (www.arabidopsis.org), whose 
homepage is reproduced in figure 5.1. The website functions as a gateway to the various 
search and visualisation tools elaborated by the TAIR team to make Arabidopsis data 
retrievable by TAIR users. It also provides abundant information about how databases are 
made, how they should be consulted and which types of data are included in the main 
TAIR data set. Last but not least, the website allows users to order stocks of Arabidopsis 
seeds from the main Arabidopsis Stock Centres.  
 
Figure 5.1 - TAIR Home Page (accessed 10 March 2006).  
 
 
 
 
The TAIR website provides access to several databases, each of which collects and 
classifies a specific set of data. Examples of these databases are MapViewer, which 
allows access to various types of mappings of Arabidopsis chromosomes; AraCyc, which 
contains data about biochemical pathways characterising Arabidopsis cellular processes; 
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and BLAST, which displays Arabidopsis metabolic cycles.
111
 All data presented in this 
way are stored in a central archive hosted by the TAIR server in Stanford.  
 
By clicking on one of the hyperlinks for databases (that is, one of the items classified in 
the homepage under the heading ‘analysis tools’), users are asked to select and specify 
parameters for their query, thus formulating their search according to the framework 
adopted by the database that they have chosen. For instance, they can choose to ask for 
data related to a specific gene marker on Arabidopsis chromosome 1. To do that, they 
would click on MapViewer, choose chromosome 1 among the five Arabidopsis 
chromosomes and fill in the name of the locus of interest (e.g., genetic marker 
SM39_256). Once the query is compiled, another click of the mouse is sufficient for the 
software to locate the relevant data and display it to the user.  
 
Notably, TAIR offers a variety of parameters in which the same query can be pursued, so 
as to maximise the efficiency of any given search. Also, it proposes several ways in 
which the results of a query can be displayed. So in the case of the above query about 
genetic marker SM39_256, the user can view results in five different formats, including a 
classical genetic map, an AGI map (that is, the type of sequencing adopted by 
contributors to the AGI project) and a RI map (‘recombinant inbred’, reporting 
information about genetic markers derived by crossing two different Arabidopsis 
ecotypes).
112
 These visualisations of Arabidopsis data are crucial to the functioning of 
TAIR. They allow the researchers working at TAIR (which I shall refer to as ‘TAIR 
curators’) to organise the sea of data stored in the central server, so as to make them 
easily retrievable. Most importantly, these images do not simply facilitate the users’ 
access to the data: they incorporate a specific interpretation of the data, which is used to 
select data in the first place, to connect them to a specific biological context and to signal 
their relevance to specific queries and types of research. In this chapter, I wish to focus 
on the interpretive component of TAIR and on its implications, especially concerning the 
prospective usefulness of TAIR to the Arabidopsis community. Through a step-by-step 
reconstruction of the main phases in the construction of TAIR, I will show that TAIR 
images are constructed around a theoretical interpretation of the data that they display: 
TAIR curators use a network of concepts known as Gene Ontology [GO] in order to 
classify, organise and display available data on Arabidopsis.  
 
The construction of TAIR databases turns out to be an extremely complex process, which 
involves making significant assumptions about how to model data collected on 
Arabidopsis. Representing available data on the plant implies some degree of 
interpretation of those data and their significance towards Arabidopsis biology as a 
whole. Reference to a conceptual framework is unavoidable when trying to construct 
such a complex set of databases and images, as decisions about how to organise data are 
never entirely neutral and/or objective, but rather they are geared towards the fulfilment 
                                                
111
 For scientific details on TAIR and its component AraCyc and MetaCyc, see Rhee (2000), Huala et al 
(2001), Reiser et al (2002), Garcia-Hernandez et al (2002), Rhee et al (2003), Mueller et al (2003), Krieger 
et al (2004). 
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 http://www.arabidopsis.org/servlets/TairObject?accession=GeneticMarker:2225346, accessed 20 March 
2006.  
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of specific goals. This is especially true in the case of TAIR, whose long-term goals are 
to make Arabidopsis data not only accessible, but also comprehensible to biologists. As 
remarked in Chapter 3, TAIR was set up as a digital platform on which different data sets 
could be confronted and eventually integrated, so as to facilitate the understanding of 
Arabidopsis biology as the biology of a whole organism. It is in this sense that TAIR 
constitutes an extremely interesting, innovative bioinformatic tool. At the same time, the 
conceptual framework required for TAIR to enhance biologists’ understanding of 
Arabidopsis biology is precisely what makes it problematic for them to use the resource 
efficiently.  
 
I intend to show that users can access the visualisations of data provided by TAIR, and 
thus use them to facilitate their own research, only if they are acquainted with the 
theoretical framework through which they were produced. This presents TAIR with a 
serious problem. The conceptual framework elaborated by TAIR curators (that is, the GO 
network) is tightly embedded in a specific, gene-centred epistemic culture. Indeed, as I 
shall illustrate, understanding TAIR images requires possessing a specific set of 
interpretive skills, which corresponds to the one used by TAIR curators in creating the 
images. This finding contrasts with the function that TAIR was intended to serve, that is, 
making Arabidopsis data accessible to all interested biologists, regardless of their 
individual skills, convictions and expertise.  
 
Before proceeding with my analysis, let me emphasise one important aspect of the 
scientific activities and results that I am about to discuss: its relatively recent birth and its 
unpredictable future. The TAIR team has started its research activities in 1999, thanks to 
a first research grant covering the period from 1999 to 2004. The continuation of the 
grant was conditional on the quality of the results obtained in that first trial period. An 
assessment exercise that took place at the end of 2004 found TAIR work to be extremely 
successful, as a consequence of which the project has been granted further funding until 
2009. The short life of TAIR is a factor that needs to be kept in view throughout my 
analysis. This is, first of all, because TAIR work is still in an experimental phase. This 
makes it an exciting site at the cutting edge of contemporary biological research, as well 
as an excellent place for a philosopher to work in collaboration with biologists: TAIR 
curators welcome all insights and suggestions for improvements on their current work. 
Second, the short life of TAIR means that its results are still relatively limited, especially 
since, as I am about to document, a long stretch of time has been devoted to building the 
foundations (technical as well as conceptual) on which to construct this resource. Up to 
now, TAIR has constructed visual representations of data concerning only the lowest 
levels of organisation in Arabidopsis biology. This initial focus on genomics and 
molecular biology was determined by the material at hand, that is, by the abundance of 
gene-level data gathered in the 1980s and 1990s through generously funded projects such 
as the Arabidopsis Genome Initiative. Given the urgent need for databases that would 
store and organise all that information, the first TAIR grant contained short-term goals 
that were explicitly targeting gene-level information and allowed for the inclusion of 
higher-level data (for instance, data pertaining to cellular organisation and ecological 
adaptability in Arabidopsis) only on the basis of gene-level information (Garcia-
Hernandez et al 2002). 
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This might appear a meagre scope, when confronted with the ambitious integration of 
data ranging from the ecological to the genomic level advertised by TAIR as its long-
term goal. In fact, I shall later criticise TAIR as ending up, despite its proposed goals, 
enforcing a gene-centric view of Arabidopsis biology. What I want to emphasise in this 
section, however, is the extent to which the existing databases and relative visualisation 
tools hitherto elaborated by TAIR curators constitute a major achievement in the context 
of Arabidopsis research, as well as in the broader landscape of model organism research. 
The work of TAIR curators involved extensive trial-and-error phases in collaboration 
with similar research teams in other model organism communities, consultations with a 
variety of disciplinary experts and bioinformaticians, as well as crucial decisions on how 
to go about interpreting and representing Arabidopsis data. Further, there is a sense in 
which TAIR personnel is aware of the shortcomings intrinsic to their approach: Principal 
Investigator Sue Rhee and Managing Director Eva Huala insist that the current choice to 
organise the database on the basis of genomic data is purely pragmatic, since the ultimate 
TAIR aim remains to capture information pertaining to all levels of biological 
organisation, from the genomic to evolutionary/ecological levels.  
 
In the years to come, TAIR curators will have the chance to prove whether their approach 
and methods can be stretched as far as to encompass such different data sets. It is 
impossible to predict whether their research will fulfil its original goal and how biologists 
within and without the Arabidopsis community will profit from it: I shall therefore 
abstain from speculations in this respect. This uncertainty notwithstanding, there is a 
strong sense in which no scientist (or philosopher) is more aware than TAIR curators of 
the difficulties involved in creating a digital resource encompassing a large quantity of 
data of widely differing origin and type. The next section is therefore dedicated to 
reconstructing the work conducted at TAIR and, as discussed in Chapter 4, is based on 
my interviews with TAIR curators, relevant scientific publications and my observations 
on site.  
 
 
5.2 The Making of TAIR 
 
5.2.1 Design: Vision and Realisation 
 
The first (and, in the view of TAIR researchers, most important) phase in the construction 
of TAIR databases is the one of design. By design, TAIR curators refer to the preparatory 
work needed to publish databases on the TAIR site. This includes learning to use 
appropriate tools, clarifying ideas about which types of databases are needed and 
selecting what needs to go into the databases, and in which form. For the purposes of my 
analysis, I divide this cluster of design-related issues into two sets of research activities, 
which I call vision and realisation. Interestingly, these two aspects of design define a 
division of labour among TAIR personnel: TAIR curators, who are all trained biologists 
with an interest in the scientific value and validity of TAIR, concern themselves mostly 
with the aspect of vision; while TAIR programmers, that is the IT engineers hired by 
TAIR to provide technical support to the curators, are in charge of the aspect of 
 105
realisation.
113
 I now discuss each of these aspects in detail and look at how they relate in 
practice.   
 
 
Visions for the User 
 
As remarked above, TAIR databases need to be easily readable and accessible to the user. 
For TAIR curators, this involves thinking about (i) how data can be visualised without 
loss of information and (ii) whether the proposed options for data visualisation would 
enable prospective users to easily locate and access the information they want. This latter 
aspect is especially important, as TAIR sponsors and scientific patrons conceive of the 
TAIR project as a service to the Arabidopsis community as a whole. TAIR director Sue 
Rhee agrees that the primary goal of TAIR consist of what she calls ‘facilitation’, that is, 
of making the acquisition of information about Arabidopsis as effortless as possible for 
all potential users (that is, biologists likely to need information to further their own 
research).
114
 The search tools contained in TAIR are therefore expected to please 
Arabidopsis biologists, thus encouraging them to benefit from the resource by making 
regular use of it. TAIR curators have taken this expectation to imply that the first step 
towards the construction of TAIR should be discussing what a database should look like, 
in order to satisfy as many of its potential users as possible. Agreement on a specific 
template for a database, they reasoned, would allow them to set out the process of 
actually producing the database. These templates are what TAIR curators refer to as their 
visions of what the user wants from a database. I thus borrow the term and its definition 
directly from them. 
 
The three TAIR curators responsible for creating visions are Sue Rhee, Eva Huala and 
Lead Curator Margarita García-Hernández, with occasional input provided by members 
of the TAIR executive committee (including Chris Somerville).
115
 Rhee firmly believes 
in the importance of spending far more time on the planning and preparation of visions 
than on their actual realisation, as she emphasises that ‘it takes more time and pain to 
‘redo’ than start slow’.
116
 Rhee and Huala point to two main difficulties in their work 
towards creating a vision of the database.
117
 The first difficulty was, unsurprisingly, 
information management. The early days of TAIR research involved frantic consultation 
of all types of literature dealing with this subject, in the hope of finding suggestions about 
how to visualise the most diverse information in the simplest possible way, without 
losing sight of its richness and of the diversity between features and sources for each 
datum.
118
 TAIR curators confronted this problem by deciding to create several different 
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 TAIR members have published their views on the effectiveness of collaboration between software 
developers and biologists in Weems et al (2004).  
114
 Interview with Sue Rhee, 12 August 2004. 
115
 As far as the elaboration of the vision is concerned, Huala cannot recall any other external influence, 
neither from within the Carnegie nor from other members of the Arabidopsis community.  
116
 Quote taken from a presentation given to NSF by Rhee in May 2004.  
117
 Interview with Eva Huala, 13 August 2004. 
118
 Huala points to Tufte (2001) as a main source for inspiration. Interestingly, she drew inspiration 
particularly from historical examples contained in the text, such as for instance graphics displaying 
information about Napoleon’s campaign to Russia.   
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databases, each of which would provide a different perspective on Arabidopsis biology. 
They therefore devised visions for a database containing data about the location of genes 
on Arabidopsis chromosomes; another displaying data about gene expression; another 
focused on data about metabolic cycles; another about biochemical pathways; and so on. 
The possibility to gather data about the same phenomena from different perspectives, 
they reasoned, would indeed maximise the information available to users, without losses 
in the accuracy or the richness of data. Further, within each database users would be 
allowed to formulate their query in different ways: they would be able to choose among 
different parameters, as well as different ways to display the results of their search (for 
instance, when searching a specific gene locus on a chromosome, current TAIR users can 
view their results in the form of a genetic, physical or sequence map
119
).  
 
A second difficulty consisted in trying to imagine what the user wants, since, as TAIR 
curators know all too well, ‘the’ ideal user of TAIR does not exist: TAIR aims to reach 
several types of scientific audiences, ranging from ‘the’ developmental biologist to ‘the’ 
technician, ‘the’ molecular biologist and ‘the’ theoretical biologist (not to mention the 
differences in epistemic culture to be found within and across those very categories). In 
order to confront this problem, TAIR curators drew insight from their own experience as 
experimental biologists specialised in different areas of Arabidopsis development.
120
 As 
they told me, they tried to ‘play the user’: that is, they tried to imagine what an 
experimenter engaged in a number of research activities would expect from a database. 
This strategy proved to be extremely useful. For instance, Huala proposed, on the basis of 
her own experience as a developmental biologist
121
, that the user should be able to ‘fly 
into’ the chromosome, i.e. to view and explore a three-dimensional representation of 
Arabidopsis chromosomes that is produced and constantly modified on the basis of 
incoming experimental data. This vision meant that TAIR should provide complex, three-
dimensional visualisation tools that would allow users to ‘click’ on the image of a 
specific chromosome and see a representation of the inside of the chromosome. On the 
one hand, this representation would have to be realistic enough as to convey ideas about 
the actual structure and physiology of chromosomes; on the other hand, it would have to 
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 As recounted in the current TAIR site (URL: http://www.arabidopsis.org/mapViewer/help/tairmapa.jsp, 
accessed 14 March 2006), TAIR's maps are divided into three general types. Genetic maps are constituted 
by sets of ‘markers’ (i.e., specific areas of Arabidopsis chromosomes) that have been mapped by crossing 
parents with two different forms of the marker (in the case of many classical markers, these are the wild-
type and the mutant) and scoring how many recombination events separate the marker from other markers 
on the same map. Physical maps are collections of overlapping clones that have been arranged into a tiling 
path based on either fingerprinting (digestion of clones with restriction enzymes and comparison of the 
fragment sizes) or hybridization. Sequence maps are sets of clones that have been sequenced or have been 
chosen for sequencing by the Arabidopsis Genome Initiative (AGI). 
120
 While Rhee has a background as molecular biologist, Huala joined TAIR after years of training as a 
developmental biologist. 
121
 The idea of  ‘flying into’ (or around) objects of interest is certainly not new, nor is it recent. Such 
methods have been in use within engineering, for instance, since at least two decades. Huala herself was 
inspired by visioning a similar tool, elaborated by another research group to simulate a bacterial system. 
What I want to emphasise here is thus not so much the innovative nature of this idea, but the free way in 
which curators went about exploring possibilities, as well as their primary motivation while doing so: that 
is, satisfying the user.   
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contain specific references to the data from which the model was generated, so as to 
allow users to trace the sources and original context of the data.  
 
Like other visions elaborated by TAIR curators, the idea of ‘flying into’ chromosomes 
became a strong heuristic in the construction of TAIR databases and eventually led to the 
creation of various types of chromosome maps (which, as in figure 5.2, represent 
chromosomes as a line on which genes and other markers are located). It also encouraged 
curators to think about spatial representations for information that is not normally visible 
in a real chromosome, but that is best visualised when using different colour patterns and 
three-dimensional effects. A relevant instance in this respect are the images provided by 
VxInsight, a tool borrowed by TAIR from Sandia National Laboratories. This database 
visualises gene expression patterns (a notably abstract type of data) as mountain terrain 
maps, where the red peak of each ‘mountain’ signals a cluster of genes characterised by a 
particularly pronounced expression pattern (figure 5.4).   
 
Figure 5.2 - Map of the five Arabidopsis Chromosomes. The map follows the suggestion 
of users ‘flying into’ the chromosomes, by letting users zoom in specific areas of the 
chromosomes and seeing what gene clusters they contain (for instance, on this map a 
specific gene locus, named At1g01010, is signalled).  
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 - Close-up view of a specific area of Chromosome 1, with indications about 
how to change display parameters and area of choice.  
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Figure 5.4 - VxInsight view of patterns of gene expression as physical mountain terrain.  
 
 
 
 
Ideally, the best way to obtain feedback on the visions underlying the visualisation tools 
above would have been for TAIR curators to ask the opinion of experimental biologists 
with no direct involvement in TAIR (that is, the actual users for which those tools were 
being devised). Obtaining input from users proved, however, impossible, at least in the 
early stages of TAIR research. This is because providing input requires extended 
familiarity both with the new kind of database that TAIR was supposed to devise and 
with the goals and tools characterising the TAIR project. Biologists who were ignorant of 
the content and opportunities afforded by such a database were not in a position to give 
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feedback on how best to construct it.
122
 Rather than asking biologists for direct feedback 
on the vision of the database, therefore, curators started asking for queries that would be 
likely to be submitted to a database such as TAIR. The crucial question for the TAIR 
team then became: can we answer this query with the current vision? By asking this 
question, TAIR curators effectively brought together their concerns about information 
management and user-friendliness, thus elaborating visions for easily accessible, clear 
and yet rich databases.  
 
 
Realisation: Java Software and the Design Loop  
 
Once curators reach agreement on what they would like their databases to look like, the 
vision thus elaborated becomes a heuristic guide in making actual databases. In fact, 
thinking about design means also to conceive of ways in which such ‘ideal’ visualisations 
can be produced in practice. This is the aspect of realisation: appropriate tools and 
methods need to be found and/or built in order to realise the vision as accurately as 
possible.  
 
The realisation of the visions agreed upon by TAIR curators meant finding software that 
would support them, while at the same time being simple enough for biologists to learn to 
work with it. As I pointed out earlier, the task of proposing appropriate programmes and 
modifying them in order to fit the curators’ demands fell on the hands of the IT engineers 
hired by TAIR for technical support (to whom I shall refer as ‘TAIR programmers’). 
Interestingly, TAIR programmers have little if any training in biology to begin with, 
while TAIR curators have only a minimal training in programming. Rhee praises the 
advantages of this situation, as, in her words, it prevents either side from ‘making 
assumptions’ about the demands and goals of the other: motivations and reasoning 
underlying each choice have to be made explicit, so as to bridge the gap in expertise. At 
the same time, this situation also requires the two groups to collaborate closely over long 
periods and learn some of each other’s skills in order to obtain acceptable results.  
 
According to TAIR programmers, Java programming represents the best combination of 
effective rendition and ease of use for the purposes of TAIR. The basic set-up of Java 
programming requires the a priori selection of a set of objects and a set of relations 
among them, which are generally referred to as ‘family relations’. These objects and 
relations are arranged into a so-called DAG structure (a ‘directed acyclic graph’; see 
figure 5.5), where each object can be both the ‘child’ and the ‘parent’ of other objects. 
Note that the nature of these family relations is purely structural: it is a way to describe 
formal relations. Even the analogy with family ties, on which this terminology is based, 
derives from the asymmetrical nature of these relations: while any object can have 
                                                
122
 As I highlight in Chapter 7, this might now be changing. Experimenters who are now acquainted with 
TAIR are expected to offer increasing feedback on the way in which the data that they produce are 
represented within the resource. This is because, as TAIR becomes a standard tool for publishing 
Arabidopsis data, experts will increasingly want their say about how data are stored and displayed.  This 
feedback is welcomed by TAIR, since it relieves the curators from the great amount of work necessary to 
elaborate visions, while at the same time improving the quality and user-friendliness of the final product. 
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multiple parents and be parent of multiple objects, the same object can never both the 
parent and the child of another object (hence the arrows pointing only downwards in 
figure 5.5).
123
 As we shall see, both of these features prove very important for the 
purposes of TAIR. Programmers refer to this approach as object-oriented, precisely 
because it involves choosing a set of objects around which all elements of the programme 
rotate.
124
  
 
Figure 5.5 - Directed acyclic graph (DAG) used by object-oriented Java software. Each 
‘child’ (i.e., object connected to other objects, here represented as a yellow/blue dot) may 
have multiple ‘parents’ (objects from which other objects derive).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
To test the viability of this programming approach, TAIR curators present programmers 
with a series of mock-ups, that is, sketches of what the database should look like and how 
should it function, according to the visions previously elaborated. These sketches contain 
actual ‘use cases’, that is, visualisations of the specific elements that the users would 
expect to see in order to submit their queries and be satisfied by the results. Programmers 
then design appropriate software in order to match the user cases presented by the 
curators. This phase requires a high level of IT expertise, as it involves the re-
programming of existing software (and sometimes even the creation of entirely new 
software). Once the software is deemed to be ready for use, programmers try to 
implement it on the user cases and pass it on to the curators so that they can verify how 
closely and accurately the implemented software matches their initial vision.  
 
At this point, the aspects of vision and realisation (as well as the input of curators, on one 
side, and programmers, on the other) join into a design loop. If the implementation 
receives positive feedback from the curators, programmers make eventual minor 
                                                
123
 The National Institute of Standards and Technology defines a DAG as a graph ‘with no path that starts 
and ends at the same vertex’ (http://www.nist.gov/dads/HTML/directAcycGraph.html, accessed 28 March 
2006). 
124
 According to Rhee, there are in fact not many viable alternatives to the Java object-oriented approach, 
which was immediately chosen by the TAIR community as the obvious candidate for database construction 
(email correspondence 19 June 2006).   
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modifications and improvements, after which the software is tried in a staging 
environment (that is, a set-up that mimics the insertion of the resulting database into the 
official TAIR website and thus allows to test the software in conditions that are closer to 
the real conditions of routine use). Approval at this stage means that the software, and 
corresponding database, are ready to be issued to the wider public. In most cases, 
however, the initial implementation tests give unsatisfactory results, either from a 
technical (malfunctioning) or from a biological perspective (misrepresentation of the 
curators’ vision). Hence, the user case goes back to the programmers, who attempt a 
different IT strategy to obtain more appropriate results.  
 
This loop of feedbacks between curators and programmers lasts as long as it takes for the 
realised database to match the vision proposed by curators. Of course, the technological 
constraints introduced by information technology imply that the vision itself has to be 
modified, sometimes radically, to fit a format that it is actually possible to produce and 
handle. Also, studying an actual prototype often allows curators to correct mistakes 
contained in the initial vision, which they could not recognise on the basis of pure 
speculation. Consider for instance the example of a design loop displayed below. On the 
basis of curators’ vision about the information that the database should yield an answer to 
a query about a specific gene, programmers construct a database interface that looks like 
figure 5.6. Curators approve the technical accessibility of the prototype, which is indeed 
very easy to obtain by digiting the name of the gene (in this case, AT5G63210.1) into the 
appropriate search engine. However, looking at the actual prototype makes them realise 
that the initial vision lacked a crucial parameter: there is currently no information about 
the ‘obsoletion status’ of data (that is, the length of time since they have been inserted, as 
well as the relation of those data to more recent data). Thus, curators propose a corrected 
mock-up of the initial vision, where information about obsoletion is prominently 
displayed (figure 5.7).  
 
 
Figure 5.6 - Prototype of database on gene AT5G63210.1 that lacks information about 
the obsoletion of data. 
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Figure 5.7 - The same mock-up after undergoing ‘correction’ by curators. This corrected 
version of the file, containing information about obsoletion and comments in the margin 
concerning data history and suggestions, is what programmers receive from curators 
during the design loop. It contains the material that they will have to work upon in order 
to realise the database according to the curators’ vision. 
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5.2.2 Conceptual Framework: Gene Ontologies 
 
My discussion of the interdependence of vision and realisation characterising the design 
of TAIR highlighted TAIR programmers’ preference for the object-oriented approach 
supported by Java. It did not, however, explain why TAIR curators endorsed that choice 
as appropriate to the organisation and integration of biological data. To appreciate the 
curators’ reasons for settling on this programming tool, we need to think about the actual 
phenomena that the data incorporated by TAIR are supposed to document: that is, the 
mechanisms, processes and components of plant development and molecular biology that 
are explored through the study of Arabidopsis.  
  
It is rather trivial to state that biological data are organised around specific phenomena: 
data can be broadly defined precisely as classified information about a process or object, 
which take different forms depending on how, where and by whom they are collected and 
expressed.
125
 One of the few features (possibly the only one) that is common to all 
biological phenomena, and hence needs to be taken into account by any biologist no 
matter his or her specific expertise and interests, is their interconnectedness. Even the 
staunchest reductionist regards biological systems as complex ensembles of 
interdependent processes. The relations holding among those processes are crucial to the 
functioning of the system: disrupting one component of a biological system often means 
disrupting, and sometimes preventing altogether, the functioning of the whole. The 
complex relations among the components and processes characterising biological systems 
are the main focus of biologists’ research. One important type of relation holding across 
biological phenomena is mereological: biological systems can be investigated via 
partitioning, that is, by locating some components of the system and studying the 
relations between those parts and the whole.
126
 Another important type of relation is the 
one of dependence: the existence and functioning of any biological phenomenon is linked 
to the existence and functioning of a number of other phenomena. A given phenomenon 
can depend on others in different ways (ranging from the causal to the phylogenetic or 
derivational) and to different degrees: in some cases, two phenomena are so strictly 
dependent on each other that if one ceases to exist, the other one does too (as in the case 
of breathing and blood circulation in mammals).  
 
These basic insights inform all functional and mechanistic explanations in biology, which 
are indeed grounded on the individuation of the mereological and dependence relations 
relevant to explaining a specific phenomenon.
127
 Research carried out on Arabidopsis 
shares this aim. The common purpose underlying the generation of data about this plant 
consists in illustrating how different elements of Arabidopsis biology interact with each 
other, so as to explain its morphology, development and behaviour: this involves, for 
instance, looking at how genes group into clusters and contribute to phenotypic 
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 I thus take data to include anything from observation statements to various types of measurements. 
Remarks on what is meant for ‘data’ have been offered in section 5.1.3. 
126
 Philosophers Wimsatt (1972), Cummings (1983) and Winther (2003, 2005a, forthcoming) have reflected 
on the importance of partitioning in scientific epistemology (Winther refers to it as a ‘style of science’ 
which he calls ‘compositional biology’). 
127
 For instance, a mechanical explanation of behaviour requires biologists to individuate components of the 
relevant system that, through their interaction, produce that behaviour.  
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development or how each biochemical pathway is constructed so as to enable the 
transport of nutrients (as in metabolism) and information (as in immunological 
responses). When thinking about how to order and represent data relevant to those 
interactions, TAIR researchers had an intuition that crucially informed their choice of 
DAGs as an efficient representational tool. Namely, they noted how the child-parent 
relations holding among the objects of Java programming are, in fact, structurally 
isomorphic to the representation of the relations linking biological phenomena with each 
other. The asymmetry characterising the formal relations in DAG can also be thought to 
mirror the asymmetry in the relations holding among biological phenomena. The object-
directed approach characteristic of Java could thus be exploited to visualise current 
knowledge about biological phenomena through a network of interrelated objects. To do 
this, one only needs to assume each Java object to represent a specific phenomenon and 
specify the relations holding between that and other phenomena (also represented by 
objects; see figure 5.8).  
 
Figure 5.8 - This figure clearly shows how the interrelations linking some biological 
phenomena (in this case, cellular components) with each other can be represented as a 
DAG in the object-oriented approach. The biological nature of the relations is here as yet 
unspecified – what counts is the structural isomorphism with the structure characterising 
DAGs.  
 
 
 
 
To be sure, this intuition was not original. The idea of exploiting the potential parallel 
between biological phenomena and the ‘objects’ of Java programming for the purpose of 
building databases had been circulating among model organism researchers since the 
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beginning of the 1980s.
128
 In fact, all sizable model organism communities, including the 
ones centred around Drosophila, C. elegans, E. coli, rats, mice, yeast and slime molds, 
have been struggling with the same problems experienced by TAIR. First, there is the 
overwhelming quantity of data needing storage and ordering, coupled with ample 
disagreement among practicing researchers about the potential significance and 
interpretation of those same data. Second, there is the problem of selecting relevant data. 
As TAIR curators were quick to realise for themselves, a database on a specific model 
organism could not possibly contain all existing data about that organism: too many data 
sets are incomplete, partially overlapping, inconsistent or tied to isolated (and possibly 
not corroborated) experiments and unpopular theoretical approaches. In this context, 
choices about which data sets to pick within any database needed to be made and, most 
importantly, justified.
129
 It seemed that TAIR, like other databases for model organisms, 
needed to establish criteria for selecting and ordering Arabidopsis data. This issue turned 
out to be strongly tied to the practical problem of how to actually store these data and 
make them searchable, as we have seen in the previous section. Several representatives of 
different communities recognised that these common problems might best be solved in 
collaboration with other model organism communities. They thus started a joint project, 
which they called ‘Gene Ontology Consortium’ and which TAIR joined in early 2000, 
aimed at producing common criteria (in fact, a full-blown conceptual framework) for the 
building of databases dedicated to model organisms (Harris et al, 2004).  
 
The GO consortium set itself to exploring the structural parallelism between the links 
among phenomena traced and explained through scientific research and the object-to-
object relations imposed by Java software. Prima facie, the object-directed approach 
provides an ideal solution to the problem of classifying and retrieving data about 
interconnected biological phenomena: it simply requires to assume that every object used 
by the programme would represent a specific biological phenomenon, specify the relation 
holding among objects so as to represent the relation holding among the biological 
phenomena that the objects stand for, and categorise available data on the basis of their 
relevance to the phenomena thus represented. The resulting representation of interrelated 
objects is called bio-ontology: that is, a network of terms (such as ‘gene’, ‘cell’ and 
‘transport’), each of which denotes a specific biological object or phenomenon and is 
represented, as required by the object-directed approach, through its relations to other 
terms (denoting other objects or phenomena).
130
  
                                                
128
 The initial idea can be traced to a collaboration between two Drosophila specialists, Suzanna Lewis 
(Berkeley Drosophila Genome Project) and Michael Ashburner (FlyBase, Cambridge), who started to think 
of IT strategies for storing, and elaborating on, Drosophila information since the early 1980s.  
129
 TAIR insistence on the necessity of consistent criteria for the selection and ordering of data is precisely 
what makes this resource so different from all other existing databases for Arabidopsis research. The 
database maintained by the Nottingham Arabidopsis Stock Centre, for instance, is constructed on the 
principle that all data should be included, even if inconsistent, incompatible or even contradictory. This 
results into a much less structured database that is independent from a specific theoretical framework, but 
whose contents are much less difficult to read and interpret for someone who is not already steeped in the 
type of research and methods used by the researchers who originally contributed results.  
130
 Note that the term ‘ontology’ to define a data set stems from research in information technology and is 
not related, at least in its origins and purpose, to the meaning attached to it within philosophy. A study of 
the relation between philosophical and IT notions of ontology constitutes an interesting project, which is 
now carried out principally by Barry Smith and his associates (2005). Within this dissertation I do not 
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Given the simplicity and representational efficiency of this framework for the 
classification and organisation of biological data, it is easy to understand why TAIR 
curators enthusiastically backed the project and incorporated bio-ontologies into TAIR. 
Still, the actual realisation of databases on the basis of GO network presents several 
conceptual and practical difficulties, which become apparent as soon as one examines a 
detailed definition of bio-ontologies. A recent review by Bard and Rhee (2004, 213) 
describes bio-ontologies as follows:  
 
an ontology is a formal way of representing knowledge in which concepts are 
described both by their meaning and their relationship to each other. Unique 
identifiers that are associated with each concept in biological ontologies can be 
used for linking to and querying molecular databases.   
 
This definition points to three important characteristics of bio-ontologies, which 
considerably complicate the apparently straightforward task of representing biological 
phenomena as Java objects and which I shall therefore consider in turn: (1) the need for 
unique identifiers for each of the concepts
131
 used; (2) the nature of their relationship to 
each other; and (3) their meaning (or definition).  
 
Researchers at the GO consortium are aware that there cannot be a unique system of 
categorisation of biological phenomena, because the same phenomenon can be described 
differently depending on the scientific interests of the researchers studying it. Indeed, as 
remarked when discussing theoretical pluralism in Chapter 2, each epistemic culture in 
biology devises its own way to study and describe a biological phenomenon, which might 
or might not match the perspective offered by other cultures. For instance, the process of 
light absorption can be analysed in terms of the components of the plant involved or, in a 
different and yet complementary way, in terms of the underlying biochemical processes. 
On the other hand, the construction of bio-ontologies requires that there should be one 
and only one term (the so-called unique identifier) associated to each phenomenon. 
Terms acting as unique identifiers need to be precisely and unambiguously associated 
with a specific phenomenon (and thus, a specific set of data). Given the interdisciplinary 
context of GO users, in which the same term might be taken to refer to different 
phenomena depending on the epistemic culture in which it is used, the selection of unique 
identifiers becomes a daunting task. The GO consortium resolved this problem through a 
compromise between pluralism and the need for unique identifiers: three different bio-
ontologies have been constructed, each of which concerns the same phenomena, but uses 
terms associated to different perspectives on those phenomena. One bio-ontology focuses 
on terms describing biological processes (e.g. aging, cell differentiation); another 
includes terms relating to molecular functions (such as transcription); and the third 
encompasses terms related to cellular components (e.g. nucleus, organelles, genes). This 
                                                                                                                                            
concern myself with this issue: I wish to discuss the epistemological function that such ‘ontologies’ are 
acquiring within biology.  
131
 Note that within my analysis I shall not differentiate between reference to GO objects as ‘concepts’ or 
‘terms’. This is because I am interested in what those terms stand for, rather than on their intrinsic 
epistemological status. For a discussion of the epistemological consequences of thinking of those terms as 
‘concepts’, see Smith (2005). 
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ordering of information ensures that the data sets contained in each ontology are 
accurately matched to an appropriate term (and thus, a relevant phenomenon). By 
consulting all three bio-ontologies, users are able to check for themselves the difference 
between describing the same phenomenon as biological process, molecular function or 
cellular component.  
 
The second issue in creating bio-ontologies concerns the nature of the relations that are to 
be represented. Of course, the unspecified child-parent relations holding among Java 
objects are not specific enough to represent the different types of relations holding among 
biological phenomena. Thus, the consortium chose to diversify the relations holding 
among objects into two categories: ‘is_a’ and ‘part_of’. The first category denotes 
relations of identity, as in ‘the nuclear membrane is a membrane’; the second category 
denotes mereological relations, such as ‘the membrane is part of the cell’. Occasionally, a 
third category ‘develops_from’ is used to signal dependence relations, as in ‘protein 
develops from amino acids’.
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Figure 5.9 - An illustration of two types of relationships holding among GO terms (in this 
case, terms denoting cellular components): ‘is_a’ and ‘part_of’.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10 - Illustration of the parallelism between parent-child relationships in DAGs 
and in GO. 
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 Within other ontologies, for instance the ones employed to gather data about phenotypes, the categories 
of relations available are more numerous and complex: for instance, including ‘measured_as’ or ‘of_a’ 
relations.  
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The last problem emerging when constructing bio-ontologies is also the most complex. It 
concerns the necessity to assign a precise definition (a meaning) to the terms under which 
phenomena are classified and made to correspond with Java objects. GO concepts need to 
have a meaning, as the phenomenon that any one concept is chosen to denote needs to be 
defined in a precise way. Finding a precise definition of a biological phenomenon that 
would satisfy all biologists researching it is, however, a daunting task. It requires 
interdisciplinary consultations and agreement on a common vocabulary and common 
definitions, to be recognised and understood in the same way in all biological fields 
involved. Such agreement could not be reached purely through discussions among 
members of the consortium, since the expertise of the members does not voice all, or 
even most disciplines affected by GO definitions (for instance, developmental biology 
and genetics are overrepresented, while there is almost no input from biochemistry and 
ecology). Moreover, differences across biological subfields and epistemic communities 
do not concern only the vocabulary used to refer to the same phenomenon: even the 
definition of phenomena changes depending on the interests, instruments and goals of 
each discipline. For instance, the definition of ‘pathogen’ accepted by immunologists 
differs in scope from the one used by ecologists: the former indicates infectious agents 
who cause disease in their hosts; the latter encompasses all agents who interact with their 
hosts’ biological functions, including the ones with beneficial, rather than damaging, 
influence (like in the case of symbiotic interactions).   
 
A further complication with building agreement on the definition of GO terms consists in 
the very limited collaboration characterising communities working with different model 
organisms, especially when it comes to ways of classifying and interpreting evidence. 
Because of the ‘founders effect’ (see section 3.1) and of the amount of embodied and 
organism-specific knowledge involved, most scientists tend to work with one or two 
‘favourite’ organisms and not to concern themselves with instruments, databases or even 
results produced by other model organism communities. This means that the terms and 
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approaches used to investigate a specific phenomenon vary even across groups that 
possess the same expertise, but that are studying different organisms. The GO consortium 
has the merit of having been one of the first institutionalised platform encouraging 
collaboration and comparative work across model organism communities. This also 
means that there are many conceptual and material bridges to be built in order for 
collaboration to work.  
 
The initial solution to this bundle of problems was to invite various experts (called, 
remarkably, ‘interest groups’) to act as consultants on different biological topics (and, 
thus, different sets of GO terms and relations to be defined). This initiative was later 
formalised into so-called ‘GO Content Meetings’. Organised every few months, these 
meetings aim at elaborating definitions for terms that prove particularly difficult to 
capture in a satisfactory, interdisciplinary way (such as ‘transport’, ‘enzymes’, ‘meiosis’, 
‘metabolism’ and ‘pathogen’). Attendance to meetings varies depending on the topics to 
be discussed and includes experts from different disciplines, scientists from the GO 
consortium and researchers working on various model organism databases (including 
TAIR, whose curators play a prominent role in the organisation of these gatherings). The 
role of the invited experts is particularly important, not only in order to obtain feedback 
about what should and should not be included in the definitions, but also to verify how 
specialists from different fields might react to general definitions such as the ones 
elaborated in bio-ontologies.    
 
 
5.2.3 Empirical Content: Data Mining and the Organisation of Evidence 
 
After considering the conceptual difficulties of selecting appropriate definitions for the 
terms and relations used within bio-ontologies, this section looks at the last cluster of 
tools required in the making of TAIR. These are the tools employed by TAIR curators to 
gather and order data in the framework provided by bio-ontologies. Implementing the GO 
framework in TAIR involves the challenging task of locating appropriate sources of data 
to be inserted in the resource, as well as devising ways to display information about those 
sources. TAIR curators are extremely alert to the importance of locating good sources 
and, above all, providing users with details of who produced the findings retrieved 
through TAIR, where and how.  
 
The first step taken by TAIR curators to gather appropriate data was to construct a search 
tool, called ‘PubSearch’, that automatically sifts through published literature about 
Arabidopsis research (as available in the main plant biology journals) to find the most 
updated and relevant information about specific Arabidopsis genes. Thanks to this tool, it 
is now relatively easy for curators to acquire an overview of what has been published, 
where and when about each Arabidopsis gene – and thus, to make a selection of the most 
relevant data. Further, TAIR curators want to incorporate knowledge embedded in 
notebooks, textbooks or academic memoirs by individual researchers: that is, knowledge 
that has not been published, but that is essential for users of TAIR in order to reconstruct 
the conditions under which data have been acquired. TAIR curators are alert to the 
importance, for users, to trace where each set of data was produced, how and by whom. It 
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is understood that this is not just relevant in order for users to assess the significance of 
the data: it also allows them to reproduce those results, contact the researchers who 
originally produced it and, eventually, further their work or replace it with better results. 
Along with the data, TAIR curators want users to be able to retrieve information about (i) 
the methods used to obtain the data reported; (ii) the experimental set-up required; (iii) 
the original investigators, including their contact details if any further clarification or 
verification is needed.  
 
Thus, TAIR aims at providing access to experimental processes and practices, rather than 
simply the resulting ensemble of data. This type of information is sometimes gathered by 
direct communication between curators and researchers: while it has the disadvantage of 
not being refereed
133
, its scientific value is enormous, as it expresses some of the 
embodied knowledge necessary to the production of the results displayed in TAIR. 
Information about data sources is usually displayed along with the data themselves, as a 
result of each user search. Curators assign an evidence code to every data set, which 
clearly indicates the circumstances in which the data set was collected (table 5.1). For 
instance, the code IEA stands for Inferred from Electronic Annotation and it indicates 
data gathered from a digital source; IPI, or Inferred from Physical Interaction, refers to 
data resulting from the researcher’s material intervention on the phenomena under 
scrutiny.  
 
Table 5.1 - Classification of types of evidence and corresponding evidence code (note 
that evidence codes are not mutually exclusive). 
 
 
Evidence Code Abbreviation 
 
 
Evidence Code Definition 
 
Computational:  IEA 
 
Manual:             IDA 
                          IMP 
                          IEP 
                          ISS 
                          IGI 
                          IPI 
                          TAS 
                          NAS 
                          ND 
                          IC 
 
 
Inferred from Electronic Annotation 
 
Inferred from Direct Assay 
Inferred from Mutant Phenotype 
Inferred from Expression Patterns 
Inferred from Sequence Similarity 
Inferred from Genetic Interaction 
Inferred from Physical Interaction 
Traceable Author Statement 
Non-traceable Author Statement 
No biological Data Available 
Inferred by Curator 
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 The lack of good quality standards for information provided on the data is a weakness of the project. For 
now, TAIR curators rely on peer review procedures by the journals issuing the papers that they use as 
reference for experiments and results; and on the reputation and record of researchers submitting their own 
experimental protocols. The hope is that, once the Arabidopsis community becomes familiar with the 
possibilities offered by TAIR, experimentalists themselves will start contributing to TAIR by bringing in 
new data & protocols as well as criticism of previously published work.  
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Apart from the evidence code, curators make sure that users can easily retrieve 
information about the experimental protocols, procedures and even personal annotations 
provided by the researchers who collected the data in the first place. This is supposed to 
guarantee that users are able to reproduce the results submitted to TAIR, or at least to 
trace the exact actions and experimental set-up used in order to generate them. A detailed 
list of the types of information involved can be found in table 5.2, which TAIR curators 
use when presenting their work to peers and prospective users.  
 
Table 5.2. List of the features of experiments producing Arabidopsis data that curators 
would like to be retrievable directly from the TAIR website.  
 
 
                                    Experimental Information - Details 
 
 
Name  
Description 
Class 
Type 
Technology 
Plant Material 
Anatomy 
Treatments 
Growth Conditions 
 
 
RNA Source 
Hybridisation protocol 
Samples: Name, Label, Description 
Number of Biological Replicates 
Number of technical replicates 
Normalisation 
Image Analysis 
Contact 
Publications 
 
 
 
Once it is made clear which data should be integrated into TAIR (and with which 
additional information), curators proceed to collaborate with programmers so as to 
develop the actual databases. Data are collected and organised into data types as relevant 
to a specific GO term. The relationship among those data types is also adapted to the 
format required by bio-ontologies. This process is known as GO annotation and it results 
in a statement expressing the definition of a specific term, its relations to other terms and 
all the data relevant to both the term and the associated phenomena. An example of this 
annotation for the term ‘nucleolus’ is given in figure 5.11 below.  
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Figure 5.11 - Example of GO annotation of the cellular component ‘nucleolus’.  
 
 
 
 
The last step after annotation is the transformation of the data thus assembled and ordered 
into standard formats that can be fitted into Java programming, thus producing the 
visualisation of data accessed by the users. These standard formats, in which DAG 
structures are operationally fitted to the GO annotation, thus incorporating all data 
appropriately categorised, are referred to as schemas. Schemas are usually extremely 
complex, as they have to incorporate a lot of information (sometimes running into the 
hundreds of data). The production of schemas enables programmers to realise, insofar as 
possible, the vision initially proposed by TAIR curators, thus creating the visualisations 
of data that become available to the users (e.g. figure 5.12).  
 
Figure 5.12 – Arabidopsis metabolic pathways as displayed by AraCyc (the pathways 
themselves are represented by the white dotted lines connecting various components).  It 
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provides information about the components relevant to Arabidopsis metabolism at the 
cellular level, as well as about the expression level of genes controlling each of the 
components. One can click on any component (such as the triangles, representing amino 
acids, or the thin white line connecting several components and representing the pathway 
itself) to access information about the components themselves and the sources from 
which data have been acquired.  
 
 
 
 
 
My reconstruction of the three main steps involved in the making of TAIR hopefully 
clarifies the difficulties involved in creating such a resource as well as the way in which it 
works. What remains implicit in my narration is the extent to which the personal 
judgement of curators, based on inferences from their own experience as researchers and 
potential TAIR users, influences the realisation of this resource. In the case of design, 
curators are in charge both of providing the initial vision and of checking that the 
programmers’ realisation fits their expectations. When it comes to bio-ontologies, it is 
curators who gather with other experts during GO Content Meetings in order to evaluate 
definitions for the terms employed; and again, in order to gather evidence, curators 
determine the criteria for selecting data as well as for accounting for their sources. In 
short, the current format and functioning of TAIR is largely tied to the curators’ 
judgement on how such a resource should work and what it should include. In the next 
sections, I focus on two types of knowledge used by curators to build TAIR. I intend to 
show that both of them need to be at least partly shared by TAIR users, who otherwise 
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would not be able to interpret the information available towards improving their 
understanding of Arabidopsis biology. First, I look at the theoretical knowledge 
contained in bio-ontologies, and specifically in the GO network adopted by TAIR. 
Second, I examine the embodied knowledge guiding the curation (that is, the actual 
compiling of data by curators) of TAIR data sets and annotations.  
 
 
5.3 Theoretical Knowledge at TAIR: GO and the Gene-Centric Perspective 
 
There is, it seems to us, 
At best, only a limited value 
In the knowledge derived from experience. 
The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies, 
For the pattern is new in every moment 
And every moment is a new and shocking 
Valuation of all we have been 
      T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets 
 
5.3.1 GO: From Standard to Theory 
 
In every phase of TAIR construction, curators bestow great attention to the prospective 
users of the resource. As I already remarked, TAIR is principally conceived of as a 
service to users. This is also true of one of its most important components, that is GO: in 
fact, TAIR curators present GO as a standardisation tool, that is, in the definition 
provided by Berg (Berg et al, 2004), as a ‘coordination device’ facilitating 
interdisciplinary research. To conceive of GO as a standard means to emphasise greatly 
its usefulness to users of TAIR, as well as the compatibility of GO to any type of research 
that users might be engaged in (hence, for instance, the use of different systems to 
capture data about processes, functions and components). The terms and relations 
specified in GO allow researchers working in different epistemic cultures to 
communicate with each other and discuss issues, methods and data of common interest. 
In this sense, GO terms constitute powerful standards around which research on model 
organisms can be organised. They offer a way to bring findings produced via diverse 
approaches, goals and tools under a unique framework, thus facilitating the exchange and 
consultation of such findings as an integrated whole.  
 
Standardisation can, of course, be a double-edged sword. In their renowned study of 
classification, Bowker and Star (1999) claim that any standardised classification system 
is bound to mask, distort and/or disregard some of the characteristics of the objects that it 
includes as well as the specific interests, methods and goals of its prospective users. It is 
this homogenising effect that makes such classification systems so effective in providing 
information. By transcending disciplinary boundaries and local motives, classified data 
are made accessible to all interested groups; on the other hand, the process by which 
objects are selected and described in order to fit standardised classifications is often 
difficult to retrieve and assess for the users of such systems. Users therefore tend to rely 
on the available data without being aware of which information was left out of the 
classification system. Data that would not fit the given standards could still be relevant to 
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the users’ own concerns and research objectives. Standard classification systems can be 
as helpful as they are potentially misleading: an element of interpretation is unavoidable 
in order to build such systems, but users should be careful that the resulting 
homogenising effect does not constrain too strongly their thinking and reading of 
information therein contained.   
 
The homogenisation of local knowledge into a ‘global’, standard framework is evidently 
also a characteristic of the GO project, as the GO consortium explicitly recognises. As a 
response to the possibility that GO might actually mislead its users, for instance by 
attributing incomplete, incorrect or incoherent definitions to its key terms, the creators of 
GO emphasise that the intent guiding their efforts is not to unify the whole of biology 
under the vocabulary and definitions proposed by GO. Rather, GO is supposed to act as a 
complement to existing resources and theoretical approaches in biology: it aims to 
provide an alternative vocabulary geared towards inter-community communication, 
which would improve the chances to exchange knowledge and constructive critiques 
among different subfields. Hence, GO terms are not intended as a substitute to the 
vocabulary used in any specific discipline: they are to be related, in ways determined by 
the relevant scientists, to the specialised terminology in use within each biological 
subfield. This is why TAIR curators are so careful in reporting sources of evidence and 
information on how to use TAIR on their website: the idea is to help users to ‘unmask’ 
the choices necessarily made by TAIR curators on the basis of GO standards, thus 
allowing users to challenge or refine their searches by examining the original sources for 
TAIR material (and, as a consequence, enabling users of different backgrounds to review 
each other’s methods and protocols).   
 
TAIR curators’ strategy is not without problems. In the next section, I shall discuss issues 
relating to the use of embodied knowledge in constructing the resource. Here I want to 
focus on issues relating to the use of GO as a standard, particularly the claim that GO 
does not per se constitute an autonomous source for knowledge, but, rather, that it 
complements research already being done. There is a sense in which GO transcends this 
role of standardisation tool and does indeed become an independent source for non-local, 
integrated knowledge. Consider this recent definition of a bio-ontology, as reported in a 
review by Rhee and collaborators: ‘an ontology makes explicit knowledge that is usually 
diffusely embedded in notebooks, textbooks and journals or just held in academic 
memories, and therefore represents a formalisation of the current state of a field’ (2004, 
221; my emphasis). The implication drawn in the latter part of this statement represents 
an important development: it now seems that bio-ontologies are not simply tools enabling 
users to retrieve information, but actually incorporate and express knowledge that is 
usually dispersed across a variety of publications and research groups. When used in 
TAIR, GO can thus be viewed as a ‘formalisation’ of the biological knowledge currently 
available about molecular and cell biology in Arabidopsis. I wish to argue that this 
implies a shift of epistemic status for GO, which comes to constitute a scientific theory 
about Arabidopsis biology rather than a mere standardisation tool.   
 
This is a significant departure from the initial aim of the GO project and has notable 
implications for the TAIR project as a whole. Let me clarify the nature of this shift from 
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standard to theory. To this aim, I refer to the work of philosopher Mary Hesse. Her 
reflections on scientific theory-making, themselves inspired by Duhemian insights on 
underdetermination and theoretical pluralism, prove very useful in order to specify the 
features of GO that make it work as a scientific theory about biological phenomena. I am 
here particularly interested in three aspects of Hesse’s work, which I now briefly 
describe. 
  
(1) Hesse’s account of scientific theorising is based on what she calls the network 
model of theoretical science (1974, 4). In this model, theories are defined as 
networks of interrelated concepts. The meaning of each concept depends on the 
phenomena to which the concept applies (for example, the concept ‘evolution’ 
could be defined as indicating the process by which new generations of organisms 
are likely to acquire traits that allow them to survive better in their environment). 
Further, the meaning of each concept also depends on other concepts by way of 
law-like statements (for instance, Newtonian mechanics includes the concepts 
‘mass’ of an object and ‘force’ applied to an object, which are related by the law-
like statement ‘force is proportional to mass times acceleration’). Theories can 
thus be propositionally expressed (by enunciating the series of law-like statements 
relating the concepts used). 
  
(2) In such a network, there is no fundamental distinction between observational and 
theoretical languages. The choice, use and modification of each concept and 
relation expressed in the network depends on the empirical study of the 
phenomena that those concepts and relations are supposed to describe, and thus 
on the complex processes of experimentation, intervention and classification 
involved in empirical research (Hesse 1980, 84; 1974, 4-26).  Hesse proposes that 
the theoretical representation of knowledge is instrumental to the goals and needs 
of empirical research (a good instance for this consists, in the case of GO, of the 
need to construct databases). 
 
(3) Networks of concepts need to maintain an internal coherence and economy, 
depending again on the wishes and expectations of empirical researchers: ‘without 
such organising conditions it is clear that a world described by even a small 
number of predicates in all apparently observed combinations is likely to become 
quickly unmanageable’ (Hesse 1974, 52; see also 1980, 108). This suggestion can 
be interpreted in a number of ways. What interests me here is the idea that, in 
order to comply with the requirement of economy, concepts referring to the same 
phenomena should be reduced to a minimum in any one network; while, in order 
to comply with the requirement of coherence, the definitions of concepts and their 
relations should not contradict each other and should be expressed through the 
same format (that is, depending on the type of network at hand, the same 
vocabulary, imagery, formulation, or else). 
 
I maintain that bio-ontologies, and specifically GO, abide to all three points and thus 
constitute a good candidate for a specific type of biological theory (among the several 
used in contemporary biology, as I illustrated in Chapter 2 when discussing theoretical 
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pluralism). For a start, the GO network bears a striking resemblance to the structure of 
scientific theories envisaged by Hesse. GO indeed consists of a string of accurately 
defined, basic concepts with clearly outlined reference to specific phenomena. The 
relations among those concepts are extremely simplified, yet they are specified so that the 
whole network can be expressed and described as a series of law-like statements 
concerning the concepts in use, as in: ‘nuclear membrane is part of cell’, ‘aging derives 
from cell differentiation’ and ‘mitosis is a cellular process’. Both structurally and 
semantically, GO concepts and relations do amount, according to Hesse’s network model, 
to a theory about the relations holding among a number of biological phenomena. This is 
evident in GO creators’ description of bio-ontologies as representations of biological 
knowledge: ‘formal representations of areas of knowledge in which the essential terms 
are combined with structuring rules that describe the relationship between the terms. 
Knowledge that is structured in a bio-ontology can then be linked to the molecular 
databases’ (Bard and Rhee 2004, 213).  
 
The last part of this quote also exemplifies how GO satisfies Hesse’s second point. The 
main motivation behind GO is to construct databases encompassing large amounts of data 
about all aspects of the biology of organisms. This means that the nature of the data 
available, as well as their format and the methods used by the laboratories that collected 
them, inform all decisions about which concepts to use, how to define them and relate 
them to each other. Concepts are thus not defined a priori, on the basis of purely 
theoretical considerations, but they are formulated to fit actual observations and, hence, 
the observational language used by empirical researchers. This became very clear to me 
when I attended the first GO Content Meeting
134
, which was called to discuss the notions 
of metabolism and pathogeny, two concepts notoriously difficult to define and treated 
differently depending on the discipline of interest. Discussion among the immunologists, 
geneticists, developmental and molecular biologists present started from a tentative 
definition of the concepts and included mostly counter-examples to that definition, in the 
form of actual observations from the bench. For instance, the proposal that pathogens be 
treated as a independent category from organelles
135
, popular among immunologists, was 
dismissed by ecologists and physiologists on the basis of specific cases of symbiosis, 
where pathogens turn out to be both symbionts and parasites of the same organism.
136
 
Here is how the argument goes: in these cases, pathogens cannot be treated as a separate, 
independent category from other microscopic components of the host’s cell, since they 
also play a role towards the well-functioning of the cell as a whole. According to 
specialists in symbiosis and its role towards plant development, these pathogens should 
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 Held in Stanford, California, 28-29 August 2004. 
135
 Organelles are secondary structures in the cell, such as mitochondria and rybosomes, which perform 
very specific functions, such as, in the case of mitochondria, that of converting organic material into energy 
usable by the cell in the form of ATP (through a process called oxidative phosphorylation).  
136
 Certain kinds of bacteria (such as nitrogen-fixing bacteria or, as we have seen in Chapter 3, the 
Agrobacterium used to generate variants of Arabidopsis ecotypes) can have at the same time mutualistic 
and parasitic associations with the plants that host them. This generates a problem concerning the 
individuality of plants: are such bacteria components of the biology of their hosts, and thus part of the 
plants, or do they remain external agents? For more information about the conundrum generated by 
mutualistic, symbiotic and parasitic associations in biology, see Paracer and Ahmadjian 2000 and Tauber 
1991).   
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therefore figure as ‘part_of’ the cell, rather than as a separate entity with no relations to 
it: thus, on the basis of a few observed cases, a whole theoretical category (the one of 
‘pathogen’) is modified to fit a different context and definition. One of the keys to the 
successful functioning of GO is precisely the avoidance of distinctions between 
theoretical and observational language and related concerns.  
 
The absence of a distinction between theoretical and observational language goes some 
way towards explaining the strong regulative role played by the requirements for 
coherence and economy in GO networks (Hesse’s third point). As Hesse notes, coherence 
conditions are needed to manage the classification of predicates: ‘not even the most 
rigorous inductivist would suggest that no further processing of the initial conditions 
should take place’ (1974, 52). Coherence conditions in GO consist of a systematic 
structure, standard formats and limited relation types: these strictures are needed to avoid 
repetitions, internal contradictions and incommensurable definitions (which, if left alone 
to proliferate, would quickly render GO unmanageable). Another reason for insisting on 
coherence within GO stems from the obligation, acknowledged by the GO consortium, to 
serve one of the main goals of TAIR project - that is, the facilitation of the integration of 
knowledge among different biological fields. GO is a theory especially geared towards 
the integration of knowledge across different fields. This also requires defining GO terms 
and relations with an eye to the internal coherence and economy of the framework that 
GO comes to constitute.
137
   
 
 
5.3.2 The Threat of Gene-Centrism 
 
This last point is most important with regard to GO as a biological theory. This is because 
coherence among concept definitions and relations cannot be obtained without 
subscribing to a specific theoretical perspective, which provides the criteria according to 
which concepts have to be formulated and related to each other. James Griesemer 
characterises the goal of a theoretical perspective as ‘coordinating models and 
phenomena’ (2000, S348): in his view, according to which theories are themselves 
collections of models, a perspective is thus responsible for determining which aspects of 
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 Interestingly, some biologists I interviewed protested against the definition of GO as a biological theory: 
to them, the notion of theory is close to the one of ‘hypothesis’ – namely, biological theories express 
something we do not know yet, rather than what is already known. When I remarked that, within 
philosophy, the term ‘theory’ is used to indicate the expression of theoretical knowledge about phenomena, 
they all admitted that, indeed, GO is supposed to include ‘all we know’ about biology (and particularly 
plant biology, as within TAIR). The following passage (from an email sent to me on 27 August 2004 by 
Eva Huala as a follow-up on our interview) illustrates the point: ‘I think that the TAIR database schema is 
not a pure representation of the relationships between biological concepts but is partly based on biology 
and partly utilitarian and based on technological considerations (to speed queries, avoid having to join too 
many tables in a query, etc.).  Also the relationships we capture tend to be the more basic and universally 
accepted ones, not those that are currently evolving as biological knowledge is extended.  Perhaps that's 
why biologists don't think of database design as the highest level of our field, analogous to a mathematical 
model for the universe.  I think ontology structure is closer to a true conceptual model, but even there the 
relationships captured are not on the cutting edge of biology but those that are already generally agreed on 
and not controversial’.  
 
 129
a theory (and hence of the models constituting that theory) are relevant to phenomena, 
and how. Translated into my own terminology, this implies that theoretical perspectives 
unavoidably follow from the theoretical knowledge upheld in an epistemic culture: they 
signal the theoretical commitments made by adopting specific theories to describe and 
explain phenomena.  
 
TAIR represents phenomena in Arabidopsis biology in a variety of different ways: that is, 
through the distinction, which I discussed in section 5.2.2, between bio-ontologies 
concerning biological processes, molecular functions or cellular components. These three 
types of bio-ontologies do not, however, amount to three different ways of interpreting 
biological phenomena: rather, they make use of three different classes of objects, which 
are however described by reference to the same overarching theoretical framework – that 
is, GO itself. The theoretical perspective upheld by GO, which I call gene-centrism, 
involves basing the whole bio-ontology on gene-related concepts (as exemplified by its 
actual name ‘ gene ontology’). In Rhee’s words, the annotation of data according to GO 
categories requires observable phenotypic traits to be ‘deconstructed’ into traits regulated 
by gene clusters (table 5.3).  
 
Table 5.3. Classification of Arabidopsis data using multiple ontologies. While ‘primary’ 
and ‘qualifier’ ontologies differ (encompassing a component, a function and a process 
and correspondingly varied relations among terms), information is classified through 
association with a specific gene. 
 
 
 GENE 
 
 
Relationship 
 
 
Primary Ontology 
 
 
Context 
 
 
Qualifier Ontologies 
 
 
 AOC1 
 
 
 
expressed in 
 
 
 
Anatomy: leaf 
 
 
 
1: during 
 
 
 
Temporal: senescence 
 
 
 
 OST1 
 
 
 
exhibits 
 
 
 
Function: protein 
kinase activity 
 
 
 
1: in 
2: during 
 
 
Anatomy: guard cell 
Process: response to 
drought 
 
 
 AG 
 
 
 
is involved in 
 
 
 
Process: 
specification of 
organ identity 
 
 
1: of 
2: in 
 
 
Anatomy: petals 
Taxonomy: Arabidopsis 
thaliana 
 
 
 
Initially adopted for purely pragmatic purposes, this commitment ends up informing both 
the observations and the concepts used in the network, with the result that the knowledge 
provided by GO is strongly biased in favour of gene-centric explanations of biological 
phenomena. For instance, the gene-centric perspective influences the mereological 
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relations used to describe which GO elements are ‘part of’ others. GO describes 
mereological relations among phenomena via an extremely simplified, linear hierarchy 
going from environment to gene (figure 5.13).  
 
Figure 5.13 - Biological organisation as visualised by Sue Rhee (presentation at the 
Carnegie Institute, Ca, Feb 6 2004). 
  
 
 
 
Given that current research is often unable to specify the exact relationship holding 
between a gene cluster and the phenotypic traits associated to it, this system of 
classification will appear problematic to many researchers. Further, this representation 
has strong affiliations with the reductionist programme underlying much of molecular 
biology, according to which there is a direct and linear flow of information from genes to 
organisms (in keeping with the so-called ‘central dogma’ of classical genetics). This 
theoretical framework is in stark contrast with the perspective endorsed within fields such 
as evolutionary-developmental biology, or some strands of ecology, which stress the non-
linear nature of exchanges of information among the components of a biological 
system.
138
 Notably, many biologists interested in bio-ontology noticed the strong bias 
characterising GO and proposed alternative bio-ontologies, each of which exploits, more 
or less directly, a different theoretical perspective to describe and systematise data 
pertaining to a variety of aspects of organismal biology: there are, for instance, an 
‘Animal Natural History and Life History’ ontology, a ‘Pathway Ontology’ and a ‘Plant 
Attributes and Traits Ontology’ (of which I shall say more in chapter 6). All these bio-
ontologies, including GO, are grouped under the umbrella heading of Open Biomedical 
Ontologies.
139
 Currently, much effort is being devoted to comparing and inter-relating 
concepts across these different networks. This constitutes an extremely interesting 
project in its own right, which would deserve a much deeper analysis than the few 
remarks contained in this thesis. For my purposes here, we need only keep in mind that 
GO is indeed part of a much broader and hitherto successful movement to order and 
systematise data sets on the basis of networks of concepts; and that each of these types of 
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 See Keller (2000) and Oyama (1985) on this.  
139
 http://obo.sourceforge.net/.  
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bio-ontologies is obviously subscribing to specific theoretical perspectives and interests, 
thus constituting more than a mere translation tool for inter-community communication.   
 
In fact, given the contentious status of the gene-centric perspective in biology at large, 
this bias represents a threat to the usefulness of GO as a standard: researchers working on 
a theoretical perspective that does not accept gene-centrism (such as, for instance, 
ecology or some strands in evolutionary biology) are reluctant to use databases 
constructed around GO. Worse still, some of these researchers might not be familiar with 
the theory around which TAIR databases are constructed, since their views on biological 
phenomena are informed by an altogether different theoretical perspective. This 
conditions their use of TAIR, since the organisation and display of TAIR data is 
dependent on GO and thus on the theoretical perspective therein expressed. In order to 
benefit from the information acquired as a result of a search through TAIR data, users 
need to interpret that information in their own vocabulary and in the context of their own 
research. This presupposes acquaintance with GO and an awareness of its theoretical 
commitments. Hostility to, or ignorance of, GO thus becomes a major obstacle both to 
accessing data displayed by reference to this framework and, most importantly, to 
evaluating the significance of those data towards understanding biological phenomena. 
 
To sum up: the adoption of a gene-centric perspective is what makes the role of GO as a 
theory different from its role as a standard. Not only are curators forced to manipulate the 
available information in order to construct standardised formats through which 
information can be retrieved: they also subscribe to a specific theoretical perspective 
which guides their classificatory work, thus giving coherence to the concepts used. For 
the users of GO, this means that it is impossible to use these networks without implicitly 
subscribing to the theoretical perspective therein employed: a perspective that might be 
irreconcilable with their own, but which transforms GO into a coherent and economical 
source of knowledge about phenomena.  
 
 
5.4 Embodied Knowledge at TAIR: Manual and Automatic Curation 
 
Only the experimentalist knows the real strengths and 
weaknesses of any particular orchestration of machines, 
collaborators, interpretations, and judgements  
Peter Galison 1987, 244  
 
TAIR curators themselves acknowledge that it is impossible to construct such a database 
while remaining neutral over the interpretation of the data. They are well aware that all 
classification is at least partly normative: it imposes constraints on the interpretation of 
the material that is classified by way of the criteria adopted in order to select, order and 
display that material. In this sense, curators certainly recognise that the incorporation of a 
theoretical perspective in the making of GO (and thus, of TAIR) is unavoidable, as it is 
necessary in order to provide categories and parameters through which data can be 
retrieved. Reference to GO allows TAIR to clarify both the biological context to which 
data apply and the scientific context in which they are produced. Reliance on a theoretical 
perspective is, in this sense, an advantage rather than a necessary compromise.  
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Acknowledging the advantages of relying on a gene-centric perspective does not prevent 
curators from taking very seriously the problems encountered by users with different 
views of biological phenomena. Their response to this issue is to highlight that biologists 
need to learn to work with TAIR and that such learning involves mastering the search 
tools as well as being aware of the reasons why TAIR is constructed as it is. In other 
words, curators appeal to transparency and user involvement as the solutions to problems 
of accessing TAIR and interpreting data in the light of its conceptual framework. As long 
as the interpretive steps taken by curators while constructing the resource are documented 
and this documentation is made accessible to users, it is possible for users to evaluate 
those interpretive choices, their significance towards assessing the value of the data and, 
possibly, the mistakes therein. This implies that users should become active contributors 
to the TAIR project, rather than just passive recipients of its benefits. In other words, 
curators shift the responsibility for the interpretive choices made in TAIR to the whole 
Arabidopsis community: problems in the ontologies, they state, ‘can be adequately 
handled if ontologies are felt to be owned by the field rather than just by the individual 
authors’ (Bard and Rhee 2004, 221). Remarkably, this is not just a cunning excuse 
allowing curators to circumnavigate the nagging issues underlying the building of a 
multidisciplinary database. Curators do everything in their power to ensure that the 
reasons and constraints dictating their choices are indeed documented and available for 
their peers to consult and criticise. In fact, the TAIR website itself gives access to all 
existing reports on TAIR progress, to the minutes of each meeting among curators, to 
teaching materials (including animations on how to use search tools and GO) and even to 
all correspondence between curators and users (that is, curators’ answers to complaints, 
requests for information and suggestions sent in by users).  
  
This is an interesting way of engaging the tension between theoretical interpretation 
(allowing for integration) and accessibility to all potential users that I outlined in the 
previous section. The personal judgements that curators need to give in order to construct 
the resource are laid bare, so as to empower users to assess their work and decide whether 
to endorse those judgements.
140
 I want to point to three problematic assumptions 
underlying this approach. One is the presupposition that users will indeed wish and/or 
have the time to engage with the extensive documentation mapping the curators’ choice. 
This is debatable, as curators themselves are experiencing since launching the project: 
unless they already have a basic affinity with the perspective offered by TAIR, thus not 
really needing to be ‘trained’ and to read about the making of TAIR, biologists are too 
absorbed in their own research to actively engage with TAIR. As far as users are 
concerned, TAIR is a service provided to them so that they can access information with 
little effort: if it is not accessible with minimal background information, then it means 
that the service does not work. The second problem concerns the idea that curators can 
accommodate all incoming critiques, no matter how diverging from each other and from 
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 As I discuss in detail in Chapter 7, this approach makes TAIR a good locus for scrutinising the 
interaction of researchers located at the centre of Arabidopsis research (such as TAIR curators, all working 
in one of the most prestigious institutes in the world for this type of research) and researchers located at the 
periphery of the Arabidopsis community, that is, (geographically and/or intellectually) far from its central 
institutions. 
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curators’ own ideas. This assumption is also clearly problematic, given precisely the 
argument (exploited by curators) that the construction of a resource like TAIR needs firm 
theoretical foundations (hence, arguably, endorsing one specific theoretical perspective). 
I shall come back to both of these important points in Chapter 7. The final problem lies in 
the assumption that the motivations and circumstances of the choices made by the 
curators can indeed be documented through a series of written texts, statements and 
illustrations. It is this assumption that I wish to discuss at length in the rest of this section.   
 
In my view, it is impossible to fully report the background for the decisions made by 
curators by means of online resources (such as protocols, minutes of meetings and even 
step-by-step animations carrying users through the various processes and reasonings 
underlying the making of TAIR). To understand why this is the case, I turn to an 
exemplification of the problem, i.e. the work involved in compiling data into annotations 
appropriate for insertion into TAIR databases. This ensemble of tasks, which TAIR 
personnel refers to as curation, involves a series of decisions which, I argue, are 
motivated strictly by each curator’s embodied knowledge of the phenomena and/or the 
type of data that he or she is annotating. Let me demonstrate how this works by briefly 
listing how curation is carried out at TAIR. 
  
Each curator is assigned a set of data types of her or his own competence. Broadly, 
curators are divided up into sub-teams looking at three areas: functional adaptations, 
genomic micro arrays and metabolism. Given the prominence of genetic data in TAIR 
databases, the curator’s job is currently focused on gene annotation, that is, the compiling 
of data relevant to each Arabidopsis gene to fit GO annotations and TAIR schemas. The 
curation of each gene can take between 20 minutes and four hours, depending on the type 
and quantity of data available. During that time, curators use PubSearch to look for the 
following three types of information: the first published paper on the cloning of the gene: 
that provides information on functional annotation; the most recent paper published on 
the gene, reporting the best information available about its biological function; and at 
least one paper giving information on location of the gene in the sequence. They then 
proceed to insert these pieces of information into the format required by TAIR, thus 
choosing: 
(1) GO terms describing the biological function, activity, expression and location of 
the gene; 
(2) GO relationship types, describing the relation between the gene and other aspects 
of Arabidopsis biology; 
(3) An evidence code designating the type of evidence used (as documented in 5.2.3); 
(4) An evidence description of the methods used to obtain the evidence (e.g. in situ 
hybridization); 
(5) Date and attribution, that is, when and by whom the annotation was made (e.g. 
annotated on 12/15/2003 by TAIR curators) 
(6) Reference: the papers used as primary source for the evidence (e.g. Huala et al., 
(1997) Science 278(5346):2120-3).
141
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 Material taken from a presentation given by Sue Rhee to Open Biological Ontologies Board on 6 
February 2004. 
 134
Curators are convinced that the whole decision-making process underlying curation can 
be documented. In fact, they claim that the parameters through which data are selected 
and compiled are so straightforward, that the process of curation could soon be entirely 
automatised. For instance, the selection of the order in which genes are curated (the 
chronological priority of gene annotation) has been automatised in 2004, following the 
suggestion of an intern to the project. The automation works because it is possible to 
formulate an algorithm for the choice of genes, containing all the criteria necessary for 
prioritisation. In Rhee’s view, increasing automation guarantees the possibility, for users, 
to easily trace the criteria used in selecting and compiling information. This would help 
access to TAIR by all interested users, no matter their own perspective and research 
interests.
142
 
 
Despite all efforts at increasing automation, however, there are reasons why manual 
curation remains a crucial feature of curators’ work. This is because the experience with 
experimental research accumulated by curators previous to their affiliation with TAIR is 
essential to the their understanding of the papers that they have to analyse in order to 
extract data for insertion into TAIR. The apparently simple information about a gene’s 
location, expression and (especially) biological functions are actually very difficult to 
extract from a bunch of papers written by different authors for a variety of mixed 
purposes. The curator’s ability is not so much to annotate the data so that they match GO 
terms and relations: it is to comprehend the experiments described in the papers, so as to 
be able to extract the relevant data (as well as relevant information about the sources of 
the evidence). All curators confirmed to me that, while in theory a researcher without 
experience ‘at the bench’ (i.e., experimenting with actual Arabidopsis plants) could 
curate genes, this has never been true in practice: all TAIR curators have experience as 
experimenters and they rely on it heavily in their interpretation of the data that they 
compile. Eva Huala, for instance, finds it difficult to compile information from areas and 
experimental approaches that she is not already familiar with. When selecting which data 
from the published literature are to be included in the database (and which ones should be 
discarded insofar as outdated or not representative), she needs to refer to her own 
knowledge about how to handle the relevant instruments, how to prepare and manipulate 
plants and cell cultures and how to read and compare results acquired through different 
experimental techniques. All of these abilities pertain to the broad category of knowledge 
that I characterised as ‘embodied’ in Chapter 2 – one of the features of such knowledge 
being that much of it cannot be expressed verbally or even pictorially, but is acquired 
through the exercise of specific (in this case, experimental) activities. Discarding 
evidence that is superfluous, dubious (because obtained through undocumented, non-
replicable or even non-standard methods) or irrelevant to the curation of the gene or gene 
function under scrutiny is one of the main skills that TAIR curators need to exercise: only 
through appeal to such embodied knowledge can Huala assess the validity, accuracy and 
relevance of results obtained by other researchers. 
 
A comparison among the elements that curators have at their disposal when annotating a 
specific set of data provides further clarification for how embodied knowledge operates 
in the curation of TAIR databases. Curators usually start from a specific item (a 
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component, process or function), whose identity is defined in relation to other items 
already in the database: for instance, a particular gene locus on a given chromosome. 
They use PubSearch to select publications that refer to that locus. This search may yield a 
small or large number of publications, depending on how much relevant experimental 
research has already been conducted. Now, the curators have to bridge a conspicuous gap 
between (A) the information available in and about the publications and (B) the 
information required by TAIR in order to classify the relevant evidence. (A) encompasses 
information such as the authors’s names and affiliations, the way in which their research 
is classified in PubSearch (and other search engines) and the actual text of the 
publication. (B) includes a description of the evidence, a classification of the type of 
evidence displayed and of its relation to other pieces of evidence in related parts of TAIR, 
and eventual comments by the curator as to how the evidence should be interpreted and 
related to other pieces of evidence. Information of type (B) is often not directly displayed 
in the text of the relevant papers. Partly this is because authors are usually writing for an 
audience of specialists who do not need to have every detail of the adopted technique and 
preferred evidence spelled out. Further, as we have seen, it is because the evidence is 
classified according to standards other than the ones used in TAIR:  
 
‘the physical loci (genes resulting from the genome sequencing effort) are 
named according to their chromosome location. Chromosome-based 
names are a combination of organism name (AT), chromosomal location 
(1–5), G (for gene), and a unique accession number (e.g. AT2G34400). 
This nomenclature has been generally accepted as the standard 
nomenclature for Arabidopsis loci and replaces the previous one used 
during the sequencing phase, which was based on BAC names (e.g. 
F23H14.2)’ (Garcia-Hernandez et al 2002, 243).  
 
Curators are not just cutting information from the papers and pasting it into their 
databases. They need to interpret the content of the papers in the light of their own 
familiarity with the techniques and methods used in that field, so as to be able to extract 
the appropriate (B) type of information. In the case above, this means recognising the 
nomenclature used in research performed up to 2001 (BAC names) and, by adding 
information about its chromosomal location and accession number, transforming it into 
nomenclature acceptable for use in TAIR (e.g. AT2G34400).   
 
The relevance of embodied knowledge to curating TAIR data implies that the longer a 
curator is unable to engage in experimental work, the more difficult it becomes for her or 
him to select and interpret data for annotation. Indeed, curators report that after some 
time spent as curators in TAIR, which implies a detachment from experimental work 
(only Rhee is still involved in experimentation at the same time), they start to lose touch 
with what happens at the bench. This is why, with the exception of the directors who 
guarantee continuity to the project, TAIR personnel shifts rather frequently: long-term 
curators need to refer to newcomers’ fresh ‘feel’ for newly developed experimental 
practices in order to continue their work. As I shall discuss in detail in the next chapter, a 
physical interaction with the plants and the experience of experimental research seem to 
be crucial in securing individuals’ ability of making sense of the data available so as to 
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interpret them and arrange them in the database. Curation work, as much as the work 
involved in actually creating TAIR databases, thus involves reference to embodied 
knowledge that cannot be documented via reports, statements or illustrations on the 
website. Curators’ decisions concerning visions, bio-ontologies, evidence and curation 
are largely based on their awareness of what it is like to experiment with Arabidopsis. 
Curators all come ‘from the bench’: they have been experimenters before entering the 
TAIR project, they plan to go back to experimenting as soon as their employment with 
TAIR is ended and they regret the impossibility to carry out experimental and TAIR work 
at the same time. This regret is not only due to their love for experimental research: all 
curators that I interviewed remarked how their contribution to TAIR is heavily informed 
by their awareness of what it takes to manipulate Arabidopsis in the laboratory. Again, 
this resonates with Hesse’s analysis of theories: the expression of empirical observations 
as a network of interrelated terms (resulting in a series of law-like predicates, such as 
‘nuclear membrane is part of cell’ in GO) necessarily implies a loss in non-verbalisable 
empirical information, such as the one that TAIR curators try to incorporate by their 
emphasis on sources of evidence (Hesse 1980, 93). 
 
Arguably, this type of embodied knowledge is relevant to users as much as it is relevant 
to curators. That is to say, users need to appeal to both their embodied and their 
theoretical knowledge of phenomena, in order to assess and interpret the decisions 
underlying TAIR ordering and display of data. However, users cannot possess the 
embodied knowledge relevant to the interpretation of the data unless they have the same 
experimental experiences as TAIR curators. This is rather unlikely, given the richness of 
techniques and protocols available in Arabidopsis research. Even more troubling, in view 
of curators’ claims, is the fact that such embodied knowledge cannot be reported on the 
TAIR website (and thus taught to TAIR users), since it is acquired via experiences of 
interactions with phenomena, rather than from verbal or pictorial representations of such 
interactions.
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 This disproves the claim that the motivations and background used in 
order to construct TAIR databases is (or could be) fully documented on the website. As a 
result, it becomes difficult for curators to appeal to transparency as a way out of the 
problem of understanding the database: even if users were trained according to TAIR 
guidelines, they still would not be able to trace and interpret all the circumstances and 
motives underlying the curators’ judgement.  
 
 
5.5 Using TAIR to Understand Arabidopsis Biology 
 
The failure of the transparency argument given by curators lands the TAIR project in a 
peculiar situation. There is a tension between the interpreted nature of TAIR, made 
explicit by its reliance on the gene-centric theoretical perspective expressed through GO 
networks, and the role of TAIR as a depository of data of interest to the whole 
Arabidopsis community. Curators argue that this tension is unavoidable, given the need 
to select a specific theoretical framework in order to construct a resource of this scope 
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 This section has focused primarily on the embodied knowledge used by TAIR curators to construct the 
database. Yet, the fact that TAIR users also recur to their own embodied knowledge to interpret data 
visualised through the resource is crucial to my analysis and will take central stage in Chapter 6.   
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and size. Information, as well as frameworks for interpreting and using information, 
always comes from a specific context – which in this case consists in the epistemic 
culture endorsed by the TAIR group of curators and programmers. However, the 
embedding of TAIR into a specific theoretical perspective, as well as the use of GO as 
theories and extensive reference to the curators’ embodied knowledge, risk to diminish 
the value of this project for its prospective users. What users fundamentally expect from 
TAIR, is that it facilitates their understanding of Arabidopsis biology: my discussion so 
far has highlighted how users, in order to use TAIR effectively to this aim, need to learn 
much of the theoretical and the embodied knowledge used in order to construct TAIR in 
the first place. I intend to dedicate this last section to a philosophical analysis of this 
situation in the light of its implications for understanding in biology.  
 
As a starting point, consider again the definition of scientific understanding proposed in 
chapter 2: the cognitive achievement realisable by individual scientists depending on 
their ability to coordinate theoretical and embodied knowledge that apply to a specific 
phenomenon. My goal is now to start unravelling what this means and how such 
coordination of relevant theoretical and embodied knowledge should be carried out. My 
examination of TAIR construction and use allows me to clarify both of these aspects in 
the case of Arabidopsis research based on TAIR: I can now exemplify what theoretical 
and embodied knowledge amount to in this case and, most importantly, I can specify 
some modalities through which reference to these two types of knowledge may yield 
understanding. In fact, the basic point illustrated by my analysis of TAIR is that not 
anything goes in order to acquire understanding in biology. The required coordination of 
theoretical knowledge and embodied knowledge needs to be accomplished skilfully, that 
is, in ways appropriate both to the features of the phenomenon at hand and to the social 
and material conditions in which research is carried out. This section thus includes a 
discussion of what I call epistemic skills, that is, the skills expressed in the actions 
undertaken in order to acquire understanding of a phenomenon. Using TAIR to 
understand plant biology requires an extensive set of such skills: I distinguish between 
theoretical and performative skills, both of which are needed for users to be able to 
understand the significance of TAIR data to the biological phenomena of interest to them.  
 
 
5.5.1 Introducing Epistemic skills 
  
Prima facie, epistemic skills may be broadly defined as the abilities to carry out a number 
of activities in order to increase one’s understanding of reality.
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 As a result of 
exercising those abilities, scientists become aware of how their experiences, as well as 
the concepts and tools that they use, fit or challenge available explanations of 
phenomena. Thus, as I shall illustrate in this last section, these abilities constitute 
indispensable conditions for the acquisition of understanding, precisely because they 
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attention than it has hitherto received from philosophers of science. My present reflections are meant to 
highlight some crucial aspects of this notion in the context of biological research, without pretending to 
exhaust its many dimensions and applications.  
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allow a fruitful coordination between the theoretical and embodied knowledge of 
phenomena.
145
 
 
Epistemic skills may be partly innate, such as the skill of drawing an object (which 
depends at least to some degree on the talent of the individual attempting such action), 
yet they are most often acquired through the imitation of others and/or through 
experience, for instance by iterative trials. Skilful actions are, in a sense, instrumental: 
they are necessarily targeted towards the achievement of a specific goal, which in the 
case of epistemic skills is an improved understanding of (some aspects of) reality. At the 
same time, the notion of skill concerns principally the means and manner by which action 
is undertaken. In fact, an action can be judged as skilful even if it does not result in the 
accomplishment of its intended goal. This is because the successful achievement of a 
particular aim involves more factors than just the intentions and ability of the individual 
acting to that aim: adverse conditions in the environment, bad timing, social context, 
interference with other individuals’ goals and actions – all these factors can influence the 
outcome of an action, no matter how skilfully that action is carried out. For instance, a 
Japanese sword master intending to slay his enemy might fail to successfully accomplish 
his goal, for reasons entirely beyond his control: for instance, in case the enemy carries a 
shotgun and shoots him while he is still too far to strike; or, in the admittedly unlucky 
case of lightning striking him while he is raising his sword to inflict the final blow. 
Failure due to factors beyond his control does not make his attack less skilful.  
 
I take this to illustrate that the assessment of an action as skilful depends as much on the 
manner in which the action is undertaken as it depends on its effectiveness in achieving 
the intended goal. In other words, possessing an epistemic skill implies more than the 
ability to perform an action: it requires performing that action well. This means that we 
need criteria to determine what it means for an action to be well performed. However, 
these regulative criteria are extremely context-dependent and thus arguably impossible to 
classify in an analytic fashion. They are dictated by factors as disparate as the nature of 
the goal to be achieved; the interests of the person performing the action; the social as 
well as the material context in which the action is carried out; and, last but not least, the 
tools available in order to carry out the action. Consider as an example the building of a 
wall. Regulative criteria for the actions to be undertaken to build a wall skilfully include: 
geometrical precision, which is dictated by the nature of the goal to be achieved (by 
definition, the wall should stand strong and perpendicular to the ground); the aesthetic 
preferences of the person building the wall as well as the architectural conventions 
adopted by his or her social context (dictating the colour and shape of the wall); the 
degree of resistance expected from the wall, which depend on its position and exposure to 
the environment (a wall built in a region subject to storms, hurricanes or earthquakes will 
have to be much thicker and have deeper foundations than a wall built in a region with a 
mild climate; a wall built to separate two rooms will have different features from the 
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 Note that epistemic skills are used to acquire various types of understanding, including – but not limited 
to – scientific understanding. I do not intend to offer an a priori demarcation between epistemic skills 
needed to understand scientifically and epistemic skills needed to understand in other ways (for instance, in 
a political or spiritual way). As I discuss in chapters 2.3 and 7, such a demarcation can only be drawn a 
posteriori by looking at the actual practices adopted and sanctioned within scientific communities.  
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front wall of a house); and, finally, the time employed and the manner of disposing the 
bricks, which depend on the composition of the bricks themselves (and thus the humidity 
and insulation capacities of the material used) as well as on the tools available to the 
builder (type of trowel, cement, etc.).  
 
What I would like to claim here is that the regulative criteria relevant to epistemic skills 
used in biological research are no less local and context-dependent than in the case of 
skills used in masonry. This extreme context-dependence makes it uninteresting, in my 
view, to try and list those criteria without looking at specific practices. Still, skilful 
actions in masonry seem to have two features in common with skilful actions in 
biological research (and possibly in other contexts): (1) they involve the exploitation of 
tools in a way deemed appropriate to effectively pursue a proposed goal; and (2) 
judgement on what constitutes an ‘appropriate’ course of action largely depends on 
standards upheld within the relevant social context. In the case of epistemic skills used to 
increase biological understanding, the tools to be exploited may range across models, 
theories, experimental instruments, features of the environment as well as samples of 
phenomena themselves, while the relevant social context is constituted by the community 
of scientific peers in charge of examining the methods and results of any research 
programme. The best way to capture these insights is, I propose, to adopt the following 
definition for an epistemic skill exercised in biology: the ability to act in a way that is 
recognised by the relevant epistemic community as well suited to understanding a given 
phenomenon.  
 
 
5.5.2 Theoretical and Performative Skills 
 
In the course of the next sections of this chapter, I shall present and discuss two types of 
epistemic skills. After having discussed their use in Arabidopsis research, I shall argue 
that, if used together, these epistemic skills indeed enable biologists to coordinate 
theoretical and embodied knowledge as required to understand a given phenomenon.  
 
The first type of skill, which I refer to as theoretical, involves mastering the use of 
concepts, theories and abstract models – in short, being able to manipulate various 
expressions of theoretical knowledge - towards the understanding of a specific 
phenomenon. As I shall show through the example of TAIR, theoretical skills enable 
biologists to reason through given categories and classification systems according to 
specific inferential rules, while at the same time judging the validity of those categories 
and rules with reference to alternative theoretical frameworks applying to the same 
phenomena. The second type of skills encompasses the performative skills enabling 
biologists to exploit material resources towards the acquisition of biological 
understanding. In other words, performative skills consist of the ability to interact with 
the environment (including laboratory equipment and the plant specimens themselves, as 
specified in the next chapter) in ways relevant to the study of a specific phenomenon. 
Performative skills are different from theoretical skills insofar as they can only be 
acquired through interaction with phenomena. A biologist can be taught how to cultivate 
a plant so that it will develop as required by a specific experimental set-up. However, the 
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corresponding performative skill is acquired purely through practice, that is, by trying 
over and over again to act in the desired manner, thus gradually adapting movements and 
sense-perception to the tools and materials used in an experiment, as well as to the 
standards enforced by the research community of interest.  
 
Both theoretical and performative skills are expressions of embodied knowledge – that is, 
as I discussed in Chapter 2, knowledge about how to act and reason as required in order 
to intervene in the world, improve control over phenomena and handle representations of 
those phenomena. In what follows, I shall discuss features of these two classes of skills. 
Another important type of epistemic skill consists in the social skills denoting the ability 
of researchers to behave and express their insights in ways that are recognised by their 
peers or/and other participants in their social context. As I highlighted at the end of 
chapter 2, this social dimension is extremely important to the definition of understanding 
as ‘scientific’. I shall therefore come back in detail to social skills in chapter 7, where I 
discuss the epistemic significance of the structure and organisation of the Arabidopsis 
community.  
 
Let me start by exemplifying what counts as a theoretical and as a performative skill in 
the context of using TAIR to understand Arabidopsis biology. This can be easily 
exemplified by looking back at the making of TAIR, as documented in this chapter, and 
analysing which epistemic skills were used to produce TAIR visualisations of data. TAIR 
curators employed a number of theoretical skills to create the resource. Most notable 
among those are the skills required to create GO and use it as a framework for data-
management in TAIR. Those include, as we have seen, the ability to associate sets of data 
to specific concepts on the basis of the definition of those concepts provided by GO; the 
ability to link concepts by means of simple relations of the type ‘is_a’ and ‘part_of’; and 
the ability to interpret and present the data of interest in terms of the gene-centric 
perspective characteristic of GO. The performative skills required to handle TAIR can be 
divided in two categories. The first consists of the IT skills enabling biologists to access 
the data and exploit the virtual environment provided by the resource to play around with 
those data in accordance with their own research objectives; examples of these 
performative skills are running TAIR searches, order data according to parameters of 
interest, eliminate from the visualisation elements that are not relevant to the user’s 
specific concerns. The second set of performative skills involved in the use of TAIR 
consists in the skills gained by interacting with the phenomena themselves (that is, the 
Arabidopsis plants), as discussed in section 5.4. These skills enable biologists to trace the 
empirical significance of data displayed in TAIR. For instance, TAIR indications about 
the sources of evidence for a specific data set are only useful to a researcher who is well 
versed in similar research methods, knows how they can be performed and what that 
implies for the applicability of the data obtained through them. As I shall describe in 
more detail in Chapter 6, relevant performative skills in this case are the ability to 
manipulate plants and to experiment on them through a variety of techniques; the ability 
to identify the empirical evidence for and content of TAIR; to store, sow and germinate 
seed; to work with Java object-directed programming (IT skills). The possession of such 
performative skills makes researchers aware of the relation between evidence, as reported 
in TAIR, and the phenomena from which it is obtained.  
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5.5.3 Combining Skills: Many Types of Understanding 
 
As it is evident from the above list, some theoretical and performative skills are 
prerequisites even just to access TAIR databases, let alone to use them effectively in the 
context of one’s own research project. TAIR users certainly need to be able to structure 
descriptions of biological processes and data through the parent-child relationships 
characterising DAGs. This epistemic skill is crucial, as this is the basic structure used in 
GO to relate concepts with each other. As I showed in section 5.3.2, TAIR users might 
also profit from the ability to recognise the theoretical commitments and motivations 
underlying GO. To acknowledge the role of GO as a theory about Arabidopsis biology 
makes it easier to critically assess the validity of GO definitions and relations, consider 
possible alternatives and evaluate how significantly the gene-centric perspective affects 
the interpretation of data that is embodied in TAIR visualisations. Further, biologists need 
to possess the appropriate IT skills to access TAIR and exploit its features.  
 
The unavoidable necessity to exercise specific theoretical and performative skills in order 
to consult TAIR constitutes a problem for TAIR users, most of whom do not possess 
these skills upon accessing the resource. As I already illustrated, TAIR curators are aware 
of the importance of epistemic skills to use TAIR. The TAIR website thus provides as 
much guidance as possible on how to acquire such skills: through simulations of the 
functioning of TAIR searches, as well as information on the origin and issues 
surrounding GO and DAGs, TAIR curators hope to provide users with enough theoretical 
and IT skills to handle and profit from TAIR visualisations of data sets. It remains to be 
seen whether the information and training given on the TAIR website is enough for users 
to acquire those skills. TAIR curator Leonore Reiser, who is responsible for education 
and outreach to the larger biological community, maintains that biologists should follow 
courses on TAIR as part of their academic training, so as to ensure that they possess such 
essential skills.
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 In the absence of such training, now unavailable in the majority of 
biology departments, it is difficult for TAIR to be as accessible to users as it is intended 
to be: the acquisition of the right skills is a necessary condition for TAIR to fulfil its 
function as a service to the Arabidopsis community as a whole. TAIR cannot be seen as a 
useful tool towards enhancing biologists’ understanding of Arabidopsis biology, unless 
adequate training and practice in the relevant theoretical and performative skills is 
enforced upon the members of the Arabidopsis research community. 
 
Does this imply that TAIR users should possess precisely the same skills as TAIR 
curators in order to be able to use the resource to enhance their biological understanding? 
The answer to this question is an emphatic no.  Surely, some of the curators’ skills are 
simply indispensable to access and use the resource. However, the number of epistemic 
skills that users can choose to exercise in order to interpret and manipulate TAIR data is 
huge and depends largely on their own purposes, habits, beliefs and expertise. An 
obvious example is provided by the performative skills enabling biologists to carry out 
experiments on Arabidopsis plants. As I pointed out in section 5.4, the ability to actually 
interact with experimental materials is paramount to the curators’ success in annotating 
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data. TAIR curators need to refer to their embodied knowledge of what it means to 
experiment on plants with one or the other technique, in order to assess which data are 
most relevant and useful for inclusion into TAIR. Equally, TAIR users need to refer to 
their performative skills in order to interpret the evidence, sources and methods reported 
by TAIR. However, each TAIR user possesses a (somewhat) different set of performative 
skills, depending on his or her laboratory experience, type of research, social context, 
disciplinary standards and even on their geographical location (as laboratories located in 
less financially powerful regions of the world might provide less access, if any, to the 
most recent instruments, materials and techniques for experimental research). Indications 
as to which of those numerous performative skills are most relevant to the interpretation 
of TAIR data are not to be found on the TAIR website. This is not only because it is 
practically impossible to convey that information through a virtual medium. It is also 
because TAIR curators do not value the extent to which their own performative skills 
impact their choice of tools and vision in visualising the data: while attempting to 
document the embodied knowledge of the researchers who provide the original data (as 
they show by reporting sources of evidence in the database), they do not take account of 
their own embodied knowledge as curators of the resource. The curators’ lack of 
reflexivity with respect to the performative skills that they use to select and annotate data 
results in ambiguity as to the empirical value of the data themselves – a confusion that 
cannot be clarified or avoided by reference to TAIR alone. In fact, users are likely to 
possess entirely different sets of performative skills than TAIR curators, thus interpreting 
the empirical significance of TAIR data sets in a potentially different way than the one 
envisaged by TAIR curators.  
 
Similarly, users do not need to learn precisely the same theoretical skills as employed by 
TAIR curators to access and use TAIR data for their own research purposes. Only some 
of the theoretical skills used by curators to build TAIR are essential to use the resource. 
Other theoretical skills used in the making of TAIR are only required if users wish to 
understand Arabidopsis biology in the same way as TAIR curators do. A biologist might 
refer to TAIR data without being aware of the theoretical perspective used to classify and 
present them, or even without being acquainted with GO. Further, possessing the 
theoretical skills relevant to reasoning through GO concepts is necessary to working 
through data in the way proposed by TAIR curators, but does not preclude using those 
data in other ways.  Many biologists possess theoretical skills that are unknown to TAIR 
curators and which enable those biologists to interpret TAIR data in ways that curators 
would not conceive of (not even while ‘playing the user’, a practice which, as we saw, is 
restricted to the curators’ own training and experiences). In the likely case that, as a 
result, their interpretation differs from the one supported by GO itself, they might draw 
very different conclusions from viewing those data than biologists endowed with another 
set of theoretical skills. Consider the following example.  
 
A biologist accesses the resource (and specifically the search tool AraCyc) in order to 
find data concerning reactions in Arabidopsis molecular biology that involve nitrogen. As 
a result of her search, she finds the visualisation of data reproduced in figure 5.14.  
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Figure 5.14 – Result of the query ‘nitrogen’ under the search category ‘reactions’ in 
Arabidopsis metabolism. 
 
 
 
A TAIR curator, well versed in the interpretation of these data according to the gene-
centric perspective enforced by GO, would acknowledge that the query triggered a 
response by a sub-class of the term ‘reactions’ that is called ‘EC reactions’; within that 
class, the TAIR database selected a specific component of ‘oxydoreductases’, that is, the 
reactions ‘acting on iron-sulfur proteins as donors’. Now, a TAIR curator would not 
interpret this result as representing all the known reactions in Arabidopsis metabolism 
that involved nitrogen: rather, she would rephrase her query so as to fit the format of 
TAIR, by using a more specific term that is already present in the GO network of 
concepts. In playing around with the terms used for the search, she would immediately 
find out that the category ‘oxydoreductases’ alone actually contains 22 subcategories, of 
which at least half involve nitrogen-fixing reactions (such as, for instance, ‘acting on the 
CH-NH(2) group of donors’).  
 
A user who is not acquainted with the GO network of concepts nor with its gene-centric 
organisation would, however, be puzzled by the result shown in figure 5.14. Surely, he 
would claim, there are many more reactions in Arabidopsis metabolism that involve 
nitrogen-fixing: as all plant biologist know well, nitrogen is one of the most important 
substances in the development of plants and its assimilation requires a number of 
complex molecular reactions. Instead of rephrasing the query in a way that is conducive 
to finding better-fitting results, he would conclude that TAIR does not contain the data 
that he needs; or, he would be deceived into thinking that the reaction portrayed in figure 
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5.14 is a particularly important nitrogen-fixing reaction and that he should study it in 
more detail. The example illustrates how a variation in theoretical skills with respect to 
TAIR curators determines a change in the understanding of nitrogen-fixing reactions 
acquired by the user thanks to TAIR.  
 
I can now conclude that TAIR users do not need to possess precisely the same 
combination of theoretical and performative skills as curators, in order to use the resource 
for their own research purposes. They can use a variety of different epistemic skills to 
access and interpret the resource for their own research purposes. This has important 
epistemological consequences for the type of understanding of Arabidopsis biology that 
they acquire through consulting TAIR data sets. As I claimed in Chapter 2, biological 
understanding emerges from the skilful coordination of theoretical and embodied 
knowledge available about a phenomenon. In this chapter, I made clear how using 
different skills can lead to a different interpretation and handling of the same data and 
conceptual categories: the term ‘nitrogen’ and the data associated to it in TAIR need to be 
handled in ways similar to the ones employed by TAIR curators, in order for their 
empirical significance to be interpreted in the same way as is done by TAIR curators. In 
the case that different TAIR users employ different skills in accessing the same data, their 
interpretation – in fact, the very understanding of the phenomena in question that they 
provide – is likely to change. This means that biologists can obtain different 
understandings of the same phenomena in Arabidopsis biology, depending on the sets of 
theoretical and performative skills available to them in order to interpret and use the 
relevant data sets and conceptual categories that they find in TAIR.   
 
This point illuminates an important aspect of biological understanding as a whole, to 
which I will come back in more detail in Chapters 6 and 8: that is, that understanding in 
biology varies not only in degree, but also in quality and substance. The possibility of a 
pluralism of epistemic skills, and thus of picking different combinations of theoretical 
and performative skills in order to obtain biological understanding, corresponds to a 
pluralism in the interpretations of data obtained through the exercise of those skills. As I 
shall discuss in more detail in chapter 8, there can be different types of understanding, 
depending on one’s skills, interests, commitments and research context.   
 
This pluralism does not diminish the epistemological significance of understanding 
biological phenomena, but rather enhances the richness and the potential applicability of 
biological knowledge: as we shall see in Chapter 7, pluralism among ways to understand 
organisms plays an important role in biology, as emergence of and dialogue among 
alternative interpretations and ways of understanding is instrumental to the growth and 
refinement of scientific knowledge. However, the existence of various ways to reason 
about, interpret and understand biological phenomena constitute, at the same time, a 
potential obstacle to meaningful communication across different communities using 
TAIR. Researchers with different skills and backgrounds can certainly communicate with 
each other, but in order to do so they need to acquire either (a) some overlapping skills 
allowing them to understand phenomena in a similar way; or (b) an awareness of how 
different their understanding of phenomena actually is, as well as of the extent to which 
such difference is due not only to their theoretical perspective on the phenomena in 
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question, but also to the skills that they employ in coordinating their theoretical and 
embodied knowledge.  
 
The potential difficulties in communicating experienced by researchers with different 
skills and different understandings of plant biology makes TAIR’s goal of integration 
more difficult to achieve than expected by TAIR curators. Does integration of data 
gathered in different biological subfields involve adopting a common outlook and 
common skills in order to understand biological phenomena? While TAIR curators (as 
well as the GO consortium) would like to answer in the negative, by pointing out how 
flexible TAIR is to the needs of users with differing interests and expertises, I hope to 
have demonstrated that at least some common skills and background knowledge are 
required in order to obtain integrated knowledge about a specific set of phenomena (such 
as, in the case of Arabidopsis, the structure, functioning and development of a plant). I do 
not think it possible to obtain a shared understanding of Arabidopsis biology as an 
integrated whole without adopting a specific theoretical perspective (in the case of TAIR, 
a gene-centric one) as a common platform on which to build the necessary tools and 
concepts. This does not necessarily represent a defeat to biologists searching for an 
integrative approach to organismal biology that is respectful of the pluralism in tools and 
perspectives characterising biological research as a whole. However, biologists using 
TAIR need to be well aware that the necessity to favour a gene-centric theoretical 
perspective over other perspectives is due to purely pragmatic reasons and should not be 
allowed to constrain the biological understanding acquired through access to the 
resource.
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 As illustrated in O’Malley and Dupré (2005), a similar debate is currently surrounding the various 
attempts to integrate biological data that call themselves ‘system biology’ (in fact, TAIR and especially the 
bio-ontologies project could themselves fit under this umbrella term). I shall come back to the links among 
integration, theoretical unification and understanding in biology in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 6. Modeling Arabidopsis: Where Theory and Plants Meet 
 
This capacity of a thing to reveal itself in unexpected 
ways in the future, I attribute to the fact that the thing 
observed is an aspect of reality, possessing a 
significance that is not exhausted by our conception of 
any single aspect of it. To trust that a thing we know is 
real is, in this sense, to feel that it has the independence 
and power for manifesting itself in yet unthought ways in 
the future  
Michael Polanyi 1958, 132 
 
The previous chapter focused on the theoretical framework adopted in TAIR and its 
significance for the biological understanding of Arabidopsis provided by that resource. In 
the conclusion, I pointed to the combined exercise of theoretical and performative skills 
as an indispensable condition towards acquiring such understanding. Further, I noted 
how, in order to make sense of the empirical significance of TAIR data, TAIR users need 
to possess performative skills (such as an awareness of how to interact with plants and 
acquaintance with some experimental techniques, sources and instruments) that cannot be 
acquired by connecting to the internet and downloading images. In this chapter, I intend 
to elaborate this claim by exploring the interaction of performative and theoretical skills 
underlying what is arguably the most important epistemic activity in contemporary 
biology: the production of models. As observed in chapter 2, modeling is widely 
recognised to be a prominent way in which biologists obtain understanding of biological 
phenomena. However, the nature of the link between modeling and understanding is far 
from clear. Further, the relative significance of handling so-called ‘material’ models 
versus handling ‘abstract’ models has received much more attention among historians of 
science than among philosophers of science. In other words, the differences in the 
practices used and the results obtained by handling these two types of models are amply 
documented by historians, but are left widely unexplained by epistemologists of 
science.
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 What is precisely the difference between handling a material entity and 
handling an abstract entity? And in which (different) ways do these two types of activities 
contribute to the understanding of the phenomena to which these models refer?  
 
Answering these questions proves especially difficult in the context of research on model 
organisms, which involves the combined use of a variety of models of different aspects of 
the biology of those organisms. I consider two types of models in particular which are 
widely used in Arabidopsis research: the two-dimensional, pictorial representations of 
Arabidopsis data displayed by TAIR (whose production is documented in the previous 
chapter); and the three-dimensional plant specimens cultivated and distributed by the 
Nottingham Arabidopsis Stock Centre. I devote my first section to reconstructing how 
NASC specimens (that is, the Arabidopsis specimens grown at the NASC) are 
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 See for instance the volume on three-dimensional models edited by de Chadarevian and Hopwood 
(2004), which, while providing wonderful examples of the contrast between ‘more material’ and ‘more 
abstract’ types of models, defines the difference between the two in little more than intuitive terms, without 
exploring its epistemological significance.  
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produced.
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 These practices can be compared to the activities required to obtain TAIR 
visualisations of Arabidopsis data, as described in chapter 5. As I argue in section 6.2, 
both TAIR images and NASC specimens should be seen as models of Arabidopsis 
wildtypes: the former because they provide symbolic, theoretically-informed 
representations of Arabidopsis (micro)biology; and the latter because they are modified 
to acquire and preserve specific phenotypic and/or genotypic features that are seen by 
researchers as representative of Arabidopsis plants. The claim that NASC specimens 
should be considered as models of Arabidopsis might seem confusing: on one hand, they 
are artefacts that are purposefully manipulated in order to represent that phenomenon; on 
the other hand, they remain samples of the very phenomenon that they are taken to 
represent. I argue that this ambivalence is precisely what makes these models so 
interesting and useful to understanding Arabidopsis biology, and thus is something that 
philosophers should try to account for in their discussion of modeling practices. 
However, the traditional categorisation of models as ‘abstract’ or ‘material’ does not 
seem to help in this respect. Many biological models, certainly including NASC 
specimens, present both abstract and material features: further, the meaning of this 
characterisation is unclear, as I shall show by listing three different ways in which the 
notion of ‘abstract model’ can be interpreted. A resolution of the debate on what it means 
for a model to be abstract would require a dissertation of its own. However, I do not think 
I have to provide such an analysis here: instead, I propose to shift the terms of the debate 
in a way that is more fruitful to the analysis of abstraction in the specific case of 
biological modeling.  
 
In the context of modeling accounts, thinking of ‘abstract’ as an attribute of models 
black-boxes, rather than clarifies, the way in which abstraction is performed during 
model-building and to which epistemological advantage: it makes abstraction seem like 
an essential property of models, whose value is not dependent on the context and manner 
in which models are used. I thus suggest to view abstraction as an epistemic activity that 
needs to be skilfully performed in order to yield models of the phenomena that scientists 
wish to study and understand – an activity performed in different ways and for different 
purposes, depending on the local circumstances of modeling and the specific features of 
the models in question. This philosophical reading of abstraction leads me to qualify both 
TAIR databases and NASC specimens as models of Arabidopsis, whose differences in 
quality and expression are due to the difference in the processes through which they are 
built. These are two types of abstraction processes: the material abstracting required in 
the production of Arabidopsis specimens and the conceptual abstracting characterising 
the elaboration of visual models of Arabidopsis genomics and metabolism. The 
difference among these types of abstracting is determined by the epistemic goals, 
material circumstances (tools and experimental setting), background knowledge and, 
most importantly for my present purposes, the skills required by the scientists performing 
them. In section 6.3, I highlight how both material and conceptual abstracting require 
researchers to exercise theoretical as well as performative skills: however, while 
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 The material that follows has been gathered during a week-long visit to NASC in May 2005, in which I 
interviewed NASC team members Emma Wigmore and Lubomira Kacinova and had several in-depth 
interviews with NASC Director Sean May. Dr. May kindly granted me access to NASC archives as well as 
to its laboratory and glasshouses.  
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theoretical skills are predominant in the construction of models through conceptual 
abstracting, performative skills are especially important to the production of models 
through material abstracting.  
 
These considerations lead me, in section 6.4, to propose a systematic analysis of how 
modeling practices help in coordinating knowledge so as to obtain a biological 
understanding of a phenomenon (thus clarifying and illustrating how my definition of 
understanding, as proposed in Chapter 2, actually works in biological practice). In 
particular, I shall highlight how the skilful handling of models enables researchers to 
select the (theoretical and embodied) knowledge that is most relevant to an understanding 
of the phenomenon that is being modelled – thus making the pursuit of understanding 
through modeling both skilful and efficient.  
 
 
6.1 The Making of Plants: Producing Specimens at NASC 
 
As I remarked in chapter 3, NASC and TAIR, despite their entirely different pursuits and 
results, share one important goal, that is, the pursuit of integration as proposed by the 
MASC committee supervising Arabidopsis research. Both centres have been created to 
produce tools that could be used by all Arabidopsis researchers, no matter their specific 
expertise and local interests: the use of similar tools would provide a material basis for 
exchanges within the Arabidopsis community and thus, eventually, for the integration of 
the various types of results produced by its participants. In chapter 5, I illustrated the 
impact of concerns about the usability of TAIR by Arabidopsis biologists on the making 
of the visualisations of data employed in the resource. TAIR images are meant to 
facilitate communication among Arabidopsis researchers and access to results from 
different research fields. Further, through the adoption of GO, TAIR provides a meta-
framework where different sets of results can be compared and integrated with each 
other. NASC is equally committed to providing tools for integration of different fields. 
As I intend to show, NASC scientists also make reference to a meta-framework where 
different descriptions of the same plants can be brought to bear on each other; most 
importantly, they produce specimens that can be employed for research throughout the 
world and that are essential to the successful integration of results obtained across 
different laboratories.  
 
The production of the ‘right’ plants for laboratory use is an extremely important task, as 
not all Arabidopsis specimens are fit for experimental purposes. Different branches of 
Arabidopsis research focus on specific ecotypes of Arabidopsis, whose features are 
particularly well suited to the experimental purposes at hand. As pointed out in Chapter 3, 
three ecotypes are particularly popular among Arabidopsis researchers working on 
molecular biology – the Columbia, Wassinlenska and Landsberg ecotypes (respectively 
abbreviated as Col, Ws and Lan). The main reason for this popularity is that researchers 
need some guarantee that the plants on which they work are as similar as possible to the 
ones used in other laboratories. Thus, plants used to obtain particularly influential results 
(such as the Col ecotype adopted by the AGI and the Lan ecotype used for Feldman 
mutations) are sought after by researchers wishing to assess, replicate and further those 
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data. That plants share the same traits is essential to the reproducibility, evaluation and 
elaboration of experimental results across different laboratories: as we shall see, this is 
one of the reasons for viewing specimens of the most popular ecotypes as an important 
type of model of Arabidopsis. Further, integration of data about Arabidopsis can only 
occur if researchers have a reason to believe that they are working on similar plant 
specimens. This might look like a simple requirement, while actually it represents a great 
challenge for the Arabidopsis community, given the numerous variants of Arabidopsis to 
be found in the wild, as well as the wealth of mutants of the plant produced in the 
laboratory in recent years.  
 
The production of Arabidopsis specimens with features appropriate to experimental 
purposes requires a complex sequence of activities, all of which are carried out at NASC.  
In what follows, I analyse these activities as pertaining to six different phases: the 
acquisition of Arabidopsis seeds from researchers (6.1.1); the preliminary classification 
of those seeds (6.1.2); the cultivation of specimens from those seeds (6.1.3); and the final 
classification, storage and distribution to the users (6.1.4).   
 
 
6.1.1 Acquisition of seeds  
 
Similarly to TAIR, NASC acquires its prime material – in this case, the seeds of plants in 
use in various laboratories – directly from its prospective users. Researchers who are 
working on Arabidopsis specimens taken from the wild or obtained through artificially 
induced mutation are encouraged to become ‘donors’: that is, they are encouraged to send 
a sample of seeds to NASC, so that the specific specimens can be replicated and stored in 
NASC archives and retrieved by anyone interested in working with plants with the same 
characteristics. Again, NASC works as a service to the community: a point of exchange 
for researchers working on Arabidopsis as well as an archive of the several hundred 
mutants of plants used for research in different areas and locations. Donors have an 
incentive to donate samples as a means to make themselves visible to the community. In 
fact, since the early days of Arabidopsis collections (such as the one compiled by Redei), 
the journals and newsletters dedicated to Arabidopsis research have promoted an ethos of 
sharing seeds and materials across the community, on the basis of the argument that 
cooperation would benefit all participants.
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The sample sent by donors is accompanied by a free-text description of the genetic and 
morphological characteristics of the plants from which the seed is taken. This is common 
practice among biologists, since there is as yet no standard terminology with which to 
describe the morphological features of a plant – the choice of terms and emphasis is 
bound to change depending on the use that researchers make of it, as well as their 
disciplinary expertise. For instance, consider the following definitions of the term ‘bud’:  
1. (botany) A small protuberance on a stem or branch, sometimes enclosed in protective 
scales and containing an undeveloped shoot, leaf, or flower. 
2. (biology) An asexual reproductive structure, as in yeast or a hydra, that consists of an 
outgrowth capable of developing into a new individual. 
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 More on this in Chapter 7, section 7.1.  
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3. (medical) The primordial structures from which a tooth is formed.
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The first two definitions are often used by donors to describe parts of Arabidopsis 
specimens, which generates confusion as to what precisely is meant by the description in 
each case.  
 
 
6.1.2 Preliminary Classification: PATO  
 
Given the diversity and ambiguity of descriptions of specimens provided by donors, the 
first thing that NASC researchers have to do when trying to categorise the incoming 
seeds is to re-phrase the description into a standardised description. This task is relatively 
easy in the case of the plant’s genetic make-up, where terminology is more highly 
standardised and NASC can also make use of GO (and other classification tools provided 
by TAIR) in order to adapt the description to a common standard that is universally 
accessible and adds coherence to the NASC storing system. Standardising descriptions of 
the plants’ morphology proves much more problematic, given the great diversity and 
inaccuracy characterising descriptions of plants at that level (as in the example above).  
 
To solve the problem, NASC is developing its own system of classification under the 
name of Phenotype, Attribute and Trait Ontology [PATO]. This system is structurally 
similar to the GO system, insofar as it also exploits the child-parent network 
characteristic of Java programming (like GO, PATO is part of the umbrella project of 
Open Biological Ontologies, as mentioned in chapter 5). The difference between PATO 
and GO lies in the type of concepts as well as the type of relations used in the network, 
which of course depends on the different goals set by each classification system. 
Concepts in PATO are mainly ‘attributes’ describing morphological features of the 
organism in question or ‘components’ of the organism. ‘Traits’ constitute the values 
and/or properties characterising these attributes. For an example of how this preliminary 
classification of plants works, consider the case of a set of seeds arriving at NASC 
together with the following description: ‘Col ecotype, glabrous leaves’. PATO allows 
NASC researchers to assign a value to each component of this description: the entity 
being described (‘leaf’), the attribute being considered (‘pilosity’) and the value given to 
such attribute in the case of this specific Col specimens (‘glabrous’). By assigning a 
precise definition and serial number to all attributes and components, PATO successfully 
standardises the descriptions available for each Arabidopsis specimen, while also 
resolving the ambiguity intrinsic to many of the relevant terms.  
 
Given the anatomical focus of PATO, concepts are classified through a top-down, 
mereological approach starting from the whole organism (‘plant’) and branching out to its 
components (‘fruit’, ‘seed’). Although the same relations are used as in the case of GO 
(‘is_a’, ‘part_of’ and ‘develops_from’), the privileged relation here is clearly the 
mereological relation ‘part_of’, as the descriptions of plants start from the morphological 
level (‘tissue’) and connects it (‘part of’) to relevant components (‘cortex’) (figure 6.1).   
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 NASC website accessed 20 April 2006.  
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Figure 6.1 - Example of how PATO works, as provided by the NASC website (accessed 
20/04/2006). Here the green symbol I indicates an identity relation (‘is_a’), while the 
purple symbol P indicates a mereological relation (‘part_of’). 
 
 
 
 
6.1.3 Cultivation of specimens  
 
Once the seeds are classified according to PATO standards, NASC researchers grow 
plants out of them so as to gather a sufficient quantity of seeds for storage and 
distribution purposes. Like most plants, Arabidopsis can self-fertilise as well as 
crossbreed with other plants. A single plant can produce over 10.000 seeds and each of 
these seeds will have precisely the same characteristics of the ‘mother’ plant, unless the 
plant is fertilised by seeds from another variant (in which case recombination occurs, 
generating an offspring sharing the traits of both parents). Provided that it is cultivated in 
strict isolation, growing Arabidopsis in its haploid mode is the most efficient method for 
multiplying seeds of the same variant. It also allows to check that the description 
provided by the donor is correct and to determine the best conditions for the growth of 
the specimen in question (protocols indicating how to grow each specimen are given to 
prospective users together with the relevant seeds, so as to make sure that plants will 
grow in the same way as in the NASC glasshouse and will therefore have precisely the 
same features and dimensions).  
 
Cultivation is the most labour-intensive phase of specimen production. It includes the 
following processes:  
1. Germination: the seed are sown in a special container facilitating their 
germination (figure 6.2); 
2. Growth: the plants (usually around 25 per type, but sometimes as few as 1 per 
type, depending on the popularity of the variant) are grown in a glasshouse 
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equipped with humidity and temperature control and an isolation system 
preventing cross-contamination (figure 6.3); 
3. Drying: the plants are transferred to a second glasshouse containing ventilators, in 
order to dry them as required for the extraction of seed; 
4. Harvesting: dried plants are squeezed and pulverised in order to gather the seed 
(figure 6.4); seeds are then separated from other plant remains and eventual dirt or 
dust from the glasshouse via a process of sterilisation.  
 
Figure 6.2 – NASC technician sowing a batch of seeds. The number and distribution of 
seeds is gauged by hand. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 - NASC glasshouse for growing specimens (the visible ecotypes are of the 
Lansberg variety, the most popular ecotype for laboratory use together with Col and Ws).   
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Figure 6.4 – Harvesting of seed (before sterilisation) 
 
 
 
 
As noticeable from the photograph depicting the NASC glasshouse (figure 6.3), these 
processes are carried out in controlled environments via tools standardised to that effect. 
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The growth of plants has been automated as much as possible, so as to avoid variations in 
handling deriving from human intervention. On the other hand, this extended automation 
still requires a great amount of manual curation by NASC personnel. No precise 
techniques or tools are used to count or weigh seed, which means that technicians 
evaluate the right amounts to be sown or harvested by reference to their previous 
experience rather than to guidelines or measurements (figures 6.2 and 6.4). It also 
happens that some plants show signs of ill health, due to mishandling, parasites or 
unexpected mutations (generated by unwanted cross-breeding) making plants unable to 
cope with the living conditions enforced in the glasshouse environment. These cases are 
noted and the plants in question are transported to a separate room, where each plant is 
taken care of on an individual basis (figure 6.5).
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Figure 6.5. Refrigerated room where plants in need of special attention are stored and 
cared for. Each of these plants is illuminated, cut and watered according to its present 
needs (as signalled on the yellow reminder stuck on them). 
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 The discarding of plants judged to be ill or anyhow inadequate to the standards set by NASC is a good 
example for the need, by NASC modellers and Arabidopsis researchers alike, to have ‘right tools for the 
job’, as put by Clarke and Fujimura (1992).  
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In sum, NASC researchers need to evaluate the growth rate and conditions of plants, 
intervening in the harvest whenever needed, multiple times per day. They acquire an 
extensive range of performative skills and, more generally, embodied knowledge about 
the plants that they are handling: actually, and despite the attempts to provide as much 
information as possible on how to handle the plants to the prospective user, it is very 
difficult for NASC to convey to others the amount of embodied knowledge accumulated 
by its technicians and researchers.  
 
 
6.1.4 Final Classification, Storage and Distribution 
 
Both the genetic make-up and the morphological features of the plants whose seeds are 
now secured in high quantity are double-checked, in order to ensure that the information 
used to label the seed samples are accurate. Seeds are cleaned and sterilised, after which a 
couple of thousands of them are frozen into the NASC ‘seed archive’ (so that a copy of 
any classified type of seed is always retrievable, no matter how many seeds are 
distributed to Arabidopsis researchers around the world). The rest is stored in 
appropriately labelled sample packages, ready for distribution. 
 
Seeds are put into sterile containers and shipped to the prospective users upon request, 
together with guidelines on how to grow and handle them. Remarkably, TAIR and NASC 
are directly related in this phase, since the TAIR website allows users to order from 
NASC precisely the specimen on which the data visualised through the resource have 
been obtained in the first place. In addition to NASC’s own website, TAIR has therefore 
become a very important portal for ordering NASC specimens – a practical 
demonstration of how close in purpose and organisation these two apparently unrelated 
enterprises really are.  
 
 
6.2 Modeling a Model Organism 
 
The extensive list of interventions required to produce NASC specimens highlights the 
fact that the transfer of Arabidopsis specimens from the wild to the laboratory involves 
more than a change of context (though the latter certainly has great impact on the 
representational value of the specimens). Obtaining specimens that are adequate for 
research purposes requires apposite structures, standardised tools and guidelines, plus 
extensive experience in handling the plants as well as experimenting on them: in other 
words, it is a matter of skilful production, rather than simple displacement. By the time 
that a seed sample is labelled and sent off to a user, researchers have achieved a high 
degree of control over the plants that will grow from those seeds.
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 The PATO 
description summarises and defines which traits the plants are supposed to grow. Those 
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 For instance, the leaf shape characterising the Columbia ecotype is replicated across Col specimens by 
gaining control over their genetic make-up and the environmental conditions under which they are grown 
(the possibility of control is greatly enhanced by Arabidopsis being a self-fertilising organism). 
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traits, which are selected depending on the experimental needs of the scientists using the 
plants, are then reproduced under the material constraints provided by the laboratory 
equipment and the resistance to modification by the organisms. The resulting plants are 
hybrids of ‘wild’ traits and traits that are well controlled by experimenters and thus 
stabilised and reproducible.   
 
To shed light on the significance of this ensemble of practices, as well as to connect them 
with the practices characterising the making of TAIR that I explored in the previous 
chapter, I shall now proceed to compare the epistemic activities involved in the 
production of NASC specimens with the epistemic activities used to produce TAIR 
visualisation tools. This comparison turns out to illuminate a variety of issues concerning 
the modeling of model organisms as well as its significance towards the understanding of 
such organisms’ biology. Indeed, I wish to suggest that both series of activities constitute 
(two different types of) modeling practices. These activities are successful, insofar as 
they result in a wide range of models of specific aspects of Arabidopsis biology.  
 
 
6.2.1 TAIR Images and NASC Specimens: Two Types of Models 
 
The visualisations of data to be found in TAIR constitute exemplary cases of two-
dimensional, visual models of Arabidopsis. They clearly encompass a lot of information 
about specific aspects of Arabidopsis biology – mainly concerning its molecular structure 
and functions. In this sense, they are representative of a series of phenomena. At the same 
time, they are structured by reference to a theoretical framework (the GO) and are 
therefore representative for that framework.
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 Further, this double role does not exhaust 
their epistemological status. By virtue of the specific skills and tools employed in their 
construction, neither of which are necessarily related to the theories and phenomena that 
the models are taken to represent, these images acquire an independent, autonomous 
status from such theories and phenomena: they start a ‘life of their own’ (Morgan 2005, 
318). In this sense, each of this images can be viewed as a mediator between theory and 
the world, according to the interpretation provided by Morgan, Morrison and their 
associates: TAIR images constitute models of specific aspects of Arabidopsis biology.  
 
Interestingly, the multiplicity of these images and the different ways in which they 
portray data about the same phenomenon (as we saw, there can be different visualisations 
emphasising the processes, components or functions associated to each Arabidopsis trait, 
such as metabolism or gene products) do justice to the need for model pluralism that I 
advocated in section 2.2.2. As we saw there, the creation and use of a plurality of models 
of the same phenomenon is not only useful, but actually necessary to its study: each type 
of model captures a different aspect of it, thus contributing to an overall explanation of 
that phenomenon. All of these models have to conform to the level of generality imposed 
by the adoption of GO as a theoretical framework: data visualised in those images are 
first associated with specific GO concepts, then interpreted in the light of the whole GO 
network to which those concepts belong, and only then can they be employed in a 
diagram depicting Arabidopsis microbiology. Thanks to this extensive theoretical 
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 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.2. 
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manipulation, these images have high explanatory power: they do provide a vision about 
how specific data can be interpreted in order to account for the specific feature or 
behaviour of the organism in question. Such a vision allows researchers to envisage the 
potential empirical significance of a theory, without however providing means to test 
whether such potential explanation actually applies to phenomena.
155
 As we saw in the 
previous chapter, a correct reading of such a vision is only possible thanks to adequate 
theoretical skills. Further, biologists willing to exploit the explanatory power of these 
models need to possess relevant background knowledge, both theoretical and embodied 
in kind: they need to know about GO, for instance, in order to learn the theoretical skills 
allowing them to use the models efficiently for their own research purposes; and they 
need to know protocols and guidelines for using specific instruments and research 
techniques, so as to learn the performative skills enabling the application of these models 
to the investigation of the actual phenomena under scrutiny (in this case, the plants). In 
fact, as clearly indicated by Morgan and Morrison, researchers can learn something from 
a model only when they are able to manipulate it and modify it to suit their research 
objectives. In order to handle TAIR images, and thus profit from their explanatory power, 
Arabidopsis biologists need to know what these models are supposed to represent as well 
as being able to think about those representational assumptions and modify them to suit 
their own interests. For instance, a model of Arabidopsis metabolism (figure 5.12) can be 
usefully manipulated when (1) users of the model refer to labels provided by TAIR 
(indicating what different components of the model stand for, as in ‘red triangle = 
protein’) and their own background knowledge on plant metabolism; (2) users possess 
theoretical and performative skills allowing them to play around with the model, handle 
and modify it according to their critical judgement of such labels and background 
knowledge.  
 
A notable feature of this description of TAIR models is that their explanatory power 
springs from background assumptions, labels and concepts used to interpret them, rather 
than through embodied knowledge of the phenomena to which these models refer. Such 
embodied knowledge is, as we have seen in the previous chapter, indispensable to the 
construction of these models and, arguably, to their use: yet, it is possible to manipulate 
the above model of Arabidopsis metabolism and learn something from it without having 
any embodied knowledge (least of all performative skills) of how Arabidopsis plants 
actually develop under varying environmental conditions. In fact, these digital models 
provide little or no feel for the empirical adequacy of the data that they contain: in order 
to evaluate what these images teach us about Arabidopsis biology we need to 
complement them with the embodied knowledge acquired through experimental 
intervention in actual plants. One way to do this is to complement the use of TAIR 
images with other types of models, which would be better suited to account for the 
empirical import of the theoretical suggestions contained in TAIR digital models. As 
indicated by Richard Levins already some decades ago, the combined use of models of 
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 In some cases of theoretical modeling, explanatory power does not even involve potential empirical 
significance. For instance, a mathematically complex model of an evolving population might provide some 
interesting theoretical insights (such as the rate of potential population growth under specified conditions): 
yet researcher using that model might not know how to apply it to any real biological population, as the 
specified conditions favour mathematical elaboration but are actually inexistent within the natural world. 
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different types (such as, in this case, models with high explanatory power and models that 
are empirically accurate) constitutes a convenient trade-off towards productive research 
on biological phenomena. I now wish to propose NASC specimens as a type of model 
that might successfully complement TAIR images towards achieving a specific goal: the 
combined use of these two types of models constitutes a good strategy towards acquiring 
an integrated understanding of Arabidopsis biology.   
 
I shall elaborate this claim in section 6.3. Before doing that, however, I need to examine a 
fundamental premise for this argument: the claim that specimens produced in NASC 
function as models of Arabidopsis. This claim turns out to be trickier and more 
controversial than in the case of TAIR images, and I shall therefore devote the rest of this 
section to it. The epistemic status of the organisms employed as model organisms in 
contemporary biology has been widely discussed by several historians and philosophers. 
It has been argued that such organisms are no models at all, but rather that they are 
simply the materials on which experimental interventions are carried out. Others have 
claimed those materials to be samples of the phenomena under scrutiny and that that does 
not amount to recognising their role as models since, again, ‘real’ science lies in the 
‘abstract’ modeling of these objects.
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 In contrast with these views, I do not think that 
there should be doubts about the representational value of NASC specimens as models of 
Arabidopsis wildtypes. This is because the standardisation and controlled distribution of 
Arabidopsis seeds has a direct impact on the content of the knowledge produced by using 
those plants. As we have seen when surveying the making of NASC specimens, the 
plants are cultivated to preserve specific traits, both at the genotypic and at the 
morphological levels: as indicated in section 6.1.3, plants that turn out not to conform to 
these standards are taken out of NASC glasshouses (and thus of their distribution circuit) 
and they are either destroyed or grown separately from the rest of the harvest. NASC 
researchers acquire a great deal of control over the features of the plants that they want to 
reproduce and distribute to Arabidopsis researchers. This means that the results acquired 
through the study of these plants are tightly linked to their specificity as products of the 
NASC selection process. This makes them at least partially autonomous from the 
Arabidopsis wildtypes festering in the European countryside. NASC specimens have 
been modified to fit some specific theoretical expectation and experimental requirement, 
with the result of producing entities that are at the same time related and partially 
independent of both the phenomena and the theoretical issues which they are used to 
represent and explore: like TAIR images, NASC specimens become mediators between 
theory (including the researcher’s expectations and interests) and the phenomena that 
they embody, that is, Arabidopsis plants.
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 Rachel Ankeny implicitly supported such a view in her (2000; 2001) papers on the modeling of C. 
elegans, where she proposed that what counts as a model of C. elegans in neurological research is what she 
calls the ‘wiring diagram’ representing the neural connections characterising the nematode. As she noted, 
this meant reducing the model organism to an idealised, abstract entity. Ankeny recently responded to my 
critique of this aspect of her work by retracting this idea and providing a much richer analysis in her (2005; 
2006), which highlights both the material and the abstract features of model organisms as models. 
157
 One powerful objection could be levelled against the argument that model organisms constitute models 
for biological phenomena in certain research contexts. This is the idea that what scientists use as models for 
biological phenomena are various components of the organism, rather than the organism as a whole. 
Indeed, most Arabidopsis researchers do not need to examine the whole specimen of the plants they 
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In fact, the representational value of NASC specimens as models often transcends the 
class of weeds to which the original Arabidopsis plants belong. Depending on the goals 
and resources of researchers experimenting on NASC specimens, these models are often 
assumed to hold for all plants, irrespective of the highly controlled conditions in which 
these plants are produced as well as of the huge differences characterising the tens of 
thousands existing species of plants. This is a very important assumption, as it determines 
the representational value of NASC specimens as models: the wide applicability assigned 
to the results gathered from NASC specimens transforms these plants into models of any 
plant. Of course, not all results gathered on Arabidopsis specimens are given the same 
representational value. There are cases where research on NASC plants yields results that 
are taken to hold only for Arabidopsis ecotypes, if only because the applicability of those 
results to other organisms still has to be tested. For instance, plant immunologists are yet 
investigating the significance of their studies of Arabidopsis/pathogen interactions for 
immunological responses in other plants. In other cases, the representational value of data 
acquired through these specimens soars, as for example in the case of recent findings on 
mitochondrial DNA
158
: the validity of these results is taken to extend to all plants and 
animals, including human beings, since plants and animals are assumed to display the 
same molecular mechanisms. It thus becomes apparent that what NASC specimens are 
models of changes depending on the research context in which results acquired through 
experiments on these plants are used.  
 
I should note here that the special representational value bestowed on Arabidopsis in the 
last few years does not in any way imply a belief, on the side of the scientists making that 
assumption, that one plant can indeed be taken as a representative of the whole floral 
kingdom. The current epistemological status of Arabidopsis specimens is, rather, dictated 
                                                                                                                                            
investigate, but only a small sample of tissue or a specific cell culture. It might be argued that, in those 
cases, it is only those specific cells, and not the whole plant, that should be regarded as models of, for 
instance, a given biological mechanism or pathway. I do not see this claim as incompatible with my view of 
model organisms as models. I  agree that, within certain settings, components of Arabidopsis specimens 
can be usefully regarded as material models of specific biological phenomena (they are what Arabidopsis 
biologists call ‘model systems’; interview with Sue Rhee, 18 August 2004). However, there are very good 
reasons for regarding whole plants as material models, too, especially when the phenomenon that is 
modelled is a complex one, involving various plant components and different levels of biological 
organisation. When ‘producing’ Arabidopsis specimens, NASC technicians have three ways of modifying 
their traits to fit the expectations of Arabidopsis researchers: the first is to modify their genome via 
interference through Agrobacterium or knock-out experiments; the second is to breed them as required to 
obtain specimens with the desired features; and the third is to control their development by controlling the 
environmental conditions in which they grow. In fact, there is no known way to produce components of the 
plant independently of the rest of the organism: what NASC technicians aim at reproducing are the 
morphology and genotype of whole plants, not their singular components, precisely because those 
components are working together in ways that are not yet understood. Taking a whole plant as a model for 
a given phenomenon (for instance, a transcription mechanism) means retaining awareness of how several 
parts of that model at different levels of organisation (e.g. enzymes, RNA, proteins, cells) may interact in 
order to produce that phenomenon. In biological research, it is increasingly important to consider the 
organism as a whole in order to understand any one phenomenon characterising its biology (good examples 
of this being the epigenetic regulation of gene silencing and plant responses to environmental stress, such 
as responses caused by pathogens or changes in temperature).  
158
 See review by Millar et al (2004). 
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by the practical necessity of focusing research efforts on one organism. In fact, 
Arabidopsis researchers – not to mention biologists working on other model organisms – 
do not hesitate in indicating the many phenomena that Arabidopsis cannot be 
representative for.  These include, for instance, RNA interference (injecting RNA into 
embryo to see what happens), which can be done on petunias but not on Arabidopsis
159
; 
homologous recombination (which is better done on yeast); and several studies of plant 
pathogens, which would require an organism with a much longer life span than 
Arabidopsis.  
 
This recognition does not take anything away from my argument that these plants 
constitute models of (often very broad) classes of organisms. In fact, I argue that the use 
of highly standardised Arabidopsis specimens, rather than specimens with different 
characteristics or of a different species, has great bearing on the outcomes of research on 
plant biology: the handling of NASC specimens, rather than natural variants, has a strong 
influence on the procedures adopted to work on the plants, as well as on the results 
obtained from such research and their interpretation. One way to illustrate this point is to 
look at how mistakes in the procedures used to produce NASC specimens can affect the 
use of specimens as models and, as a result, the biological knowledge derived from them.  
 
Consider the case of C24, an ecotype that enjoyed a brief but high popularity among 
Arabidopsis researchers at the end of the 1980s. Sean May, the director of NASC, defines 
this case as an ‘example of what could happen when you don’t have a stock centre’ 
supervising the production and distribution of seed.
160
 C24 acquired a good reputation as 
a very easily transformable ecotype in the 1980s and was thus privileged over Lan when 
it came to experiments involving mutagenesis. Importantly, it was classified as a mutant 
of Col (hence the ‘C’) and results obtained in reference to it were interpreted accordingly. 
Upon further research, however, it became clear not only that all main ecotypes were 
easily transformable (thus eliminating the main reason for the popularity of C24), but that 
the putative identity of C24 as a mutant of Col was altogether a mistake. A study of its 
flowering time alleles reveals that C24 and Col are polymorphic, and thus do not share a 
common heritage (Sanda and Amasino 1995, 2). C24 turned out to be a descendent of the 
wildtype Coimbra, which has been wrongly classified because someone had written down 
its name in an illegible handwriting (“Coimbra’ thus turning into ‘Columbia’). This 
mistake in classification did have consequences for research. Researchers were insisting 
on the use of C24 because of its (non-existing) genotypic closeness to Col, despite strong 
evidence that C24 had strong disadvantages to its use as a model for other plants. The 
most serious among those was its being carrier of two mutations that, when separated by 
interbreeding, produced late flowering – in other words, that transformed weed into 
cabbage! Following the uncovering of C24’s real identity, several experiments carried out 
and interpreted on the assumption that C24 was similar to Col had to be re-examined and, 
in some cases, discarded. Arguably, this seemingly blatant misunderstanding survived 
well into the 1990s precisely because, when C24 was initially adopted, the Arabidopsis 
stock centres did not yet have the function of checking upon the lines used by 
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 The reasons for this are unknown to biologists, one of whom remarked to me that ‘it’s meaningless to 
ask why, actually, it’s like asking why it is so easy to transform Arabidopsis’.  
160
 Interview, 16 May 2005. 
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researchers. In the absence of an institution devoted to such double-checks, errors of this 
kind are all too likely to be perpetuated in biological literature (which is often focused on 
the production of new data rather than on the verification of old ones).   
 
Other types of problems can be caused by mistakes in devising protocols and tools for the 
cultivation of plants in the laboratory. An instance of this is the slowness in improving 
strategies and tools that ensure that plants of different strands can be grown in the same 
room without risks of cross-contamination. Back in the 1980s, specimens of a single 
strand were grown on gravel in 25 exemplars per strand, and plants of different ecotypes 
would be separated from each other by plastic walls. This solution turned out to be both 
space-consuming and risky because contamination could still happen through the air. The 
next step was then to cultivate only one plant per strand (which would anyway produce 
thousands of seeds by itself), grow them in separate pots and isolate them from the 
environment by attaching a stiff tube of plastic to the base of the pot, which would reach 
up to thirty centimetres over the maximal height of the plant. This second solution was 
also a failure: while efficient in shielding contamination by circulation of seeds in the 
atmosphere, the tube did not allow plants to grow to their full potential (especially 
Columbia specimens, which are much shorter than Landsberg erecta and whose leaves 
are round and big, needing more horizontal extension). Sean May came up with a better 
technology by thinking about ways of packaging flowers in supermarkets and florist 
shops. NASC now uses ‘zwapak flower sleeves’, a type of plastic bag exported from a 
Dutch flower shop, which is efficient in shielding contamination, flexible enough to let 
the plants breathe and grow to their full potential, and can even be bent and crushed at 
will for a better germination and easier harvesting of seeds (figure 6.6). Even those, 
however, have some problems: when I visited the NASC glasshouse, some of the packs 
had been bent by the ventilation system and actually crushed the plant – not an 
encouraging sight, when considering that each pot constitutes the unique sample of a 
whole mutant line (figure 6.7).  
 
Figure 6.6 – Pots isolated by zwapak flower sleeves. Note that the specimens in the pots 
are already dried out and ready for the harvesting of the seeds. 
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Figure 6.7 – Flower sleeves crushed by the ventilation system. The risk is then for seeds 
of the plants contained in the pots to disperse and mix with seeds from other plants. 
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6.2.2 The Ambivalence of Specimens as Models 
  
From these examples, it becomes evident how the specific traits of NASC specimens (as 
grown via appropriate handling and cultivation procedures) are influential to the 
production of biological knowledge on plants, since those exact traits are assumed, by 
homology, to represent traits in several other (often widely different) organisms. 
The latter example also illustrates the extent to which the handling and growth 
environment of specimens influences their features. By increasing their expertise on the 
maintenance of plants that best fit their purposes, NASC researchers acquire a great deal 
of control over the plants’ morphology and growth. Arabidopsis is not alone in this 
respect: most widely used model organisms present characteristics that are rarely, if ever, 
found outside of the lab. In his illustrious study of Drosophila melanogaster, which also 
highlights the high degree of control acquired by geneticists over the fruit flies, Kohler 
uses this point to argue that model organisms are, in fact, artefacts of biological research. 
He claims that, as in the case of Arabidopsis specimens, laboratory organisms are 
reproduced and modified under such controlled and purpose-oriented conditions that they 
end up bearing little resemblance to their relatives in the wild: their features have been 
largely reshaped by scientists according to their research interests - a fact which, in 
Kohler’s eyes, signals that laboratory organisms should be considered as artificial 
products of human interventions rather than samples of nature (Kohler 1994).  
 
Kohler’s point, if taken seriously, has great consequences for the representational value 
of model organisms as models. The idea of model organisms as samples of nature is often 
used to justify the representational value of those organisms with respect to their relatives 
in the wild: the idea that experimental manipulation might compromise such 
representational value is not contemplated, as it would nullify the scope (and thus, the 
significance) of the results of research carried out on them. Given this context, Kohler’s 
suggestion is valuable and provocative, because it forces biologists to put into question 
the extent to which model organisms actually represent organisms growing outside of the 
laboratory. This is a highly contested issue in model organism research, as I briefly 
mentioned above and in chapter 3. I already highlighted the dubious epistemological 
status of model organisms research, insofar as the obvious advantages of being able to 
accumulate knowledge on just a few organisms might be outbalanced by the lack of 
justifications for extending the applicability of such knowledge to the millions of species 
that are only related to those models through common descent. It is important to keep in 
mind that the very idea of producing NASC specimens for distribution across the globe 
has deep roots in microbiology and especially in molecular biology. Ecologists and even 
some developmental biologists are sceptical of the possibility to study the huge diversity 
characterising organisms on the basis of a few exemplars. This approach is favoured by 
microbiologists, who argue that the ‘basic’ mechanisms of genetic transmission, 
biochemical processing (such as involved in cellular communication and metabolism) 
and cell biology are common to most organisms. Even when admitting the validity of this 
argument (which has itself been contested), it displays a strong bias in favour of 
molecular biology in the context of model organisms research. Having several specimens 
of the same ecotype is useful to investigate mechanisms and micro-structures common to 
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all plants; it is much less useful in investigating ecological features, such as comparing 
the development of different ecotypes under the same environmental conditions. Thus, 
the special representational value assigned to NASC specimens over and above natural 
variants has been extensively criticised by ecologists and other biologists interested in 
natural variation among Arabidopsis species. These scientists argue that reliance on 
standardised and controlled specimens of plants prevents researchers from taking into 
account the influence of the environment, cross-fertilisation and specific ecological 
niches on the structure and development of Arabidopsis traits (Alonso-Blanco and 
Koornneef, 2000). By pointing to the number of Arabidopsis features that are not 
representative for plants in general, opposers of the use of NASC specimens agree with 
me that these plants are used as models of plant biology: in fact, they criticise this use as 
unjustified and potentially misleading, insofar as the representative value attributed to 
these models is often too broad (‘all plants’ rather than ‘this specific family of 
Arabidopsis ecotypes’).  
 
In this thesis, I do not wish to take sides in this debate. There is a simple reason for this 
choice: I do not think that research on NASC specimens should be condemned, just as I 
do not think that it is useful for any type of investigation in plant biology. Of course, for 
the purposes of comparative research (especially involving ecological aspects), the use of 
standardised specimens is bound to be misleading rather than helpful, since the 
manipulation of specimens aims at reducing the natural diversity among them. What I 
wish to emphasise here is that there is a strong sense in which NASC specimens are very 
useful models in order to enhance the biological understanding of plants: that is, there is 
an undeniable sense in which they are actual samples of the phenomena that they stand 
for, rather than artefacts produced to represent those same phenomena (as Kohler would 
have it). NASC specimens are, after all, actual organisms: entities that we could not hope 
to create from scratch in a laboratory (despite many attempts in this direction, e.g. 
robotics), precisely because we do not know, and understand but a minimal part of, their 
functioning. Organisms, even when highly controlled as in the case of NASC models, 
retain a mysterious quality that is crucial to their role in the laboratory: they are actual 
samples of the very phenomena that they stand for. As I emphasised in my description of 
modeling activities carried out at NASC, popular model organisms used in actual 
laboratories, such as Arabidopsis, go through an extensive process of preparation. In this 
sense, the organism selected to be a ‘model organism’ is certainly not a random sample 
taken out of its natural environment. The transition from natural to laboratory 
environment is accompanied by a series of modifications of the organism itself. The 
process of preparation of an organism for experimental use consists precisely in a 
selection of traits that researchers wish to focus on (and thus, to stabilise and control). On 
the other hand, these traits are parts of a whole material organism – an organism that is 
partly ‘built’ to fit research purposes, but that preserves components that are untamed and 
sometimes even unknown to researchers. It is important to keep in mind how model 
organisms are not only typical of a phenomenon, but also ‘are’, to an extent, the 
phenomenon itself.  
 
This intuition is well illustrated in the following passage from Keller’s discussion of the 
role of model organisms in biological research: ‘unlike mechanical and mathematical 
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models (and this may be the crucial point), model organisms are exemplars or natural 
models - not artifactually constructed but selected from nature's very own workshop’ 
(Keller 2002, 51). While I disagree on Keller’s outright rejection of Kohler’s point, I 
welcome her attempt to re-focus on the features of model organisms that make them into 
a special, and indeed precious, type of model in experimental biology. How to put 
together these two, apparently opposing, insights about the nature of model organisms as 
models? My view is that we should recognise the ambiguous status of model organisms – 
which are taken to be at once samples of nature and human artefacts, abstract and 
material entities, known and unknown phenomena – as precisely the feature that makes 
them such interesting and important objects in biological research. Model organisms are, 
indeed, models of the ‘untamed’ class of organisms of which they are a sample (and can 
even be taken as representatives for a much wider class of organisms, as in the case of 
Arabidopsis plants becoming representative for all plants in certain research contexts) – 
and yet, they are highly domesticated samples, whose handling and traits are so familiar 
to the researchers employing them as to become ‘tame’, that is, subject to control by 
those researchers. In fact, work on model organisms implies a reciprocal domestication 
of scientist and phenomenon: the scientist learns to handle and know the phenomenon by 
modifying it, so that the phenomenon itself adapts to such handling by changing some of 
its distinctive features.
161
  
 
Oddly, perhaps, the best illustration for this process of reciprocal domestication does not 
come from philosophy but from literature.
162
 In his famous story about the Little Prince, 
Antoine Saint-Exupery devotes a chapter to describing the blossoming friendship 
between the prince and a fox. The fox asks the prince to be tamed. Upon the prince’s 
question ‘what does that mean.. tame?’, the fox replies: 
 
"It is an act too often neglected," said the fox. "It means to establish ties. [..] 
To me, you are still nothing more than a little boy who is just like a hundred 
thousand other little boys. And I have no need of you. And you, on your 
part, have no need of me. To you I am nothing more than a fox like a 
hundred thousand other foxes. But if you tame me, then we shall need each 
other. To me, you will be unique in all the world. To you, I shall be unique 
in all the world. . ." (Saint-Exupery, ch.12) 
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 Harré (2003) also uses the notion of domestication to describe model-researcher interactions. However, I 
take distance from his account, within which the term domestication is used to define a specific type of 
simplification (ibid., 28), rather than the more complex processes of standardisation and abstraction 
(leading to actual modifications in the nature and properties of the object at hand) that I consider here.  
162
 The intuitions underlying the notion of reciprocal domestication are the same underlying the biological 
mechanism of co-evolution. Donna Haraway attempts a philosophical discussion of co-evolution when 
considering the ontologies of companion species (such as dogs and cats), which she defines as ‘figures of a 
relational ontology, in which histories matter; i.e. are material, meaningful, processual, emergent and 
constitutive’ (2003, 69). She does not, however, explicitly analyse how such co-evolution of humans and 
other life forms happens, nor its consequences (particularly in a context such as model organism research). 
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The fox goes on to argue that taming occurs by iterative encounters, during which the two 
parties get to know each other and acquire habits (‘rites’) through which to interact with 
each other. The acquisition of these habits changes the way in which both parties behave: 
just like, in the constrained environment and standard practices characterising 
interactions in the laboratory, the repeated encounters between scientist and phenomenon 
results in modifications of the features and behaviour of both. It is precisely these 
modifications that allow for reciprocal knowledge: the plant learns to respond to certain 
instruments and tools (such as the Agrobacterium inducing mutations), while researchers 
learn to observe and manipulate plants so as to obtain the expected results.
163
 Organisms 
functioning as models are both found and produced; and both their selection and their 
production require the research community that employs them to acquire an appropriate 
ethos, structures and resources.
164
 Plants thus become models of a specific phenomenon 
and/or issue, while biologists acquire the embodied knowledge required to handle the 
model. This results in the balanced mixture of the natural and the artificial that 
characterises model organisms as models. As a sample, model organisms such as NASC 
specimens are highly domesticated so as to become representative of a whole class of 
organisms (including other variants of Arabidopsis, as well as many other plant species); 
yet, they are only partially an artefact of human intervention. 
 
Reciprocal domestication accounts for the combination of natural, induced and projected 
features that I listed as characterising model organisms in chapter 3. Further, the 
procedure of reciprocal domestication echoes Latour’s ideas about the representational 
status of laboratory results: findings obtained through the study of phenomena brought 
into a laboratory do not tell anything about nature outside of the laboratory, since natural 
phenomena can only be brought into an experimental setting through substantial 
intervention on (and thus modification of) their original features (Latour 1988). On the 
other hand, my framework does not deny that laboratory findings might provide us with 
an understanding of ‘untamed’ nature: in fact, I do think that studies of model organisms 
can yield results that are applicable to plants living in the wild. What I am pointing at is 
the necessity to acknowledge the ‘artificial’ nature of the models employed in the 
laboratory (including model organisms) in order to evaluate their representational value 
with respect to natural phenomena. The representational value of these model organisms 
lies precisely in the ambivalence characterising their epistemological status.
165
 NASC 
specimens are, on one hand, produced and marketed by a group of researchers in order to 
represent some specific features of Arabidopsis biology - such as for instance the 
genotypic sequence embodied specifically by the Columbia ecotype (a sequence that is 
not, or anyhow rarely, shared by other Arabidopsis ecotypes). They are artefacts, in the 
                                                
163
 Of course my use of the verb ‘learning’ here is partly metaphorical, as learning for plants is in many 
ways a very different process than for humans.  
164
 The importance of community ethos has been argued also in the case of Drosophila: 'standard flies were 
not just the means of experimental production but also the bearers of a distinctive moral economy and a 
distinctive way of experimental life'  (Kohler 1994, 168). Without some communality of ethos, funding 
sources and communication tools, the skills and networks needed to produce and distribute Arabidopsis 
specimens would not exist: I come back to this point in chapter 7. See also Leonelli (2006).   
165
 I here interpret the term ambivalence etymologically: the term comes from the Latin valent, meaning 
valuable, and ambi, meaning ‘in two ways at once’.  
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sense of being selected and bred so as to classify as a ‘normal’ specimen of a specific 
class of organisms. At the same time, they are actual samples of those organisms, thus 
retaining much of the mystery and wilderness of their undomesticated relatives – that is, 
the several types of weed infesting European and North-American countryside and cities. 
This latter feature allows researchers to use these organisms for exploring, and eventually 
discovering, aspects of Arabidopsis biology that are yet unknown.
166
 
 
 
6.2.3 A Second Look at ‘Abstract’ Models 
 
Given the ambivalence of NASC specimens as models, what can we say about their 
features, especially when comparing them to the features characterising TAIR images? A 
first temptation would be to declare, with Kohler, that the features of these models are 
purely material: they are three-dimensional entities whose epistemological value is 
determined by the possibility, on the side of researchers, to physically intervene in them. 
This notion of ‘material model’ has become a popular topic in the philosophy of biology, 
thanks to the work by Griesemer (1990), de Chardaverian (2003) and Rheinberger 
(1997): yet, disagreement remains on which features of these models, if any, are abstract. 
The problem springs from the fact that, in order to be models at all, these material models 
have to be representative of a broader class of organisms and representative for a set of 
issues or processes: these attributions of representativeness are in themselves abstract 
qualities, since they are not material features of the models, but they are endowed on 
them by the researchers. While developing my views on the ambivalent – and, hence, 
valuable – status of model organisms as models in biology, I have come to regard the 
debate on whether certain types of models possess material and/or abstract features as a 
peculiarly unfruitful way to analyse the epistemological advantages characterising the 
handling of models. The notions of abstraction and materiality are treated as essential and 
often incompatible attributes of specific models: the recognition of a model as ‘abstract’, 
for instance, is supposed to tell us a lot about its characteristics and the way in which it is 
used in order to obtain scientific understanding. Yet, there is no consensus within the 
relevant literature on what it means for a model to be abstract: in fact, I can list at least 
three (arguably contrasting) intuitions underlying the use of the term ‘abstract’ as an 
attribute of models.
167
  
 
One such perspective concerns the extent to which models are embodied in objects that 
can be perceived via our senses. In this first sense, the adjective ‘abstract’ figures as the 
opposite of ‘concrete’ and ‘material’: something is abstract when it is not tangible and/or 
visible, as in the case of a mental construct or an imaginary object for instance. This is an 
absolute notion: there are no ‘degrees’ of abstraction, as an entity is either tangible or not. 
According to this interpretation, neither TAIR images nor NASC specimens are abstract, 
                                                
166
 Rheinberger’s analysis of experimental systems resonates with this second epistemological role of 
Arabidopsis specimens, when he notes that ‘[experimental systems] are not simply experimental devices 
that generate answers; experimental systems are vehicles for materialising questions’ (Rheinberger 1997, 
28). 
167
 My list is not supposed to be exhaustive, but rather to give an idea of the confusion underlying the use of 
the term ‘abstract’ in the discussion of modeling practices.  
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since they are both embodied into an image on a computer screen (the former) and an 
actual organism (the latter).  
 
A second interpretation concerns the amount of information conveyed by a model with 
regard to its empirical import or applicability, that is, the way in which it relates to the 
phenomena that it is taken to represent. Thus, a model is the more abstract, the more it is 
devoid of physical meaning.
168
 Note that this notion of abstraction admits of degrees, 
which can be measured by the amount of additional information needed for a model to be 
applicable to the analysis of a particular phenomenon. This second intuition conflicts 
with the previous one both in its motivation and in its implications. There is a clear 
difference in the amount of additional information needed to relate TAIR models to the 
appropriate component of Arabidopsis plants, as compared to NASC models (which are 
as highly endowed with physical meaning as possible, being actual samples of the plants 
themselves). To understand the empirical content of TAIR images, one needs to refer 
heavily both to GO categories and to the object-oriented approach to the organisation of 
data (as well as, in some cases, the circumstances and experiments yielding the evidence 
incorporated within each image). In this respect, TAIR images can rightly be claimed to 
be abstract, and certainly to be more abstract than NASC specimens.  
 
The third sense in which a model can be abstract refers to the number of particular 
phenomena that it is taken to represent.  Even more strongly than in the previous case, 
‘abstract’ is here a relative notion whose application depends on the context: a model is 
the more abstract, the more specific situations it can be taken to represent.
169
 This means 
that a description is abstract insofar as it can be ‘fitted’ to a number of other descriptions, 
which are therefore defined as ‘less abstract’ or ‘more concrete’ (Cartwright, 1999). 
According to Cartwright, something ‘abstract’ does not differ from something ‘concrete’ 
in an absolute, or qualitative, sense. The two notions are continuous and the 
characterisation of a model as abstract or concrete depends largely on its specific context 
of use.
170
 In this third perspective, both NASC and TAIR models can be thought of as 
very concrete or very abstract, depending on the research goals of the scientists handling 
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 This is true of symbolic representations, such as a mathematical formula, for instance: it does not 
contain indications as to how it can be applied to actual phenomena. See Cat (2001) for an exploration of 
this notion of abstraction in relation to Maxwell’s work.  
169
 This sense of abstraction is similar to Radder’s definition of abstraction as ‘summarising’, which he 
identifies (and goes on to criticise) as one of three main senses in which abstraction works (2006, 110). 
Note, however, that while his analysis applies to abstraction as a whole, I am here focusing on abstraction 
as used to produce models.  
170
 It should be noted that Cartwright’s discussion could be read as applying primarily to scientific 
discourse, and thus to symbolic or linguistic representations. This is because she does not explicitly 
consider the link between her notion of ‘concrete’, as applying to descriptions, and a notion of ‘concrete’ 
denoting a degree of materiality. However, even if Cartwright’s account is supposed to apply to non-
tangible entities such as concepts and sentences, the second intuition about abstraction creeps back into her 
examples of abstract versus concrete descriptions. Consider her classic example of the notion of work, 
which she takes to be an abstract notion with respect to the many different activities that it can be used to 
describe (such as cleaning dishes, marking exams, drilling a hole in the wall). There is a strong sense in 
which the sentence ‘I am doing work’ is abstract with respect to the sentence ‘I am marking exams’ insofar 
as it is largely devoid of physical meaning. The sentence ‘I am marking exams’ conveys a different type of 
information with respect to ‘I am doing work’: it indicates a material way in which I move, think and 
manipulate objects. 
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them. Prima facie, NASC models qualify as very concrete models, since they are only 
representative of the specific class of Arabidopsis ecotypes defined by their specific 
morphological and genetic make-up. However, many molecular biologists use a specific 
ecotype as a representative of any Arabidopsis variant - or even, in some cases, of any 
plant or living organism. In this latter case, NASC models are highly abstract. Similarly, 
the TAIR image of a metabolic pathway can be taken to represent any similar metabolic 
pathway found on any organism – thus ‘fitting’ a large amount of particulars. The same 
image can also be taken to represent a pathway typical of Arabidopsis plants, or even of a 
specific ecotype of Arabidopsis. In this latter case, the degree of abstraction 
characterising the TAIR model is lower than in the former.  
 
These three intuitions about abstraction are often conflated in philosophical accounts of 
abstract models.
171
 This is understandable, since all three contain a reference to the 
different meanings assumed by the term abstraction in common language (as well as by 
scientists themselves).
172
 However, they spring from three very different philosophical 
concerns: the first, more ontological, with the extent to which entities are embodied; the 
second, epistemological, with the extent to which models contain information about how 
they apply to phenomena; and the third, also epistemological, with the extent to which 
models can generalise over and/or be used independently from particular contexts. As 
illustrated above, the difference in concerns underlying the three intuitions results in 
conflicting diagnoses of which models are abstract and in which ways and contexts. The 
conflation of these three notions of abstraction can prove uninformative, or even 
misleading, when uncritically used to characterise the differences in representational 
value among types of models.  
 
I do not wish to argue that an analysis of model features as abstract and/or material would 
not be fruitful to a better understanding of their epistemological status, as well as of the 
value of the findings acquired through using those models. Yet, I am not interested in 
carrying out such an analysis here. Rather, I would like to propose a shift of perspective 
in the philosophical discussion of abstraction as characterising modeling practices: that is, 
from a view of abstraction as an attribute of models to a view of abstraction as an activity 
required for their production. 
 
 
6.3 Skilful Abstracting 
 
6.3.1 Abstracting to Model 
 
I intend to address the debate on what it means for a model to be abstract by focusing on 
the processes required to produce a model. This implies a shift from thinking of 
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 See, for instance, Ankeny’s ambiguous use of the notion of ‘abstract entity’ (2000, S264-6). Ankeny 
takes descriptive models of organisms (such as the wiring diagram representing C. elegans neurons) to be 
abstract in at least two of the senses suggested in my analysis. The wiring diagram model is: a. 
disembodied (it has no physical correspondent in any one specimen, since it is supposed to abstract over 
any specifically individual character in order to acquire generality) and b. widely representative (having 
broad representative value with respect not only to worms but to any simple metazoan nervous system).    
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 For a philosophical reflection on common-sense notions of abstraction, see again Radder (2006).  
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abstraction as a property of models (‘abstract’ as an attribute) to considering abstraction 
as an activity that is necessarily performed in order to produce models (the verb ‘to 
abstract’ as a way of acting) – a shift which, as I shall argue, throws light on the 
epistemic skills required to handle them in order to gain understanding of the natural 
world. I therefore wish to view abstraction as the activity of selecting some features of a 
phenomenon P, as performed by an individual scientist within a specific context, in order 
to produce a model of (an aspect of) P. In other words, I define the process of abstracting 
as involving the transformation of some features of a phenomenon into parameters used 
to model it, as relevant to the specific aspect of its biology that the model is deployed to 
study. For instance, in the case of Arabidopsis plants, abstracting means picking a limited 
set of properties of Arabidopsis wildtypes and use them as parameters to produce a 
specimens of Arabidopsis that always incorporates these features. A NASC specimen 
with these characteristics can then be employed to investigate and understand specific 
aspects of plant biology. In the case of TAIR images, instead, abstracting means selecting 
the aspects of the phenomenon that TAIR curators wish to model; interpreting the 
relations among those aspects in the light of a given theoretical framework (GO in this 
case); and producing a digital image containing symbolic representations of those aspects 
as well as suggesting how they might be connected with each other.  
 
Defined in this way, abstraction is one of the processes required in creating a model, 
rather than an attribute of the model itself (the model thus being ‘abstracted’ in various 
ways depending on the specific circumstances and epistemic goals, rather than ‘abstract’ 
in an absolute sense). Further, it is an essential process in the context of modeling 
practice, as it is the process by which all types of models acquire a representational value 
with respect to some aspects of a phenomenon. As I shall illustrate, theory can play 
different roles in this process: the selection of features of P can be entirely based on 
theoretical assumptions (and thus make no direct reference to actual observations and 
interactions with P) or it can be largely independent of any theory, as it is based purely on 
a researcher’s proto-explanatory exploration of P. I shall now illustrate how this applies 
to TAIR and NASC modeling practices. In the sections that follow I focus on the 
epistemological insights offered by this perspective on abstraction.  
 
In the case of TAIR, abstracting is performed when selecting data resulting from an 
experiment in order to construct a two or three-dimensional visualisation of those data 
and the connections among them, relative to a specific component or process (such as a 
gene function or a metabolic pathway). NASC specimens are also abstracted from 
Arabidopsis wildtypes, insofar as they have to display specific sets of features of such 
wildtypes (such as a glabrous leaf surface), which are chosen on the basis of their 
relevance to research purposes as well as the extent to which they can be realised in a 
plant and replicated in others under controlled conditions. In both cases, then, abstracting 
is a crucial activity involved in modeling. Yet, it is carried out in markedly different 
ways. Abstracting as performed in TAIR implies selecting features of Arabidopsis 
genetics, biochemistry and cell biology by assessing their relevance to the interpretative 
framework that is (tentatively) used to study the entity or process under scrutiny. The 
main concerns underlying the production of TAIR images are their explanatory power, 
internal consistency (determined by reliance on the GO framework) and aesthetic value 
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(simplicity and legibility), rather than the degree to which their parameters capture the 
relevant features of the plants. In other words, TAIR modellers prioritise an accurate 
rendition of the relations among elements of the model over an accurate rendition of the 
empirical meaning of these elements as represented. In visualising a metabolic pathway 
(figure 5), the emphasis is on the type of relation linking elements such as aminoacids 
and carbohydrates in order to enable metabolic processes. It is of secondary importance, 
within these models, whether the little triangles representing aminoacids and the little 
squares representing carbohydrates tell us something about the actual composition and 
structure of these substances as found in real plants. In this sense, abstracting towards 
TAIR images is largely an intellectual activity: it is theory-guided, geared towards 
explanation and requiring no physical contact with the phenomenal properties to be 
abstracted. I thus refer to it as intellectual abstracting. 
 
In the case of NASC, abstracting is aimed at the material replication of features of the 
plants, whose stability across experiments and laboratory settings is a necessary condition 
to their representational value. The epistemic priority of NASC modellers is to maintain 
control over the development of traits characterising different ecotypes, thus ensuring the 
reproducibility of specimens as well as their non-locality (that is, the stability of their 
features regardless of the time and location of their use).
173
 NASC researchers select 
specific features of the phenomena that they wish to model by reproducing these features 
across different generations of specimens: abstracted features of Arabidopsis plants are 
thus features characterising the morphology, physiology and genetic make-up of 
standardised specimens such as the Col (e.g. glabrous, round leaves, short stems, short 
life-span). This is realised mostly by modifying the growth environment and disposition 
of the plants: that is, by ensuring that they are sown and germinated in the best possible 
conditions (e.g. with enough space, water and humidity) and by growing them in isolated 
containers under artificially regulated light. Direct interventions in the plants themselves 
are also involved, in case they manifest undesirable or unexpected traits and when 
preparing the seed for storing and distribution. Here, abstracting does not imply 
establishing relations among given data about the plant by reference to specific 
theoretical frameworks (or, less generally, to actual explanations, as in the case of the 
explanatory powerful TAIR images). Abstracting involves focusing on the material 
features of the plants that need to be reproduced across specimens grown all over the 
world. This type of abstracting is performed by physical interaction between the 
researchers and the phenomenon to be modelled and is thus based largely on perceptually 
acquired knowledge about the phenomenon. While background theoretical knowledge is 
certainly involved (abstracting is theory-informed, as evident from the use of 
organisational concepts in PATO), it does not determine the activities and results of 
modeling (abstracting is not theory-guided). To emphasise the contrast with what I called 
intellectual abstracting, I refer to this type of activity as material abstracting.  
 
A possible objection to this way of reading the processes involved in the production of 
material models is to question the label ‘abstraction’. Are these not processes of 
standardisation, that is, of constructing consensus around rules governing the production 
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 A detailed analysis of the notions of reproducibility and non-locality (in patterns as well as meanings) in 
the context of experimentation can be found in Radder (2003) and (1996, 2, 35-36). 
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of objects (Bowker and Star 1999, 13)? And if so, what is the use of referring to them as 
ways of abstracting? Some of the procedures that I list as part of the abstracting process 
are indeed determining standards (for instance, by establishing and enforcing criteria to 
define a plant as pertaining to a specific ecotype, or as being adequately grown in view of 
performing experiments). However, considering standardisation alone does not help in 
confronting questions about the epistemological value of material models. In other words, 
I am here interested in the production of representations rather than in the representation 
of production processes: thinking about abstraction in models means thinking about how 
models come to be representative of specific phenomena or issues, and with which 
consequences. 
 
The distinction between intellectual and material abstracting immediately points to the 
different kinds of skills required to produce, handle and interpret models thus obtained. 
As clearly demonstrated in the cases of NASC and TAIR, modeling, no matter which 
types of activities it involves, is not carried out in a vacuum. Modeling activities are 
performed by particular individuals in a given context and with the help of specific 
instruments and tools, all of which factors impose material constraints on the way in 
which models are realised as well as on the type of biological understanding that can be 
achieved through handling them. As remarked in the previous chapter, researchers cope 
with the material constraints dictated by models themselves (as well as the context in 
which they are produced) by acquiring skills that enable them to handle models correctly, 
depending on the circumstances. The very adequacy of models as representations of 
natural phenomena is determined by the skill with which they are produced and handled 
as much as it depends on the features of models themselves.  
 
As anticipated in Chapter 5, it is usually the epistemic community within which a 
scientist works that determines which skills should be exercised, and how, for a modeling 
activity to be judged as adequate. In producing NASC models, one needs to know how to 
handle plants, isolate them from each other, make sure they germinate and grow properly, 
regulate thermostats and ventilators and harvest seeds. TAIR modeling requires the 
ability to use a computer, type on a keyboard, write programmes in Java-script, search for 
relevant data by accessing specific databases on the internet or emailing/calling up the 
researchers responsible for them, and so forth. These are what I called performative 
skills. Then we have theoretical skills, like the ability to fit one’s perception of a plant’s 
morphology into PATO categories, or the application of the concept of ‘gene product’ to 
specific sets of data operated in TAIR. Further, there are social skills involved – such as 
the capacity to argue convincingly and intelligibly for the validity of a specific 
visualisation tool, as TAIR researchers do when presenting their work for evaluation at 
Arabidopsis conferences and meetings; or the co-ordination among technicians and 
researchers that is required for maintaining the NASC glasshouse and advertise NASC 
guidelines and distribution mechanisms to prospective users. I will say more about this 
last type of skills in the next chapter. The next two sections are dedicated to an analysis 
of the interaction of performative and theoretical skills in the two cases of intellectual 
abstracting and material abstracting.  
 
 
 174
6.3.2  Intellectual Abstracting and Theoretical Skills 
 
Let us examine more closely the cases in which model manipulation and abstracting 
happens largely conceptually. In those cases, the main goals for the manipulation of the 
model are the testing, elaboration or illustration of a given theory about the phenomenon 
that is modelled. The goal is, in other words, to uncover ways in which a model can be 
representative for a given theory. The choice of the parameters used within the model is 
thus characteristically informed by a well-defined hypothesis about the theoretical 
outcome that the model is supposed to illustrate, test, predict and/or elaborate. This is 
because we start from a theoretically informed ‘prepared description’ of the phenomena 
under scrutiny. The term ‘prepared description’ was introduced by Cartwright, who 
defines it as ‘presenting the phenomenon in a way that will bring it to the theory’ 
(1983,133). A description of Arabidopsis microbiology constructed with the help of GO 
categories constitutes a good example for this. Importantly, Cartwright also argues that 
‘the check on correctness at this stage is not how well the facts known outside the theory 
are represented in the theory, but only how successful the ultimate mathematical 
treatment will be’ (ibid.). Substitute ‘mathematical’ with ‘conceptual’ and this statement 
becomes applicable to the construction of TAIR images, in which, as we have seen, 
internal coherence and conceptual clarity have priority over the relations between models 
and the plants that they are meant to portray. Thus, according to Cartwright, the 
properties of the phenomena that are abstracted in order to be represented in the model, 
are properties that are either more causally relevant or more general (less context-
dependent) than others: both generality and causal relevance are assessed in the light of a 
given theory.  
 
The use of intellectually abstracted models is increasingly widespread among biologists. 
Take mathematical models, whose crucial role in the establishment of the ‘Modern 
Synthesis’ in the 1920s and 30s (Mayr and Provine, 1980), resulting in the birth of a 
whole discipline relying on statistical methods of analysis (i.e. population genetics), was 
only a prelude for their growing application across almost all biological disciplines. Even 
more evident is the pervasive use of simulations and algorithms to visualise empirical 
data, not to mention the push towards formalisation and away from the laboratory 
brought about by the increasing use of bioinformatics to store, organise and integrate 
data. These models are especially useful for elaborating explanations or confirming 
predictions stemming from given hypotheses (they are what Cartwright calls 
interpretative models in her 1999, p.181). They are also fundamental to the integration of 
biological knowledge concerning specific phenomena (as, for instance, bringing together 
insights from physiology, molecular biology, functional genomics and cell biology in 
order to understand root development in plants). However, precisely because of their 
strict reliance on theoretical assumptions, models constructed through intellectual 
abstracting are not the best of epistemic tools in cases where the goal of their 
manipulation is to improve the empirical content of a theory. They do not help with 
testing the empirical (descriptive) accuracy of the relation it stipulates between 
theoretical terms and aspects of the phenomenon.  
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This characterisation of intellectual abstracting does not leave doubt as to the importance 
of theoretical skills in order to successfully accomplish this activity. As we have seen in 
chapter 5, TAIR curators are devoted to creating models with high explanatory power. 
Accordingly, they exercise and value theoretical skills over and above the performative 
skills needed to handle the plants from which data are obtained. While working at TAIR, 
almost all curators are forced to forgo their experimental work and in fact they rarely 
acknowledge their expertise in handling plants as relevant to the construction of TAIR 
visualisations.
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 Their educational background is also geared towards theoretical skills, 
as the overwhelming majority of TAIR researchers have been trained in developmental 
biology (that is, the branch of life sciences that embraces most elements coming from 
other disciplines – such as physiology, evolutionary and molecular biology – and thus has 
sophisticated theoretical tools at its disposal for studying complex biological processes).  
 
What about performative skills then? Skills relating to the handling of Arabidopsis plants 
are, as I already illustrated in 5.4, important to the interpretation of TAIR models and 
their use towards acquiring understanding of Arabidopsis biology. On the other hand, 
precisely because these skills play a minor role in the construction of TAIR images (and 
thus the abstracting of their properties), it is possible to handle these models without 
possessing this type of performative skills: only IT skills, involved in accessing and 
handling digital models, are required. Curiously, this latter type of performative skills is a 
prerogative of TAIR programmers, rather than TAIR curators. This sub-group within the 
TAIR research team specialises in bioinformatics rather than actual biology and thus 
lacks the theoretical skills required to making sense of the models that they develop. At 
the same time, their performative skills are crucial to the realisation of TAIR models. The 
division of labour between curators and programmers generates problems for TAIR users 
needing to handle TAIR images for their own purposes: to this aim, biologists need the 
theoretical skills used by TAIR curators (and thus need to be acquainted with the GO 
framework) as well as the performative skills characterising the work of TAIR 
programmers (without which it is difficult to gain access to models to start with, not to 
mention to manipulate them as generally required by researchers).   
 
The dominant role of theoretical skills, as well as the relegation of a great part of 
performative skills to technicians rather than biologists, shows how TAIR models are 
largely intellectually abstracted: their features are selected on the basis of a given 
theoretical framework (the GO) and in response to the research interests expressed by the 
prospective users of those images. The emphasis on producing models with high 
explanatory power does, however, diminish their empirical content, as the increased 
theoretical significance is gained at the expense of materially abstracted features within 
the model. This is a typical trade-off situation among the various epistemic values that 
models can possess, as described by Levins and mentioned in chapter 2. I am now in a 
position to explain the necessity of a trade-off between explanatory power and empirical 
content of models in terms of the skills involved in abstracting them. In the case of 
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 This does not mean that they do not recognise their embodied knowledge, as acquired through 
experimental work, as crucial to accomplishing their tasks (as I discussed in section 5.2.3). Rather, it 
indicates that TAIR curators bestow little attention to this aspect of their work: they recognise it and are 
able to discuss it, but only when they are explicitly questioned about it.   
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intellectually abstracted models such as TAIR images, the performative skills required do 
not concern the handling of plants themselves (thus, the interaction between biologists 
and phenomena): rather, they concern the building of images that conform to the ‘vision’ 
devised by TAIR researchers though reference to their theoretical skills. Theoretical skills 
thus play a primary role in the construction of TAIR images, to which performative (IT) 
skills are subsidiary: the activity of abstracting is largely intellectual, thus generating 
models with high explanatory power but low in empirical content. Let us now see how 
materially abstracted models can complement intellectually abstracted ones, namely by 
adding empirical content to such theory-rich representations.  
 
 
6.3.3 Material abstracting and Performative Skills 
 
When thinking about the type of description needed to model a phenomenon, Cartwright 
proposes to focus also on ‘unprepared descriptions’. These are descriptions that (i) 
‘contain any information we think relevant, in whatever form we have available’ and (ii) 
‘are chosen solely on the grounds of being empirically adequate’ (1983, 133). As an 
example, consider the free-text descriptions of Arabidopsis morphology provided to 
NASC by donors of specimens. These descriptions provide a lot of empirically adequate 
information, yet are not phrased in ways useful to NASC researchers in order to grow and 
categorise models. To that aim, the descriptions have to be ‘prepared’, i.e. modified and 
standardised through PATO.  
 
I consider Cartwright’s account of unprepared descriptions as a fruitful recognition 
(contra more traditional accounts of modeling that insist on referring to theoretical 
physics as a ‘role model’ for all other sciences) that the testing of theories need not be the 
starting point of investigation in experimental science. What we witness in experimental 
biology is the use of several types of models that are not built to verify or extract 
predictions from a given theory. Their use is unavoidably guided by background 
knowledge and a commitment to the investigation of specific conceptual issues. Yet, the 
background knowledge needed to formulate a question should not be confused with the 
knowledge produced by trying to answer it. In preparing a description, scientists rely on 
an already formed hypothesis about how to answer a given theoretical question. The 
manipulation of unprepared descriptions, by contrast, does not require the choice of a 
specific interpretation to start with. That is to say that the manipulation of models 
sometimes requires no more than a general interest in exploring one or more aspects of 
the phenomena that they are taken to represent. In fact, and here I part company from 
Cartwright’s 1983 account and I move into her revised 1999 framework, there are cases 
in which the unprepared description of a model is constituted by diagrams, objects or 
even samples of the phenomenon itself. NASC specimens themselves are a case in point: 
these organisms are taken to be representative of a set of phenomena (amounting, 
depending on the research context, to ‘all plants’, ‘all flowering plants’, ‘all weeds’ or 
‘all other Arabidopsis ecotypes’), in the sense of being used to explore which properties 
of the phenomenon could turn out to be relevant to a theoretical account of it. Thus the 
model provides the epistemic access to phenomena that is necessary in the first place, in 
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order to infer the kind of unprepared description that Cartwright is talking about.
175
 
Epistemic access is granted first and foremost by material manipulation and abstracting, 
since the amount of intellectual manipulation and abstracting necessary to handle these 
models is minimal. The theoretical framework that they are representative for does not 
need to be specified in order for scientists to use them, since it will eventually be 
developed through other, complementary forms of modeling. 
 
Contrary to my characterisation of models produced through mostly intellectual 
abstracting, models derived through material abstracting belong to a ‘proto-explanatory 
context’ (Ankeny 2001). In such a context, scientists not only have not agreed on a 
theoretical explanation of the phenomena under investigation, but have not even settled, 
yet, on which properties of those phenomena could be relevant to the explanation (a 
decision that is crucial to the building first of an unprepared, then of a prepared 
description, thus enabling the shift from largely material to largely conceptual 
manipulation - and back). Such models are often tangible objects like scale models, 
samples, robots or, most emblematically, model organisms, which the scientists interact 
with through their sense perception.
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 As illustrated in section 6.2, the ambivalent nature 
of materially abstracted models such as NASC specimens constitutes one crucial reason 
for their effectiveness as exploratory tools. Griesemer stresses this aspect when declaring 
that 'material models are able to serve certain sorts of theoretical functions more easily 
than abstract formal ones in virtue of their material link to the phenomena under scientific 
investigation. [..] They are robust to some changes of theoretical perspective because they 
are literally embodiments of phenomena' (1990, 80). It is the degree to which materially 
abstracted models represent phenomena independently of a theory that makes them, in 
my view, take a substantially different epistemological role with respect to intellectually 
abstracted models as characterised above. This is illustrated by the performative skills 
refined by researchers in order to abstract their material features.  
 
To NASC modellers engaged in material abstracting, performative skills are essential to 
abstracting reproducible features of the plants, as is evident from the crucial step 2 of the 
procedure (‘cultivation of specimens’). NASC researchers select which aspects of 
Arabidopsis plants should be abstracted largely by experimenting with the plants and 
seeing which of their features can be reproduced in a stable and predictable way under 
laboratory conditions. The features of the plant that are abstracted within NASC 
specimens are those over which researchers hold some degree of control: the features 
that, through specific performative skills acquired by iterative handlings of the plants, can 
be reproduced across generations of specimens. A case in point is the skill, exemplified in 
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 Cartwright herself recognised this in her most recent work and thus distinguished these ‘representative 
models’ from interpretive ones (1999, 180). Morgan also emphasises the explorative role played by models 
in her (2003) and (2005).  
176
 A scale model or an organism might seem far too complex an object to play a representational role: yet 
interacting with it - feeling, choosing, discarding and comparing its characteristics (whether implicitly or 
explicitly) – often leads scientists to consider alternative explanatory frameworks, precisely because of the 
dynamic nature of their features. On this point, see also Giere (1999), Magnani (2001) and Polanyi (1958). 
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section 6.1.3, to recognise plant ecotypes and discard those whose characteristics do not 
conform to the expectations of researchers (figure 6.5).
177
  
 
The fact that performative skills represent a primary means to perform material 
abstraction is reflected in the background and skills of researchers hired to produce 
NASC models. Researchers working in the NASC laboratory and glasshouses need an 
educational background as technicians and/or experimentalists. NASC director Sean May 
values researchers with good material skills and a practice-oriented approach much more 
highly than he does appreciate theory-directed scientists whose focus is on explaining, 
rather than acquiring, data (such as the ones working at TAIR; pers. com.). There is 
relatively little place for theoretical skills in the abstracting of NASC specimens: they are 
exploratory tools, whose features are not chosen because they fit a specific theoretical 
framework or skill, but rather because they are easily transformable through mutation and 
thus can be used to verify the effects of various kinds of experimental interventions in the 
plants (this is certainly the case, for instance, with the Lan ecotype of Arabidopsis). 
Researchers who need to handle specimens need first and foremost the relevant 
performative skills, as acquired in their own laboratory experience or, in part, through 
protocols and guidelines about how to handle plants divulgated by NASC. PATO 
descriptions might be viewed as bringing some theoretical input into the abstraction 
process. Their use in the making of NASC specimens requires theoretical skills such as 
acquaintance with bio-ontologies, knowledge of the PATO descriptions that apply to the 
description at hand and the ability to restructure the donor’s description along PATO 
lines. Yet, these theoretical skills are as subsidiary to performative skills characterising 
NASC practice as the performative skills employed in the abstracting of TAIR models 
are subsidiary to the theoretical skills of TAIR curators.   
 
Performative skills are part of the embodied knowledge gathered by biologists who 
conduct actual experiments on Arabidopsis plants: they are one reason why material 
experiments on organisms are very difficult (if not impossible) to substitute with virtual 
experiments performed on digital reproductions of those organisms – the latter being far 
less efficient than the former in enabling biologists to coordinate their theoretical 
knowledge with embodied knowledge of the phenomena under scrutiny. Current attempts 
to carry out biological research on purely theoretical, or even digital, platforms (such as 
TAIR) are bound to provide a limited understanding of biological phenomena, precisely 
because these activities do not help acquiring the performative skills needed to make 
empirical sense of the theoretical knowledge therein contained. Biologists need to 
intervene in organisms in order to understand their functioning. This is true of 
Arabidopsis plants as, I expect, it is true of fruit flies, mice, rats and even monkeys. This 
remark is not meant to justify all experimental practices on animals and plants. I agree 
with animal right activists that much of this research is futile, since it is often carried out 
for scientific goals of little import (such as skin-tests commissioned by the cosmetic 
industry), as well as unnecessarily cruel, insofar as it shows little concern for the animals’ 
welfare (animals are kept in deplorable conditions and are often made to suffer far more 
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 I here follow Radder (2006) in suggesting that observation is an epistemic activity to be performed 
skilfully, as there are different ways in which a scientist can observe and different conclusions can be 
drawn from the same observation.  
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than strictly necessary for achieving the given research goals). However, I do want to 
point to the irreplaceability of such research in biology. Unfortunately for the animals, 
there is no way in which the use of model organisms as models in biological experiments 
can be replaced by the use of other types of models.
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6.3.4 Skills in Abstracting: Indispensable and Inseparable 
 
I have been arguing that, while noting the different degrees of materiality or abstraction 
embodied by NASC and TAIR models is not particularly informative towards clarifying 
their role in acquiring understanding of phenomena, the distinction between conceptual 
and material abstracting of models allows us to note the different skills required in order 
to handle them. Experimentation on actual plants allows biologists to learn things that 
they would not learn by consulting TAIR or running a few simulations of plant 
development. They do not only acquire performative skills: they also learn what the 
plants are like, what are their structure, texture and responses to specific handlings, what 
is their response to the environment and specific parasites. All of this knowledge, which I 
defined as embodied knowledge, informs and complements the performative skills 
acquired in order to handle the plant. Through exercise of these skills, biologists use their 
embodied knowledge of a phenomenon to intervene in the phenomenon itself.  
 
As is evident from my analysis so far, the gap in values, training and skills privileged 
within the NASC and TAIR research teams is so strong as to generate intellectual and 
social tensions between them.
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 This reflects the striking difference between the types of 
skills accompanying different types of abstraction processes. At the same time, the 
distinction between material and intellectual abstracting does not in any way preclude 
recourse to performative skills to perform intellectual abstraction, nor does it preclude 
recourse to theoretical skills to obtain material abstraction. Abstracting as operated in 
TAIR can be said to involve performative skills, insofar as it requires researchers to 
physically fumble around alternative visualisations of the same set of data and categories 
(as I pointed out, TAIR modeling involves manual curation to a large extent).
180
 
Abstracting towards NASC models also implies several theoretical skills: the way in 
which specific traits of plants are categorised is partially conceptual, as exemplified by 
the reference to PATO networks of concepts (which are themselves, however, much less 
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 Note that questions about the extent to which animals or plants can be representatives for other species – 
especially humans – is not confronted here. It constitutes an entirely different issue, which I have no 
interest in tackling within this context. What I want to discuss here is not whether the representative value 
of model organisms, as attributed by the research community using them, is justified. Rather, I focus on the 
conditions under which model organisms become models and thus contribute to biologists’ understanding 
of phenomena that they are assumed to represent.  
179
 Both groups argue that their approach to modeling is better than the other’s, an attitude that does not – 
thankfully - entirely prevent their collaboration, but that signals the extent to which their modeling 
strategies differ. These tensions have become especially clear to me through conversation with Sue Rhee, 
the director of TAIR, and Sean May, the director of NASC. More on this point in Chapter 7. 
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 A relevant difference between manual curation of NASC specimens and TAIR images is, however, that 
NASC specimens are, at least in part, samples of the very phenomenon that they are meant to represent – 
thus, material abstracting involves manipulation of the phenomenon to be abstracted as well as of the 
model, while intellectual abstracting does not involve handling the phenomenon to be represented.   
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theoretical than the GO framework, since they are constructed in order to describe the 
morphology of specimens – ‘glabrous’, ‘leaf’ - rather than in order to capture the 
meaning of notions used to describe processes, such as ‘metabolism’ or ‘pathogeny’). 
Indeed, the intertwining of performative and interpretive skills to perform any type of 
abstracting is unavoidable: as demonstrated by recent results in cognitive science, even 
the most conceptual and rationalistic human activity always implies physical interaction 
with the world. All human actions, including the ones aimed at producing scientific 
knowledge, are necessarily both embodied and reflexive. This means a constant interplay 
between theoretical and performative skills, which enables researchers to coordinate their 
theoretical knowledge with their embodied knowledge in order to understand a specific 
phenomenon. The example of TAIR and NASC models in Arabidopsis research usefully 
illustrates this point. The role played by TAIR models towards their users’ understanding 
of Arabidopsis biology is greatly enhanced by these users’ experience with largely 
materially manipulated models, such as NASC models.
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 That both TAIR and NASC 
recognise this is evident from their agreement to make NASC databases searchable in 
TAIR, as well as from TAIR recommendations to its users to order the NASC seed of the 
recommended variety in order to test or further an existing set of data.  
 
 
6.4 Modeling to Understand 
 
The main goal of this chapter has been to illustrate, by comparing activities carried out at 
TAIR and NASC, how the coupling of theoretical and embodied knowledge achieved 
through modeling practices might bring about an understanding of the biological 
phenomena being modeled. Modeling activities are a striking case of this as well as an 
important one, given the prominence of such practices in biological research. The focus 
on the epistemic skills required when abstracting and handling models has hopefully 
highlighted the importance of embodied knowledge to the acquisition of a biological 
understanding of phenomena. As I argued in Chapter 2, theoretical knowledge needs to 
be complemented by embodied knowledge in order for researchers to make sense of the 
aspects of the natural world that they are studying. The ability to manipulate and, to a 
certain degree, control a phenomenon is essential to acquiring biological understanding: 
without this ability, biologists would not be able to single out features of a phenomenon 
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 My claims about the necessity of theoretical and embodied skills in order for users to make sense of  
TAIR categories and datasets, which I also emphasised in Chapter 5 when addressing the embodied 
knowledge involved in interpreting TAIR results, run against an argument proposed by Anne Beaulieu 
(2001) in her study of the role of digital modeling and database construction within the neurosciences 
(which, as she recounts, bears remarkable similarities to digital resources and informatics in the biomedical 
sciences). Beaulieu insists on the valuable features of integration through digital tools, thus buying into the 
idea (much publicised by curators directly involved in making these tools) that ‘neuroinformatics foster 
large-scale sampling and automated processing – remote from the individual as embodied object or subject’ 
(2001, 661). Beaulieu’s fascination with these practices leads her to propose the digital manipulation and 
integration of data as a path towards ‘a new digital objectivity’ (2001, 664). As evident from my analysis so 
far, my view on the value of bioinformatics is not as rosy: while also appreciative of the advantages 
provided by the new digital tools, my study of the theoretical and performative skills involved in using 
these tools shows that researchers using them always require personal input and interpretation. Their 
contribution to integration in the biomedical sciences can thus hardly be described as guaranteeing 
objectivity through automation.   
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that are relevant to explaining its behaviour; to apply their theoretical concepts to the 
observations that they make; or to coordinate their thoughts and actions in the 
reproducible way that characterises scientific understanding and makes it one of the most 
interesting results of human cognitive abilities.  
 
Scientific understanding requires both interaction with the phenomena to be understood 
and reflection upon their features: performative skills play the crucial role of granting 
access to various features of the phenomenon and determine which ones can be subjected 
to experimental studies; theoretical skills allow to reflect on those features, classify them 
on the basis of a theoretical hypothesis or framework, and determine inferences from 
those features to an explanation of the functioning/behaviour/structure of the 
phenomenon at hand. In short, biologists value knowledge that they can efficiently use in 
order to understand phenomena. Skilful modeling does not only require, but actually 
enhance researchers’ ability to use theories, protocols and other types of theoretical and 
embodied knowledge towards the understanding of a specific phenomenon. This 
constitutes the essence of what I called ‘coordination of knowledge’ in Chapter 2. In the 
same chapter, I also indicated how, in the case of understanding through modeling, such 
coordination needs to be both skilful and efficient: ‘skilful’, in the sense hitherto 
discussed of requiring expertise; ‘efficient’, in the sense of allowing researchers to 
understand the phenomenon that they intended to study in ways that are coherent with 
their previous knowledge and understanding of related phenomena (and, thus, coherent 
with the research goals that they set out to accomplish). My analysis of TAIR and NASC 
modeling practices has amply illustrated how different types of modeling activities 
require different combinations of skills in order to be adequately performed. As I argued 
in Chapter 5, such skills are indispensable to acquiring and coordinating the knowledge 
(both theoretical and embodied) that grants understanding of the phenomena being 
modeled. Here is thus a first important link between modeling and understanding. The 
use of a variety of models requires researchers to learn and exercise several theoretical 
and performative skills. These skills are potentially helpful to the pursuit and acquisition 
of biological understanding, depending on the specific phenomena to be understood as 
well as on the kind of understanding sought by researchers.
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I now wish to highlight another way in which epistemic activities involved in 
constructing and handling models crucially contribute to a researcher’s understanding of 
a biological phenomenon: modeling provides grounds on which to identify knowledge 
that is relevant towards the understanding of a given phenomenon. This is a very 
important feature, as the knowledge of the natural world possessed by researchers trained 
for scientific inquiry is usually extensive: finding which parts of such knowledge – 
whether theoretical or embodied – are relevant to understanding the specific phenomenon 
under scrutiny is one of the most difficult tasks to be accomplished by biologists. 
Relevance can be established according to two main criteria: (1) the extent to which that 
knowledge fits the properties of the phenomena at hand (and allows researchers to 
manipulate them, whether conceptually or materially); and (2) the extent to which that 
knowledge serves the research goals and interests pursued by researchers.  
 
                                                
182
 More on kinds of understanding in Chapter 8, section 8.3. 
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Concerning (1), I have discussed how modeling via skilful abstracting constitutes a 
particularly efficient way to match properties of a phenomenon with specific parts of the 
theoretical knowledge possessed by a researcher. Selecting the features of the 
phenomenon that are to be abstracted involves selecting, at the same time, theoretical and 
embodied tools through which these features can be identified. For instance, modeling a 
metabolic pathway means matching data about the molecular structure of nutrients in a 
cell with terms that describe and classify those structures (such as amino acids, proteins, 
carbohydrates and so forth). The visual representations of metabolic pathways produced 
by TAIR allow to check and improve on the fit between theoretical knowledge and 
empirical data, In this sense, modeling enables researchers to fit data to interpretations, as 
well as to use those interpretations to guide their interventions on phenomena. Further, 
modeling allows researchers to distinguish knowledge that they wish to hold as an 
undisputed premise of their research (so-called ‘background knowledge’) from 
knowledge that they are prepared to test, challenge or modify as a consequence of their 
findings. The construction of GO is a good example of this: by building GO, TAIR 
curators have effectively established the theoretical boundaries within which Arabidopsis 
researchers, especially those working on molecular biology, ought to work. The 
importance of distinguishing knowledge used as a premise from knowledge that is to be 
tested was evident in my analysis of material abstracting, where I pointed to the use of 
theoretical knowledge as a platform from which to ask questions, rather than as a 
resource with which to formulate tentative answers. In a similar way, the goal of 
intellectual abstracting is not to acquire new embodied knowledge or challenge the 
performative skills already gathered, but rather to use that embodied knowledge as a basis 
for pursuing theoretical hypotheses and thus further existing theoretical knowledge. 
Without basic and undisputed assumptions, beliefs and habits (many of which are 
acquired through socialisation and training, as I shall discuss in my next chapter), it 
would be impossible to attribute a representational value to models: what a model stands 
for depends both on its features (which constrain the manner in which the model can be 
usefully manipulated) and on the research context in which it is used. Similarly, which 
aspects of a phenomenon are understood (and how) is determined as much from the 
modeling of the phenomenon as from the way in which researchers formulate their 
questions about the phenomenon (which in turn depends on their research goals and 
background knowledge).
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Let us now turn to the second criterion for relevance, that is, the necessity for each 
researcher working in a specific community to adhere, at least in part, to the epistemic 
culture of that community, including its interests, goals and values. The knowledge 
acquired and used by an individual scientist to research a phenomenon is extremely 
specialised and highly conditioned towards the areas of knowledge already selected as 
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 In Chapter 8 I shall come back to these points and their significance towards an analysis of 
understanding. In particular, I shall focus on the commitments under which research is being carried out. In 
section 5.5 I argued that the same phenomenon can be understood in different ways by researchers 
equipped with different combinations of epistemic skills. In fact, such pluralism depends not only on skills, 
but also on the different commitments to specific concepts, gestures, theories and perspectives that skilful 
actions such as the ones involved in modeling might bring about. ‘Relevant’ knowledge identified through 
skilful modeling can actually become the object of such a commitment, if it becomes entrenched in 
scientific inquiry to such an extent that it is not anymore subject to extensive critical scrutiny. 
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relevant by the community within which such research is carried out. This means that the 
interests, goals and values characterising that community play a role in selecting the 
knowledge that is to be considered of relevance to understanding a specific phenomenon. 
In fact, the very skills used to model phenomena are formed through appeal to 
knowledge, interests and values that transcend individual experience. They are shaped by 
participation in one or more scientific communities: the ‘right’ type of understanding, 
that is the one fulfilling the expectations, goals and questions posed when starting 
research on a phenomenon, is determined as much from individual researchers’ 
experiences in handling and modeling that phenomenon as it is shaped by the social 
context within which research is conducted and evaluated. In the next chapter, I shall 
therefore turn to the relevance of the social dimension to the acquisition of biological 
understanding.  
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Chapter 7. Community Matters 
 
In a very real sense, we create knowledge when we give 
it to more people. And the acquisition of the ‘same’ 
piece of knowledge by every new person will have a 
distinct meaning and import within that individual’s 
system of beliefs. When it comes to knowledge, 
dissemination is a genuine form of creation  
Hasok Chang 2004, 243 
 
In the previous two chapters, I focused on how an individual biologist might understand a 
phenomenon by skilfully coordinating theoretical and embodied knowledge as relevant to 
this aim. Yet, as I discussed in section 2.3.1, the skilful and efficient manner by which 
such understanding is obtained is not enough to qualify it as scientific (or, more 
specifically, biological). In order for understanding to be recognised as scientific, the 
biologists acquiring it need to be able to communicate their insight to their peers, so as to 
make it vulnerable to public scrutiny and evaluation. Individual understanding becomes 
scientific only when it is shared with others, thus contributing to the growth of scientific 
knowledge and partaking in the rules, values and goals characterising scientific 
research.
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Of course, the interpersonal communication of biological understanding looks like a 
paradoxical requirement, given my definition of such understanding as the cognitive 
achievement of an individual scientist, based on his or her own experiences, skills and 
knowledge. And in fact, I do not wish to argue that individuals can disseminate their 
understanding of a phenomenon in an unmediated, direct way – that is, for instance, by 
talking to other individuals. I want to propose that individuals possessing a specific 
understanding of a phenomenon might enhance other individuals’ chances of acquiring it 
in an indirect manner: that is, by constructing tools (including, for instance, models, 
explanations, experimental set-ups and materials) that will enable other individuals to 
learn and exercise skills in ways that might eventually lead them to experience the same 
kind of understanding. This type of indirect sharing of understanding characterises both 
the acquisition and the dissemination of understanding in scientific communities. On the 
one hand, biologists seeking an understanding of a phenomenon are required to learn as 
much as possible from similar efforts by other scientists, so as to use the understanding 
accumulated by others as a vantage point for starting their own research. On the other 
hand, biologists who already understand a specific phenomenon are required to contribute 
to the body of theoretical and embodied knowledge available on that phenomenon in 
ways that will help other scientists acquiring the same insight. I argue that the social 
processes through which biological understanding is acquired and disseminated have a 
strong impact on the features of such understanding, One way to analyse such impact is 
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 Other types of understanding besides scientific understanding might also require dissemination and/or 
discussion among different individuals. What I want to stress here is that, in order to be classified as 
scientific, understanding needs to be shared within a scientific community. Only under this condition does 
understanding a phenomenon count as scientific, no matter how interesting or useful it might be otherwise.  
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to focus on a third category of epistemic skills that is involved in the acquisition of 
scientific understanding, that is the category of social skills.  
 
This chapter is dedicated to a reflection on social skills and their role towards the 
acquisition of understanding. In the case of Arabidopsis research, such reflection involves 
an analysis of the ethos and structure of the Arabidopsis community as well as of the 
relations of epistemic dependence existing among individuals and/or groups within and 
outside the community (7.1). This analysis of the social organisation of Arabidopsis 
research, which I identify as a case of centralised big science, will bring me to list the 
social skills without which it would be impossible, for individual members of the 
community, to understand aspects of Arabidopsis biology in a way that can be shared by 
other members of the same community (7.2). This is, on the one hand, because 
individuals need to use social skills in order to be trained and constantly updated on the 
theoretical and embodied knowledge accumulated in the community: as I explain in 
section 7.2.1, exposure and participation to one or more scientific communities provides 
researchers with at least some of the theoretical and performative skills that they require 
in order to understand the aspect(s) of Arabidopsis biology that they are interested in. On 
the other hand, the exercise of social skills is paramount also in order to share individual 
understanding with the rest of the community, thus making it open to constructive 
criticism and eventual improvement (and therefore transforming it into a contribution to 
the growth of the established body of scientific knowledge). As I illustrate in section 
7.2.2, it is possible for a researcher to learn to build theories, models, explanations and 
observations so as to make it easier for other individuals to understand a phenomenon in 
the same way as he or she did.  
 
The significance of this series of claims will be discussed in the last two sections of this 
chapter, where I shall use my view to evaluate a philosophical view previously proposed 
to make sense of the constraints posed by community dynamics to the making of 
scientific knowledge. This is Helen Longino’s account of the norms that a community 
needs to follow to produce what she calls ‘epistemically acceptable’ knowledge (7.3). I 
shall conclude that, while providing a rich and informative perspective on the relevance 
of socialisation to scientific knowledge, Longino’s disregard for the issues relating to 
understanding leads her to omit some crucial elements, which results in a weakening of 
her whole approach. Through this example, I hope to illustrate how my analysis of 
scientific understanding can illuminate new aspects of some long-standing debates in the 
philosophy of science, especially within the area of social epistemology.   
 
 
7.1 Epistemic Dependences 
 
Dear Aunty Raby,  
I am 24 days old and really desperate. I still 
haven’t flowered and my rosette leaves are beginning to 
die. Do you think it’s my appearance? Why do maize 
plants have all the fun? Please help me before I 
introgress myself. 
Erica Erecta 
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Dear Erica, 
Don’t worry! See a specialist. I recommend 
genetic counselling. You may have an inherited 
mutation. Why not try 10?m gibberellic acid, it’s a 
wonderful pick-me-up. I always find it helps.  
Aunty Raby 
 
‘Agony Column’ from Rabido, the Fifth Arabidopsis 
newsletter, July 1991 
 
The international newsletters circulating around the Arabidopsis community at the end of 
the 1980s, when communication among members was still dependent largely on paper 
rather than on digital tools like email and the internet, represent an excellent source for 
the historian trying to reconstruct the early history of research on this organism. They are 
rich of information concerning the groups participating in Arabidopsis research, the 
increasing coordination of their research efforts and the astonishing growth of results 
harvested from studying this plant. A particularly striking feature of these newsletters, 
which testifies to the friendly atmosphere in which the Arabidopsis community 
developed (at least in the United States and the United Kingdom), is the wealth of extra-
scientific material with which they are filled: jokes, cartoons and caricatures (such as the 
‘Agony Column’ reported above) abound among those pages, with researchers 
contributing even some (rather atrocious) poetry and recipes centred on Arabidopsis. That 
so much enthusiasm, energy and creativity was invested in the writing of a newsletter – 
that is, a means of communication of no academic prestige whatsoever
185
 - is a telling 
signal of the importance of inter-personal ties and shared values in the development of 
Arabidopsis research.  
 
An even more significant factor pointing to the uncommonly friendly ethos characterising 
the Arabidopsis community is the ease and openness with which researchers used the 
newsletters as an informal platform for exchanging results and insights at the pre-
publication stage. This is an exceptional occurrence, especially given that most 
Arabidopsis researchers involved in the community at the time were molecular biologists. 
As narrated in chapter 3, molecular biology has been a very competitive field for over 
four decades now: researchers working on other organisms usually refrain from sharing 
their results for fear that other researchers might steal and publish them beforehand, thus 
gaining all recognition. This competitive system is enhanced by the tendency by sponsors 
to consider the number of publications issued by any one laboratory as an absolute 
measure of the quality of research conducted there: funding is given to the groups that 
publish the most, thus making researchers even more defensive of their results and 
cautious of the possibility that others might steal them or publish similar data beforehand. 
Such caution engenders a lack of collaboration among biologists and especially among 
different research groups working on similar phenomena. This is damaging to the quality 
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 Articles published in newsletters, as well as all the rest of the work needed to organise and publish them, 
are not usually recognised as a valuable component of a researcher’s CV: in fact, they are mostly seen as 
distractions from conducting ‘real’ research and preparing more valuable publications. This is despite the 
enormous importance of these means of communication to enhance the internal cohesion and information 
flow within a research community (a function well recognised within the Arabidopsis community).  
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of the research produced, while also enhancing the risk of different groups working on 
the same phenomena with the same objectives and tools without being aware of it – thus 
wasting resources and time that could be spent on other, more fruitful projects. The ethos 
of the Arabidopsis community, which TAIR director Sue Rhee aptly characterises 
through the motto ‘share and survive’, constitutes a surprising exception in this 
context.
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In fact, allegiance to this surprisingly cooperative ethos has played an important role 
towards transforming the Arabidopsis community from a little group of like-minded, 
young researchers to one of the largest cases of centralised big science in contemporary 
biology. As shown in chapter 3, the close personal ties among the founders of the 
community, as well as their wish to enforce and maintain an ethos of openness and 
collaboration among researchers working on Arabidopsis, were crucial to the success of 
Arabidopsis as a model organism and to its adoption by so many laboratories around the 
world. Those research groups were not only attracted by evidence showing the 
advantages of using Arabidopsis, rather than other plants, for experimentation: it is not so 
clear that those advantages were decisive in choosing a species of weed over plants of 
more obvious agronomic interest (such as yeast, rice or tomatoes). A strong incentive for 
new participants to Arabidopsis research was the common ethos enforced across the 
community, its highly centralised structure and the ease with which it seemed to attract 
funding (three factors which I referred to, respectively, as ‘social commitment’, 
‘institutional organisation’ and ‘funding sources’ in section 3.2.3). It is therefore on these 
three characteristics that I would like to focus now, placing particular attention on the 
types of epistemic dependence that they enforce in the Arabidopsis community (and thus, 
their impact on the tools and interests employed by researchers in their quest to 
understand Arabidopsis biology).  
 
 
7.1.1 An Ethos of Accessibility  
 
Each one of the 5000 laboratories working on the model tackles questions concerning 
Arabidopsis biology with a unique and specialised combination of skills and expertise. 
Thus it is impossible to define Arabidopsis research as centring around a specific 
methodology, a unified research programme or a disciplinary approach. Even the 
instruments used in the community tend to vary. For instance, researchers working within 
the subdiscipline of molecular biology employ tools ranging from microarrays and 
affimetrix (i.e. sophisticated and expensive new techniques allowing to track gene 
activity across whole gene clusters) to classic sequencing and chromosome analysis. 
Surely, reference to the same object – Arabidopsis plants – is the main factor bringing all 
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 It could be argued that the peculiar nature of the Arabidopsis community ethos greatly diminishes its 
representativeness with respect to other model organism communities in biology, thus weakening the scope 
and applicability of my philosophical analysis. Of course, it is true that the social organisation of the 
Arabidopsis community is more of an exception than the rule within biological research. I am convinced 
that, for the purposes of my analyses, this is actually an advantage rather than a disadvantage: the 
exceptional nature of Arabidopsis research allows me to highlight issues (such as the tension between 
centre and periphery or the difficulties involved in interdisciplinary collaboration) that characterise most 
model organism research, but that are less visible in other communities.   
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these different approaches and perspectives together. Yet, what makes Arabidopsis 
researchers into a coherent community is their constant communication and data-
exchange, as well as their allegiance to a set of common research goals and institutions. 
The communication patterns and ethos of social cohesion initiated within the community 
since its foundation are largely responsible both for its success and for the initial choice 
of the plant; further, the construction of integrating models such as NASC specimens or 
TAIR images would be impossible in the absence of the network of institutionalised 
collaborations that devised and supported both the NASC and the TAIR projects.   
 
Since the early 1980s, when Arabidopsis was re-discovered as a model organism and 
research efforts on it acquired momentum, an agreement was stipulated among some 
prominent Arabidopsis researchers that the data acquired through research on this model 
organism would be kept freely available.
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 In this respect, the Arabidopsis community is 
unique among the main model organism communities. In no other case have the 
modalities and division of labour in studying the organism been ‘rationally planned’ from 
the very set-up of research. Both biologists and research institutions involved in 
Arabidopsis research invested and continue to invest considerable effort in trying to 
ensure that such agreement is respected as much as possible, especially given the 
increasing commercialisation of basic biological research (prominently in the form of 
patenting, today a diffused practice in virtually all model organism communities). The 
agreement on free exchange makes it possible to build and maintain a constant stream of 
communication among researchers, both on a personal level (through regular 
international meetings and conferences) and in publishing (through peer-reviewed papers 
and centralised online databases, which are now substituting the international newsletters 
in use from 1964 until 1994). It also ensures that Arabidopsis research is largely 
conducted within academic institutions rather than corporations (though, as I shall discuss 
in the next sections, this does not imply that there is or could be a strict distinction 
between basic and applied research in the community, nor that industry did not influence 
the research under way).  
 
It is tempting to relate the adoption of this ethos and organisational structure to the 
extraordinary scientific success of the Arabidopsis community, which, in little more than 
two decades, has unravelled some of the most important recent discoveries in molecular 
and developmental biology (including studies of the role of hormones in development, 
methylation processes and the role of various kinds of RNA in the expression of genetic 
material). It is not obvious, nor can it be proven, that observance of such an ‘ethos of 
accessibility’ has been one of the main causes for the great increase in the understanding 
of plant biology acquired by researchers studying Arabidopsis. Yet, causal ties between 
the two factors are very likely. Observance of this ethos ensured that power struggles and 
competitive tensions did not entirely prevent exchanges of ideas, data, instruments and 
materials between researchers. Biologists involved in the study of Arabidopsis do not 
only share their interest in this specific organism (which would, on its own, already 
warrant the attempt to share as much information as possible, in order to rationally 
distribute research efforts and thus avoid duplicating results). They share some broad 
goals and beliefs, among which the assumption that Arabidopsis can be representative for 
                                                
187
 For details on this agreement, see Chapter 3, section 3.1.1. 
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many (if not all) other plants and the belief that it is important to try to integrate 
knowledge about different aspects of Arabidopsis biology. Most important for the 
purposes of maintaining a common ethos, many Arabidopsis researchers share the idea 
that a joint effort to integrate molecular biology with other disciplines may lead to the re-
invention of plant biology as a whole, thus transforming it from a field consisting largely 
of taxonomy and natural history (a feature that contributed to its becoming highly 
unpopular with respect to ‘intellectually exciting’ animal biology) to a field whose 
understanding of organismic development, growth, morphology and ecology is both 
descriptive and mechanistic - that is, whose advances are informed by information about 
processes happening at the level of molecular biology as well as mechanisms for heredity 
and transmission of information from the lowest to the highest levels of organisation in 
an organism. I do not wish to discuss here the scientific import of this latter ideal.
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What interests me here is the extent to which (1) these common goals help transform a 
case of disunified big science into a highly collaborative project, at least when compared 
to other examples of big science in biology and (2) such extensive and centralised 
collaboration impacts the type and quality of biological understanding obtained by the 
researchers involved.  
 
Providing answers to these two key questions is, of course, very difficult, especially in 
view of the little empirical data yet available on the sociology of the Arabidopsis 
community. As already specified in Chapter 4, my own research on the collaboration 
patterns characterising Arabidopsis research has been focused on a very restricted set of 
powerful players in the community. Sociologist James Evans is the only other researcher, 
to my knowledge, who tried to study – and, in fact, measure – collaboration patterns 
among Arabidopsis researchers, specifically in relation to their ties to the industrial world 
(Evans 2004; more on this in the following sections). However, there are no data as yet 
documenting the quality of relations between specific sub-disciplines within the whole 
community and the extent to which they adhere to the common ‘share and survive’ ethos. 
My research on this point is therefore based on in-depth interviews conducted with a 
small sample of Arabidopsis researchers, as well as on relevant archival and published 
documentation produced in the community (and the published results of similar in-depth 
interviews carried out on a sample of American researchers by Evans). Both interviews 
and archival documents confirmed that researchers strongly value the peculiarly 
collaborative ethos characterising the Arabidopsis community and believe that it played 
an important role in their research practices and relations to other research groups. In 
other words, Arabidopsis researchers see themselves as strongly epistemically dependent 
on the rest of the community, since they value collaboration as the best strategy towards 
obtaining significant results in their work.  
 
The research area dealing with cold acclimation constitutes a telling example of the 
difficulties encountered when collaboration is constrained by geographical and national 
limits, rather than being promoted across the whole Arabidopsis community. Cold 
acclimation is a very exciting field in plant biology: it brings together microbiology, plant 
ecology and evolutionary biology in order to understand the mechanisms through which a 
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 A consequence of this rhetoric is visible in the gene-centric perspective uncritically adopted, as we have 
seen in Chapter 5, by The Arabidopsis Information Resource. 
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plant can adapt to the temperature of the environment. Starting from the observation that 
plants can adapt to resist drops in temperature (for instance, by increasing levels of 
sucrose and the flexibility of cellular membranes), researchers have looked for 
correlations between such metabolic and physiological ‘cold responses’ and changes in 
the gene expressions patterns of the plant. They identified a regulon (that is, a gene 
cluster responsible for the transcriptional activation of a specific function) that is 
responsible for imparting freezing intolerance, thus activating cold response pathways 
that change the metabolism of the whole plant (Thomashow 2001). The study of this 
regulon, known as CBF, is an example of an extremely successful collaboration among 
Arabidopsis researchers with different expertises and coming from different epistemic 
cultures. Yet, collaboration patterns did not develop as ideally as Arabidopsis researchers 
would have liked: in fact, in the late 1990s two different research groups were formed, 
one based in the United States, the other in Japan. Both of them ended up discovering the 
CBF regulon through the same, ‘classical’ approach (that is, by mapping one gene to one 
enzyme and seeing what happens) and publishing results at more or less the same time, 
thus engendering a climate of competition and hostility between the two communities.
189
 
Collaboration within each of the two groups conformed to the norms established in the 
community, and their results certainly started a fruitful debate on how the process of cold 
response regulation is actually distributed among various gene clusters, which are now 
seen as interacting among themselves as well as in response to different physiological or 
climatic conditions. However, international communication between these groups and the 
rest of the community was not good enough for the two groups to realise that they were 
pursuing the same phenomenon with the same tools: at least, they did not realise it in 
time to avoid the subsequent conflict and, as a consequence, did not manage to establish 
cooperative ties with each other.  
 
Examples such as this demonstrate that the extent and manner in which the ‘share and 
survive’ ethos is respected and enforced by different laboratories within the community 
varies depending on the specific geographic area where the laboratories are located, the 
personal ties between members of any specific laboratory and researchers in the rest of 
the community, the social and political context in which research is developed, as well as 
the specific field or aspect of Arabidopsis biology studied in any one lab. This does not 
diminish the importance of the ethos of accessibility as a widespread pattern in the 
Arabidopsis community. Yet, it highlights the fact that many groups participating to 
Arabidopsis research are at the same time participating in other epistemic cultures, 
depending on the specific combinations of expertises of their members. For instance, a 
laboratory working on the ecology of Arabidopsis variants participates in the Arabidopsis 
community as well as in the community of plant ecologists and, possibly, the field of 
ecology as a whole. The possibility – in fact, the need – for each local group to ally itself 
to different communities (and thus different epistemic cultures) has a great impact not 
only on how closely these groups respect the ethos of each of those communities, but also 
on the overall social dynamics and attitudes within the group. Trading between the ‘share 
and survive’ ethos proposed by the Arabidopsis community and the ‘publish or perish’ 
mentality plaguing much of the extant research in the life sciences proves a difficult task 
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 The development of cold acclimation research has been described to me by Sue Rhee (who was one of 
the principal investigators involved in the project) in an interview dated 8 August 2004.  
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for many of the individual researchers and research groups studying Arabidopsis. 
Arguably, the research areas whose results are likely to be significant in fields beyond 
plant biology (such as microbiology) are the ones that present the most problems: while 
their studies are conducted on Arabidopsis, the validity of their results has to be assessed 
by researchers working outside the Arabidopsis community. 
 
There are no obvious mechanisms through which Arabidopsis principal investigators 
(PIs) can enforce adherence to such ‘ethos of accessibility’ among their colleagues and 
pupils, other than public acknowledgment of the fruitfulness of successful collaboration 
and recourse to social skills – of which I shall say more in section 7.2. Further, it is very 
difficult to determine in which instances scientists do follow the norm of collaboration 
and in which instances they instead decide not to. As I already anticipated, there are 
tensions between groups within the community and areas where competition is stiffer and 
sharing data more difficult than in others. I shall focus on such tensions in more detail in 
the following section. By looking at some of the problems encountered in enforcing the 
Arabidopsis ethos, I hope to provide a realistic picture of the complex, yet highly 
efficient, ways in which the Arabidopsis community remains centralised and largely 
united by common goals and institution, despite the diversity of groups and interests that 
populate it. I thus hope to provide some insight on the impact that the communal 
community ethos and centralised organisation have on the quality of the understanding of 
plant biology acquired by Arabidopsis researchers. As I intend to show, the ethos 
proposed by the founders of the community continues to have a significant influence on 
its success in recruiting new participants, attracting funding and, arguably, engendering 
new discoveries.  
 
 
7.1.2 Struggles Within the Arabidopsis Community 
 
We have put forth a goal of no less than complete understanding of the 
biology of an organism; the only way to achieve success is to work 
together with the realization that we are all wedded to the same goal 
The Multinational Arabidopsis Steering Committee, 2002 
 
As implied in my characterisation as centralised big science, a little group of key 
institutions and sponsors plays a significant role in directing and administering research 
production within the Arabidopsis community as well as between members of the 
community and the groups that are external to it. These institutions and sponsors are what 
I call ‘central’ actors in Arabidopsis research. They play a role akin to the one of 
benevolent tyrant, holding great power and the final word on every important decision 
and strategy to do with research in the community, yet at the same time absorbing 
information and insights (allowing him to take such decisions) from the various groups of 
researchers working in the community.  I shall start my analysis of this situation and its 
implications towards the gathering of knowledge on Arabidopsis by focusing on the 
impact of institutionalisation on social dynamics within the community: that is, the 
institutional set-up devised, at least in principle, to serve the community ethos and the 
problems and tensions generated by the power of such institutions over local research 
groups. The next section will instead focus on so-called ‘external dependencies’, that is 
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on the constraints and requirements imposed on Arabidopsis research by agencies that are 
not directly involved in carrying out such research, but nevertheless retain a high level of 
power over its modalities and outcomes: its sponsors (both in government and in 
industry).  
 
As outlined in Chapter 3, the Arabidopsis community is officially centred on the MASC, 
or Multinational Arabidopsis Steering Committee. Members of this committee range 
from 15 to 20 depending on the year and serve for a total of four consecutive years. They 
are elected by representatives of the most prominent and active laboratories within each 
nation and are responsible for reporting on national initiatives and results in Arabidopsis 
research, while at the same time absorbing inputs from abroad as well as organising 
multinational projects and initiatives together with other national representatives. 
Meetings of the MASC, both informal and formal such as the ones happening at the 
yearly International Meeting for Arabidopsis Research, help to keep Arabidopsis 
researchers in touch with each other and to coordinate research directions across the 
community. The MASC thus tries to make sure that no two laboratories are focused on 
precisely the same phenomena (or at least not with the same tools, thus risking useless 
duplication of results as in the case of cold acclimation research) and that new 
applications for grants and resources obtained by specific groups in the community are 
employed to study yet unexplored aspects of Arabidopsis biology, thus progressively 
filling the gaps in the knowledge hitherto accumulated. This function is greatly 
appreciated by Arabidopsis scientists, who see centralisation, as embodied by the MASC, 
as a way to keep some coherence in Arabidopsis research, with a view to integrating all 
the knowledge of the plant into an integrated understanding of plant biology.  
 
Closely associated to the MASC is a huge umbrella project, funded mostly by the NSF 
and the European Commission, called ‘Project 2010’. This project is the successor to the 
AGI sequencing project (1996-2000), and is meant to enforce collaboration among 
microbiologists and developmental biologists working in the community: the putative, 
yet extremely ambitious, goal of this collaboration is to be able to outline the functional 
role of each Arabidopsis gene by the year 2010 (hence the name of the project). This 
project certainly does not incorporate all laboratories engaged in Arabidopsis research. 
However, it is worth mentioning its existence, as the extensive network of collaborations 
and centralised organisation that it displays are representative of the type of projects 
encouraged within the community. Its ambitious goals are also indicative of the tendency, 
by Arabidopsis scientists, to think broadly about the significance of their research – a 
tendency that is much criticised by scientists worried about the representativeness of 
Arabidopsis with respect to other organisms, but which also signals the willingness to 
overcome fragmentation and competitiveness in biology and start building an integrated 
understanding of organisms.  
 
Let me now focus again on the MASC and specifically on its members. The number of 
MASC members per country is more or less proportional to the percentage of 
Arabidopsis papers that are published in each country. In 2002, there was one member for 
Australia/New Zealand; two for Canada; two for China; one for the European Union as a 
whole, which is important to note since the European commission has been the major 
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sponsor for Arabidopsis research in Europe already since the early 1990s; one for France; 
one for Italy; two for Germany; one for Japan; five from the U.K. (a predominance due 
both to the size of Arabidopsis research there and the importance of the U.K. as a 
platform for MASC discussions); and, finally, two for the United States. This latter 
number might seem disproportionate, since the U.S. hosts a good third of total 
Arabidopsis research as well as most of the resources and coordinating initiatives 
fostering it (such as the ABSC stock centre, the twin brother of NASC, and TAIR). 
However, it is important to note that most representatives for other countries at the 
MASC have either been trained in the States or have spent a considerable time visiting 
there. This is a first sign of a reality that we will encounter again and again in this 
chapter, and which is of capital importance to understanding the social dynamics 
surrounding Arabidopsis research: that is, the US have no rivals in the quality and 
quantity of Arabidopsis research that they produce as well as in the resources (financial, 
human and institutional
190
) made available to scientists. They are followed closely by the 
United Kingdom, where most of European Arabidopsis research, as well as the NASC, is 
based. In fact, the very birth of MASC is largely due to efforts by the USA and UK to 
institute an English-language, official forum to organise, control and promote advances in 
Arabidopsis research.  
 
Table 7.1. Most Cited Institutions in Arabidopsis Research. The predominance of North-
American research is indisputable in the face of these data. Compiled by Evans (2006).  
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 Note that, in the States, private foundations devoted to the financing of basic scientific research (such as 
the Carnegie Institute, where TAIR is based) represent a significant addition to governmental institutions 
such as the NSF or NIH. See Gerson (1998) on this.  
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American and English cultures are therefore bound to have a great impact on the values 
and norms implemented within the community as a whole, as well as on its research 
goals. Arabidopsis research is international insofar as the laboratories where it is 
performed are located in several nations around the world, ranging from the ones 
represented in MASC to smaller groups in Mexico, Chile, Brazil and Russia (see figure 
7.1 below). However, it is important to keep in mind that almost half of these laboratories 
are in fact based in the USA or UK; that this gives a central role to research performed in 
those nations, which keep attracting the best researchers and resources to conduct 
especially molecular biology; and that this is bound to create tensions between Anglo-
American ‘central’ institutions, holding much of the power and money required by 
contemporary science, and ‘peripheral’ institutions located in the remaining nations. A 
good example of this latter issue comes from France, where Arabidopsis research is also 
thriving, but where ‘francophone’ researchers have a notorious tendency to refrain from 
participation in international (and, as they see it, far too ‘anglophone’) projects – with the 
result that French contributions to the Arabidopsis community are fewer than what this 
powerful country could afford.   
 
Figure 7.1. Distribution of Arabidopsis research worldwide up to 2002. Courtesy of 
TAIR. 
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As mentioned in section 2.3.2, it is hard to assess whether the type of institutionalisation 
that I characterised as centralised big science provides more advantages or more 
disadvantages to biological research practice and results. The problems with such an 
institutional set-up intensify, naturally, as the centre around which research is organised 
has very local characteristics tied with a specific epistemic culture, which therefore 
imposes itself on the rest of the groups involved. This is actually very often the case in 
centralised big science, as it is arguably difficult to institute central organs that are not 
influenced by a specific perspective, approach, methodology proposed by some of the 
most powerful members of the community. Admirably, an effort has been made within 
the Arabidopsis community to give a voice to all nations involved in this big science 
project: in this sense, the MASC is quite efficient in its setting up of representatives 
reporting on each nations’ researchers’ results, needs and wishes. This effort has led to 
many advantages involved in participation in the community, by enhancing epistemic 
dependences among Arabidopsis researchers of different nations and epistemic cultures. 
It also, as we shall see in the next section, improved the community’s capacity to attract 
sponsors. Nevertheless, centralised big science can be very restrictive in the type of 
methods and results that it sanctions as acceptable. In the case of the Arabidopsis 
community, this is due to a variety of factors, some of which I shall now list and 
examine.  
 
Let me start by observing that research in the Arabidopsis community typically involves 
several types of peer-different collaboration.
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 Perhaps the most common is 
collaboration among researchers with different disciplinary backgrounds, such as in the 
case of biochemists and developmental biologists working together to study Arabidopsis 
metabolism, or the case of mathematicians and ecologists exploiting each others’ 
expertise to analyse variations among Arabidopsis mutant populations. We could define 
this type of peer-different collaboration as involving the coordination, and sometimes 
even the exchange, of different theoretical skills (such as the ability to juggle with 
mathematical symbols and to plot statistical studies based on empirical data about mutant 
populations). A second important type of peer-different collaboration consists of attempts 
to coordinate different performative skills in order to achieve a common goal. These 
collaborations bring together researchers with differing technical expertise (or, to use my 
own terminology, embodied knowledge). These include biologists able to analyse the 
same phenomena through different instruments, an occurrence that becomes more and 
more usual as instruments and techniques for both experimentation and data-analysis 
become more sophisticated, thus requiring unique and well-trained performative skills.
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They also include collaborations between bioinformaticians (including programmers and 
engineers) and biologists, such as the ones I mentioned when analysing the TAIR project, 
which I will discuss in more detail below.  
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 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.1 for a discussion of Thagard’s notion of peer-different collaboration. 
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 Consider for instance the different methods available to study gene functions: rather than training one 
individual in each Arabidopsis laboratory to use them all, which is anyhow unlikely, it is more profitable to 
institute collaborations among individuals endowed with different skills that are relevant to the research 
questions at hand.  
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The possibility to establish and carry out such collaborations is greatly enhanced by the 
central organisation of Arabidopsis research, thanks to which it is very easy to locate 
individuals with expertises and interests that complement one’s own in the required 
manner. Yet, peer-different collaboration encompassing the exercise of theoretical and 
performative skills involves a major difficulty, which Thagard aptly defines as follows: 
'peer-different collaborators are exceptionally epistemically dependent on their co-
workers, since they typically lack the skill to validate work done in a different field' 
(1997, 254). The issue of finding common evaluative criteria, which is indeed 
characteristic of interdisciplinary research as a whole, represents one of the most serious 
problems in the Arabidopsis community: as in the case of any other participant in big 
science, its scientific results and plans for the future need to be assessed over and over 
again in order to be sanctioned as appropriate and worth pursuing further. Up to now, it 
has been difficult to propose general solutions for this problem; as we have seen, that 
would imply agreeing on common standards, theoretical interpretations and research 
priorities, thus effectively dismissing the value of the diversity of approaches and insights 
characterising the community. The problem of finding evaluative criteria is therefore 
solved on a case-by-case basis. Often, however, such evaluations constitute strategic 
responses to extant social and economic issues at least as much as they address the 
scientific quality of research. As often pointed out in critiques of the peer review and 
funding allocation systems, the evaluation of the quality of projects might well turn into a 
power struggle among different parties, each of which represents its own interests and 
reasons for insisting on the adoption of its own evaluative criteria. The struggle is 
intensified by the fact that actors involved occupy a variety of positions in the strict 
hierarchy characterising academic science, some of which are immensely more powerful 
than others. PhD students and post-doctoral fellows, for instance, have very little 
decisional power over how their research will be interpreted and integrated into their 
supervisor’s project – no matter how great their contribution to the development of the 
research in question.   
 
Table 7.2 – Academic Position of Subscribers to TAIR as for 2002 and 2003. 
Unfortunately many subscribers did not choose to specify their precise position in the 
academic hierarchy; however, these are the best data available to me at this time. Note 
that the number of senior and graduate researchers has been steadily growing from one 
year to the next. TAIR officials confirm steady growth also for years 2004 and 2005. 
Courtesy of TAIR.  
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October 2003 October 2002
total community 12535 total community 11335
Unspecified 8921 Unspecified 9438
Graduate Student 737 Post-Doctoral Researcher 408
Post-Doctoral Researcher 707 Graduate Student 372
Professor 325 Assistant Professor 185
Research Scientist 323 Research Scientist 163
Assistant Professor 304 Professor 147
Associate Professor 239 Associate Professor 135
Research Associate 145 Group Leader 74
Group Leader 125 Research Associate 74
Research Assistant 111 Other 56
Other 108 Research Assistant 48
Unknown 97 Project Leader 43
Research Fellow 70 Undergraduate Student 40
Undergraduate Student 67 Research Fellow 32
Project Leader 66 Director 28
Director 41 Lecturer 23
Lecturer 35 Curator 15
Senior Research Officer 25 Unknown 15
Curator 20 Senior Research Officer 14
Programmer 16 Programmer 10
Coordinator 9 Senior Lecturer 4
High School Teacher 9 Teacher 3
Senior Lecturer 9 Advisory Board Member 2
High School Student 8 Coordinator 2
Teacher 8 High School Student 2
President 7 High School Teacher 1
Advisory Board Member 2 President 1
Middle School Teacher 1  
  
 
In the absence of detailed empirical data concerning the whole Arabidopsis community, 
let me exemplify these concerns through the cases of the research groups working at 
TAIR and NASC. TAIR lab members work together as a tight unit. Knowledge and tasks 
required for the creation of databases are necessarily distributed, as no single member of 
the team is knowledgeable about all disciplines involved: this creates a need for close 
collaboration and frequent meetings and informal exchanges within the group. This is 
evident in the decision, taken in 2004, to bring all collaborators of TAIR to the Carnegie 
Institute of Plant Biology in Stanford – a significant change from the original set-up, 
according to which half of the group (especially programmers) was based at the Santa Fe 
Institute in New Mexico. Work used to be organised via weekly meetings of the team at 
the Carnegie, in which the content of the tasks to be performed was decided upon. The 
two groups would have joint meetings, via conference call, every fortnight. This 
arrangement was discovered to be highly inefficient and needed to be changed. As also 
argued in programmatic statements featured in renewal NSF grant documents, one thing 
learnt by the first five years of TAIR experience is that the physical presence of all 
participants in the same institute is crucial. This finding is significant for Arabidopsis 
research as a whole, as it signals the great difficulties encountered when carrying out 
research collaborations among individuals located in different regions, or even different 
countries or continents. The optimisation of expertises involved in any particular project 
often goes at the expense of the optimisation of working conditions (geographical 
proximity, access to common facilities and so forth).  A trade-off between these two 
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important factors is thus a common characteristic of peer-different collaborations in the 
Arabidopsis community.  
 
Another interesting feature of collaborative work at TAIR is a constant tension in the 
expertise and roles of what is regarded as ‘technical’ staff (that is, researchers whose 
theoretical and performative skills lie in the development of software and bioinformatics) 
and ‘research’ staff (that is, researchers whose theoretical and performative skills lie in 
molecular and developmental biology). The tension between the two groups is already 
evident from the classification of bioinformaticians as ‘technical aid’, rather than as 
researchers in their own right. This is in part justified by the guiding role assumed by 
biologists in developing TAIR. They are representatives for the prospective users and 
know what needs the resource is supposed to serve: thus, they are the ones developing 
visions for the users and evaluating the extent to which bioinformaticians can match 
those visions. However, as observed in Chapter 5, ‘technicians’ at TAIR are anything but 
passive instruments for the realisation of biologists’ goals. They have their own expertise 
and goals, not to mention career prospects, given that bioinformatics is quickly becoming 
one of the hottest areas of research in computer engineering. They also strive to learn the 
biology involved in TAIR images and provide their own perspective on the alternative 
ways in which such knowledge could be visualised. This type of peer-different 
collaboration is, however, made difficult by the differing status and recognition reserved 
to biologists and informaticians within TAIR.  
 
Last but not least, consider the extent to which not only internal, but also external 
collaborations sustains TAIR work. The decision-making process through which 
schemas, nomenclatures and data to include in the databases are chosen relies on: 
(i) specialised experimental knowledge from published literature as well as 
consultations with experts in each field; 
(ii) personal experience and affiliation of each TAIR curator with specific fields 
of biological research;  
(iii) research conducted within the GO community, notably based in Cambridge 
(UK), whose researchers are actively collaborating with TAIR researchers 
(joint, cross-continental meetings are held every two to four months); 
(iv) innovations produced by the bioinformatics community; and 
(v) research conducted jointly by all curators of model organism databases: 
personnel from each prominent model organism community is in fact involved 
in frequent meetings in order to compare their results and strategies, as well as 
the prospects to develop a joint database collecting data from all organisms (to 
be called Generic Model Organism Database, or GMOD). 
In the context of this extensive network of collaborations within and outside the 
Arabidopsis community, it is even more surprising to discover that the work of TAIR 
curators themselves is actually not valued by other Arabidopsis researchers, who see this 
kind of non-specialised research as a service to the community and, thus, as not leading 
to concrete results in specific areas of inquiry. In other words, TAIR curators are not seen 
as biologists and their work tends to be stigmatised, rather than applauded, by other 
researchers. This makes TAIR curators’ position within the community rather peculiar, as 
their commitment to the integrative ideals underlying the TAIR project is counter-
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balanced by the certainty that, once that temporary project is terminated, it will be very 
difficult for them to find a good job within the Arabidopsis community of hands-on 
researchers.  
 
Similar issues can be observed in the NASC laboratory, where we find three distinct 
expertises, whose boundaries are neatly demarcated: the biologists and technicians taking 
care of plant specimens; the biologists and bioinformaticians working on NASC 
databases such as PATO; and the technicians developing instruments for use by 
Arabidopsis researchers. Sean May, the director of NASC, explicitly told me that he 
searches for employees who are ‘intellectually unambitious’, that is, who can deliver 
what they are asked for in the simplest possible manner and who are uninterested in an 
academic career. This is because NASC work, requiring so much collaboration among 
biologists, bioinformaticians and technicians, can be frustrating to what he calls 
‘academic’ mentalities: in the eyes of many Arabidopsis scientists, the goal for NASC is 
not so much to develop new knowledge, but to preserve and improve the conditions 
under which knowledge is produced, thus spending much time on elaborating 
instruments, tools and protocols.
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 Of course, what is also true is that May reserves for 
himself the privilege to supervise and assess research conducted in all three areas covered 
by his laboratory. As he told me, he has the perfect background for this job: a degree and 
interest in population genetics, expertise with transactivation techniques and a hobby in 
computing. He practically functions as a mediating figure between scientific and 
technological concerns in the lab. May’s attitude stands for a different way to cope with 
the difficulty of evaluating and coordinating interdisciplinary research – that is, reference 
to one or more supervisors whose expertise covers all of the various fields involved.  
 
The latter situation immediately engenders a worry: by assigning evaluative powers to 
just a handful of individuals, don’t we risk to distort the results of Arabidopsis research to 
fit their individual beliefs and perspective? Indeed, as we saw in the case of TAIR, the 
risk of relying on a centralising theoretical perspective is not only present, but actually 
unavoidable, as reliance on a specific viewpoint is needed as a platform for the 
development of an integrated view on Arabidopsis biology. I shall expand on the 
epistemological implications of this claim in Chapter 8. What I would like to examine 
now is the extent to which one specific view, that is the gene-centric approach, continues 
to hold sway among the most prominent members of the Arabidopsis community. To 
start with, genome sequencing is generally presented as the necessary ‘raw material’ (i.e. 
as a starting point) in order to understand developmental processes. This is a highly 
reductionist assumption, as DNA sequences are but one component of an extremely 
complex ensemble of processes: it is the interaction of DNA with other cellular 
components, rather than its isolation into seemingly autonomous genes, that should be 
seen as the ‘raw material’ for the study of plant development. Furthermore, microscopic 
and mechanistic explanations of developmental processes are vastly predominant and 
sought after.  
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 Of course, it could be argued that the production of adequate research tools is as important to scientific 
output as experimental research done through those tools. Yet, a distinction between these two 
complementary types of activity seems to persist both within and outside of biology, at least in terms of the 
different levels of social status and prestige associated to each of them (Radder 1996, 43-44).  
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The emphasis on making sense of genetic sequences does not diminish the importance of 
the blossoming side of research focusing on higher-level organisational processes (e.g. 
embryological and growth processes). TAIR director Sue Rhee herself, despite co-
ordinating what is still largely a collection of databases concerning the genomics of 
Arabidopsis, is a developmental biologist and is pushing the TAIR to integrate data from 
higher-level studies, from cellular to environmental. However, the pursuit of gene-centric 
research is today the most likely path towards earning resources and funding in 
Arabidopsis research. This is where governmental and industrial sponsors most like to 
invest; and in fact, it is this area that exhibits the highest condensation of charismatic and 
capable principal investigators, exercising a great degree of authority over their own 
laboratories, over broad research trends within the community as well as over funding 
agencies. The swaying authority of gene-centrism in biology is indeed, as remarked by 
many an historian
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, due as much to the scientific characteristics of this view (including 
its relative simplicity) as it is due to the central role played by its spokespersons within 
the biological community at large. This is evident also in the Arabidopsis community, 
where gene-centrism and powerful, charismatic scientists seem to go hand-in-hand, not 
least because groups that do not follow the gene-centric trend find it still difficult to 
acquire funding, resources and visibility in the community.  
 
Power struggles among different groups in the Arabidopsis community are often not 
based around competition for results, resources and recruits, but rather around the quest 
for authority among one’s peers. Among others, sociologist Pierre Bourdieu highlights 
this point in his definition of a scientific field: 
 
As a system of objective relations between positions already won (in previous 
struggles), the scientific field is the locus of a competitive struggle, in which the 
specific issue at stake is the monopoly of scientific authority, defined inseparably 
as technical capacity and social power, or, to put it another way, the monopoly of 
scientific competence, in the sense of a particular agent’s socially recognised 
capacity to speak and act legitimately (i.e. in an authorised and authoritative way 
in scientific matters) (1975, 19).
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The gist of Bourdieu’s argument here is that whenever a scientific research group forms 
around the study of specific phenomena with a common set of theoretical and 
methodological tools, there is chance for competition among its members over whose 
approach and insight will direct the group’s research direction in the years to come. 
Figures like Chris Somerville provide a good illustration of the gains deriving from 
winning the battle over authority in the field. The importance of retaining influence over 
others in the same community becomes even more evident when considering 
competitions for authority among different groups, rather than individuals, within the 
community – which brings us back to the issue of centre versus periphery of research 
from which I started my analysis in this section.  
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 Keller (2000) and Oyama (1982).  
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 See also Bechtel 1993, 280 and Latour and Woolgar’s discussion on credibility (1979, ch.5). 
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It would in fact be wrong to characterise Chris Somerville as a lone, gifted scientific hero 
struggling for recognition in the face of hostile academic circumstances. Somerville had 
many advantages to start with over many of his colleagues. He was trained in the best 
schools of what is currently the most powerful (and wealthy) nation on Earth and, when 
still very young, he was assigned the direction of a whole laboratory and was given 
relatively large freedom to pursue whichever research direction he chose. These 
advantages were not undeserved: he had proved from a young age to be an exceptionally 
talented and dedicated individual, whose many gifts extended to personable, friendly 
manners and ‘a way with people’ (Koornneef, pers. comm.) that gained him many a 
powerful friend in governmental circles. He was clearly the right man for the job and 
made the most out of the resources that were given to him. Yet, the fact remains that 
those resources were available to him, as was the possibility to communicate with 
English-speaking colleagues in his own language, form friendships that would greatly 
enhance his scientific authority and work in institutions with a reputation for scientific 
excellence.
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Chris Somerville’s group is in fact one of the most influential in the Arabidopsis 
community as a whole. Members of his laboratory include some of the best Arabidopsis 
researchers in the world, several of which have been or are now acting as elected 
members of MASC, the steering committee coordinating Arabidopsis research 
worldwide. TAIR itself is headed by a student of Somerville’s and TAIR activities are 
conducted in the same building as his research laboratory, so that there is constant 
feedback flowing from his office to the TAIR section (and from there, through TAIR 
databases, to the whole community). In short, Chris Somerville’s Stanford group, 
including TAIR, constitutes what we call ‘central’ science in the Arabidopsis community. 
This is opposed to ‘peripheral’ research, that is research conducted in areas and 
institutions that are not as recognised and valued – in a word, not as authoritative – as 
Stanford University is in the academic world. These places are too poorly equipped to 
guarantee cutting-edge results (most of which require access to the latest technology); 
they have little funding to hire new talents and even less to sponsor their member’s 
travels to the venues and meetings set up at more central places, for instance, by the 
MASC.   
 
As an example of the issues about ‘who is central’ in the Arabidopsis community, and 
will thus influence research directions and results obtained from the study of Arabidopsis, 
consider the conflicts arising between the different databases organising Arabidopsis data 
as a service to the community. As we saw, TAIR is indisputably the best organised and 
most ‘central’ of these projects. However, this does not mean that TAIR is also the most 
used database for Arabidopsis data. In fact, researchers interested in more detailed data 
on Arabidopsis genomics might prefer to resort to the MIPS; researchers interested in the 
morphological characteristics of Arabidopsis plants, as well as their physiology, might 
instead turn to PATO, the database for plant traits and attributes developed by the NASC. 
Notably, MIPS makes little use of bio-ontologies and organises its data more loosely, yet 
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 Evans (2006) provides a very interesting picture of Chris Somerville as an entrepreneur, an activity 
which he successfully managed to couple with his academic position and which brings out many of his 
talents in dealing authoritatively with people.  
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in a way that is less dependent on the theoretical framework endorsed in TAIR. Per se, 
this feature does not make it incompatible with the TAIR effort, as demonstrated by the 
fact that many Arabidopsis biologists make use of all three databases in their research. At 
least in principle, all database projects (especially TAIR and NASC, because of their 
collaboration on seed distribution) are supposed to collaborate at all times, thus providing 
biologists with the best range of tools for the retrieval and digital handling of 
Arabidopsis-related data. Such direct collaboration does not, however, take place. Even if 
collaborating on the surface, there is hostility between the TAIR and the NASC group, 
which was visible in the interviews I carried out with the two directors of the projects, 
Sue Rhee and Sean May. Rhee did not even acknowledge NASC efforts at database 
development as a significant addition to TAIR’s own efforts. May, par contre, was fairly 
critical of TAIR attempts to unify data under the same terminological banners, as he 
found that the price to pay for such integration (that is, the loss of pluralism of 
perspectives and of a great amount of partially, yet not entirely, overlapping data) is too 
high. Rhee also displayed a general disinterest for what researchers at MIPS were up to. 
She sees the MIPS as an offspring of the AGI that did not integrate very well into TAIR 
(she defined it as an ‘alternative approach to TIGR’, which is the database on which 
TAIR has modeled its efforts from its inception) and displayed reluctance in approaching 
the issue – due partially to her ignorance of what MIPS researchers are actually doing. 
Mostly, she was critical of the decentralised strategy adopted by MIPS, where collection 
of data is not ordered along pre-established lines, but is categorised progressively 
depending on which types of data become available.  
 
The tension among strategies adopted by different Arabidopsis databases in the USA and 
Europe results in the different status of these databases within the two continents. While 
in the States the authority of TAIR seems undisputed, European Arabidopsis researchers 
are more aware of the existence and differences among the three resources and use them 
depending on their needs (it would take months of further empirical work to substantiate 
this claim, but this is the trend I saw emerging from my interviews). Already from this 
example we can see that the struggle for who is central in the Arabidopsis community is 
ongoing and has severe repercussions on the research being conducted. Ongoing disputes 
between central and peripheral loci of Arabidopsis research, as well as between different 
expertises represented within the community, indicate that the Arabidopsis community is, 
for all sorts of scientific as well as socio-economic reasons, very diverse and unequal in 
its access to resources, expertise, epistemic authority and research instruments. In other 
words, epistemological diversity depends not only on differences in skills and theoretical 
perspective: it also depends on the resources and social contexts available to individual 
researchers. In the midst of all these tensions, however, another important factor 
contributes to the enforcement of a common ethos and common goals throughout the 
community, thus maintaining its basic structure as centralised big science: that is, the 
nature and interests of its sponsors. 
 
 
7.1.3 Heterogeneous Alliances: Governmental and Industrial Sponsors 
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A prominent factor allowing for the centralised organisation of Arabidopsis research has 
been the heavy involvement of governmental agencies as its sponsors. This is mainly due 
to four reasons. First, the government granted funding for basic, rather than applied, 
research, thus allowing Arabidopsis researchers to develop plans best suited to 
understanding plant biology for its own sake, rather than trying to acquire knowledge that 
could be exploited in the short term for agronomical or pharmaceutical purposes (as more 
commercially-oriented sponsors would have required). Second, governmental funding 
allowed for a centralised organisation of national resources on Arabidopsis research, thus 
preventing the fragmentation of results and projects that would have occurred if many 
different agencies had been involved. Third, research groups sponsored by the 
government found it much easier to implement the ethos of accessibility and data-
exchange that would become a trademark of the Arabidopsis community. This would 
have almost certainly been impossible in the profit-oriented, competitive environment 
characterising privately funded research, as researchers working for firms are usually 
required to agree that disclosure and/or publication of results be agreed upon by the firm, 
on a case-to-case basis. Last but not least, the reliance on governmental funding allowed 
Arabidopsis researchers to transform requests for grants into opportunities for 
international alliances, both at the scientific and at the political level. As both Chris 
Somerville and Koornneef told me, funding applications in the USA would always point 
to the need to match the resources employed in the UK on Arabidopsis research. 
Researchers would emphasise how failure to obtain governmental funding would imply 
being left behind by European scientists: not only would US scientists be unable to 
compete, but they would also lose the opportunity to collaborate with other countries (as 
they would have little to offer to such collaboration). This strategy worked as efficiently 
in the US as it did in Europe and the rest of the world, where governments were pressured 
into giving money to keep up their scientific reputations. Allocating suitable funding for 
Arabidopsis research became a matter of national pride and strategic international 
collaboration, rather than a purely scientific issue.  
 
But how did this caricature of an arms’ race begin? The circumstances of initial NSF 
involvement in Arabidopsis research are relatively clear. The main force behind this 
event was James Watson, discoverer of the double helix and, by the early 1980s, one of 
the most powerful men in American science. Convinced that Arabidopsis could indeed 
constitute an extremely fruitful model for plant biology and microbiology at large, 
Watson convened a meeting in 1989 involving several representatives of the NSF, among 
whom director Eric Bloch, and several prominent Arabidopsis scientists, among whom 
Chris Somerville and Elliott Meyerowitz. Following this meeting, NSF officials offered 
large support to the ambitious proposals presented by the scientists: in fact, it was then 
that projects such as the construction of a centralised stock centre, databases and 
coordinating institutions such as the MASC were presented and initiated. This strong 
impulse matched the existing programs already implemented by the British government 
and the European Commission. Together, these funding programmes constituted the start 
of an international effort to support Arabidopsis research, which culminated in the 
successful collaboration characterising the sequencing project.   
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One of the effects of the alliance between prominent Arabidopsis scientists and 
governmental agencies is the concentration of key roles within the community in the 
hands of few researchers. Take again the case of Chris Somerville and Meyerowitz. 
Besides holding key academic positions and conducting research in important fields 
(Meyerowitz on flowering and Somerville on cell wall and plant body development), 
Somerville and Meyerowitz are key members of the scientific committee advising the 
National Plant Genome Initiative, as well as privileged advisors to the NSF funding 
committee. They also play a key role as spokespersons for two of the major web 
resources on Arabidopsis: Somerville is the scientific patron of TAIR (whose curator Sue 
Rhee is a former student of his) and Meyerowitz is the founder and current editor of The 
Arabidopsis Book.
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 Chris Somerville is acting as consultant for a variety of private 
funding agencies, such as, most remarkably, the Bill Gates Foundation.
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 This latter 
responsibility seems to confirm the full realisation of the vision that Chris and Shauna 
Somerville had of Arabidopsis research at the very beginning of their career: they are 
now in a position to act as ‘expert advisors’ for projects that concern applied Arabidopsis 
biology, most notably biotechnology and the production of GMOs.  
 
In fact, it is now time to add some layers of complexity to the simple picture of alliance 
between governments and science that I painted here. Complications consist chiefly in 
the increasing interest expressed in Arabidopsis by commercially-oriented firms, several 
of whom understood already in the 1980s that research on this plant would have earned 
academic science scores of important inventions in molecular biology – inventions whose 
patenting would have earned universities the right to exploit their commercial 
applications. Biotechnology corporations such as Monsanto, Novartis, DuPont and Dow 
thus started to compete with academic research in order to develop methods to 
genetically modify plants for agronomic purposes.
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 This research was secondary in size 
to the Arabidopsis research carried out through governmental sponsors, both because 
only few companies decided to hire their own researchers to carry it out and because the 
industries that offered to sponsor university programmes had to sign agreements 
favouring disclosure (thus promising to distribute research results to the rest of the 
community, in conformity to the Arabidopsis ethos).
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 However, commercially 
sponsored research contributed in significant ways to the study of Arabidopsis. Perhaps 
the most significant example of such a contribution is the development of a key technique 
for the mutation of Arabidopsis plants, that is, the infection of plant tissues with 
Agrobacterium tumafaciens (a discovery that, as we saw in Chapter 3, had a tremendous 
significance for the expansion of Arabidopsis research): the technique was first proposed 
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 For information about TAB, see Chapter 4.  
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 Chris Somerville confirmed this engagement to me during an interview held on the 23rd of August 
2004.  
199
 Evans reports a quote from the chief technology officer of one plant genomics company founded in the 
early 1990s: ‘being a company... you’ve got to worry about the competition and the competition is really 
the public sector’ (Evans 2004, 61).  
200
 Evans draws a distinction between two modes of interaction between corporate sponsors and scientific 
researchers: relational ties, signalling ‘joint company-university research’ and transactional ties, indicating 
‘exchanges of company money for academic results’ (Evans 2004, 8; 2006a). The number of subgroups 
within the community engaged in relational ties is, for now, relatively low compared to the research areas 
sponsored by, and carried out within, academic institutions. 
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by a Monsanto laboratory, then expanded by Ken Feldmann and David Marks under the 
Sandoz Crop Protection Corporation. Another contribution was the donation of data 
acquired through corporate sequencing projects, whose results were used to refine the 
sequencing data already obtained by universities through the AGI project. Last but not 
least, industrial research has successfully targeted the need for adequate research 
instruments by academic scientists. The best example of this is the development of chips 
serving microarray research, which now go under the name of Affimetrix, or ‘Affy-
chips’, from the name of the company that invented and distributes them (Evans 2004, 
63).  
 
What impact does the involvement of industrial interests have on the conditions through 
which Arabidopsis biology is investigated and understood? This question has no simple 
answer. It is certainly true that most strands of basic research in Arabidopsis are 
intermingled with considerations about applicability to biotechnology, or even with 
applied research itself. Scientists seem not only to be aware, but also to be proud of the 
overlap of basic and applied research, both because they seem to believe in its 
intrinsically positive ethical character and because it boasts the funding that 
governmental and private agencies are willing to provide to biological research.
201
 Note 
that Arabidopsis research is a major part of the US-led political and scientific effort 
towards the enhancement of agricultural productivity, an effort that includes the study of 
‘optimal’ cultivation techniques and the use of genetically modified organisms. The 
rhetoric of benefiting mankind by enhancing plant productivity and defeating plant 
diseases is used uncontroversially in most major scientific writings (and grant 
applications) on Arabidopsis. Consider the following extract from an important review 
paper published by Somerville in ‘Science’: 'Because as much as 40% of plant 
productivity is lost to pests and pathogens in Africa and Asia, strategies to control these 
will be a continuing challenge. The recent progress made in understanding the molecular 
basis of race specific pathogen interactions provides a new basis on which to try and 
develop durable forms of resistance' (Somerville 2000, 22).  
 
The ethical questions arising from this situation are major ones, given the widespread 
opposition to the policies of dissemination of such agricultural practices in both Western 
countries and the so-called Third World. The production of GMOs is unfortunately 
coupled in most political domains to the old-fashioned discourse of ‘development’, 
defined as the duty by Western countries to help ‘less developed’ (i.e., culturally and 
economically different) countries by exporting and enforcing their own technology (on 
the acknowledged failure of such discourse of development, see Rich 1994). 
Technological and scientific knowledge are routinely presented as coupled with the 
values of representative democracy and the neo-liberal ideals of efficiency and 
production (Escobar, 1994). Both academics and activists all over the world have 
defended the value of non-western agricultural practices on the social ground that they 
are intrinsically valuable as part of the local cultures, as well as on the scientific ground 
of pointing to the value of natural diversity versus artificially manipulated diversity (see 
Radder 1996, ch.7; Shiva and Holla in van der Zwaan and Petersen 2003; Shiva 1999, 
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 This viewpoint is common to all American biologists that I have interviewed.  
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2002). It is in fact the case that most GM cultivations have hitherto been employed as 
monocultures, to be used in large plantations (thus favouring corporate over local 
administration) and to take the place of modes of production enhancing diversity and 
rotation of cultivations (e.g. soy cultivations in North Africa, China and Philippines). 
Further, the rights towards the production and distribution of GM seeds fell in the hands 
of only five major corporations, each of which already infamous for its lack of 
environmental ethics.   
 
Little is known about the effects that such controversies on the ethical value of 
Arabidopsis biology and its applications have on the practices and results of Arabidopsis 
researchers. Certainly, the public image of plant biology has been affected. This is 
especially true in Europe, where a moratorium on GMO research issued in 1999 has 
caused difficulties even for basic research on plant biology (Helleman, 2003). 
Unfortunately, without appropriate empirical research it is impossible to determine the 
extent to which Arabidopsis research is materially constrained by these controversies on 
its commercial significance and humanitarian aspirations. The same holds for personal 
views and involvement of Arabidopsis scientists. The extent to which scientists are 
involved, personally or publicly, in controversies over the applications of their research 
remains an important open question when trying to assess which social parameters are 
relevant to the acquisition of knowledge about Arabidopsis.
202
  
 
As mentioned above, James Evans has been carrying out substantial research on one 
related area, that is, the extent to which industrial ties and corporate sponsorship affect 
the content and distribution of Arabidopsis research. His results point to the following 
two trends: 
(1) on average, affiliation with industry makes science ‘less novel and more 
commercial’ (Evans 2004, 6): it discourages scientists to repeatedly test their 
findings before publication and runs counter the ethos of accessibility pervading 
the academically-sponsored parts of Arabidopsis research (ibid.,198); 
(2) while providing a wealth of additional resources for further research, private 
funding is usually highly unequal in its distribution – most of it is assigned to 
central loci of Arabidopsis research, to the obvious expense of the periphery 
(ibid., 6; as I discussed above, this can also be said of governmental research).  
As put by Evans, ‘by expanding the web of science, industry involvement also stretches it 
thin and makes it fragile’ (2004, 6): social, economic and political considerations tend to 
override concerns about the quality of the research that is conducted as well as the 
reliability of the results that it yields.  
 
The scarce presence of research that is directly controlled by industry is a main reason for 
the success and endurance obtained by the distinctively accessible ethos of the 
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 Another interesting question awaiting further research is whether, depending on variations in location, 
epistemic culture, interests and so forth, different groups within the Arabidopsis community have different 
perceptions of the ethical and commercial value of their research.  
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Arabidopsis community as a whole. However, it is important to note that industrial 
interest – and thus sponsorship – in Arabidopsis is increasing fast, due to the more and 
more obvious applicability of the results obtained by academic researchers. The academic 
community is also becoming more sensitive to the opportunities and research directions 
offered by corporate funding. This is partly due to the constant difficulties experienced by 
senior Arabidopsis researchers in renewing sponsorship from governmental agencies. 
Yet, it is also a signal of the increasing willingness by the government itself to sponsor 
applied over basic research, thus reaping the dividends of a quarter of a century long 
investment in basic plant biology.  
 
.  
7.2 The Significance of Social Skills 
 
If someone is comfortable with the things and language used by 
a group of others, we say that he or she is a member of that 
group. In this sense, categories – our own and those of others – 
come from action and in turn from relationships  
Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star 1999, 285 
 
On the basis of the observations made in the previous section, and following up on the 
considerations hitherto made on the nature of understanding, I would now like to argue 
that participation in one or more scientific communities, and thus communication and 
exchange with other scientists and affiliation with one or more epistemic cultures, are an 
essential condition for acquiring scientific understanding. This might not seem to be the 
case when looking at my analysis of theoretical and performative skills. After all, I 
hitherto qualified the coordination of theoretical and embodied knowledge (that is, the 
main condition I posed for the acquisition of understanding) as the result of individually 
performed skills. Further, my definition of understanding itself does not seem to leave 
much space for the social realm: if understanding is a cognitive process, how can it be 
shared with others and, most importantly, how can this matter to the quality of the 
understanding that is achieved? In this section I intend to answer these questions by 
pointing to a third set of skills whose exercise I take to be indispensable to defining 
understanding as ‘scientific’. These are what I call social skills, that is, the ability of an 
individual scientist to exchange knowledge, both theoretical and embodied, with other 
scientists – including the theoretical and performative skills that we have seen to play a 
crucial role in the understanding of phenomena.  
 
There is a sense in which my analysis might seem trivial: after all, it is rather obvious that 
the pursuit and accumulation of knowledge requires interpersonal communication. 
Nevertheless, this important point often plays the role of ‘elephant in the room’ within 
philosophical discussions of scientific epistemology. It is not explicitly acknowledged 
and, most importantly, its consequences are not investigated. For instance, Miriam 
Solomon discusses the social nature of scientific practice by pointing to what she calls 
‘non-empirical decision vectors’, i.e. factors that inform individual’s decisions 
concerning their research, even if they are independent from the empirical success of 
such research (Solomon 2001, 57). Examples for these vectors are epistemic values like 
 209
simplicity and elegance, but also personality traits such as pride, conservativeness or 
radicalism. Through her framework, Solomon ends up depicting scientific practice as an 
ensemble of individual actions and decisions: she does not consider the manners in which 
such actions affect each other, nor does she highlight how constraints on communication 
(such as, most remarkably, institutional and material constraints) influence individual 
decisions.  
 
In the analysis that follows, I intend to expose two crucial roles played by social skills in 
shaping the understanding of a phenomenon that is acquired by an individual scientist – 
and in fact, as I will argue, in transforming it into ‘scientific’ understanding. One is to 
enable access to the theoretical and performative skills needed to understand a biological 
phenomenon. The exercise of social skills is crucial to the successful accomplishment of 
activities such as conquering recognition and authority within a research community or 
field; acquiring resources; participating in appropriate networks; earning prestigious job 
appointments; and gaining access to laboratory materials – elements that, as we have seen 
in the previous section as well as in the last section of Chapter 6, are part and parcel of 
scientific research as a whole and particularly of research organised as centralised big 
science. The second important role played by social skills is to allow researchers to 
communicate their insights to others. Social skills enable a scientist to secure a material, 
social and economic environment that is suitable to creating tools (such as models, 
theories or instruments) that might help others to acquire and exercise the same 
theoretical and performative skills as the ones exercised by that scientist in the first place. 
Once other researchers are able to interact with phenomena under the same conditions 
and with the same skills as used to acquire a specific type of understanding, they will be 
more likely to undergo a similar experience of understanding.  
 
In this section I will examine both of these roles in turn, first by analysing their general 
features and then by providing examples of social skills that fit one or both of these roles, 
as exercised in the context of Arabidopsis research. I shall start with the social skills 
relevant to the individual acquisition of understanding and then proceed to examine the 
social skills required to communicate such understanding to others. My list of social 
skills is by no means complete and its relevance to research practices in other 
communities remains to be investigated, given the extreme variability of social dynamics 
characterising research communities in different disciplines and fields. Further, most 
items in the list are closely related to each other, sometimes to the point of partially 
overlapping (as in the case of personability and charisma, for instance) – an occurrence 
due to the fairly limited and highly institutionalised set of activities, or ‘research 
practices’, within which they are exercised. I hope that this list can nevertheless serve as 
an illustration of the relevance of social skills to the acquisition of scientific 
understanding.  
 
 
7.2.1 Social Skills Towards Acquiring Understanding 
 
Social skills enable scientists to acquire theoretical and embodied knowledge of a 
phenomenon and thus to perform the right epistemic activities towards understanding it, 
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including for instance modeling or experimental interventions. A scientist that is 
adequately socially skilled will be able to participate in the research communities that 
provide the theoretical and performative skills needed to investigate the phenomena of 
interest to him or her. As becomes evident from my analysis in section 7.1, participation 
in a scientific community (e.g. training in its adopted theoretical and embodied 
knowledge, including theories, methods, tools, ethos and experimental results) is crucial 
to being able to identify a phenomenon to be investigated as well as the means through 
which such investigation should be carried out. A researcher or layperson that is not 
exposed to the epistemic culture of the Arabidopsis community (and, at the local level, of 
some of its subgroups) would not even be able to decide which aspect of Arabidopsis 
biology to investigate, nor to use knowledge previously accumulated on the same topic as 
a starting point for his or her own research. The acquisition of adequate social skills is 
made even more relevant by the centralised nature and common ethos of the Arabidopsis 
community: for instance, not only it is important to participate in at least some of the 
community events organised on a monthly or yearly basis (such as the International 
Arabidopsis Meeting), but, once there, one needs to be able to express one’s ideas and 
results with reference to the work carried out by others, as well as the values and 
motivations underlying such research.  
 
Remarkably, social skills are useful to acquiring all kinds of theoretical and embodied 
knowledge, whether such knowledge is acknowledged and approved of within one or 
more scientific community or not. This is fine for my purposes, since I do not think that 
all the knowledge used in acquiring understanding must necessarily come from scientific 
training and exposure to scientific epistemic cultures. The whole experience of an 
individual may be relevant to the understanding of a phenomenon: it is hopeless to try 
and demarcate between ways of thinking and acting acquired through scientific training 
and ways of thinking and acting learnt in everyday life and informed by personality, 
talents and upbringing.
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 In fact, I would argue that social skills represent a modification 
of skills acquired in everyday life with the aim to fit the epistemic culture(s) 
characterising the scientific communities in which researchers find themselves. This is 
why many of the skills listed below are not by any means specific to science: rather, they 
are exercised in specific ways in different specific communities because adequate 
exercise of these skills is required for scientists to acquire the theoretical and 
performative skills needed to carry out their research. In fact, there is a sense in which 
social skills are subsidiary to theoretical and performative skills in science: they are not 
part of the knowledge that researchers aim to acquire, but they constitute a necessary 
means towards yielding scientific knowledge. 
 
Planning 
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 The theoretical and performative skills learnt in scientific education are not always exclusive to science: 
they represent forms of everyday skills that are refined and adapted to the specific concerns and 
requirements of investigation of natural phenomena through specific (conceptual or material) tools and 
instruments. This is true, for instance, of the skills required to abstract. While these are specifically 
modified to help in constructing, handling and interpreting models, the ability to abstract features of the 
natural world to construct representations of it is by no means limited to science: rather, the use of the same 
basic ability (as for instance in the arts or in street signs) is modified to fit different concerns from the 
scientific ones.  
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Strategic thinking and planning is a fundamental skill for researchers to learn. The 
rational vision constructed by Chris and Shauna Somerville at the start of their career in 
Arabidopsis research constitutes a blatant example of the usefulness of planning 
adequately one’s training and career moves: they were both successful in working within 
environments that welcomed their attitude and ideas, as well as providing space for 
experimenting not only with a novel model organism, but with a whole new approach to 
research in molecular biology. More generally, by rationally choosing which social and 
scientific environments to participate in and contribute to, biologists actually select the 
skills that they might want to learn so as to pursue their research goals. I shall come back 
to the significance of picking and developing specific skills when discussing the related 
commitments in Chapter 8.  
 
Competitiveness 
Biologists working in big science projects need to be able to withstand an often 
aggressively competitive research environment, in which scores of highly qualified 
individuals study the same phenomena and strive to produce results as fast as possible. 
Typically, this means that individuals who display some propensity towards 
competitiveness might acquire more resources, power and/or visibility than individuals 
who refrain from the spotlight. Within the Arabidopsis community the situation is made 
more complex by the predominance of the ethos of accessibility. As we have seen, such 
an ethos considerably lightens the competitive climate in Arabidopsis research is 
conducted. However, some areas remain competitive, either because of their own internal 
dynamics or to withstand pressure from the rest of the biological community. In such 
cases, in order to preserve appearances, attempts at competition have to be carried out 
without direct confrontations but, when possible, under the pretence of collaboration. 
 
Open-Mindedness  
Open-mindedness might seem an unlikely candidate for a social skill, as it concerns the 
ease with which researchers deal with new ideas, projects, methods and so forth. Yet, 
new ideas usually come from other people or tools for mass communication – colleagues, 
journals, conference talks, textbooks. An unwillingness to consider new and possibly 
different viewpoints could seriously damage the education of a researcher, barring him or 
her from considering alternative interpretations of a phenomenon or alternative strategies 
through which to study it. The very participation in Arabidopsis research was, for 
biologists joining at the beginning of the 1980s, a considerable gamble motivated by their 
ability to envisage the possible advantages and new opportunities offered by the new 
model organism (and, for animal biologists, for work on plants in general): the exercise 
of open-mindedness paid high dividends for people who took that decision. Also, we 
have seen in the previous section how peer-different collaboration now constitutes a main 
avenue towards developing integration among different areas of organismal biology: the 
construction of an integrative framework also requires, first and foremost, the ability to 
learn from colleagues working on one’s same topic with differing tools, perspectives and 
expertises. 
 
Patience and Dedication 
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The abilities to be patient and to persevere with the study of a single topic would seem, 
prima facie, to constitute good candidates for performative, rather than social, skills. In 
fact, I regard them as valuable in both senses. They help researchers to interact with their 
material environment in ways that are helpful to their gaining an understanding of a 
phenomenon, thus playing the role of performative skills (for instance, consider the 
patience displayed by a researcher in carefully sawing and growing Arabidopsis plants 
according to the protocols distributed by the NASC). Yet, they also enable researchers to 
absorb from their teachers, colleagues and students the theoretical and embodied 
knowledge that is necessary for them to perform their research, thus acting as a social 
skill. Training within scientific communities requires a great deal of patience and 
dedication, as does peer-difference collaboration (which includes a great amount of 
learning for all participating sides). Maarten Koornneef, now a central figure in 
Arabidopsis research, started his study of the plant at a time when few of his peers shared 
his conviction that plant molecular biology would eventually blossom. His patience and 
dedication over the first few years of his career in Wageningen paid off as soon as his 
results became known internationally, causing him and his lab to be hailed as a prominent 
source of data and expertise on Arabidopsis. Dedication is also visible in the case of 
Chris and Shauna Somerville, who devoted their whole life to uncovering the mysteries 
of plant biology. 
 
 
7.2.2 Social Skills Towards Communicating Understanding 
 
I have hitherto qualified understanding as a cognitive process that results from the skilful 
and efficient coordination of theoretical and embodied knowledge. Given its nature as a 
cognitive achievement, it thus seems strange to define such understanding as social in the 
sense of being communicable to others: rightly so, since there is no way, as far as I know, 
of ‘convincing’ someone to undergo the same cognitive process. Does this mean that the 
very idea of communicating understanding is unfeasible in my framework?  
 
The direct interpersonal exchange of scientific understanding is in my view unrealisable, 
in the same sense in which other cognitive processes (such as seeing, listening, thinking) 
cannot be directly taught to or exchanged with others. However, there is a sense in which 
an individual can provide others with tools that will help them to experience the same 
cognitive process as themselves. Take the case of seeing. We cannot teach someone to 
see a hare hiding in the grass: either it happens or it does not. However, we can teach 
someone what to see and when by, for instance, pointing in the direction of the hare, 
drawing it on a piece of paper (so as to allow our interlocutor to identify it) or directing 
him or her towards the hare (even if that would probably cause the hare to jump away). In 
other words, we can instruct someone on the conditions by which he or she might see 
what we do. The same is true of understanding: we cannot make someone understand 
something in the way we do, but we can provide tools that will help that person to 
understand a specific phenomenon in a way similar to the way in which we have 
understood it. In science, this corresponds to trying to express and communicate the skills 
and commitments adopted by an individual scientist to understand a specific 
phenomenon.  
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Of course, this means that there can never be certainty as to how exactly any individual 
understands something, nor as to whether a group of people who professes to share the 
same understanding actually does. Yet, this is true of any cognitive process (and indeed, 
philosophers of mind have long referred to this phenomenon as the ‘problem of other 
minds’). In the absence of a precise measurement tool, there seem to be only two 
guarantees of the quality of understanding acquired by an individual: one is the way in 
which her understanding of phenomena informs her interactions with others and with the 
material environment; the other, most interesting for my purposes, consists of 
reconstructing the conditions under which understanding has been acquired.  
 
Let me now list some of the social skills that enable researchers to share understanding 
with one another. 
 
Authority/Charisma 
Again, the powerful protagonists of Arabidopsis research provide an excellent example of 
how the exercise of authority, united with the ability to exude charisma, might go a long 
way towards facilitating the development and implementation of research programmes, 
the acquisition of funding and the recruitment of pupils (not to mention enhancing the 
sympathy of peers and collaborators towards one’s ideas and plans). As remarked by 
William Bechtel,  
There are both important social and cognitive components to the process by which 
scientists acquire the authoritative stature, which enables them to settle questions 
as what lines of investigations should be taken seriously and what techniques are 
appropriate. The social components include factors as the ability to interact with 
others in a manner that commands respect and to plot a course of action that will 
result in that respect. There are able practitioners of many research fields who 
lack such social capacities and consequently are handicapped in establishing 
authority. But there are also cognitive considerations in developing authority, 
such as successfully developing new techniques or respectable arguments for 
pursuing a line of research. (Bechtel 1993, 281) 
Both Sue Rhee and Sean May, whose daily activities I had the chance to observe, 
exercise remarkable authority on the members of their laboratories, which is essential 
towards securing a harmonious and efficient working environment. They also see 
themselves as responsible towards the many scientists making use of TAIR (in the case of 
Rhee) and NASC (in the case of May). Following on Bechtel’s argument, such a sense of 
responsibility is justified, given the great authority that they exercise (personally as well 
as through their scientific choices and claims) over the rest of the Arabidopsis 
community, particularly its periphery. They are responsible for developing tools, models 
and databases for use by any interested plant biologist: through this appointment, situated 
at the very institutional centre of the community, they influence the ways in which 
Arabidopsis researchers interact and perform experiments in fundamental ways.  
 
Personability 
A friendly and engaging personality is helpful to constructing good personal relations 
with one’s collaborators, as well as to extending one’s own network to include useful 
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acquaintances (such as, in the case of Chris Somerville, the friendship of James Watson, 
whose sympathy proved crucial to starting Arabidopsis research in the US on a massive 
scale). The ability to establish personal networks is useful in both competitive and 
collaborative research environments:  
 
Clarity in Exposition  
This is a skill that any reader of this thesis will find extremely useful: if I am unable to 
express my thoughts and motivate my actions in a clear and intelligible way, my chances 
of convincing you of my arguments are certain to diminish (if not to vanish entirely). The 
same is true in scientific discussions and writing. Clarity in exposing one’s ideas is a 
means towards the acquisition of authority, especially in the context of gatherings such as 
the yearly Arabidopsis Meeting, where hundreds of Arabidopsis researchers strive for 
their peers’ attention in order to advertise and discuss their ideas. This skill is also crucial 
in scientific debates and controversies, where problems are often due as much to 
ambiguities in premises and methods as they are due to actual dissent. Acquiring this skill 
is complicated by the predominance of the English language as the official lingo for 
scientific communication, a factor that certainly favours native English speakers with 
respect to individuals who have to learn to master a foreign language. The unrivalled 
status of Anglo-American research as the centre of the Arabidopsis community is no 
doubt also due to this issue. 
 
Trend-Watching 
When selecting research directions, techniques or model organisms, researchers need a 
sensitivity to upcoming trends both among their peers and among their sponsors. In other 
words, they need to be able to align themselves with powerful allies, in order to increase 
their chances of receiving funding or carrying out fruitful collaboration with other 
scientists. This does not necessarily mean giving up on one’s ideas if those ideas do not 
fit a pre-established paradigm. Rather, it means being able to phrase one’s own position 
and goals in the terms and perspective favoured in the larger community, without 
necessarily changing the content of one’s own proposals (or at least, not radically). This 
skill is especially evident in the uncanny ability of members of the Arabidopsis 
community to tap the most sensitive nerves of governmental funding policies: for 
instance, while the first decades of Arabidopsis research were largely blue-skies, 
Arabidopsis projects have long been advertised to the NSF as crucial to agronomic 
development.  
 
A combination of these skills, especially authority and planning, has been necessary to 
achieving the largely successful enforcement of the ethos of accessibility in the 
Arabidopsis community. Without the commitment of skilful individual researchers in 
power positions to enforce collaborative norms, it would have been impossible to 
establish the ideal to ‘share and survive’ among researchers used to the competitive 
strategies promoted in most other big science projects. In this way, the exercise of social 
skills contributed both to the divulgation of individual understanding and to making 
available the conditions under which such understanding is achieved in the first place.  
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7.3 Does Access to Knowledge Guarantee Understanding? A Critique of Critical 
Contextual Empiricism 
 
7.3.1 Epistemically Acceptable Knowledge 
 
Critical contextual empiricism, or CCE, is one of the labels given by Helen Longino to 
her views on scientific knowledge. The emphasis on empiricism stems from Longino’s 
long-held naturalist approach, by which she implies treating ‘the conditions of knowledge 
production by human cognitive agents, empirical rather than transcendental subjects, as 
the starting point for any philosophical theory of knowledge, scientific or otherwise’ 
(Longino 2002, 10). CCE builds on two insights developed by recent work within 
philosophy, history and sociology of science: the irreducible pluralism of explanatory 
practices
204
 (hence the adjective ‘contextual’) and the social nature of scientific practices, 
including theory-making and reasoning as well as experimentation, where ‘social’ 
indicates all modes of interactions leading to a revision of the beliefs held by all 
participants (hence the adjective ‘critical’). It is in this context that Longino tries to 
provide a definition of what scientists should regard as ‘epistemically acceptable 
knowledge’:  
 
Some content A is epistemically acceptable in community C at time t if A 
is supported by data d evident to C at t in light of reasoning and 
background assumptions that have survived critical scrutiny from as many 
perspectives as are available to C at t, and C is characterised by venues for 
criticism, uptake of criticism, public standards, and tempered equality of 
intellectual authority (Longino 2002,135). 
 
Longino is here building on the Mertonian tradition of articulating criteria for ‘good’ 
scientific practice, while at the same time upholding a Popperian trust in the power of 
effective criticism to improve scientific results. She proposes four norms that scientists 
should follow in order to secure discursive interactions and thus produce epistemically 
acceptable knowledge, all of which stress the conditions under which scientists can 
communicate (and criticise each other) freely and effectively. The first, venues for 
criticism, points to the necessity of instituting publicly available platforms for scholarly 
exchanges – such as journals and conferences. The second norm concerns the status and 
role of critiques in scientific discourse: uptake of criticism implies that making and 
debating critiques should be considered as important as producing new results, so as to 
force scientists to modify their arguments and results in view of their peers’ assessment 
of them. The third norm speaks for itself: without public standards, there would be no 
way to communicate and, most importantly, assess one’s findings in the light of the 
overall cognitive aims of the scientific community in question. Finally, Longino proposes 
tempered equality of intellectual authority: even in the face of differences among the 
cognitive capacities, training and institutional resources possessed by each researcher 
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 See Chapter 2, sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.1. 
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(hence the qualification ‘temperate’), there should be opportunities for all members of a 
given scientific community to express and debate their views and results.
205
  
 
Rather than relying, like Merton, on idealistic motivations, Longino gives a strongly 
pragmatic flavour to her view: in her eyes, adopting these regulative norms constitutes 
the only way towards creating reliable scientific knowledge. I here want to point out, 
however, that her view does not take account of a crucial ingredient for fruitful scientific 
debate: this is the necessity, for the participants in the discussion, to understand each 
other at least to some extent. As made clear in the preceding chapters, making the tools 
and concepts needed for understanding a phenomenon accessible to one or more 
scientific communities is not enough to secure understanding. Scientists need to learn 
how to use these tools, which in turn implies learning how to interact with members of 
the relevant communities: namely, there needs to be a constant balancing between 
accessibility of tools and education about their use and significance in view of the 
communities’ epistemic (and other) goals. Social skills play a crucial role in this context. 
Possessing the same social skills means being able to communicate with others in the first 
place; further, the exercise of the right social skills guarantees access to the theoretical 
and performative tools needed to conduct research on the phenomena of interest.  
 
Further, Longino’s disregard for the conditions under which understanding is obtained, 
and thus for the importance of social, theoretical and performative skills in the social 
production of scientific knowledge, leads her to overlook an even more urgent problem 
plaguing communication within and among research communities. This is the idea, 
illustrated in Chapter 5 and further elaborated in the next chapter, that different 
researchers might resort to different combinations of tools and skills in order to 
understand the same phenomena, thus acquiring different understandings of those 
phenomena. It is difficult to determine whether those different understandings are 
compatible with each other, and whether reliance on one rather than the other impacts the 
efficiency of scientific communications. Yet, these difficult questions need to be 
addressed by scholars who, like Longino, believe that constructive criticisms and 
dialogue among researchers are what makes scientific knowledge epistemically 
acceptable. Consider the case of two scientists from two different laboratories, both of 
which work on Arabidopsis metabolism, meeting up in order to discuss and compare their 
results. In accordance with Longino’s norms, the goal of their exchange is to improve 
each other’s understanding of plant metabolism. Yet, to reach that goal, they first need to 
acknowledge in which ways their understandings of metabolism differ, as well as the 
reasons for that difference. I have been arguing that the only way for each of these 
researchers to understand metabolism in the same way as the other is to acquire a similar 
set of theoretical and performative skills, which would allow them to perform the same 
experiments, reason in similar terms and ultimately share the experience of understanding 
the phenomenon in the same way. The scientific exchange between these two individuals 
thus presupposes much more than simply the ability to meet and talk to each other: they 
need to possess the social skills that will allow them to communicate their methods, tools 
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 As Longino notes, the ‘exclusion of women and members of certain racial minorities from scientific 
education and the scientific professions constitutes not only a social injustice but a cognitive failing’ (2002, 
132). 
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and skills to their interlocutor, with the goal of enabling her to experience the 
phenomenon in question in a way similar to their own.
206
   
 
In the next subsection, I shall try to analyse these issues with reference to Arabidopsis 
research, particularly by focusing on the relation between TAIR curators and the rest of 
the Arabidopsis community. I intend to demonstrate how Longino’s criterion for 
epistemically acceptable knowledge is insufficient to addressing the problems confronted 
by TAIR researchers, whose scientific goal is precisely to facilitate epistemic access to 
knowledge about Arabidopsis. My analysis of communication dynamics between TAIR 
and its users illustrates that a common, or shared, understanding is very difficult to 
achieve and assess, thus making of scientific understanding (and the conditions under 
which it is achieved) a topic of major importance to social epistemology in science.  
 
 
7.3.2 Reality Check: TAIR and the Arabidopsis Community 
 
Let me start from the observation that the ethos of accessibility characterising 
Arabidopsis research, and especially the TAIR project, conforms perfectly to Longino’s 
four CCE norms. Concerning venues, Arabidopsis researchers are certainly encouraged to 
frequently attend conferences and meetings in order to hear what others are doing in their 
fields and present their own work. These conferences are organised on a monthly basis at 
the national level and of course there is the International Arabidopsis Meeting, which 
draws thousands of Arabidopsis researchers together every year. Further, the community 
as a whole places emphasis on building public platforms for data exchange, such as TAIR 
and other databases, newsletters, Arabidopsis mailing lists, books, journals and, most 
recently, even blogs. Finally, we have seen how the free exchange of data (also at pre-
publication stage), seed stocks and instruments is encouraged in the community. The 
requirement of uptake of criticism also seems to be amply satisfied. TAIR curators are 
constantly trying to encourage critical feedback from TAIR users (as already noted, one 
of the curators is actually specialised in education and outreach), as are the stock centres 
NASC and ABRC. Various groups in the community are also busy trying to establish 
comparative studies with other plant/animal model communities, thus exposing their 
work to evaluations by peers from varying social and scientific contexts. As to tempered 
equality, we have seen that the organisation of Arabidopsis research as centralised big 
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 The requirement of at least partial overlap between two researcher’s understanding of a phenomenon, in 
order for them to be able to exchange critiques and information, is in contrast with the description of 
‘trading’ among scientists put forward by Peter Galison. Galison argues that researchers coming from 
different epistemic cultures do not need to understand each other’s view of the phenomena under scrutiny 
in order to exchange information about them from their respective viewpoints. As an example, he takes the 
case of experimentalist and theoretical cultures in particle physics: while experimenters provide data to 
theoreticians, he notes, theoreticians provide experimenters with testable hypotheses; yet, for this exchange 
to take place, experimenters do not need to understand phenomena in the same way as theoreticians, and 
vice versa (Galison 1999, 152). I take issue with this description. In the biological sciences, boundaries 
between epistemic cultures have mostly to do with changes in the way to understand a given phenomenon, 
rather than (as Galison proposes) with different research goals (e.g. experimental versus instrument-making 
versus theory-making): and in most cases, researchers need to confront the nature of those changes (thus 
managing to compare their approach with others) in order to be able to fruitfully communicate with 
biologists trained in other cultures.  
 218
science might pose a threat to the equal distribution of resources and power among 
participants to the community. However, it is also true that both the MASC and the EU 
hold regular meetings trying to ensure that all participating groups, also the ones that are 
not working at the level of molecular or system biology, be granted attention and funding. 
Finally, there can be no qualms with the way in which the Arabidopsis community 
creates and enforces public standards. The pursuit of integration as a prominent research 
goal, as well as the elaboration of common terminology and frameworks (such as in GO 
and PO consortia) and the incentives towards interdisciplinary research make the 
Arabidopsis community a role model for good planning and successful implementation of 
standards allowing participants to communicate with each other – certainly in the 
biological sciences, where the absence of public standards is notorious and conspicuous.  
 
In short, it seems that the Arabidopsis community is doing its best, given its size and 
breadth of research interests, to comply with the norms of CCE. TAIR, in particular, 
incorporates and actively tries to respect all four norms. Does this make it into an ideal 
scientific community, where knowledge is produced via critical confrontation of a 
plurality of perspectives and is thus, in Longino’s definition, epistemically acceptable? I 
would like to argue that this is not the case, since the contents of their research remain 
largely uncriticised and unquestioned. As I already pointed out, this has nothing to do 
with TAIR researchers’ eagerness to establish platforms for critical exchanges with their 
users. The TAIR site offers numerous ways to contact TAIR curators with questions and 
suggestions. Incoming queries are dealt with swiftly, with replies being posted online so 
as to be available to anyone interested in the same issue. Yet, the few questions pouring 
in are ones of clarification or concerning technical details (e.g. ‘I want data’, ‘I don’t 
understand this tool’, ‘I can’t find this tool’, ‘Please include this info’, and so forth), 
rather than questions concerning the conceptual, interpretive and empirical content of the 
database.  
 
There are many reasons for the lack of critical attitude among TAIR users. Sue Rhee 
observes that most researchers are not used to extensive collaboration with others, but 
rather are trained to work as much as possible with small groups of people, so as to get 
personal credit for their results.
207
 This means that most biologists do not appreciate the 
ethos driving projects such as bio-ontologies and databases, i.e. the idea to contribute and 
share data rather than simply profiting from existing resources in order to develop new 
insight in their own specialised problems. More generally, this can be seen as a 
fundamental tension between specialists, that is researchers focusing their work on very 
specific phenomena (and thus restricting their skills to the mastery and development of 
tools and skills relevant only to that context), and generalists, that is researchers needing 
to understand as many phenomena as possible (thus acquiring a diverse set of skills and 
tools), in order to achieve a more global view of their subject and employ that bird’s eye 
perspective to construct tools towards enhancing integration. TAIR curators, who need to 
know about several aspects of Arabidopsis biology in order to curate Arabidopsis data, 
constitute a good example of this second category. However, such a generalist outlook 
tends to be stigmatised by the broader biological community, where specialist knowledge 
is held to be of much higher value. This preference is rooted in pragmatic considerations. 
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 Interview held on 17 August 2004. 
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Publishable discoveries (the ones counting as ‘cutting-edge research’) are much easier to 
obtain within very specialised domains than through encyclopaedic knowledge of a series 
of phenomena. Projects guaranteed to bring swift results within a narrow domain are 
what counts as cutting-edge research: they receive funding more easily and frequently 
than projects concerning broad questions that require long-term sponsorship and 
constitute a much riskier investment, as the proposed goals are more ambitious and thus 
more difficult to achieve. Consequently, researchers shy away from a generalist training, 
which is seen as unlikely to attract funding as well as scientific success.  
 
This situation has two main implications. On the one hand, generalist knowledge tends to 
be pursued by a very small set of researchers, whose work is viewed as a ‘service’ 
provided to deserving specialist users.
208
 The reliability and accessibility of such services 
is taken for granted by users, thus making it hard for TAIR researchers to ask for 
collaboration from the rest of the biological community towards improving and refining 
their tools.
209
 On the other hand, specialists trained to focus on a very narrow set of 
phenomena lose the ability (in fact, the skills) to critically assess knowledge accumulated 
by specialists in other fields. It thus becomes difficult for them to assess the research 
towards integration carried out by TAIR workers, or to reason about a project as 
ambitious as the GO (which they see not so much as providing the foundations for their 
own research, but as summarising discoveries that already took place – thus disregarding 
the impact that such formalisation of biological knowledge could have on their own 
research
210
). Not only do Arabidopsis researchers lack the willingness to provide 
constructive critiques to TAIR contents and conceptual framework: they also, arguably, 
lack the skills enabling them to do so.  
 
Lack of active participation and feedback from TAIR users means that TAIR curators 
lack sources of criticisms to their work, which, in accordance with Longino’s 
observations, greatly diminishes the epistemic value of the knowledge that they assemble. 
It also means that TAIR curators take significant decisions on how to portray Arabidopsis 
research, thus, as I remarked in the previous section, strengthening the divide between 
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 Interview with Doug Becker, programmer at TAIR, held on 18 August 2004.  
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 Interestingly, the Open Bio Ontology projects, including GO, also suffer from such stigmatisation as 
‘mere services’ and are not generally regarded as involving actual biological research (interviews to GO 
team held in Stanford, CA on 21 August 2004). Sociologist James Evans also regards TAIR scientists as 
outcasts from the larger biological community, precisely for the generalist, service-related nature of their 
research (pers.comm.): TAIR members themselves acknowledge that such stigmatisation will make it hard 
for them to get research jobs after the TAIR project is completed. Remarkably in terms of gender 
(in)balance, the great majority of researchers currently busy in curating databases and bio-ontologies for 
model organism communities are women: a situation that might indicate the persistence of gender 
stereotypes within scientific research, with women more willing than men to take on jobs that are 
indispensable to the community, yet bringing little recognition or rewards.  
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 Recall from Chapter 5 that TAIR data are largely gathered through compiling and organising data from 
existing published literature and protocols. This means that curators take great liberty in interpreting and 
selecting data that they deem appropriate to describe specific phenomena. Arabidopsis scientists do not 
recognise the extent to which data are interpreted and manipulated within TAIR (through what I called 
‘vision’ in section 5.2.1): they use it as a neutral source of data, rather than actively contributing to the 
database by verifying the accuracy of the published data, the credibility and usefulness of the visualisations 
offered by TAIR curators and the possible improvements on the dataset.  
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central loci of Arabidopsis research and peripheral locations where such decisions are 
accepted rather than contested. Paradoxically, TAIR risks to become an ‘epistemic elite’ 
with monopolised and unchallenged control over the structure, content and functioning of 
what is tacitly recognised as ‘common knowledge of Arabidopsis biology’ by the whole 
community.
211
  
 
TAIR researchers are actually well aware of the risks posed by the lack of interaction 
with much of the Arabidopsis community. They attempt to correct this tendency through 
two main strategies: (i) making the representations and practices that foster the 
understanding - and thus, the further development - of the database and its conceptual 
basis accessible to all participants; and (ii) establishing measures to check that a minimal 
level of understanding of how TAIR works and on which assumptions is actually 
achieved among TAIR users. Among the steps taken to pursue strategy (i), we already 
found: 
- the development of guidelines, freely available online, illustrating how TAIR 
works; 
- collaboration with stock centres to make specimens of Arabidopsis easily 
retrievable; 
- publication of proceedings from GO meetings and curators’ meetings, so as to 
make deliberations on terminology, parameters and family relations to be adopted 
as accountable and transparent as possible;
212
  
- collaboration in the development of The Arabidopsis Book (overview of 
theoretical developments across local research contexts; see section 4.3); 
- small expert meetings (e.g. GO content meetings); 
- choosing curators that possess a variety of different specialist understandings, 
while keeping in mind ‘what the user wants’.   
The realisation of strategy (ii) is more complex, since it involves using monitoring 
systems and communication channels that simply do not yet exist between Arabidopsis 
researchers and TAIR researchers. TAIR curators are currently working on alliances with 
major journals in plant biology, which would make gene annotations compulsory for 
submissions (just like keywords) and thus alert researchers to the importance of 
classifying their work in the terms chosen by TAIR. Also, some members of the team are 
busy with special training programmes on bioinformatics, annotation procedures and GO, 
as well as a campaign for inserting bioinformatic skills in educational programmes of 
BSc curricula in biology.  
 
I would argue that Longino could learn much from TAIR scientists’ concerns. TAIR 
curators are aware that following Longino’s four norms is not enough to secure 
epistemically acceptable knowledge, because they witness how, despite the fulfilment of 
these norms within the Arabidopsis community at large, constructive communication and 
critical exchange among Arabidopsis researchers is still scarce – especially when it 
comes to the tools, models and concepts that they all have to agree upon in order to carry 
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 This is especially true since, as we saw, TAIR members collaborate closely with (and are based in the 
same location as) some of the most powerful members of the MASC.  
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 This archival documentation is available for free at www.biocurator.org.  
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our their research.
213
 Longino’s framework thus fails to confront a crucial issue in social 
epistemology: that is, ‘the problem of common representation in diverse intersecting 
social worlds’ (Star and Griesemer, 1989). Longino’s failure represents an important 
finding for my current purposes. In my view, the knowledge produced by the Arabidopsis 
community can be deemed as epistemically acceptable (as in Longino’s definition) only 
if its members are both able and willing to critically assess the body of knowledge that 
the community produces, in light of its epistemic goals, as well as the role of their own 
contribution towards such achievement. TAIR researchers have long noticed that, in 
order for researchers to effectively critique each other’s work and thus improve the 
quality of knowledge in their community, they need to be able to understand each other. 
Such understanding can only be acquired through recourse to similar skills and 
experiences: this means that participants in a research community, no matter their 
specialisation, should be given a minimal set of skills (in the form of training and 
exposure to diverse research activities) for understanding their own research in the light 
of the research efforts and results of the whole community. Researchers need to be 
trained in ways appropriate to facilitate their dialogue with members of epistemic cultures 
different from their own: the possibility of establishing such common understanding 
depends greatly on the social skills of individuals, since it is through social skills that 
they acquire the performative and theoretical skills that will enable them to experience 
phenomena in ways similar to their peers. The ‘share and survive’ motto of Sue Rhee 
should not imply a mere commitment to making all data freely and easily accessible; it 
should also imply a commitment to train as many scientists as possible to make the best 
of those tools and data. This is an insight that has been picked up and emphasised in 
TAIR itself; yet, it receives almost no attention in Longino’s framework, which is 
arguably too far removed from scientists’ practices to take account of the work and skills 
needed to acquire understanding, as well as the differences in understanding that could 
derive from differences in skills, experiences and labour distribution within any one 
scientific community.  
 
Ultimately, Longino falls into the same trap in which Hempel fell half a century ago: she 
does not acknowledge that the mere availability of knowledge does not guarantee 
understanding. Her choice of norms enforces openness and critical exchange among 
scientists: she does not, however, have anything to say about the manner in which such 
exchanges should take place. She does not show interest in whether researchers are 
talking past each other or employing standards, skills and tools so different that 
communication, even if it exists, does not really lead to acquiring a better awareness of 
how others understand phenomena: what matters in her framework is that researchers can 
physically meet, spend their time in conversations or in studying other people’s work, 
and confront their peers if they feel that they should. Longino does not say anything 
about the quality of communication among scientists: in particular, she does not talk of 
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 Longino might object that the communication problems encountered within the Arabidopsis community 
can be accounted for within her view, insofar as they are due to disregard for the norm ‘uptake of 
criticism’. However, Longino’s definition of uptake of criticism does not set any criteria for what counts as 
a valuable criticism and, even more important, for what counts as a valuable form of uptake. Thus, in a 
superficial sense, Arabidopsis researchers show respect for the norm by constantly exchanging information 
and modifying their work accordingly. Yet, this type of uptake is not necessarily based on a shared 
understanding and thus does not necessarily lead to the wished-for meaningful critical discourse.  
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the impact that diverse research conditions might have on each individual’s 
understanding of the same phenomena. I see this as a major omission. In order for these 
norms to work according to Longino’s wishes, researchers need to respect a basic 
requirement: they need to try to acquaint themselves with the skills and knowledge used 
by others in order to understand a phenomenon. To criticise each other’s views, they have 
to acquire an awareness of how the other understands phenomena: only on that basis can 
researchers compare their understanding and the other’s, assess whether they are in any 
way compatible and to which extent the differences in results are dictated by differences 
in the conditions under which they carry out their research. 
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Chapter 8. Committing to understand 
 
The recognition of a person in the performance of a skill 
or in the conduct of a game of chess is intrinsic to the 
understanding of these matters. We must surmise that we 
are faced with some coordinated performance, before we 
can even try to understand it, and must go on trying to 
pick out the features that are essential to the 
performance, with a view to the action felt to be at work 
with it   
        Michael Polanyi 1966, 30 
 
8.1 Scientific Understanding in Biology (and Beyond?) 
 
This final chapter has the predictable function of bringing together the various threads of 
my analysis of scientific understanding. Less predictably, I also aim to highlight some 
implications of my views, including the relation between scientific understanding and 
other types of understanding, as well as between understanding and knowledge (section 
8.1.1); the extent to which my perspective is compatible with the one offered by a 
prominent contributor to the contemporary debate on scientific understanding, Henk de 
Regt (section 8.1.2); and the ways in which some of my results could be developed as a 
contribution to biology itself, in the 'complementary' fashion proposed in Chapter 4 
(section 8.4). The most important goal of this chapter, however, is to elaborate on the 
philosophical significance of my analysis of biological understanding as achieved by 
Arabidopsis researchers. I develop a novel perspective on the relation between epistemic 
skills and what I call research commitments (section 8.2), which in my view helps to 
clarify the differences among three main kinds of scientific understanding, which I 
identify in section 8.3 as theoretical, embodied and integrated understanding. Particular 
attention is devoted to integrated understanding and its role in contemporary model 
organism research (section 8.3.2). 
 
 
8.1.1 The Result of a Well-Coordinated Performance 
 
Lack of clarity about the nature of understanding and the conditions under which it is 
acquired generates confusion with regard to the differences separating the notion of 
understanding from the one of explanation. As I outlined in Chapter 2, many 
philosophers of science believe these two notions to be epistemologically equivalent. 
Consider for instance the tentative definition of scientific understanding provided by 
Lacey in 1999: ‘understanding reality involves grasping the ‘what?’, the ‘why’, and the 
‘what possible?’ of phenomena’ (95). Lacey develops his claim through an analysis of the 
nature and possible answers to ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘what possible’ questions: he then 
investigates the types of explanations through which understanding is achieved and 
assumes, as many other philosophers have done, that an investigation of explanatory 
strategies will lead to a philosophical understanding of how scientists understand natural 
phenomena.  
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I see Lacey’s strategy as misguided, as it focuses on the objects and results of 
understanding rather than on the process of understanding as such and the conditions 
under which it takes place. This does not mean that the nature of the phenomena to be 
understood, as well as of the tools, theories and models used to gain such understanding, 
do not impact the quality of the understanding that is obtained: in Chapters 5 and 6 I have 
examined precisely how models and theories are used as tools to understand phenomena 
– and how, depending on the selected combination of tools, scientists’ understanding of 
the same phenomenon might change. Rather, I am claiming that Lacey’s approach does 
not consider a crucial philosophical issue in the study of understanding, that is, the 
meaning of the term ‘grasping’ used in his definition. Regardless of the specific nature of 
the answers given to scientific questions, what is it that makes us able to grasp their 
relevance to our understanding of phenomena?
214
 My analysis of understanding as 
obtained by (plant) biologists tried to address precisely this question. I am now in a 
position to discuss my findings and their epistemological implications in a systematic 
fashion, thus sketching a philosophical account of the nature of scientific understanding 
by reference to the conditions under which it is acquired in the life sciences.  
 
In my view, scientific understanding is a cognitive achievement resulting from 
performing a series of actions (including both mental actions, such as thinking, and 
bodily actions, such as ways of moving and interventions on phenomena). The 
performance of such actions needs to be skilful: biologists seeking understanding of a 
natural phenomenon need to master theoretical, performative and social skills that will 
help them to adequately reason about, interact with and share knowledge about that 
phenomenon (often through the correct handling of theories, models and instruments). 
This is because the exercise of skills enables biologists to acquire and coordinate 
theoretical and embodied knowledge about the phenomenon under scrutiny in a manner 
that is adequate to the material, scientific and social environment in which they find 
themselves. Such coordination is what ultimately grants a scientific understanding of the 
phenomenon. Knowing a theory about a phenomenon does not suffice to understand it, as 
understanding springs from knowing how to apply such theory to the phenomenon and 
thus use it as a platform for further investigations. Similarly, knowing how to manipulate 
some material features of a phenomenon (such as a Columbia specimen in the case of 
plant biology) does not imply having an understanding of it. At least some theoretical 
knowledge, including concepts appropriate to the categorisation of and reflection upon 
sense-perception and data gathered through measuring instruments, is needed to 
systematise and order information accumulated through interaction with the phenomenon 
as well as to recognise how previously accumulated biological knowledge applies to that 
phenomenon. 
 
The prominence of scientists’ skills and experiences in achieving such coordination 
between thoughts and actions, conceptual analysis and sense-perceptions, effectively 
separates the understanding thus obtained from the mere possession of theoretical 
knowledge in the form of an explanation. Theoretical knowledge, per se, does not provide 
biologists with the theoretical and performative skills needed to trace its significance for 
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 To Lacey, ‘grasping’ means ‘possessing an account of’: his account thus falls in the category of 
philosophical positions trying to reduce understanding to explanation (see section 2.1.2). 
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natural phenomena. This is the sense in which, as I stated in my introduction, the 
possession of theoretical knowledge in the form of theories or explanations does not 
automatically imply the ability to use such knowledge to understand phenomena. In fact, 
I would like to push my argument further: in science, to ‘know’ implies not only to 
possess theoretical knowledge, but also to be able to use it towards understanding actual 
phenomena. The ability to use theoretical knowledge to that aim is granted by embodied 
knowledge, and particularly by components of embodied knowledge that I called 
epistemic skills. Possessing skills relevant to coordinating theoretical and embodied 
knowledge of phenomena is thus a prerequisite for an individual to declare that he or she 
‘knows’ something about such phenomena: scientific knowledge without understanding 
amounts to a mindless reading of unintelligible concepts and data, and should therefore 
not be considered as adequate knowledge.
215
 In short, understanding constitutes a 
precondition for the acquisition of scientific knowledge: it is not acceptable for scientists 
to declare that they know something about a phenomenon (for instance, an explanation of 
a behaviour or a physiological process displayed by a specific organism), unless they 
possess skills enabling them to understand that phenomenon in the light of such 
knowledge.   
 
The skilful coordination of theoretical and embodied knowledge is crucial to 
understanding phenomena in two ways: (1) as I illustrated when analysing modeling 
practices in Chapter 6 (section 6.4), it allows biologists to select beliefs, thought 
processes and experiences that are relevant to the phenomenon in question and (2) it 
enables biologists to successfully integrate these components with the goal of applying 
them to the phenomenon.
216
 
 
Let me exemplify how my views apply to the case of a biologist seeking to understand a 
specific phenomenon in Arabidopsis biology: for instance, the phenomenon of growth 
regulation, that is the process by which a plant ‘decides’ when and in which size to 
develop roots, stem, leaves and (if at all applicable) flowers and fruits. Attempts to 
understand the complex processes underlying growth regulation in plants have been at the 
centre of (among others, Meyerowitz’s) Arabidopsis research since its inception. This is 
hardly surprising: making sense of how plants germinate seeds, metabolise nutrition and 
develop leaves, flowers and roots is essential to being able to intervene in their 
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 Note that this approach is different from the definition of knowledge as ‘justified, true belief’ that stands 
at the centre of many an epistemological discussion. An in-depth analysis of the implications of my 
argument for this view would require a second dissertation and I will therefore not pursue it here. I shall 
only point out that, while not necessarily incompatible with it, my definition of adequate knowledge differs 
from the standard definition of knowledge as justified, true belief in two main respects. On the one hand, it 
highlights the difficulties in establishing what amounts to a ‘justified’ belief in science (a feature that is not 
emphasised within general epistemology, where the actual conditions under which scientific beliefs can be 
considered as justified are rarely the object of critical scrutiny). On the other hand, it emphasises the 
experience and abilities of the knower, as well as the circumstances and aims towards which knowledge is 
acquired, as important characteristics of the nature of scientific knowledge, rather than just of its context of 
application. In this sense, my approach follows in the steps of the early pragmatist tradition.  
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 Galison uses the expression ‘coordination of action and belief’ to describe the interaction between 
experimentalist and theoretical culture in physics (1997, Chapter 9). The practices to which he refers 
constitute, in my eyes, an excellent case for the analysis of understanding that I propose here, even if my 
emphasis on theoretical and embodied knowledge is largely unrelated to Galison’s account. 
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development and modify it as required by private or public sponsors. Current research 
has acquired a good level of knowledge especially concerning the molecular bases for 
this phenomenon: that is, the biochemical pathways through which signals regulating 
growth are sent to responsible organelles throughout any given plant. Accessing such 
knowledge is relatively easy. Our biologist needs only to open a textbook on plant 
development to find that much of growth regulation takes place thanks to one single 
gaseous hormone called ethylene. Ethylene acts as an endogenous regulator of plant 
growth and development via a process called ‘ethylene signal transduction’. Thanks to 
this process, germinating seeds (grown in the dark) become sensitive to the level of 
ethylene in the environment, which can change dramatically depending on environmental 
conditions. Plants learn to respond to ethylene levels with a range of inhibiting or 
stimulating responses. Thus, the ability to measure ethylene levels becomes a way for 
plants to identify and prepare for all sorts of environmental stresses, from pathogen 
attacks to flooding. Further, specific quantities of ethylene also signal the presence and 
eventual competitive advantage of other plants in the neighbourhood (for instance, 
whether there are very tall plants nearby, which are therefore likely to steal all the 
sunlight): the plant is therefore able to regulate the timing as well as the size of growth 
processes in accordance with environmental variations (e.g., plants would not bear 
flowers in very low temperatures and would develop strong stems and roots if they 
perceive their environment to be particularly competitive). 
 
Now, it may seem that this explanation of growth regulation enriches one’s 
understanding of this phenomenon without recourse to specific background knowledge 
and skills. Even readers who have no training in biology should have understood 
something about growth regulation from reading the above paragraph. However, what 
kind of understanding is this? I would suggest that the understanding gathered thanks to 
the above explanation is extremely superficial and vague, unless: (1) we are aware of the 
definitions attributed by plant molecular biologists to the terms ‘response’, ‘transduction 
signal’, ‘competitive advantage’ and ‘biochemical pathways’; (2) we know what parts of 
plant morphology are identified via the terms ‘stem’, ‘root’ and ‘seeds’, as well as which 
parts of the plant are involved in realising the process of signal transduction; (3) most 
importantly, we are able to bring together our awareness of how the plant is structured 
with the concepts and processes specified above, thus effectively understanding how 
precisely ethylene signal transduction takes place and what are its effects on the plant. 
Rephrased in the terminology that I introduced so far, point (1) represents what I call 
theoretical knowledge; point (2) corresponds to embodied knowledge about the 
phenomenon at hand; and point (3) refers to the ‘coordination of theoretical and 
embodied knowledge’ that I indicated as an essential condition for understanding the 
phenomenon.  
 
What about skills? In my example, the use of skills already comes to the fore: it is clear 
that, in order to be able to use the relevant knowledge, we must possess theoretical skills 
enabling us to reason through theories about mutation responses and transduction, as well 
as performative skills deriving from interaction with the plant and, possibly, the handling 
of illustrations (pictorial models) representing the process of ethylene reception. Yet, the 
importance of exercising specialised skills, which can only be acquired through scientific 
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training and research experience, is not obviously implied here. This is actually because 
the explanation that I gave above is not the explanation of growth regulation that you 
would find in a basic biology textbook: it is my ‘translation’ from biological jargon to 
something closer to everyday terminology, which I carried out precisely to allow non-
biologically-trained readers to acquire some common-sense understanding of the 
phenomenon that the explanation is meant to illustrate. Contrast my simplified 
explanation of the role of ethylene in growth regulation with the following excerpt from 
an introductory chapter in The Arabidopsis Textbook, summarising recent findings on 
ethylene in what biologists would regard as extremely simple terms: 
 
Ethylene affects many processes throughout the plant's growth and 
development, but most of these effects are cumbersome to use for a mutant 
screen. For example, although ethylene modulates the timing of leaf 
senescence in Arabidopsis, it is not required for the senescence syndrome to 
occur. Thus, mutant isolation in Arabidopsis has relied almost exclusively 
upon one mutant screen: the triple response. Dark-grown seedlings exhibit 
several phenotypic responses to ethylene that are collectively termed the 
“triple response’. The triple response in Arabidopsis seedlings is 
characterized by a shortened and thickened hypocotyl, an inhibition of root 
elongation, and the formation of an exaggerated apical hook. These features 
contrast sharply with the etiolated phenotype observed in dark-grown 
seedlings exposed to air. The readily distinguishable phenotype and the 
ability to screen thousands of seedlings on a Petri dish have greatly facilitated 
the identification of mutants that affect ethylene signalling in Arabidopsis. 
Mutations isolated using a screen for an altered triple-response to ethylene 
fall into two main classes: (1) mutations that render a plant insensitive to 
ethylene; and (2) mutations that result in a constitutive ethylene response. 
Ethylene-insensitive mutants display a similar phenotype when grown in 
ethylene to what they display in air. Examples of ethylene-insensitive mutants 
are etr1-1, a gain-of-function mutation in an ethylene receptor, and ein2, a 
loss-of-function mutation in one element of the signal transduction pathway. 
Constitutive ethylene-response mutants display a triple response in both air 
and ethylene. A constitutive ethylene response can result from ethylene over-
production (eto mutants). Alternatively, mutations in the signal transduction 
pathway can also lead to a constitutive ethylene response as has been found 
with the ctr1 mutant. (Shaller and Kieber 2002, 1)
217
 
 
                                                
217
 For reasons of space, I have eliminated all references to landmark papers that peppered every line of this 
short excerpt (e.g. ‘[Kende 1993]’). I eliminated 10 references in total. This does not mean that the 
availability of references is not relevant towards the biological understanding of growth regulation to be 
acquired through reading this paragraph. A biologists reading it is likely to possess theoretical, 
performative and social skills allowing him to relate the text to the actual discoveries and experiments 
made by each of the persons cited, thus greatly enhancing the theoretical and embodied knowledge that the 
biologist coordinates towards understanding the phenomenon. The ability to interpret references is thus per 
se a sign of the gulf between the understanding of plant growth regulation acquired from such a paragraph 
by a trained biologist and the (little) understanding acquired by a layperson with no adequate epistemic 
skills.   
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In my view, understanding the phenomenon of plant growth regulation through reference 
to this passage implies a series of theoretical and embodied skills that can only be 
acquired through training in molecular biology as well as experience in experimental 
research on Arabidopsis signal transduction pathways. I defy a reader who possesses 
none of such skills to understand this phenomenon to a level acceptable in order to be 
able to communicate with biologists, further research on this topic and manipulate plants 
according to this knowledge. How would this be possible, unless one knows what a 
mutant screen is, what it looks like and how it is isolated experimentally; how to observe 
and evaluate the ‘formation of an exaggerated apical hook’; or how to distinguish an 
etiolated from a non-etiolated seed phenotype among the hundreds visible from a Petri 
dish? In fact, I readily admit to not possessing such an understanding myself, despite the 
time spent in Arabidopsis laboratories and studying Arabidopsis papers: my theoretical 
and embodied skills, as well as my background knowledge about plant biology, are not 
enough for me to be able to use information such as the explanation above to understand 
the phenomenon of plant growth regulation in the same ways as trained biologists would. 
I would not be able to use my understanding of this phenomenon to investigate it further 
and share my findings with other researchers: in short, my understanding is not scientific, 
as it does not allow me to contribute to biological research on the phenomenon of interest 
by employing biologists’ skills, methods and knowledge.
218
      
 
This example shows that, as I specified in the last chapter, there is a difference between 
understanding a phenomenon scientifically and understanding it in other ways: a 
scientific understanding of a phenomenon presupposes acquaintance and mastery of 
specialised tools, skills, concepts and methods that are used within scientific communities 
producing knowledge about that phenomenon. Further, this example illustrates how the 
ability to understand a phenomenon is crucial to the claim of possessing knowledge about 
that phenomenon. This is a useful reminder that much of science, and certainly much of 
biology, is concerned primarily with understanding phenomena, rather than with 
producing theoretical knowledge in the form of theories and explanations. Theoretical 
knowledge is an indispensable tool towards acquiring understanding of phenomena: it is 
not an end in itself, nor is it a sufficient tool to that aim - since, as we have seen, it needs 
to be skilfully coordinated with embodied knowledge in order to provide such 
understanding.  
 
Note that this conclusion opens up several interesting questions concerning the status of 
scientific understanding with respect to other types of understanding obtained through the 
exercise of different skills (such as philosophical, political or literary understandings of 
phenomena). For instance, does the fact that I do not understand growth regulation in a 
scientific manner imply that my understanding of this phenomenon is wrong, superficial 
or useless – or that I, as a philosopher, would not be able to contribute to a scientific 
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 It could be argued that my familiarity with biologists’ tools and terminology allows me to gain a partial 
or incomplete scientific understanding of the role of ethylene in plant biology. Such partial understanding 
may in fact be viewed as a necessary condition for performing complementary science. Yet, here I do not 
wish to focus my arguments on the degrees of scientific understanding (e.g. poor or good) possessed by any 
one individual; rather, I want to focus on the qualitative differences between kinds of understanding that 
can be found both within science and between scientific and other human activities. 
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discussion on these findings by employing skills differing from the ones adopted by 
biologists? I do not think so, as clearly indicated by my stance on complementary science 
(Chapter 4). What I want to point out is that the scientific understanding of a 
phenomenon is the result of the correct application of a number of skills, depending on 
the scientific context to which such understanding is supposed to contribute. This does 
not make other types of understanding, obtained with other types of skills, useless or 
irrelevant to science. Indeed, science might be argued to represent only one of many ways 
in which the same phenomenon can be understood: which type of understanding (e.g. 
scientific, political, aesthetic, popular, literary) is most helpful depends on the context in 
which the phenomenon is being analysed, as well as the purposes of the analysis. For 
instance, there is no doubt that my scientific understanding of growth regulation is very 
scarce compared to the scientific understanding obtained by a trained biologist 
specialised in this field of inquiry; as a result, it might be claimed that I do not have much 
knowledge of this phenomenon. On the other hand, my philosophical skills enable me to 
reconstruct the methods by which such scientific understanding is achieved. My 
philosophical understanding of Arabidopsis research hopefully sheds light on aspects of 
such research that biologists tend not to think about, or anyhow not systematically. I 
might thus contribute something to science even without possessing a scientific 
understanding of phenomena. Further, each individual might possess skills that allow him 
or her to understand the same phenomena in different ways. Hence, a biologist is not 
condemned to a ‘purely’ scientific understanding of a certain phenomenon simply 
because she possesses and exercises the relevant skills: she might also be able to 
understand her own practice philosophically and refine this second type of understanding 
by discussing and reading philosophy.  
 
A second sphere of inquiry triggered by my position concerns the nature of scientific 
knowledge as such. If it is indeed the case that understanding is a prerequisite for 
possessing knowledge, can people without scientific training ever gain any knowledge of 
nature through science? This question brings me back to an issue I raised already in 
Chapter 2, concerning the internalist nature of my account. To which extent do we need 
particular kinds of expertise in order to understand and evaluate the results of scientific 
inquiries? In order to reflect on this question, I propose that we distinguish the types of 
understanding (and knowledge) needed to contribute to science itself from the types of 
understanding (and knowledge) needed to assess the significance of scientific (and 
technological) results for sociological, political, economic or theological issues. In the 
latter case, more than a scientific understanding of the phenomena is needed: for instance, 
an individual might understand how a plant is genetically modified, yet not how such 
intervention impacts on national economy or local ecology once GMOs are cultivated on 
a large scale. To assess the social implications of scientific findings, a variety of 
understandings is required of which scientific understanding is only one type: there is 
thus a wide space for scientists and non-scientists to interact and exchange expertise and 
opinions. The case of understanding aimed at contributing to science is different. It could 
be argued that such understanding is, by and large, scientific, as it is achieved mostly by 
individuals trained and socialised to study the phenomena under scrutiny. This does not 
imply that individuals who do not possess scientific understanding of specific phenomena 
are entirely unable to contribute to scientific research on those phenomena. Take, for 
 230
instance, current investigations of avian influenza, encompassing its actual and potential 
distribution and the probability of human contagion. Understanding the features of the 
virus, and thus deliberating on the implied health risks for humans and other animals, 
requires skills such as bird-watching and knowledge concerning the behaviour and 
movements of birds in the wild and in (not entirely industrialised) farms. These skills and 
knowledge are not acquired through scientific training, but through years of hands-on 
experience in farming and/or bird watching – and in fact, scientists investigating avian 
influenza capitalise on the contribution of farmers and bird-watchers to their 
investigations. These contributions by non-scientists are certainly valuable to scientific 
research; yet, they can arguably be dubbed as scientific knowledge only once they are 
tested and extended through scientific methods, as well as integrated with theoretical and 
embodied knowledge of viruses and disease.  
 
A full discussion of this topic and its implications would require more than a mere 
dissertation. What I want to do here is simply to point at the range and potential 
significance of philosophical questions emerging from my views on understanding.
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8.1.2 Similarities and Contrasts With De Regt’s Views 
 
As already indicated in Chapter 2, my approach to scientific understanding in biology 
owes much inspiration to Henk de Regt’s research on understanding in science (1999, 
2001, 2004, 2005). For a start, we are both interested in understanding as expressed and 
sought for by practicing scientists within specific research contexts and with the help of 
available tools (as de Regt notes, there is ‘a variety of toolkits for understanding’; 2001, 
261). In fact, we both oppose what de Regt calls ‘objectivist’ accounts of understanding, 
in which ‘one understands a phenomenon if one possesses all relevant knowledge’ (de 
Regt 2004, 100). Additionally, I share de Regt’s emphasis on the pragmatic side of 
understanding and his stance that such pragmatism should not be confused with 
subjectivism (or, in the words of Trout, with a ‘feels right’ experience of ‘intellectual 
satisfaction’; Trout 2002, 213): rather, it indicates the extent to which scientific 
understanding results from researchers’ ability to use and apply the theoretical knowledge 
that they possess. 
 
There are also ways in which my approach and de Regt’s differ considerably. In many 
respects, this is a matter of emphasis. For a start, de Regt is interested in scientific 
understanding as an aim of science, rather than as a cognitive process. These two 
readings of the same phenomenon are by no means incompatible: as made clear in the 
previous section, understanding nature is both an aim and an achievement to practicing 
scientists. Also, de Regt does not discuss the difference between individual and social 
understanding, nor does he analyse the extent to which scientific understanding depends 
on social sharing and communicative skills: still, paying attention to such topics 
represents a continuation of, rather than a departure from, his approach. The same holds 
for de Regt’s emphasis on intelligibility as an epistemic value with which to assess 
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 More on the prospective implications of my views can be found in section 8.4. 
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scientific theories (2001, 261): in my present work, I have simply avoided to discuss 
intelligibility, as such discussion was not relevant to my purposes.  
 
I now wish to focus in more detail on the aspects of de Regt’s view of which I am 
outright critical. All of them concern the primary role taken by theoretical knowledge in 
his account, at the expense of the type of knowledge that I call ‘embodied’. De Regt 
insists on theories as a necessary means towards acquiring scientific understanding, as 
illustrated in his Criterion for Understanding Phenomena (2005, 150): 
 
CUP: A phenomenon P is understood if and only if a theory T of P exists that is 
intelligible (and meets the usual logical, methodological and empirical 
requirements). 
 
As made clear in the previous chapters, understanding in biology does not necessarily 
have to be obtained through theories: biologists understand phenomena also by building 
and handling models of those phenomena as well as by exploring and interacting with the 
phenomena themselves (e.g. Chapter 6). Further, even when understanding is obtained 
through reference to a theory, it is important to specify that there are many types of 
theories available in the life sciences, each of which has to meet different ‘logical, 
methodological and empirical requirements’ depending on the context in which it is used 
(see Chapters 2 and 5). I think that de Regt should expand his account of the role of 
theories in acquiring understanding in the light of these objections – or, more simply, 
delete the ‘only if’ clause from his CUP, thus recognising the role of other components of 
scientific practices in providing understanding.    
 
A second problematic aspect of de Regt’s conceptualisation consists in his definition of 
intelligibility, as expressed in his Criterion for the Intelligibility of Theories (2005, 151): 
 
CIT: A scientific theory is intelligible to scientists S (in context C) iff they can 
recognise qualitatively characteristic consequences of T without performing exact 
calculations. 
 
While agreeing with de Regt that ‘intelligibility depends not only on the virtues of T 
itself but also on such contextual factors as the capabilities, background knowledge and 
background beliefs of the scientists in C’ (2005, 151), I think that his distinction between 
qualitative and quantitative aspects of theories, as well as of their consequences, does not 
at all respect this crucial premise. De Regt seems to equate ‘qualitative consequences’ 
with aspects of a theory that are intuitive to scientists using it: as he specifies in a 
footnote, this means that such aspects do not require ‘complete logical argumentation’ in 
order to become clear to scientists (2005, 167). This characterisation of intuition does not 
take account of the differences in expertise and skills among scientists working in 
different fields. Scientists who possess strong theoretical skills, such as the ability to 
work with specific concepts and symbolic notations, might find the quantitative 
implications of a theory (and/or logical argumentation supporting them) to be more 
intuitive than its qualitative consequences. Scientists working in applied areas, such as 
engineering and experimental biology, might find calculations to provide more 
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understanding than their own intuitions about the qualitative consequences of a theory, 
depending on the phenomenon that they are analysing. For instance, it could be argued 
that areas such as evolutionary-developmental biology, nanotechnology or quantum 
computing require scientists to disregard their qualitative intuitions and develop 
quantitative treatments of phenomena, since qualitative intuitions about implications of 
the theory for the phenomena at hand are misleading and confusing. In fact (and this is 
where I think de Regt’s account needs substantial amendments), nowhere in de Regt’s 
definition is it explicitly specified that such ‘qualitative consequences’ of a theory consist 
of the relation and/or significance of the theory with respect to the phenomena to which it 
can be applied. From de Regt’s examples from the history of science, it becomes obvious 
that this is what he means. I think, however, that such a relation should explicitly feature 
in his definitions of understanding and intelligibility, as establishing a relation between 
theories and phenomena is crucial to the ability of researchers to use theories to 
understand phenomena. As I illustrated throughout my thesis, understanding a 
phenomenon results from coordinating theoretical and embodied knowledge that is 
relevant to that specific phenomenon: there is little in de Regt’s account that helps us to 
identify relevant knowledge and/or to analyse the relation between the intelligibility of a 
theory and its potential applicability to the phenomena to be understood. In the CUP, 
empirical requirements do not figure as major constraints on the achievement of an 
intelligible theory, but are rather mentioned as a mere addition to intelligibility. While 
carefully analysing the role of theories in the acquisition of understanding, de Regt seems 
to take phenomena for granted.  
 
Against my critique, it could be argued that the differences between my approach and de 
Regt’s spring from differences in the objects of our analyses, that is, the physical sciences 
(in his case) and the biological sciences (in mine). Whether this is true is of course a very 
interesting question, especially given the many existing claims about biology being more 
disunified and pluralistic (in its theories, models and perspectives) than the physical 
sciences.
220
 I have myself proposed, in Chapter 2, that biology has a dual nature, i.e. that 
theoretical knowledge in biology can never be dissociated from or favoured over 
embodied knowledge. This feature might be taken as a reason to emphasise embodied 
knowledge and skills in the context of biological research, without necessarily being able 
to apply the same approach to the physical sciences. This would mean that de Regt is 
right in emphasising theoretical knowledge as a principal means towards understanding 
in the physical sciences, while his account does not adapt as well to sciences where 
theories, and particularly formal theories expressed in mathematical terms or strictly 
logical connections, play a less central role. Is it then the case that biological 
understanding differs substantially from understanding in the physical sciences? 
 
I am actually rather sceptical about the supposedly ‘special’ features of the biological 
sciences and of the understanding therein acquired. Notably, when arguing about the dual 
nature of biology I have not insisted that such a framework would not hold for other 
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 This view of the difference between biological and physical sciences is implicitly supported by many of 
the philosophers working on disunity and pluralism in biology. Explicit claims in this regard have been 
advanced, among others, by Mayr (1982, 2004); van der Steen (1991); Wimsatt (1972); Cummings (1983, 
ch.1) and Haugeland (1998[1978]).  
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sciences. In fact, I think that a close look to the practices characterising other fields is 
likely to prove that the physical sciences are (1) as disunified and pluralistic and (2) as 
dependent on embodied knowledge as biology is.
221
 I have no firm grounds on which to 
defend this intuition: much further research is necessary in order to explore the 
applicability of my views to other fields and the way in which the organisation and 
knowledge produced in other sciences resembles the situation that I ascribed to the life 
sciences in this thesis. In the absence of such research, the eventual applicability of my 
views on understanding to sciences other than the biological ones (and thus, the extent to 
which my views and de Regt’s on the role of theories actually clash) remains an open 
question.  
 
 
8.2 Three Types of Skills, Three Types of Commitments 
 
8.2.1 Skills and Commitments 
 
As illustrated in the last section of Chapter 6, the exercise of epistemic skills allows 
researchers to identify which parts of the (theoretical and embodied) knowledge that they 
possess are relevant to the investigation of the phenomenon under scrutiny. Here I want 
to discuss the further claim that the skilful performance of research practices both 
requires and enables scientists to recognise specific bits of knowledge as a stable 
background to their investigations. Such recognition can be self-conscious. For instance, 
a researcher might explicitly recognise that his skills in manipulating whole plants are 
higher than his skills in handling microscopic parts of the plants, such as DNA samples 
(or vice versa); he will therefore gear his experimental activities to a field of inquiry 
allowing him to use his skills, such as ecological or physiological research, rather than to 
an area where he is sure to fare badly (such as microbiology). Researchers might also be 
unaware of how their skills steer their research directions: for example, a cell biologist 
might learn to search TAIR for Arabidopsis data without acknowledging that this implies 
subscribing to the gene-centric theoretical framework adopted by TAIR curators to model 
and display the data.  
 
This apparently trivial point has important epistemological implications. Skills enable 
researchers to perform a set of activities leading to specific results. As we saw in the 
examples of TAIR and NASC, skills do not come easy: considerable time and effort is 
invested in learning a set of skills, certainly in the case of most theoretical or 
performative skills used in contemporary biology. This means that the set of skills 
available to any one researcher is limited. Each researcher will bother to learn and perfect 
skills that, he or she believes, will be helpful in pursuing his or her research interests. It 
also means that trained researchers, who already master several skills, have a strong 
tendency to pursue projects where those skills can be exercised, rather than embarking on 
projects where (a) they will have to invest time in mastering new skills and (b) they will 
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 I take work by Peter Galison, Jordi Cat, Nancy Cartwright and Hans Radder to add empirical 
significance to my claim here, even if none of these scholars are engaged in a direct comparison between 
the physical and the biological sciences.  
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not be able to use their old skills.
222
 In other words, through acquiring specific skills, 
researchers become committed to the actions, concepts and research directions enabled 
by the exercise of these skills. Whether researchers explicitly acknowledge it or not, 
certain principles, concepts, ways of acting and handling objects become entrenched
223
 in 
the practice of researchers engaged in the study of a specific phenomenon. They represent 
knowledge that is assumed, rather than hypothesised, to be relevant to the study of the 
phenomenon in question. When this happens, those bits of theoretical and embodied 
knowledge start to be regarded as a necessary platform to carry out research.
224
 They 
become what I shall call research commitments, encompassing items as diverse as the 
theoretical perspective held by the individual biologist engaging in research; the research 
goals and interests in his or her work; the research conducted by his or her research 
group; gestures and ways of moving; and the assumptions about the representativeness of 
the research materials on which the researcher works, as well as the applicability of his or 
her results.  
 
Research commitments are strongly tied to epistemic skills. They are two aspects of the 
same process: acting skilfully implies committing to the activities and results that those 
skills bring forth, while making a commitment to a specific technique or concept requires 
learning skills adequate to follow up on such commitment. Yet, it is clear that the two 
notions should be clearly distinguished. As we saw in Chapter 5, epistemic skills denote 
the abilities to perform an action in a specific manner; commitments consist of a tendency 
towards (or preference for) pursuing goals that can indeed be obtained through 
performing that action. As I already remarked, skills are costly: the acquisition of certain 
skills rather than others represents an investment in the goals that those specific skills will 
enable one to pursue. This means that the possession of a skill entails a commitment to 
exploiting that skill (thus taking advantage of an otherwise useless investment
225
). Also, 
once a commitment is made, it implies learning and exercising skills that are relevant to 
fulfilling that commitment. This is what makes commitments different from a mere 
promise or a pledge: they imply, and result from, skilful action.  
 
To underline further the link between skills and commitments, I shall now trace a 
categorisation of commitments that runs parallel to the categorisation of skills proposed 
in earlier chapters. I propose to distinguish three types of commitments, depending on the 
type of goals to which they apply. Theoretical commitments are commitments to using or 
investigating specific concepts, theories and principles. Much has been written about 
these types of commitments in terms of biases, theoretical perspectives and background 
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 This is especially true within current research practices, which are geared towards producing as many 
short-term results (and publications) as possible. In this landscape, there are no resources (time as well as 
funding) to allow researchers to acquire new skills without knowing whether those skills will be useful.  
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 See Wimsatt 1986. 
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 Elihu Gerson colourfully describes this situation as follows: ‘our tentative alliances [with phenomena] 
become stronger as they are used successfully as tools and materials in other projects. It is at this point that 
our theories become ‘facts’, firm commitments to act in a certain way’ (1998, ch.2, 13). Note the similarity 
to Hacking’s formulation of entity realism, where the ability to manipulate an unobservable entity in the 
laboratory constitutes a criterion for believing in the existence of that entity (1983, 265). 
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 Rouse (1987, 87ff.) provides an interesting analysis of the role of research opportunities, as perceived by 
researchers, in shaping the directions and content of science. 
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knowledge. An example of theoretical commitment is the gene-centred perspective 
adopted by TAIR as a foundation for its modeling practice. Performative commitments 
consist of commitments to specific habits, that is, ways of thinking or moving that 
become entrenched to a scientist’s practice. For instance, some actions performed by 
TAIR curators (such as switching on and off a computer or doing a search on TAIR 
databases) constitute performative commitments by virtue of their being (after years of 
practice) habitual, unchallenged practices – yet indispensable to carrying out research. 
Social commitments apply to the interests and values endorsed by scientists as a 
consequence of their financial, professional and personal dependence on specific social 
hierarchies, sponsors or practices. They affect scientists’ epistemic resources, without 
however being a matter of epistemic dependence themselves. For example, peer review 
mechanisms engender a series of commitments towards wedding one’s work to 
recognised keywords, the expectations of prospective peers and the content of journals in 
which one hopes to publish; funding agencies might require scientists to observe specific 
criteria and/or values in their research, such as, in the case of corporate sponsors, the 
search for commercially applicable ways to mutate plants and a predilection for short-
term results over long-term research projects; or, scientists working in a university or 
laboratory dominated by powerful deans and supervisors might have to adopt these 
people’s views (including their theoretical and embodied commitments, but also their 
preferences for values and directions in research) in order to be granted employment or 
funding for their research.   
 
Commitments have varying time-scales and contexts: a researcher can commit to using a 
specific technique in order to participate in a given research project, but might never use 
that technique again once that project ends; on the other hand, a biologist can commit to 
using animals in experiments and hold on to that commitment for the rest of his career. 
Peter Galison exemplifies this point by distinguishing between long-term commitments, 
which he describes as ‘metaphysical’ and which concern methods, principles and goals 
transcending belief in specific explanations or theories; middle-term commitments, that is 
‘programmatic goals or laboratory practices’; and short-term commitments, shaped by 
particular theories and models that are constantly subject to changes and revisions 
(Galison 1987, 244
226
). What I find especially interesting in Galison’s distinction is his 
assumption of a hierarchy among components of scientific practice based on their 
temporal endurance: he stresses how general principles and goals (what I hitherto referred 
to as ‘theoretical perspective’) constitute a more fundamental and thus more enduring 
commitment than laboratory practices or specific models adopted for a limited time to 
test a specific hypothesis. Such a hierarchy illustrates the different levels of entrenchment 
that commitments can reach within any researcher’s practice: a long-term commitment 
dictates habits that will not be modified unless there are substantial changes in both the 
theories and methods used in the field, while a short-term commitment might signal 
simply the week-long choice to adopt a specific mutant of Arabidopsis to perform a series 
of experiments – a choice that does not necessarily compromise the long-term results of 
research, but allows to explore a new terrain and determine whether it might be fruitful. 
What I wish to add to Galison’s remarks is that the endurance of commitments often 
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depends on the outcomes of research carried out under their guidance. Given this factor, 
which Galison does not take into account, I disagree with his characterisation of models 
and theories as necessarily short-term commitments: whether they turn out to be tools 
granting a transition to better models and/or theories, or whether they become a central 
dogma for a whole field (as in the case of the transcription-translation model in classical 
genetics, which can certainly be classified as a long-term commitment
227
), depends on the 
circumstances of their use as well as the results obtained from them. The same is true of 
laboratory practices. 
 
 
8.2.2 Commitments and Personal Identity 
 
The previous section contained a number of examples and observations concerning 
commitments and their relations to epistemic skills. In the next section, I shall highlight 
the usefulness of considering the link between skills and commitments in the context of 
my analysis of scientific understanding. Before turning to that, however, I would like to 
focus more closely on the nature and role of commitments in scientific research. In this 
section I shall argue that commitments constitute important features of the identity of a 
researcher: features of which scientists might be conscious or unaware depending on their 
professional and personal circumstances.  
 
Let me start my analysis from the discussion of commitments proposed by Michael 
Polanyi in his (1958, 1967). Polanyi conceives of commitments as ‘a manner of disposing 
of oneself’ (1967, 302-3): that is, a way of behaving that defines and delimits one’s 
personal identity and way of life. Scientists should be particularly careful about the 
commitments that they undertake, as, in Polanyi’s view, their choice of commitments is 
strongly related to their beliefs: it constitutes ‘a responsible decision, in submission to the 
compelling claims of what in good conscience I conceive to be true’ (1958, 65). Through 
commitments, scientists gain ‘legitimate grounds for the affirmation of personal 
convictions with universal intent’ (1967, 324): Polanyi points to the importance of 
commitments in shaping one’s research practices and conferring credibility (in his view, 
‘objectivity’ – hence the reference to ‘universal intents’) to one’s results.  
 
Polanyi’s description does not fit my characterisation in one crucial respect: I do not 
think that commitments necessarily constitute a manifestation of belief or a ‘personal 
conviction’ of the person that expresses them (1958, 325). A scientist can, in my view, 
commit to following a specific course of action or way of thinking without necessarily 
believing it to be ‘true’ or helpful towards acquiring true knowledge. Commitments can 
be undertaken for wholly different reasons than the quest for truth, such as for instance 
pragmatic requirements (having to exercise a skill that took long to be learnt and that 
guarantees a prestigious job), aesthetic preferences (committing to buy green equipment 
in one’s lab because one likes the colour, rather than because one believes that the brand 
fabricating green instruments is of superior quality) or emotions (committing to research 
on lung cancer because a close relative has died of that illness). Further, commitments 
can be undertaken both consciously and unconsciously, that is, as a result of a decision-
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making process or as a result of habit or unacknowledged preferences (a point to which I 
return below). Thus, an individual’s beliefs about what constitutes true knowledge might 
be among the reasons for his or her choice of other commitments; yet, the latter remains 
primarily a pragmatic necessity emerging from the individual’s need to act and think in 
specific ways (most notably, in a skilful way) and towards specific goals. 
 
This modification of Polanyi’s view implies a revised account of the putative link 
between commitments and objectivity. Holding commitments is no guarantee for 
‘universal intent’, as Polanyi puts it. As a researcher, I can commit to following specific 
courses of action without believing that they will uncover universal truths or that they 
constitute the best possible way to achieve a certain goal: rather, they could constitute a 
convenient way to achieve that goal – a way that, in the specific context in which I work, 
reveals itself to be more useful than other, supposedly better, ways. Nevertheless, I 
believe Polanyi is right in indicating that scientists’ commitments are as much linked to 
their research practice as they are expressions of their personality. Polanyi acknowledges 
that commitments are strongly influenced by the scientific and social context in which 
research is conducted. Commitments are in fact both a personal feature (of individual 
scientists who subscribe to them) and an important factor keeping scientific communities 
together and defining their epistemic cultures. Each epistemic culture in science has a 
slightly different set of commitments, depending on the specific methods, beliefs and 
values that researchers in the group decide to adopt. Indeed, scientific communities might 
be defined as units of researchers sharing a common set of commitments. 
 
Polanyi’s account is based on a deep appreciation for what he calls tacit knowledge, that 
is, knowledge that researchers possess and use in their everyday practices without being 
aware of it. In Chapter 2, I criticised Polanyi for shying away from the full implications 
of such a position: regretfully, he ends up relegating the role of tacit knowledge to a 
subsidiary position with respect to theoretical knowledge, which, according to Polanyi, 
remains the main goal and primary concern for scientists. I now wish to critique 
Polanyi’s view on commitments for being equally conservative and not fully building on 
the implications of recognising tacit (and embodied) knowledge as crucial constituents of 
scientific practice. In several passages of his work, Polanyi is in fact unclear on whether 
he views commitments as resulting from a self-conscious choice or whether he thinks of 
them as stipulated unconsciously - a side effect of the research practices conducted by 
any one researcher. As I already emphasised, it is important to Polanyi that researchers 
take responsibility for their commitments – a position that implies the necessity, for 
scientists, to settle on a commitment only as the result of a decision-making process. At 
the same time, Polanyi rightly notes that ‘personal commitment [..] is involved in all acts 
of intelligence by which we integrate some things subsidiarily to the centre of our focal 
attention’ (1967, 61). In other words, commitments can also be ‘tacit’, as they amount to 
the actions and beliefs uncritically and unconsciously assumed by a researcher in order to 
pursue his/her central research interests. 
  
I view Polanyi’s ambiguity on this point as reflecting a reality that hopefully already 
emerged from my analysis: indeed, as Polanyi should have explicitly acknowledged, 
research commitments can be both tacit and explicit, motivated and unjustified. This 
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finding fits my approach to commitments as entrenched in the successful accomplishment 
of specific epistemic activities, such as the ones of modeling and abstracting that I have 
discussed in Chapter 6. I described commitments as necessary conditions for the 
acquisition, conceptualisation, interpretation and communication of experiences and data: 
in short, as crucial tools enabling scientists to pursue their investigations. Some 
commitments are adopted unconsciously as an apparently obvious aspect of a specific 
research practice, while other commitments are made explicitly and consciously by 
scientists who are well aware of their impact on their research. The manner in which a 
researcher ‘disposes of himself’ can be the fruit of a conscious decision among several 
credible alternatives. As we saw when surveying the social skills displayed by successful 
Arabidopsis researchers, it is very useful for scientists to recognise and prioritise 
commitments that might favour their career, their ability to collaborate with other 
scientists and/or to bring funding and popularity to a research topic that they are 
interested in studying. Many prominent scientific debates are constructed around the 
clash between different commitments. For instance, the unresolved dissent among 
evolutionary biologists about the exact patterns of evolutionary change (featuring 
scientists committed to phyletic gradualism against the advocates of ‘punctuated 
equilibria’); or the age-old debate between catastrophists and uniformitarianism about the 
rate of mass extinctions.
228
    
 
The self-conscious nature of research commitments is emphasised by sociologist Elihu 
Gerson (1998) in his analysis of commitments as ‘more than a verbal promise’, that is, as 
‘an actual expenditure of resources’ routinely required by scientific work (ibid., ch. 2, 2). 
Gerson underlines the way in which commitments constrain and at the same time enable 
specific courses of action. He also draws a distinction between obligatory commitments, 
that is commitments dictated by the nature of the phenomena under scrutiny or the social 
context in which research is carried out, and non-obligatory commitments, that is choices 
made by individual researchers given a number of available or foreseeable options (ibid., 
3). The distinction between obligatory and non-obligatory commitments seems to me 
illuminating as it highlights the importance, in certain research contexts, of self-
consciously making and maintaining certain commitments in the face of alternative 
options. I actually think that these two types of commitments, as well as the manner in 
which they are undertaken, are associated to different phases in a scientists’ career and 
research trajectory. At certain junctures in his or her career, such as the start and the end 
of a PhD or the beginning of a new research project, a researcher is relatively free to 
choose the instruments and models to use in order to investigate a specific phenomenon, 
as well as the school of thought and discipline under which to carry out the research. It is 
in this context of broad choices about communities and methods that non-obligatory 
commitments play their most important role. Once such broad choices are made, 
obligatory commitments follow in the form of commitments to the more specific norms, 
concepts and techniques used within the chosen communities to pursue their goals. 
Further, both obligatory and non-obligatory commitments can be upheld consciously or 
unconsciously, depending on the social/material context as well as the personality of the 
researcher in question. A PhD student might be swayed by mentors towards accepting a 
postdoctoral job in a specific laboratory without being aware of the theoretical, material 
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and social commitments involved; another student in the same position might consciously 
subscribe to the commitments enforced by the same laboratory, or disregard external 
influences in order to join a group endorsing very different commitments.  
 
While Polanyi’s account of commitments remains ambiguous on this crucial issue, 
Gerson’s account of intentionality in research commitments proves too one-sided, insofar 
as it over-emphasises the self-conscious nature of making commitments. Gerson goes as 
far as to define commitments as a ‘bet that a certain course of action (and not others) will 
turn out to be the right thing to do’ (Gerson 1998, 7). This interpretation stands in square 
opposition to Polanyi’s notion of tacit commitment, as it requires not only that 
researchers are always aware of their commitments, but also that the stipulation of 
commitments is always preceded by strategic reasoning about their future consequences. 
As I already mentioned, I do not share Gerson’s belief that research commitments are 
always the result of strategic thinking. Commitments are not necessarily chosen through 
conscious deliberation over their prospective utility to a given goal, just as they are not 
always the expression of what a scientist believes to be true or truth-conducive (as 
advocated by Polanyi). As exemplified by the case of obligatory commitments, many of 
the commitments displayed in scientific research are not the result of careful 
consideration and decision-making, but are rather dictated by the epistemic culture, 
material environment and/or personality of the researcher who adopts them.  
 
Further, Gerson’s notion of ‘the right thing to do’ is dangerously vague. He could use this 
definition in a broad sense, to imply anything judged as ‘right’ according to evaluative 
criteria ranging from scientific (‘right’ in the sense of scientifically successful) to moral 
and social (‘right’ in the sense of ethically valuable or socially useful). However, we 
could take his definition to imply ‘right’ in a purely scientific sense: researchers bet on 
commitments that are expected to grant reliable or innovative results by the standards of 
the one or more scientific communities in which they work. This narrow interpretation is 
more problematic, as it gives a utilitarian picture of researchers as concerned purely with 
maximising the scientific utility of their research without regard to other factors, ranging 
from their feelings and moods to their religious and political beliefs. The definition of 
commitments as utility-maximising bets excludes commitments made for reasons that 
have no direct link to one’s welfare or professional success, such as one’s cultural or 
moral allegiances; one’s feelings, as determined by one’s professional as well as private 
life; and one’s preferences, as acquired through past experience and sometimes dictated 
by nothing more than personal taste. For instance, researchers might be committed to 
studying Arabidopsis rather than mice because they have moral objections to 
experimentation on animals; they might be committed to protracting their experiments 
through the night or not to do it, depending on their private life (for instance, the wish to 
be close or away from their family in the evening), ability to stay awake and feelings 
towards working at night (as some people dislike the absence of daylight); or they might 
be committed to a theoretical perspective out of devotion to and respect for their mentors, 
who endorsed the same perspective, rather than because they are deeply convinced that 
this choice will improve the quality or visibility of their research. Thinking of committing 
as betting on a profitable course of action is like thinking of living as betting on a set of 
personality traits: just as acquiring a personal identity is as much a matter of choice as it 
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is a matter of circumstances and environment, committing to a set of values and ways of 
acting is as much the result of a conscious deliberation as it is the result of unconscious 
habits dictated by the context.
229
  
 
 
8.2.3 Crucial Conditions for Biological Understanding 
 
Research commitments are at once a basic result and a crucial motivation for the exercise 
of epistemic skills. As claimed in Chapter 6 through the case of modeling, the exercise of 
epistemic skills allows researchers to determine which knowledge is relevant to 
understanding the phenomenon under scrutiny. I can now add that commitments play a 
crucial complementary role to skills in the individuation of knowledge relevant towards 
understanding a phenomenon.  
 
Skilful abstracting towards the production and use of either TAIR or NASC models does 
indeed involve specific commitments, which my analysis in terms of abstracting as an 
activity helps to analyse and compare. As we have seen in Chapters 5 and 6, the 
abundance of data about Arabidopsis chromosomes and gene products, as well as the 
appeal that molecular biology exercises on research sponsors, induced TAIR researchers 
to adopt the term ‘gene’ as the central organisational term of GO as well as the starting 
point for all TAIR modeling efforts. This practical constraint implied that the GO 
network structures its concepts according to their relation to ‘gene’, while TAIR visual 
models are still very far from being able to incorporate information about plant 
morphology, evolutionary history and higher-level physiology. The initial availability of 
genomic data need not have shaped later research in this way. GO personnel could have 
encouraged the development of several types of ontology, each dealing with a different 
aspect of organismal biology and thus adopting different concepts as key reference points 
for the categorisation and integration of knowledge. Such alternative ontologies are 
indeed being elaborated by researchers working on different organisms and in 
communities distant from the communities in which GO researchers work.
230
 
Alternatives to GO do exist: TAIR has chosen not to consider them and to pursue their 
initial choice of GO as the appropriate bio-ontology to use in order to organise and store 
Arabidopsis data. In other words, the steps involved in the actual realisation of the 
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 In this sense, my analysis of commitments is closer to Amartya Sen’s work on commitments, freedom 
and personal identity of human agents (Sen 1976, 96). Sen defines commitments in a way apparently 
similar to Gerson: ‘a person choosing an act that he believes will yield a higher level of personal welfare to 
him than an alternative that is also available to him’ (ibid., 95). Sen clearly states that the choice to commit 
is geared towards enhancing someone’s personal welfare. This includes various aspects, such as financial, 
professional and family welfare, which the person in question can rank depending on his or her preferences 
and priorities. A person more interested in career than in family life will rank professional welfare as the 
highest form of personal welfare; a person valuing economic prosperity over social ties will view financial 
welfare as the highest form of personal welfare. These preferences are in themselves already a broad 
commitment; further, they are an expression of the individual’s personal identity and of its ties to the social 
context in which the individual finds him or herself. As Sen notes, ‘commitment is, of course, closely 
connected to one’s morals. But moral in a very broad sense , covering a variety of influences from religious 
to political, from the ill-understood to the well-argued’ (ibid., 97).  
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 The rapid growth of various types of bio-ontologies is documented in the following website, which 
collects and gives access to all bio-ontologies including GO: http://obo.sourceforge.net/. 
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abstracting of Arabidopsis biology into TAIR models generated a theoretical commitment 
to a gene-centric vision of Arabidopsis biology. This theoretical commitment generated, 
in turn, a performative commitment to using Java programming to visualise such gene-
centric ordering of data; as well as a social commitment to spreading this view (and the 
resulting tools) among Arabidopsis researchers of all trades. These commitments are 
explicitly acknowledged by the TAIR team and condemned by many ecologists and 
evolutionary biologists.  
 
Does NASC modeling commit to gene-centrism as heavily as TAIR does? The answer to 
this question is, as briefly mentioned in Chapter 7, definitely not. NASC researchers 
translate their everyday experience with the morphology and physiology of actual plants 
into a theoretical commitment to highlighting their macroscopic features rather than their 
microscopic ones. As illustrated in Chapter 6, PATO itself is constructed around concepts 
descriptively applying to anatomical components of the plants (such as ‘leaf” and ‘stem’). 
This theoretical commitment is associated to a performative commitment to descriptive 
accuracy in categorising ecotypes cultivated within NASC facilities, where researchers 
have a habit of identifying their plants both through genomic structure and through their 
morphological traits. Some of the associated social commitments adopted by NASC 
biologists include the willingness to privilege technical over theoretical work. Rather than 
valuing discussions and exchanges about theoretical knowledge of Arabidopsis biology, 
they privilege sharing embodied knowledge of the plants themselves and ways to handle 
them, thus often seeking the advice of experimental biologists, plant breeders and 
laboratory technicians. Rather than seeking theoretical results themselves, they are 
committed to isolating and reproducing ecotypes that will become the best available tools 
towards acquiring theoretical results. 
 
The focus on the skills required to abstract features of a phenomenon (in order to model 
it) allows me to trace the commitments involved in abstracting processes at both TAIR 
and NASC. Once we have traced the commitments implied in the production of each 
model, it also becomes easier to clarify how those models are handled by the researchers 
using them and with which epistemological implications. This is true, for instance, in the 
case of the nagging preoccupation of any biologist engaged in model organism research, 
which I have raised already in chapter 3: that is, the question concerning the 
representational value of the results obtained on any specific organism. Broadly, this 
issue concerns the applicability, or significance, of results obtained through the study of a 
specific organism. Can those results tell us something about other types of organisms? 
And how can we determine this? As I already pointed out, within the Arabidopsis 
community there is a strong drive to interpret results obtained on Arabidopsis specimens 
as representative not only of all Arabidopsis ecotypes, but of all plants (and even, in some 
cases, of animal organisms up to Homo sapiens, as in the recent case of the discovery of 
mitochondrial gene transfers
231
). The extent to which a model organism can be 
representative of other organisms – that is, the extent to which knowledge of the biology 
of a specific organism can be taken to be relevant to understanding other types of 
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 Evidence for mitochondrial gene transfers has been one of the most important results hitherto achieved 
through research on Arabidopsis. A review of this discovery and its impact on biology as a whole is 
provided by Millar et al (2004). 
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organisms – depends as much on biologists’ background knowledge and skills as it 
depends on their beliefs and objectives. In other words, it depends on the biologists’ 
commitments as much as on their expertise. Acknowledging the skilful practices and 
relevant commitments involved in abstracting has implications not only for the 
developers of models but also for their users. Scientists employing NASC specimens and 
TAIR images to further their understanding of plant biology require skills, materials and 
commitments that allow them to handle those models successfully to this aim.  
 
More broadly, reflection on differences in commitments and skills may also help us to 
understand the differences in epistemological commitments characterising the 
experimental versus the theoretical life sciences, as well as the reasons for such 
differences and – more practically - the possibilities for a better integration of different 
modeling techniques such as the PATO and the GO terminologies (in the framework of 
what is sometimes referred to as ‘integrative’ or ‘system’ biology; more on this below). 
Further research is needed on the way in which different communities perceive and 
adhere to commitments: for instance, as signalled by Galison in his analysis of theoretical 
versus experimental cultures in physics, ‘theorists often divide over the choice of guiding 
principles while maintaining a consensus on the rules specifying legitimate inferences 
from them. [..] experimental debates can flourish even when the specific experimental 
goal is above dispute’ (1987, 244).  
 
Together, skills and commitments represent two fundamental tools for the achievement of 
understanding: adherence to commitments and skilful research practices constitute basic 
conditions under which researchers coordinate theoretical and embodied knowledge 
towards understanding specific phenomena.
232
  
 
Table 8.1. Schematic representation of my views on how scientists achieve an 
understanding of phenomena through coordination of theoretical and embodied 
knowledge gathered from abstracting relevant features of the phenomena in question. 
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 I hold these two conditions as jointly sufficient, from an epistemological perspective, in order to grant 
understanding. Yet, I do not intend to portray my account as a complete picture of the conditions that 
would suffice to guarantee scientific understanding of any biological phenomenon independently of the 
specific research context. Further, such a complete account would require knowledge of the cognitive 
processes underlying understanding – knowledge that, despite the fruitful efforts of neurologists and 
psychologists, is not yet available.  
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8.3 Kinds of understanding 
 
8.3.1 Theoretical, Embodied and Integrated Understanding 
 
In the conclusion to Chapter 5, I mentioned an important consideration emerging from 
my view. There can be several different ways of coordinating theoretical and embodied 
knowledge about a given phenomenon, depending on the actual knowledge available to 
the researcher seeking understanding of a biological phenomenon. As illustrated by the 
above comparison between NASC and TAIR modeling activities, researchers possess 
different combinations of skills and commitments depending on the epistemic culture to 
which they belong, their goals, training and professional experience. Of course, all 
researchers, no matter what their field and occupation is, possess a minimal amount of 
theoretical knowledge as well as theoretical commitments to specific concepts and 
theories guiding their research; and they possess embodied knowledge, in the form of 
both theoretical and performative skills, as well as performative commitments. Yet, the 
balance between theoretical, performative and social skills, as well as commitments, can 
vary. Depending on such variation, there can be different ways to understand the same 
biological phenomenon. For instance, the database developed by TAIR can be used to 
acquire different understandings of Arabidopsis biology, depending on the training and 
experience of the researchers accessing the resource (e.g. an experimental biologist will 
use information gathered through TAIR in a different way than a theoretical biologist).  
 
As I tried to make clear, understanding is not a monolithic process. It is not a unique 
activity to be performed better or worse depending on abilities and resources, nor is it a 
measurable, homogeneous property applying to a larger or smaller extent to any 
particular researcher.
233
 I shall try to clarify this intuition by examining and comparing 
three kinds of understanding, each of which derives from different combinations of 
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 The idea of understanding as a ‘property’ that can be measured is often embedded in common-sense 
uses of the term understanding, as in ‘I understand a little bit of thermodynamics, while Piet understands a 
lot of it’. 
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theoretical and embodied knowledge. The first, or theoretical understanding, denotes a 
situation where understanding of biological phenomena is acquired through recourse to 
theoretical commitments and skills, with performative skills and commitments playing a 
subsidiary role. The second, or embodied understanding, illustrates the opposite situation: 
theoretical skills and commitments are used to pursue and develop a set of performative 
commitments and skills, which constitute the main interest of the researcher. The third 
kind of understanding is the one that interests me the most, as it is the one proposed as a 
principal aim in Arabidopsis research: that is, the integrated understanding deriving from 
a balanced exercise and coordination of theoretical and embodied knowledge.  
 
Theoretical understanding is based largely on the exercise of theoretical commitments, 
theoretical knowledge and embodied knowledge (the latter in the form of predominantly 
theoretical skills). A good illustration for this kind of understanding is provided by 
population biology, that is, one of the main branches of biology studying evolutionary 
patterns with the help of mathematical models of populations. In the case of 
understanding gathered in this field, such as for instance the understanding of the 
evolving interaction of two populations endowed with different traits, research is 
accompanied by extensive theoretical commitments: researchers are not questioning what 
is meant by evolution, how populations and population interactions are characterised, 
whether traits are inheritable or acquired by nurture, as such assumptions are usually a 
platform from which they can try to derive results. Similarly, theoretical biologists tend 
to make strong embodied commitments towards specific ways of looking at phenomena, 
such as specific diagrammatic or mathematical representations and computer 
programmes allowing for specific types of simulations (and not others). This is the extent 
to which such researchers interact with phenomena to be understood: with the help of 
modeling tools that are conceptually abstracted from the phenomena themselves. 
Performative commitments and skills are therefore subsidiary to the development of 
theoretical skills and knowledge: they are not an aim in themselves and embodied 
knowledge of the phenomena under scrutiny is generally not valued as a crucial 
component of these researchers’ understanding of them.     
 
Theoretical understanding contrasts very strongly with the kind of understanding of 
biological phenomena obtained, for instance, by a researcher working in the NASC 
glasshouse. Such a person is specialised in taking care of Arabidopsis specimens and 
seeds: he or she exercises a number of performative skills, such as sowing, harvesting, 
cleaning and ordering the seeds, as well as feeding the plants, caring for them and 
checking on their health and growth. These skills are related to a number of performative 
commitments, which consist of the standards adopted by NASC for what constitutes a 
healthy plant and a specific type of seed. Further, most researchers working in the glass-
house possess theoretical skills and commitments, such as the skill to fit observed traits 
into the conceptual framework provided by the PATO system of categorisation and the 
commitment to produce specimens of the desired ecotype in total isolation, that is, by 
preventing cross-breeding among different variants. As a consequence of such expertise 
and daily manoeuvres, NASC researchers acquire an understanding of plants that 
concerns their macroscopic traits and developmental strategies, rather than their 
microscopic traits. They understand plant development in its phenomenological 
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expression, a type of understanding that is often not shared by researchers specialising in 
theoretical analyses of plant development. This is what I call embodied understanding: it 
revolves around embodied knowledge and makes very few theoretical commitments, as 
what is central to it is the ability to intervene in phenomena, rather than to explain or 
predict them. Embodied understanding might in fact be referred to as understanding 
geared to acquiring control over phenomena. The emphasis of research is on acquiring 
performative skills that will be useful to explore phenomena through interaction with 
them. Theoretical skills required to this aim are likely to be minimal: the theoretical 
knowledge used is the background knowledge needed to formulate questions that might 
direct explorative interactions with phenomena.  
 
I would like to distinguish the theoretical and embodied types of understanding from a 
third type of understanding, to whose features and significance I shall devote the rest of 
this chapter. This is what I call integrated understanding, that is, an understanding 
resulting from a balanced combination of theoretical and embodied knowledge as well as 
theoretical and performative commitments. This means that neither theoretical nor 
embodied knowledge are given a privileged role in the understanding of a phenomenon. 
Rather, researchers are interested both in acquiring a theoretical interpretation of a 
phenomenon and in obtaining tools and methods that will enable them to match such 
theoretical interpretation to the actual features of the phenomenon. To this aim, the 
embodied knowledge used to acquire this type of understanding includes both theoretical 
and performative skills: researchers exercise their ability to reason as much as their 
ability to observe and/or intervene in the phenomena under scrutiny.  
 
 
8.3.2 Integrative Understanding and Integration in Biology  
 
A different model of integration centres on cooperation 
and communication among theoretical and phenomenal 
equals, rather than on imperialism and competition for 
primacy and fundamentality 
   James Griesemer 2006a, 4 
 
I now wish to propose and discuss the claim that integrated understanding constitutes the 
best way to understand biological phenomena in a scientific manner. Two objections can 
be levelled against this proposition, each of which I shall analyse in turn.  
 
First, the quality of understanding acquired by scientists depends largely on their research 
contexts and goals. For instance, in the context of theoretical biology, researchers need to 
concentrate all their skills and resources on acquiring theoretical interpretations of 
phenomena. This means committing to using mathematical modeling, that is, an 
intellectually abstracted set of models with high explanatory power but little empirical 
accuracy.
234
 Yet, it might be argued, this choice leads to gaining insights that might not 
have been obtained if biologists insisted on making empirical sense of their findings 
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 I have argued for the need for a trade-off between empirical accuracy and explanatory power in Chapter 
6, where I analyse the difference between what I call material and intellectual abstracting in modeling.  
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throughout their research. In theoretical biology, it seems entirely justified to regard 
theoretical understanding as the most useful kind of biological understanding. Another 
example is the field of natural history, where researchers commit to accumulating 
detailed knowledge about the morphology of as many species as possible. They thus 
acquire embodied understanding of what organisms look like, where they can be found 
and how they should be spotted, kept and eventually embalmed. It does not matter that 
the skills and commitments of natural historians greatly limit their theoretical 
understanding of the differences among organisms (and, eventually, the causes of such 
difference): for their research purposes, the best understanding of organisms is embodied 
rather than theoretical. In view of these examples, how can it be maintained that 
integrated understanding constitutes a better way to understand biological phenomena 
regardless of the research field and goals?  
 
The second objection against the preference for integrated understanding looks even 
more compelling. It could be claimed that it is simply impossible for an individual 
biologist to acquire integrative understanding, given the increasing specialisation in 
subfields and the use of specific techniques characterising today’s biology. The study of 
each aspect of an organism, not to mention a population or ecosystem, is conducted with 
the help of thousands of different techniques, tools and perspectives. The skills and 
commitments within each epistemic culture are acquired through years of training and 
require extensive division of labour among biologists, thus making it technically 
impossible for any one researcher to hold more than a very limited set of skills and 
theoretical knowledge at the same time. Further, it is not socially advantageous for a 
researcher to keep shifting from one set of skills to the next: the risk is for his or her work 
not to be recognised in any of the institutionally established disciplinary structures, thus 
damaging his or her job prospects, while also losing touch with developments in one field 
in order to acquire basic skills in another.
235
  
 
I intend to argue that even in the light of these two objections, there are very good 
reasons for holding integrated understanding to be the most preferable type of 
understanding in biology. Let me begin from tackling the first issue. It is indeed true that 
the type of understanding that is privileged within any research community depends on 
its specific goals and tools. It is also true that there are good reasons for this preference, 
as each field needs to concentrate its resources on the skills and commitments that best fit 
its research interests. Yet, this sociological observation does not tell us much about the 
                                                
235
 As we have seen, such fragmentation has the positive effect of enhancing epistemological diversity in 
the types of understanding acquired by different biologists of the same phenomena. Epistemic communities 
are by no means isolated from each other: peer-different collaboration fuels constant interactions and 
overlaps among them, thus guaranteeing that the boundaries between different epistemic cultures keep 
shifting and changing depending on the available institutional arrangements and scientific goals. Individual 
researchers can choose whether to stick to one specific research group for their whole research career or, as 
is often the case, meander within a few different research communities, thus acquiring skills and 
commitments helpful to conduct different types of research and acquire (and combine) different kinds of 
understanding. Yet, because of the tendency to value specialisation over generalist knowledge within 
biology (which we encountered also in Chapter 7, section 7.3, when discussing TAIR), the number of 
epistemic communities within which any one researcher can successfully move is limited – so limited, in 
fact, as to put the sustainability of integrated understanding in question.  
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overall quality of the understanding of biological phenomena obtained by communities 
focusing exclusively on theoretical or on embodied understanding. The theoretical 
understanding of evolving systems acquired by theoretical biologists could be viewed as 
very partial, since these researchers often have no idea of how their results could apply to 
actual phenomena: they use intellectual abstracting to such an extent that they lose a 
sense of how their models and theoretical knowledge could be matched to observations, 
measurements, statistics and other empirical data. Similar problems plague the field of 
natural history, which has lately lost much of its attractiveness precisely because it does 
not provide interpretive tools to make sense of the observed differences among organisms 
and among species.
236
 In both examples, researchers seeking either theoretical or 
embodied understanding seem to be missing out on something important. After all, 
biology is about the exploration as well as the analysis of phenomena: researchers who 
understand a phenomenon in one of these two ways should ideally strive to understand it 
also in the other, thus balancing the amount of theoretical and embodied knowledge used 
to this aim.  
 
Hence, at least in principle, it makes sense to identify integrated understanding as the 
kind of understanding that biologists should pursue in the long term, no matter their 
expertise and specific interests. Now the question becomes, can biologists actually pursue 
this type of understanding in practice? This brings me to tackle the second objection 
against integrated understanding. The extent to which an individual can master and 
combine skills and knowledge as diverse as required to obtain integrated understanding 
is, as I noted, extremely limited. At the level of the biological community as a whole, 
there is a sense in which specialisation in biology actually enhances the chance of 
obtaining an integrated understanding of phenomena. The division of labour in biology, 
as well as the critical discussions and controversies enabled by such epistemological 
pluralism, make it possible to acquire skills, commitments and knowledge that facilitate 
the integrated understanding of at least some biological phenomena and that could not 
have been acquired without such division of labour. For instance, consider micro arrays 
technology, which was initially developed by molecular biologists as a tool to store 
information: researchers in medicine found that they could use micro arrays to measure 
the susceptibility of genes to environmental conditions, thus enhancing medical 
understanding of the genetic basis of diseases. In this case, a tool developed thanks to the 
specific skills and specialised knowledge of one subfield is found to help researchers 
understand phenomena in another subfield. At the same time, understanding remains, in 
my account, a cognitive achievement by individuals. This means that, for integrative 
understanding to be achieved, individuals must exist that can master and apply all the 
relevant skills, commitments and knowledge accumulated in biology to understanding the 
phenomenon under scrutiny. This second step, the individual achievement of integrated 
understanding, is entirely dependent on the collective acquisition of relevant skills and 
tools
237
, yet it represents a different and more difficult stage of research. Integrated 
                                                
236
 Typically, observations gathered within natural history tend to become interesting only in the light of 
evolution (thus, through the disciplinary lenses of an evolutionary biologist).  
237
 My depiction of the role of a scientific community as a necessary, yet insufficient condition towards 
understanding a phenomenon in a scientific manner resonates with my account of social skills as necessary 
to the acquisition of theoretical and performative skills. It is the individual mastery of theoretical and 
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understanding cannot be distributed among members of a community, but needs to be 
acquired by an individual trained to integrate and skilfully apply the knowledge 
collectively accumulated by such community. 
 
Notably, the feasibility of acquiring an integrated understanding of a phenomenon 
depends strongly on the scale and complexity of the phenomenon itself. If dealing with a 
relatively simple and well-circumscribed phenomenon, it is within the reach of an 
individual to acquire the various skills, tools and commitments allowing him or her to 
understand that phenomenon in an integrated manner. A good example of this is provided 
by the field of evolutionary developmental biology (or ‘evo-devo’) This area constitutes a 
platform for peer-different collaboration between evolutionary, developmental and 
molecular biologists, leading participants to acquire the various skills required to obtain 
an integrated understanding of specific aspects of organismic development (most notably, 
the evolutionary history of epigenetic mechanisms
238
). This kind of understanding is also 
visible in the Arabidopsis community, where individuals such as Chris Somerville have 
assembled enough skills, knowledge and experience to understand some components of 
Arabidopsis biology in an integrated way. Somerville’s research focuses broadly on cell 
biology and more specifically on the role of the cell wall in cellular metabolism. To 
acquire an integrated understanding of this phenomenon, he studied various related 
aspects of plant physiology and microbiology, ranging from understanding how cellulose 
is made to studying the genetic basis for enzymes catalysing polysaccharides. Further, he 
developed techniques, instruments and databases that can be used to carry out such 
research, including ways of handling plants and cell samples (Somerville et al, 2004). 
The skills developed throughout his long career allow him to coordinate his extensive 
theoretical and embodied knowledge of Arabidopsis cell biology in order to obtain an 
integrated understanding of the cell wall (its structure, composition, biological 
significance and relation to other organs). 
 
Attempts to understand highly complex systems (e.g. a whole organism, an evolving 
population, an ecosystem) in an integrated manner prove to be much more ambitious and 
questionable than attempts to understand relatively self-contained phenomena such as 
cellular components or gene functions. In the former case, the skills and commitments 
needed to understand various aspects of the phenomenon in question are distributed 
among several research groups: there are very few individuals – possibly no one yet – 
who can acquire all these skills and commitments at the same time, so as to obtain an 
integrated understanding of the complex phenomenon under scrutiny. The Arabidopsis 
community constitutes an excellent case of a collective effort towards acquiring 
integrative understanding of a complex system. The founders of the Arabidopsis 
community, as well as many of its current members, have spent much thinking and 
                                                                                                                                            
performative skills that directly determines the quality of the understanding achieved by any one 
researcher; yet, no individual would master those skills to the extent required for this task, unless he or she 
was trained within a community of expert peers. 
238
 Müller and Newman (2003), for instance, have studied the early developmental history of multicellular 
organisms with the help of experimental research as well as highly theoretical digital and mathematical 
models. They thus acquired an integrated understanding of the developmental (epigenetic) mechanisms 
responsible for originating biological form, particularly in the case of limbs, body symmetries and 
segmented structures. 
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efforts towards devising ways to eventually obtain an understanding of Arabidopsis 
biology as a whole. Arabidopsis research, and particularly projects such as TAIR, thus 
provide a fitting context in which to examine the value, implications and results of a 
commitment to integration. It also exemplifies one way in which a large research 
community can help its members towards acquiring an integrated understanding of some 
given phenomena: that is, by striving to construct tools that facilitate the coordinated use 
of the different skills developed within different sections of the community. Since the 
early 1980s, Arabidopsis scientists have understood the importance of elaborating 
methods and tools to integrate knowledge.
239
 In other words, they have understood that 
integration in biology, especially in the form of what I call integrated understanding of 
phenomena, cannot happen purely through the accumulation of knowledge about 
different aspects of a phenomenon. Rather, it requires the construction of 
interdisciplinary tools and standards allowing individuals to acquire an integrative 
understanding without, however, losing the specialised information and perspective 
provided by their training in each participating sub-discipline. 
 
Let me illustrate this important point by reference to TAIR, a project that represents the 
pinnacle of scientific efforts towards integration within the Arabidopsis community. 
TAIR curators summarise their experience by indicating three conditions as essential to 
obtaining integration among Arabidopsis results:  
(a) the formulation of standardised concepts, such as the terms employed in the GO 
framework;   
(b) the provision of material tools for integration, such as the possibility to easily retrieve 
data about different aspects of Arabidopsis biology (through bioinformatics) and a 
facilitated access to plant specimens (provided through NASC);  
(c) a so-called ‘systems approach’
240
, which, in the words of Sue Rhee, implies that 
integration of knowledge about a phenomenon can be achieved only when working 
both on conceptual integrative tools (such as TAIR) and applied projects allowing 
researchers to experimentally manipulate a large variety of aspects of the plant – from 
the genotypic to the phenotypic.  
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 As we have seen, the community has been organised so as to encourage and enhance personal 
exchanges, peer-different collaboration and use of standardised tools (including the plants themselves). I 
have mentioned several advantages of such arrangements in previous chapters. Yet another one is the 
acquired ability to spot phenomena that are not yet being researched, either because no one noticed that no 
one else was doing it or because no one noticed their existence. According to all Arabidopsis researchers I 
interviewed, it is impossible to spot such grey areas without having a more systemic view of what goes on 
in Arabidopsis biology: both Chris Somerville and Sue Rhee argue that the concentration of research efforts 
on the same organism, joined with the commitments towards integrating knowledge about it, has propelled 
researchers in directions otherwise inconceivable. Further, they claim that the Arabidopsis research culture 
is itself changing. Thanks to the current degree of integration, it is now easier for researchers to move from 
one area of expertise to the next: they can branch out and do things that have not been tried before, rather 
than specialise in a single area. 
240
 I shall not refer here to the various perspectives, put forwards by both scientists and philosophers, of 
what ‘system biology’ is or should be. As illustrated by O’Malley and Dupré (2005), this topic is 
generating some of the hottest and most interesting controversies in contemporary biology: employing my 
ideas to address the details of this debate would require another dissertation. I shall therefore treat the idea 
of ‘system biology’ in its most basic characterisation.  
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The first two points, which I discussed at length in Chapters 5 and 6, can be rephrased as 
the conditions under which researchers can hone skills adequate to the integrated 
understanding of Arabidopsis biology: (a) concerns the intellectual tools needed to 
develop appropriate theoretical skills, while (b) takes care of the material settings 
required for biologists to learn how to manipulate models of the plant. Condition (c) is 
especially interesting for my purposes, as it suggests that integration might emerge only 
through the balanced coordination of theoretical and embodied knowledge – hence 
mirroring closely my own definition of how integrated understanding can be obtained. 
Remarkably, TAIR director Sue Rhee is one of a handful of Arabidopsis researchers who 
has actually tried to carry out both wide-ranging conceptual work (as Director of TAIR) 
and experimental work (on the molecular biology of cold acclimation in Arabidopsis, 
involving experiments on both the genomics and the ecology of the plant) at the same 
time and with the same degree of involvement. Her motivations for doing that reflect my 
own motivations for favouring integrated understanding: as she repeatedly stated to me, 
such a ‘system approach’ is the only way to effectively achieve integration, especially 
between studies of the microstructure and developmental mechanisms of the plant and 
research on its ecology and evolutionary history. Yet, Rhee also complained to me about 
how hard it was to keep up both expertises: in fact, she did not think that she would be 
able to pursue both to the same extent any longer. 
 
As I already remarked, the habit of carrying out both conceptual and experimental 
research is rarely sustainable by an individual within the highly fragmented, specialist 
cultures characterising biological research. Conforming to the third condition proposed 
by TAIR curators is thus only possible as a result of the distributed labour (and related 
understanding) by the whole Arabidopsis community. This resembles the vision proposed 
by Chris Somerville and his colleagues at the start of research on the weed. 
Understanding Arabidopsis biology would require recourse to all available tools for the 
study of a phenomenon, including all the theoretical knowledge accumulated on various 
aspects of a phenomenon, plus as many of the theoretical and performative skills 
currently available to the biologists studying it. Further, it involves reaching an awareness 
of how the many different results acquired on Arabidopsis biology might relate to each 
other: a form of integration that allows biologists to coordinate the various types of 
theoretical and embodied knowledge accumulated on the plant to obtain an overall 
understanding of its biology.  
 
This latter point constitutes, in my view, the greatest challenge to any research 
community aiming to acquire an integrated understanding of a complex phenomenon. 
Given the skills and commitments already distributed within the Arabidopsis community, 
the achievement of an integrated understanding of the plant (as in the goals put forward 
by MASC) is possible, at least in principle, and might be obtained in the future. However, 
such understanding is not yet available, precisely because Arabidopsis researchers still 
have to find ways to integrate these skills, competences, perspectives, and commitments 
without losing precious information.
241
 What individual Arabidopsis researchers need to 
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 Another great obstacle, already mentioned in section 7.3.2, is the increasing gap between over-
specialised and integration-oriented research, as exemplified here by the gap between TAIR generalists, or 
‘super-experts’, and Arabidopsis specialists. The challenge for researchers interested in integration is to 
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pursue, in order to acquire integrated understanding of Arabidopsis biology, is a kind of 
integration without unification: that is, a way to integrate knowledge that is respectful 
and receptive to the epistemological pluralism embodied by the several fields and 
competences involved in studying this plant. As I argued in Chapter 5, the TAIR project 
is far too dependent on a gene-centric perspective to allow for epistemological pluralism: 
in this sense, it does not fulfil the goals and values that motivated it in the first place. It 
could be said that TAIR models and databases achieve integration through unification 
around a specific theoretical framework, that is the GO network of concepts.
 242
 In so 
doing, they inevitably dismiss alternative frameworks emphasising other types of data 
and concepts, such as for instance data coming from ecology and comparative biology. 
 
Whether TAIR could actually be modified (and thus, according to my arguments here, 
improved) to encompass alternatives to GO remains an open question. TAIR researchers 
are responsive to critiques and in the future they could, if appropriately challenged by 
fellow biologists or complementary scientists, try to adopt a more inclusive approach. 
The problem is that, as the many groups of biologists working with different organisms 
and bio-ontologies know, there are no clear clues yet as to what such an inclusive 
approach would look like, or whether it would succeed. The production and use of bio-
ontologies for data storage and distribution is still in its infancy. It is simply too early to 
say whether bioinformatics could provide efficient ways to integrate knowledge, while 
still granting access to the richness of information and the plurality of perspectives 
developed in each biological subfield. It is not unreasonable to expect that bioinformatics 
could, one day, be used to maximise each researcher’s chance to understand complex 
phenomena in an integrated manner. This expectation is, however, unsubstantiated as yet: 
my analysis of TAIR demonstrates how far biologists are now from achieving integration 
without eliminating pluralism. 
 
Some philosophers of biology have argued that integration without unification is actually 
impossible to achieve, as integration will always imply a decrease in epistemological 
                                                                                                                                            
avoid transforming their interests into a specialisation of its own, which would not be accessible to 
specialists working on restricted aspects of biological phenomena. At the same time, integrative 
understanding is obtained through the sharing of skills and commitments: as long as many researchers 
remain interested only in acquiring a very narrow understanding of simple phenomena, they will not be 
committed to acquiring (the skills necessary to) a more integrated understanding.  
242
 This involves a re-assessment of what TAIR, as a service, can actually provide to its users. TAIR 
curators have been under the illusion (still mentioned in their funding applications) that TAIR could be 
used as a tool for discovery in biology, that is, it could provide an environment for testing the validity of 
experimental hypotheses without necessarily having to carry out experiments. According to TAIR curators, 
much experimental effort goes into discovering and/or testing connections between pathways, gene 
expression patterns at different loci and other compatible data sets: this effort could be much reduced by 
reference to TAIR, since the resource allows users to match their hypothesis against the huge amount of 
data contained in its databases. If this proposal is taken to imply that TAIR should substitute experimental 
work, I hope to have shown how untenable it is (Chapter 5): a fair amount of performative skills that are 
only acquired through experimental work are needed to interpret the significance of TAIR results for 
Arabidopsis biology. TAIR curators should therefore modify this suggestion by pointing to TAIR as a 
useful complement to experimental research, rather than a replacement for it. This idea is much more 
attractive, as TAIR could indeed save experimenters a lot of the work that usually goes into digging out 
relevant evidence and connecting it with results obtained by other researchers - which does not mean that it 
could, on its own, provide enough information to enable them to make new discoveries.  
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pluralism in any research programme. One such philosopher, Wim van der Steen, 
convincingly demonstrates that at least some attempts at integration are bound to be not 
only useless, but also damaging to research on biological phenomena (1993). He gives 
the example of the failed attempts to integrate physiological and psychological 
approaches to the phenomenon of stress in humans. He concludes: 
 
The field of stress research is actually a collection of loosely interconnected bits 
of natural history. The point is that stress stimuli, as stimuli, do not have anything 
in common beyond producing the same kinds of internal states and/or responses. 
That’s all there is to it. It makes no sense to try to develop general laws of stress. 
There is just a great diversity of phenomena producing the stress response, and we 
should appreciate diversity when we meet it, and not try to force it into a common 
mould (1993, 264). 
 
Van der Steen is here primarily concerned about the theoretical kind of integration 
sought by practitioners in stress research. As a conclusion to my discussion of integrated 
understanding, I want to emphasise two points in contrast with his claims. First, acquiring 
an integrative understanding need not necessarily include theoretical unification. Rather 
than trying to modify different theoretical insights to fit them all under the same 
framework, biologists seeking an integrated understanding might simply wish to learn 
how to use all of such insights at the same time in order to understand many different 
aspects of the phenomenon in question at once. In contrast with van der Steen, and in line 
with arguments put forward by Mitchell (2003) and Rose (1997), I thus maintain that 
integration in biology does not necessarily imply the unification of approaches used by 
different types of biologists under the same overall theory or perspective.
243
 The key to 
the success of a ‘system approach’ lies in its capacity to include as many perspectives and 
expertises as possible. Second, the extent to which integrative understanding proves 
valuable in scientific practice is unavoidably context-dependent. A unified theoretical 
understanding of stress might prove not only impossible to obtain, but also useless to 
researchers themselves: a case, as van der Steen notes, of ‘pseudo-integration’. However, 
an integrated understanding of stress, leading for instance to a standardised way to 
measure it, might be very helpful in a research context such as biomedical research, 
where the goal is not to obtain a unified theory of stress, but rather to develop better 
treatments for it, for instance by assessing whether tests and treatments advised by 
physicians and psychologists are compatible with each other. Depending on the goals and 
purposes of research, there are cases that demand, in the words of Richard Burian, ‘to 
seek a coherent account of the competing descriptions [of the same phenomenon] 
provided by the disciplines involved, laden with discipline-specific presuppositions and 
theoretical commitments’ (Burian 1993, 310). Integrative understanding of complex 
biological phenomena could therefore be held as a regulatory ideal for all branches of 
biology, while not necessarily constituting an explicit goal for all research projects 
independently of their contexts. Some branches of research indeed find it useful, in 
practice, to focus on specialised understandings achieved within single disciplines; other 
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 At least in principle, the coordination of different types of theoretical and embodied knowledge can be 
achieved without subsuming such knowledge under a unique framework, but rather by learning to use each 
perspective to gain a different understanding of the specific aspect of the phenomenon under scrutiny.   
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fields (or groups, as in the case of the Arabidopsis community) thrive, at least in part, 
thanks to their pursuit of integrative understanding. 
 
 
8.4 Final Reflections: Understanding Organisms in Complementary Biology 
 
As I pointed out throughout the text, the arguments presented in this thesis bear wide 
implications for general epistemology, the philosophy and history of biology and biology 
itself. In concluding, I would like to briefly discuss some of the research paths opened by 
my analysis. I start by sketching some foreseeable developments in philosophy. I then 
point to areas where collaboration between philosophers and biologists could encourage 
developments in the life sciences, thus pursuing the stance on ‘complementary science’ 
described in Chapter 4. My closing paragraphs are devoted to a specific instance of my 
work could contribute to current scientific debates: that is, the controversy over the use of 
‘virtual organisms’ in experimental biology. 
 
A large area for further philosophical research is related to one of my main claims about 
the nature of scientific understanding, that is, the pluralism in understandings of 
phenomena that might be acquired by different individuals through scientific research. It 
is evident from my account that the same biological phenomenon can be understood in a 
variety of ways, depending on the skills and commitments of the individual(s) involved. 
The issue then becomes, which type of understanding is best suited for which type of 
research? In particular, are there types of understanding (and thus specific combinations 
of skills and commitments) that are more valuable than others in the context of biological 
research? One way to investigate this crucial evaluative issue could be to construct a 
detailed taxonomy of scientific understandings and find criteria to establish how each of 
them fulfils different goals and interests (where these goals and interests can be scientific 
as well as economic, social or ethical, as for instance when acquiring a scientific 
understanding of stem cell research for the purpose of evaluating its ethical status). 
 
This could help to develop normative epistemological frameworks allowing to assess the 
quality of scientific understanding achieved in any given case, as well as, importantly, its 
relation to truth in science. I have argued that there is no straightforward link between the 
scientific understanding of a phenomenon and the truth-value of the theories used to 
understanding that phenomenon. Scientific understanding is the result of the tools, 
commitments and skills available to scientists at a particular point in time. Such tools are 
honed through constant negotiation with the material world, and are thus not simply the 
fruit of ‘cultural trends’ or ‘social settings’ (as radical social constructivists would like to 
believe). However, precisely because of the specificity of their context and of the 
motivations and interests guiding their use, these tools and commitments are fallible: they 
might lead to achieving ‘true’ understanding of the world, but they constitute no 
guarantee of such ‘true’ understanding. The precise nature of the link between acquiring 
scientific understanding of a phenomenon and acquiring ‘truthful’ understanding of that 
same phenomenon is left unclear in my account. What I hope to have offered is a 
framework to articulate further thoughts about the relation between truth and 
understanding, with the aim of outlining a conception of scientific understanding that is 
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not entirely dependent on the truth of the knowledge used to understanding, but rather 
incorporates the subjective perceptions, experiences and skills of the (fallible and 
gullible, yet determined) individuals attempting to ‘carve nature at its joints’. 
 
Such a normative view could be usefully employed in the context of debates concerning 
the role of expertise in peer-different collaboration among scientists, as well as in public 
deliberations about scientific results and their implications. For instance, consider my 
claim that, without adequate scientific training, lay people cannot hope to acquire a 
scientific understanding of Arabidopsis biology. This does not amount to declaring that 
they cannot evaluate the social implications of scientific findings in plant biology, nor 
that they would not acquire any understanding whatsoever from discussing with 
biologists or reading about such research. In fact, recognising the differences between 
scientific and other types of understanding allows to acknowledge the existence of 
inequalities in expertise that would, if ignored, seriously impair the possibility by 
different sectors of society to discuss and judge the findings and implications of 
biological research. These claims could be usefully pursued by reference to the excellent 
work on expertise and public deliberation available within the sociology of science, 
which I had to largely disregard for the purposes of this thesis. 
 
Further, an evaluative view on the quality of different scientific understandings of 
phenomena has the potential to inform several ongoing debates in contemporary biology, 
thus effectively allowing philosophers to act as complementary scientists in the sense 
proposed in Chapter 4. One of these debates concerns the elaboration of appropriate 
(institutional and intellectual) conditions for an integrative study of the biology of 
organisms. My critique of TAIR, pointing out the limits imposed by its reliance on a 
gene-centric perspective, exemplifies a way in which biological research focused on 
integration can be evaluated and possibly improved through philosophical analysis. 
Similarly, philosophers could help assessing how new disciplines such as bioinformatics 
and new approaches such as ‘system biology’ contribute, if at all, to an integrated 
understanding of organisms (both by scientists and by the general public). A 
complementary biologist can usefully identify the research commitments held by 
currently dominant views and propose viable alternatives. This is a way to enhance the 
variability of the perspectives and commitments informing the production and use of 
instruments, models and tools used in biological research - such as, in the case of model 
organism research, bio-ontologies. 
 
A second important debate centres on the role of model organisms in biological research. 
Given the importance of this debate in the context of my work on Arabidopsis, I wish to 
conclude by focusing more closely on how my results could inform further reflection on 
the use of animals, plants and micro-organisms in research. Especially in view of the new 
technologies recently emerged as a crutch to more traditional experimental biology, such 
reflection is needed both at the epistemological and at the ethical level. Arguably, as I 
claimed in Chapter 6, experimental research on actual organisms cannot be substituted 
with research on virtual models of organisms without substantial changes in the 
theoretical and embodied knowledge acquired by biologists conducting the investigation. 
In contexts such as biomedical research, there is little justification for resorting to 
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research methods and tools granting less information about (and possibly a worse 
understanding of) the phenomena under scrutiny than others. Hence, it could be argued 
that the proposal, by several prominent scientists, to build ‘virtual organisms’ as a 
substitute for real ones in experiments, is misguided. Remarkably, one of the advocates of 
this position is Chris Somerville himself, who talks about expanding TAIR until it 
constitutes a ‘meta-plant’, that is, an ensemble of models and data that can simulate the 
actual plant in all respects. This virtual plant would not only be serving the same role as 
actual Arabidopsis plants in laboratories; it would also represent an integration of the 
knowledge we possess about plants in general. The knowledge gathered around the plant 
could be used by people working on any other plant as a point of reference for 
comparisons and the identification of similarities and differences. In short, knowledge 
about Arabidopsis gathered in the virtual model would become the rule of thumb for 
assessing diversity among plants (and organisms in general). The virtual plant would then 
serve as (1) a heuristic tool to find gaps in knowledge; (2) a tool for discovery; (3) and a 
‘virtual organism’ for testing.  
 
This suggestion is fascinating to scientists, scientific sponsors and interested citizens 
alike, for different reasons - for instance, the promise of cheaper, faster and more 
efficient ways of conducting research
244
 and the possibility to avoid torturing animals or 
even humans (as in particularly risky clinical trials) – which also implies no need for 
ethical restrictions on research. I remain, however, highly sceptical of this project for a 
number of reasons. First of all, the idea that virtual organisms could substitute 
experiments on actual organisms is preposterous. Manipulating an actual organism 
provides different kinds of information from the manipulation of a digital one. Virtual 
organisms can certainly play a heuristic role in experimental biology, thus 
complementing research on real animals; however, they can hardly be treated as tools for 
discovery and exploration of phenomena, and much less as a substitute for knowledge 
gathered through actual experiments. Second, the appealing idea that this procedure 
would be more convenient and efficient than actual experimentation is also dubious. The 
production of virtual models of organisms, especially at this level of complication, is 
extremely expensive, both for the producers of the model and for its users, who have to 
acquire equipment and skills adequate to the task. Further, running such complex models 
and simulations is likely to become slower, the more complex the system under 
examination. Climate modeling constitutes a good example of what happens to models 
that become extremely complex: it can literally take months to run one programme or 
query. Finally, the efficiency of these models can be questioned, precisely because of the 
inherent risk of bringing all available knowledge of an organism under the same 
theoretical perspective (as in TAIR). This would result in a substantial reduction of the 
diversity and richness of approaches used to study organisms, with a consequent loss in 
integrated understanding of their functioning. 
 
This brief discussion of the role of virtual and actual organisms in experimental biology 
exemplifies some of the ways in which a philosophical analysis of contemporary 
biological practices may help to address questions that are very much alive in the 
sciences themselves. Writing in such a ‘complementary science’ mode also generates 
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 I thank John Duprè for stimulating my thinking in this direction.  
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potential constraints to my analysis. One of them is that my discussion of understanding 
in Arabidopsis research is at least partially dependent on current developments and trends 
in plant biology. Indeed, it is most likely that Arabidopsis will soon cease to have such a 
central role as model for the whole of plant biology. As knowledge about other plants 
(tobacco, maize, yeast are just some examples) increases, biological research will start 
focusing more on the diversity among organisms rather than their common mechanisms 
and structures, thus increasingly debilitating the credibility of Arabidopsis as 
representative of so diverse a group of organisms. The future of Arabidopsis as a model 
organism almost certainly involves shifts to more comparative approaches to plant 
biology, which might have interesting implications for a philosophical analysis of 
biological understanding as well as of ways to integrate biological knowledge across 
different organisms. This said, I do not believe that these shifts will cause my analysis to 
become invalid or pointless. The recent history of Arabidopsis research constitutes a 
significant exemplar for modes of research, organisational structures and styles of 
reasoning that characterise biology at the turn of the 21
st
 millennium. These modes, 
structures and styles keep changing, as they did throughout the history of science so far. 
The way in which individual scientists understand the world might change accordingly, 
and it will be the job of complementary scientists to trace and discuss these new patterns.  
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Glossary 
 
ABRC Arabidopsis Biological Resource Centre (American stock centre for 
Arabidopsis specimens) 
AGI Arabidopsis Genome Initiative (international project that successfully 
sequenced the Arabidopsis genome) 
Annotation attribution of properties (such as history, expression, function,  
localisation, keywords, etc.) to an object. In TAIR: the manual selection 
(by a curator) of data and references relative to a specific gene or pathway 
to be inserted in the database 
AraCyc visualisation tool for biochemical pathways 
AtDB  Arabidopsis thaliana database (predecessor of TAIR in the 1990s) 
Curator biologist in charge of annotating biological data into a database (mostly 
involved both with setting-up relevant representations and with manually 
annotating each set of data) 
DAG directed acyclic graph used in object-oriented Java software  
Developer IT programmer assisting curators in developing and maintaining the  
software needed by model organism databases 
EBI  European Bioinformatics Institute 
FlyBase international database for Drosophila melanogaster 
GMOD Generic Model system Database 
GMOs  genetically modified organisms 
GO  Gene Ontology 
GOC  Gene Ontology Consortium 
MASC Multinational Arabidopsis Steering Committee, coordinating international 
research on Arabidopsis 
MetaCyc TAIR tool for the visualisation of information about Arabidopsis 
metabolism 
MIPS  Munich Information Centre for Protein Sequences 
NASC Nottingham Arabidopsis Stock Centre (main stock centre in Europe) 
NIH  National Institute for Health (USA) 
NSF  National Science Foundation (USA) 
Object  what data-types refer to (e.g. genes, markers, sequences, maps) 
OBO  Open Biological Ontologies 
PATO  Plant Attribute Trait Ontology  
PI  Principal Investigator (head of laboratory/project in the life sciences) 
POC  Plant Ontology Consortium 
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TAB   The Arabidopsis Book 
TAIR  The Arabidopsis Information Resource 
TIGR  The Institute for Genomics Research (Rockville, Maryland)  
2010 NSF-sponsored ‘Project 2010’ encompassing all current research on  
Arabidopsis Functional Genomics 
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Hoe Biologen Tot Begrijpen Komen: 
Onderzoek aan het Modelorganisme Arabidopsis thaliana  
 
Nederlandse Samenvatting  
 
 
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit een epistemologische analyse van noodzakelijke voorwaarden 
om fenomenen wetenschappelijk te begrijpen, waarbij ik de nadruk leg op de 
levenswetenschappen. Twee begrippen, al te vaak onder één noemer geschaard in de 
wetenschapsfilosofie, worden onder handen genomen en hun onderlinge verschillen 
worden belicht: begrijpen en verklaren. Onder welke voorwaarden leren mensen 
wetenschappelijke verklaren te gebruiken, teneinde een natuurlijk fenomeen te begrijpen?  
Wat speelt er bij wetenschappelijk inzicht en het verwerven ervan? 
 
Mijn vertrekpunt bij het behandelen van deze vragen is een nauwgezette historische en 
sociologische studie van de wetenschappelijke praktijk die het onderzoek aan 
Arabidopsis thaliana (zandraket) kenmerkt, een duinplantje dat het geschopt heeft tot 
prominent modelorganisme binnen de biologie. Ik bestudeer de procedures, modellen, 
theorieën en de infrastructuur die specifieke groepen Arabidopsisonderzoekers gebruiken 
om biologische vraagstukken op te lossen. De relevantie van Arabidopsis als 
modelorganisme stoelt voornamelijk op het gebruik ervan in interdisciplinair onderzoek 
in vele takken van de levenswetenschappen. Mijn reconstructie van de geschiedenis en 
sociologie van het onderzoek aan Arabidopsis dient als een empirische voor een 
filosofische bezinning over de wijze waarop deze plant wordt gebruikt door 
wetenschappers om biologische fenomenen op te helderen. Activiteiten zoals het 
manipuleren van verscheidene fysieke zowel als conceptuele modellen van Arabidopsis 
zijn cruciaal om de kennis te doorgronden die ontleend is aan de studie van deze plant. 
Zulke modelleeractiviteiten vereisen verschillende specifieke epistemische vaardigheden 
en ‘research commitments’, afhankelijk van de materiële eigenschappen van de modellen 
in kwestie en van hun representatieve functie binnen een gegeven onderzoekscontext. 
Ieder individu in de Arabidopsisgemeenschap bezit vermoedelijk een verschillende 
combinatie van relevante vaardigheden en ‘commitments’, en ik argumenteer dat dit de 
kwaliteit van hun begrip bepaalt. 
 
Ik richt de aandacht op het geheel van vaardigheden en ‘commitments’ die 
Arabidopsiswetenschappers verwerven door drie types van ervaring: intellectuele, 
waaronder het formuleren van theorieën en verklaringen voor natuurlijke fenomenen en 
het redeneren aan de hand van concepten; materiële, die betrekking heeft op het opstellen 
van en tussenkomen in proefnemingen omtrent het fenomeen in kwestie; en sociale, die 
volgt uit het feit dat de individuele onderzoeker zowel afhangt van als bijdraagt aan een 
of meerdere onderzoeksgemeenschappen die een deel van diens onderzoeksinteresses 
delen. De sociale context waarbinnen inzicht tot stand komt is essentieel om het als 
‘wetenschappelijk’ te kunnen bestempelen, aangezien de persoonlijke ervaring van het 
begrijpen wordt omgezet in een overdraagbare, gedeelde ervaring doordat het individu 
deel uitmaakt van een of meerdere wetenschappelijke gemeenschappen. Mijn studie van 
de biologische praktijk laat mij toe om een filosofische beschouwing uit te werken over 
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wetenschappelijk inzicht als een onafwendbaar pluralistische, persoonlijke ervaring die 
steunt op specifieke sociale, intellectuele en materiële omstandigheden. De focus op 
hedendaags biologisch onderzoek illustreert hoe de kijk van een bioloog op de wereld 
gevormd wordt door de vaardigheden en ‘commitments’ die hij verworven heeft door 
specifieke praktijkervaring.  
 
Daarom stel ik een beeld voor van wetenschappelijk begrijpen als een cognitieve 
verworvenheid die volgt uit een doelmatige volbrenging van specifieke taken, zodat er tot 
verschillende interpretaties van eenzelfde fenomeen gekomen wordt door onderzoekers 
met verschillende epistemische vaardigheden en ‘research commitments’. Er is een 
verscheidenheid aan manieren waarop individuen hun capaciteit voor wetenschappelijk 
begrijpen verwerven, die daardoor verscheidene vormen kan aannemen als gevolg van de 
werktuigen aangewend tijdens het proces. In het geval van biologisch inzicht zal deze 
capaciteit afhangen van de benodigde achtergrondkennis die de individuele onderzoeker 
heeft opgedaan, tezamen met zijn of haar expertise in het hanteren van instrumenten, 
modellen en theorieën die het opstellen en toepassen van wetenschappelijke verklaringen 
toelaten. Het vereist ook de benodigde sociale vaardigheden om effectief te interageren 
met andere wetenschappers, om bijvoorbeeld de eigen onderzoeksresultaten te 
verspreiden en hun belang te beoordelen zowel in het licht van persoonlijke ervaring als 
langs de meetstaf van de relevante onderzoeksgemeenschap. Uit de toegankelijkheid van 
kennis volgt niet automatisch dat de gebruiker bewust is hoe deze kennis moet 
geinterpreteerd worden en hoe ze kan toegepast worden, dit bewustzijn moet daarentegen 
opgebouwd worden door jaren van training in specifieke wijzen van denken en handelen.  
Dat inzicht leidt mij tot de conclusie dat de capaciteit voor wetenschappelijk begrijpen 
een noodzakelijke voorwaarde is voor wetenschappelijke kennis; met andere woorden, in 
een wetenschappelijke context is het niet toelaatbaar dat een persoon zegt dat hij of zij 
een specifiek fenomeen ‘kent’, wanneer die persoon geen wetenschappelijke verklaring 
kan gebruiken om het fenomeen in kwestie te begrijpen.   
 
Teneinde de wijdlopende draden van filosofisch, historisch en sociologisch materiaal tot 
een samenhangende analyse te weven, is dit proefschrift georganiseerd langs een lijn van 
toenemende complexiteit. Elk hoofdstuk bouwt verder op de voorgaande zodat de 
verschillende aspecten van mijn argumentatie een voor een belicht worden, waardoor ik 
hun filosofische betekenis en implicaties kan bespreken voor de eigenschappen en 
processen die het onderzoek aan Arabidopsis kenmerken. 
 
Hoofdstuk 1 introduceert mijn onderwerp en de vragen die ik behandel in deze thesis, en 
wordt gevolgd door drie hoofdstukken die de filosofische, historische en 
methodologische basis van mijn argumentatie introduceren en rechtvaardigen. Hoofdstuk 
2 presenteert het filosofische kader voor mijn analyse, te beginnen met een overzicht van 
het hedendaagse filosofische debat over het onderscheid tussen verklaren en begrijpen. 
Mijn startpunt hier is Henk de Regts visie hoe de relatie tussen deze twee begrippen moet 
omschreven worden. Vervolgens bekijk ik de biologie van dichterbij en bespreek ik twee 
van haar kenmerken die ik van belang acht in een studie van het begrijpen: het pluralisme 
dat zowel theorieën als modellen kenmerkt, en wat ik de ‘tweeledige natuur’ van 
biologische kennis noem. Dit laatste omvat theoretische kennis (ondermeer datgene wat 
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meestal gezien wordt als de inhoud van kennis, dat wat we beschouwen als feiten, 
theorieën, verklaringen en concepten over fenomenen die niet afhangen van specifieke 
procedures of interacties) en belichaamde kennis (die bestaat uit een bewustzijn van de 
benodigde handelswijzen en redeneervormen voor het uitvoeren van wetenschappelijk 
onderzoek). Binnen deze context geef ik een eerste definitie van het wetenschappelijke 
begrijpen als de cognitieve verworvenheid die bereikbaar is voor individuele 
wetenschappers, afhankelijk van hun bekwaamheid in het coördineren van theoretische 
en belichaamde kennis over een specifiek fenomeen. Doorheen Hoofdstukken 5, 6 en 7  
geef ik illustraties van deze definitie en diep ik haar verder uit, om haar tenslotte in 
Hoofdstuk 8 een systematische behandeling te geven. Ik sluit het tweede hoofdstuk af met 
het voorstellen en bespreken van die elementen uit de sociale epistemologie die relevant 
zijn voor mijn onderzoek naar het vormen van individueel begrip door deelname aan een 
of meerdere onderzoeksgemeenschappen. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 3 schets ik de historische en sociale context van mijn onderzoek. Na een 
korte bespreking van ‘onderzoek aan modelorganismen’ in de biologie, belicht ik de 
oorsprong en ontwikkeling van de gemeenschap van onderzoekers die met Arabidopsis 
werken. Vervolgens bespreek ik de structuur en de doelstellingen die de gemeenschap 
heden ten dage heeft, en bestudeer ik nauwgezet welke sociale en wetenschappelijke 
rollen vervuld worden door twee onderzoeksgroepen waar het merendeel van mijn 
analyse zich op toespitst. De eerste is The Arabidopsis Information Resource [TAIR], 
ondergebracht bij het Carnegie Institute for Plant Biology in Stanford (VS).  
Dit onderzoeksteam is belast met het opzetten van digitale databanken die (1) alle 
beschikbare gegevens over Arabidopsis toegankelijk zouden moeten maken voor 
geïnteresseerde onderzoekers, en (2) werktuigen zouden moeten aanreiken waarmee deze 
uiteenlopende gegevens kunnen samengesmeed worden, teneinde tot een geïntegreerd 
begrip van de biologie van Arabidopsis te komen. De tweede groep beheert het 
Nottingham Arabidopsis Stock Centre [NASC] vanuit de Universiteit van Nottingham 
(GB), waar verschillende types van Arabidopsis worden gecatalogeerd, gecultiveerd, 
bewaard en verspreid onder wetenschappers die ze gebruiken als modelorganisme. 
Hoofdstuk 4 dient ter introductie en verdediging van mijn onderzoekswijze, die ik onder 
de noemer ‘geschiedenis, filosofie en sociologie van wetenschap en technologie’ plaats, 
in het licht van de filosofische en historische elementen die in de voorgaande 
hoofdstukken voorbij kwamen. Vertrekkende vanuit een discussie over de betekenis van 
het gebruik van case studies in het onderzoeken van algemene filosofische kwesties, 
bespreek ik de beweegredenen en bezorgdheden waar mijn onderzoek uit volgde, en 
breng ze in verband met de onderzoeksmethode die ik koos. Zoals ik in dit hoofdstuk 
benadruk, hoop ik dat dit onderzoek interessant is zowel voor de wetenschapsfilosofen en 
–historici als voor biologen met een filosofische inslag (zoals de vele wetenschappers die 
mij geholpen hebben door mij toegang te verlenen tot hun proefruimtes, personeel en 
gedachten over onderzoek aan Arabidopsis). In die geest neem ik de kijk op 
‘complementaire wetenschap’ over van Hasok Chang zoals hij die recent introduceerde, 
en breid ik deze uit door te stellen dat wetenschapsgeschiedenis en –filosofie kunnen en 
moeten trachten ons begrip van de wereld te verbeteren, zodat ze een goed deel van de 
doelstellingen en waarden van de natuur- en sociale wetenschappen delen. 
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Hoofdstukken 5, 6 en 7 vormen de centrale argumentatie van dit proefschrift. Elk bekijkt 
een ander aspect van biologisch inzicht van naderbij, geïllustreerd aan de hand van 
onderzoek aan Arabidopsis. Hoofdstukken 5 en 6 staan uitgebreid stil bij de rol in het 
begrijpen van biologische fenomenen dewelke gespeeld wordt door twee types van 
epistemische vaardigheden, die ik theoretisch en uitvoerend noem. Hoofdstuk 5 richt zich 
op de onderzoekspraktijk binnen TAIR, die bestaat uit het vervaardigen van databanken 
die zoveel mogelijk beschikbare gegevens over Arabidopsis kunnen visualiseren. Ik toon 
aan dat zowel het ontwerp als het gebruik van dergelijke gegevensbanken 
noodzakelijkerwijze refereert aan een theoretisch kader, in casu het netwerk van 
concepten dat de TAIR onderzoekers gebruiken om de gegevens te structureren. Ik 
betoog dat dit netwerk van concepten dat biologen duiden met het woord ‘bio-ontologie’ 
geen neutraal hulpmiddel is voor het verpreiden van gegevens uit experimenten. Het 
representeert veeleer een nieuw type van theorie in de biologie, die biologische betekenis 
kleeft aan gegevens tegelijk met het beschikbaar stellen ervan. De bespreking van bio-
ontologieën leidt mij tot het onderscheiden van de twee genoemde types van 
vaardigheden bij de onderzoekers, waardoor ik de schijnwerper kan richten op het feit dat 
Arabidopsisonderzoekers die verschillende vaardigheden gebruiken tot een verschillend 
begrip kunnen komen van eenzelfde fenomeen. Deze bewering wordt uitgewerkt in 
Hoofdstuk 6, waarin ik de werkzaamheden bespreek van NASC onderzoekers bij het 
produceren van Arabidopsis specimens verspreiding onder laboratoria over de gehele 
wereld. Ik stel dat zowel TAIR als NASC met succes modellen maken van veldstammen 
van Arabidopsis: in het eerste geval bestaan deze modellen uit beelden van de biologie 
van de plant, in het tweede geval uit fysieke organismen met eigenschappen die gekozen 
en aangepast zijn om aan de eisen van de proefnemers te voldoen. De belangrijke 
verschillen in de benodigde vaardigheden om te werken met deze twee soorten van 
modellen komen naar voren bij een vergelijking van de vervaardiging en het gebruik van 
beide. Door een analyse van de wijze waarop deze modellen geabstraheerd worden uit 
respectievelijk gegevensverzamelingen over en daadwerkelijke exemplaren van 
Arabidopsis, kan ik uitweiden over de manier waarop de onderzoeker een samenspel van 
theoretische en uitvoerende vaardigheden kan gebruiken om met deze modellen zijn of 
haar begrip van de biologie te vergroten. 
 
Hoofdstuk 7 voegt een essentieel niveau van complexiteit toe aan de analyse tot dusver, 
door de sociale dynamiek rondom het Arabidopsisonderzoek te bespreken. Ik typeer de 
Arabidopsisgemeenschap als een geval van gecentraliseerde Big Science, en analyseer 
het effect dat deze institutionele structuur heeft op het verwerven en verspreiden van 
wetenschappelijk begrip in deze gemeenschap. In het bijzonder maak ik een lijst van 
sociale vaardigheden die ik noodzakelijk acht om de biologie van Arabidopsis te 
begrijpen, in zoverre dat ze toegang verlenen tot de theoretische en uitvoerende 
vaardigheden nodig voor het uitvoeren en delen van onderzoek met collega’s. 
Ik toon ook aan dat aandacht voor deze vaardigheden complementair kan zijn voor 
bestaande benaderingen van sociale epistemologie in de wetenschap, waarbij het 
‘kritisch-contructieve empirisme’ van Helen Longino het meest voor de hand ligt. 
  
Hoofdstuk 8 tenslotte presenteert de epistemologische conclusies die ik trek uit mijn 
analyse van hoe het handig gebruikmaken van theorieën, modellen en door de 
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gemeenschap gedeelde bronnen de Arabidopsiswetenschappers toelaat om hun begrip 
van de plantkunde te vergroten. Ik duid op de sterke band tussen de vaardigheden van 
onderzoekers en de verbintenissen die ze aangaan,  voor zover het handelingen en 
overtuigingen betreft waarbij hun kennis en vaardigheden een rol spelen. Daarna 
beschouw ik drie grote types van biologisch inzicht in een fenomeen die alle drie volgen 
uit specifieke combinaties van vaardigheden en ‘commitments’ die onderzoekers 
gebruiken om hun theoretische en belichaamde kennis van dat fenomeen met elkaar in 
overeenstemming te brengen: theoretisch, belichaamd en geïntegreerd begrijpen. Het 
bestuderen van de epistemische rol van geïntegreerd begrip blijkt vooral interessant in 
verband met de pogingen die momenteel ondernomen worden meerdere biologische 
onderzoeksgebieden te fuseren of integreren, om tot een ‘volledig’ begrijpen van een 
organisme te komen. Tot besluit haal ik mijn methodologische insteek weer naar voren, 
in verband met complementaire wetenschap zoals voorgesteld in Hoofdstuk 4, en ik 
bespreek een aantal manieren waarop mijn onderzoek over begrip een impact kan hebben 
op de dagelijkse biologische praktijk.  
 
